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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis focuses on the renovation and regeneration projects, and also on the 
gentrification concept in the historic neighbourhoods of Istanbul. Exploring the 
complex and diverse relationship of economic change, housing markets, property 
and land ownership, the state leading to gentrification and why in certain cities 
gentrification occurs after renovation and regeneration projects are the main aspects 
of the present study. Another pivotal point of this thesis is to move away from the 
well-known subjects of global North when it comes to study of gentrification. This 
thesis does not claim that the global North urban theories are not applicable in global 
South, but it aims to expand the limited sites in which the urban theory is produced 
by moving towards the geographies with a new set of cities. To investigate these 
points, world city theory and processes of gentrification are examined in the first 
part of the thesis. In the second part of the thesis, research motivation, research aims, 
research questions and research methods are investigated. In the third and last part of 
the thesis, changes in Turkish economic and housing system are studied to 
understand the dynamics that affect Istanbul.  Particular attention is provided to the 
gentrified neighbourhoods in the historic part of Istanbul. Before the 2000s, 
gentrification through private housing market was the case in Istanbul, but from the 
2000s state-led gentrification started to become more common. The reason behind 
the increase of state intervention and involvement in gentrification from the 2000s 
represent a key aspect to the study. Lastly, in this part, Galata and Tarlabasi case 
studies and analysis of these case studies are discussed with regard to the 
abstractions used in the thesis.  
In the conclusion, state’s role in “renovating” the historic neighbourhoods of 
Istanbul and the possible future paths for the historic environment of Istanbul are 
explored in relation to the developing countries’ world cities literature. This thesis 
aims to provide an alternative to the gentrification and regeneration processes in 
developing countries’ big cities with respect to the historic environment.    
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
 “We are making Istanbul more beautiful by demolishing it” 
The Mayor of Istanbul (Topbas, 14 April 2005, Hurriyet) 
 
 
The aim of this research is to explore the relationships between economic change, 
housing markets, property and land ownership, and the state which leads to the 
gentrification of historic inner areas of Istanbul, and to explore how poor inhabitants 
of those areas might be enabled to stay in their homes rather than being displaced. 
This research has two motivations: political and intellectual. The first is political: I 
am concerned by the way the national and local governments have been treating the 
working class people living in these historic neighbourhoods. I was dricen to explore 
tis topic by people being displaced, mostly against their will, being unease at the 
government’s methods of achieving this, and the destruction of some of the 
historical heritage of Istanbul.  
My second motivation is intellectual: I want to understand the processes that are 
leading to gentrification in Istanbul, to explain what is happening, how and why. I 
take a critical realist approach to this study because critical realism asserts that 
deeper processes affect concrete cases and these abstract processes, not immediately 
visible, are necessary to explain reality. For this reason, I have investigated the 
deeper processes that affect the concrete cases investigated in this research, such as 
the importance of historical and spatial context, and have observed economic change 
in the process of gentrification. The wider, time-dependent context involves 
economic, social and political processes, different geographical scales and long-term 
history. What happens in the historic neighbourhoods of Istanbul cannot be 
understood without a broader context that includes economic power, historical 
context and various spatial scales.  
Accordingly, in the conduct of this research, two major global processes were 
examined: world city theory and gentrification. Since the 1980s, the study of cities 
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has been strongly connected to understanding of the world economy; that is, world 
city theory provides a spatial perspective on the economy (Friedmann, 1986:69).   
This theory is a framework for research and a starting point for political inquiry into 
big cities. World city theory provides us with an understanding of what is happening 
in major cities of the world and the economic and political conflicts in these cities, 
and this theory can suggest the common features of world cities in the international 
system of market relations (Friedmann, 1986:69). In world cities, economic changes, 
including increases in finance and business services (FBS) sectors, increases in 
employment in the management and finance sectors, high wage employment and 
increases in upmarket consumer services (Sassen, 2001), have brought a new kind of 
culture to urban areas, with associated changes in consumer preferences. 
Professionals working in these sectors and expressing the new cultures and 
consumer demands have driven gentrification. 
Gentrification – the transformation of a working class area into middle-class 
residential – is one of the most popular topics of urban inquiry (Lees et al., 2008). In 
the global West, the process of gentrification is generally considered to have started 
in the 1960s, and most studies have been about developed countries. It has been an 
important phenomenon since the 1980s, but it has not been commonly associated 
with the growth of finance and business services in the literature. Since the 1970s, 
manufacturing production moved out of, or to the peripheries of, the big cities in 
developed countries, employment in manufacturing  decreased in the city centres 
and inner cities while employment in finance and business services increased 
dramatically, contributing the gentrification process. Professionals started to live in 
the city centre and inner city, transforming neighbourhoods to fit their needs and 
tastes. In Less Developed Countries (LDCs), market-led gentrification started to 
become common only after the 1980s; however, state-led gentrification became 
more common in LDCs than More Developed Countries (MDCs). 
In this research, two kinds of gentrification are explored: gentrification through the 
private housing market and state-led gentrification. Gentrification through the 
private housing market, in other words, market-led or ‘classical’ gentrification, 
started in the 1960s when middle class people bought and renovated flats and houses 
in previously working class neighbourhoods located in the inner city. State-led 
gentrification, on the other hand, results from a state-induced urban ‘renovation’ or 
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‘regeneration’ project and may lead to similar effect that market-led gentrification 
have such as displacement, social polarization and damage to the historical 
environment; however, in state-led gentrification, these effects are more visible and 
the displacement process tends to be more brutal. In addition, damage to historical 
environment is larger compared to market-led gentrification. State-led gentrification 
is more common in developing countries and has been less well studied. This thesis 
aims to fill a gap in the research into gentrification processes in a large city in a 
developing country: Istanbul in Turkey.   
In addition, this thesis aims to respond several calls (Lees, 2012; Roy, 2009; 
Robinson, 2011; Slater, 2015; Gertner, 2015; Lopes-Morales, 2015) to expand the 
set of cities in gentrification studies with a specific importance given to cities of the 
‘global South’. Most of the time, explanations and examples of processes of 
gentrification have been from the Western Europe and Northern America. In the 
developing part of the world or as some scholars (Lees et al., 2015; Islam and 
Sakizlioglu, 2015; Roy, 2009; Merrifield, 2014) call it ‘the Global south’, this 
dominantly Anglo-American concept has been borrowed and used to explain the 
gentrification process in developing cities. Istanbul, as a developing country world 
city, is no exception. Gentrification research in Turkey started in the early 1980s and 
mostly consisted of historical neighbourhoods experiencing gentrification through 
private housing markets. This Anglo-American understanding of the concept of 
gentrification has been an important tool to understand the processes in Istanbul. The 
reason for that is because typical gentrification examples in Istanbul show the ‘main’ 
principles of the gentrification concept. This thesis claims that the global North 
urban theories are applicable in the global South to a certain degree, but it aims to 
expand the limited sites in which the urban theory is produced by moving towards 
the geographies with a new set of cities.  
Changes in the locational preferences of middle class people from suburban living to 
previously working class inner city areas have driven processes of gentrification. 
Gentrification is more than the accumulation of capital in housing; it is also affected 
by housing preferences and shifts in social dynamics. The argument of this thesis is 
that the shift in social dynamics that leads to state-led gentrification in developing 
countries is related to the expanding employment in the finance and business 
services (FBS) sectors, media, cultural industries and tourism.  
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The FBS have produced increases in upmarket consumer services (Sassen, 2001). 
Professionals’ consumer preferences have been different from those of the suburban 
middle class, being particularly interested in the cultural and entertainment amenities 
in a ‘vibrant’ environment. Consumer services such as entertainment, hotels, 
elements of tourism, eating and drinking establishments, and personal services are 
mostly located in the central business district (CBD). With the change in consumer 
habits, the growth in upmarket consumption in the central city, especially in world 
cities, has increased dramatically. 
In an environment where states promote gentrification and upmarket consumption to 
secure their cities’ places in the world cities hierarchy, old and historic buildings 
have started to become more popular and this had two outcomes:  profiting from 
historical and cultural heritage and using this heritage as sign of social status (Enlil, 
2000). First, “selling the city” through the renovation and re-use of the historic 
buildings became important to attract tourists to the cities. Secondly, young 
professionals started to see living in the historic environment as a privilege that only 
they should have because they thought of themselves as better custodians of this 
historical and cultural heritage than the rest of the population. While the upper class 
was increasingly living their lives in gated communities, professionals chose to live 
closer to cultural activities and in culturally and architecturally significant buildings. 
For that reason, they renovated the old buildings and started to gentrify these areas.  
In the 1990s, the gentrification process in Istanbul was through the private housing 
market without direct state intervention, but by the 2000s, state-led gentrification 
became increasingly common. To be able to explore this change, my research has 
been conducted in the historic neighbourhoods of Istanbul. Some of these areas have 
been exposed to gentrification through the housing market without state intervention 
and some to state-led gentrification that has taken place through an urban renovation 
project.  One reason for this change is the state’s aims to turn Istanbul into a world 
city and to attract foreign urban investment that will integrate the city into the global 
economy. Urban renovation and regeneration projects followed by state-led 
gentrification are used by the state as a strategy to accelerate the process of 
transformation of the central city, attract local and international investment and 
attract middle and upper class people to the central neighbourhoods while pushing 
poor, working class inhabitants to the periphery.  
5	  
	  
One of the dynamics of these urban renovation and gentrification processes is the 
presence of one powerful party in the Parliament. The ability of the Justice and 
Development Party (JDP) to change regulations and laws without the necessity of 
consulting other political parties or public opinion has led to a concentration and 
centralization of power (Turkun, 2011). In particular, in recent years, most of the 
laws concerning urban space have been enacted in order to remove potential 
obstacles to neo-liberal urban policies. At the same time, important state institutions, 
such as the Mass Housing Development Administration (MHDA) and the 
Privatization Administration, have been strengthened to enable the actualization of 
big urban projects. Although the Privatization Administration and some other state 
institutions have considerable influence, the major institution in question is the 
MHDA (Turkun, 2011), the capabilities and power of which have been greatly 
increased since 2003.  
The authorities are, in addition, targeting their urban regeneration or renewal efforts 
at the older historic urban centres that have become heavily populated by the urban 
poor. Historic but deprived parts of Istanbul’s city centre have been the focus of 
attention in recent years by private developers and the local and national state, and 
many urban renovation projects are taking place in these areas. Once a renovation 
project is completed, most of the current inhabitants are displaced because state and 
private developers want to sell the residences to people who can pay a high price. 
These urban renovation projects followed by gentrification are not in the interests of 
the current inhabitants. There is no real concern for improving the neighbourhood 
for them or for what will happen to them after they have been displaced from their 
homes. In some cases, the state is moving them to the periphery of the city, which 
worsens their standard of living and burdens them with additional commuting costs 
since most of them work in the city centre, and amenities and services such as 
hospitals are also located in the central city.  The former residents thus are excluded 
from the central city and become even poorer. 
As mentioned earlier, I do not agree with the gentrification processes – in particular 
state-led gentrification – in Istanbul. My political motivation in this thesis to point 
out the brutal treatment of the working class people and propose a different way of 
doing this. While moving towards that aim, I want to understand the global and local 
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processes that led to this kind of gentrification with regard to the historical and 
spatial background of Turkey and Istanbul. 
This section in essence shows what I will be doing in the thesis, and I now move on 
to explaining its structure.  
 
1.1 Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis consists of four parts: theory; research aims, objectives, questions and 
methodology; analysis of the primary research; discussion of the important issues 
and themes. In the first chapter, world city theory is investigated to discuss the 
changing world economy since the 1970s and its spatial effects on major cities. In 
the last few decades, considerable numbers of cities have emerged as control centres 
of the world economy. They have grown especially through the FBS sector in the 
last 40-50 years, and they are arranged in a hierarchy, with three cities at the top: 
London, New York and Tokyo. This hierarchy mostly includes world cities in 
developed countries, but there are also world cities in developing areas, including 
Istanbul. Economic growth in a world city has led to economic growth for the 
country it is located in, which contributes to a city’s place in the global economy. I 
give particular attention to the spatial effects – within a world city – of these 
processes and how the state affects, leads or is involved in them. In addition, the 
discussion outlines the adoption of neo-liberal policies by many governments since 
the 1970s.  This was a period of relative economic stagnation and relatively low 
profits compared to the 1950s and 1960s, and governments reacted to the new 
situation by adopting strategies known as neo-liberalism. The neo-liberalist approach 
contributed to the current form of the world economy and is closely linked to the 
emergence of world cities.  
In Chapter 3, gentrification is investigated in relation to economic changes and their 
effects in developed and developing countries. Early gentrification came about 
through the private housing market, although the state made indirect interventions 
during this process.  Economic changes that are discussed in Chapter 2 have led to a 
professional class with different goals in life and different consuming habits. The 
first reason for this change in consumption patterns is that over the last few decades, 
it has become common to postpone marriage and childrearing, and in some cases, 
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women in their early thirties are deciding to remain childless (Beauregard, 1984).  
Another reason for changes in life choices and housing consumption is that in order 
to manage childrearing in a family where both partners work, travel to work times 
and costs need to be minimized. The third reason for middle class people becoming 
gentrifiers is that it can be easier for two partners to find a job in a big city than in a 
smaller town. Finally, considering the level of education, some couples are attracted 
to the cultural activities and amenities of big cities (Lyons, 1996).  
The second process is state-led gentrification, a much more coercive process that 
started to become common especially in the large cities of developing countries. It is 
a form of gentrification in which the state actively encourages higher income 
populations to move into lower income areas. Many academics argue that making 
profit from restructuring the built environment for higher income groups is now a 
goal that is driving the state (Lees, 2009; Smith, 2002; Webb, 2010). Over the last 
30-40 years, regulation of the market by the state has changed and now states 
support and copy market processes, instead of trying to constrain their damaging 
effects through policies to redistribute income and provide welfare (Weber, 2002; 
Moulaert, 2000).  
Both market and state forms of gentrification resulted in replacement and 
displacement of working class people from inner areas and caused many resistance 
movements organized by poor inhabitants of the gentrifying neighbourhoods: 
resistance is especially strong against state-led gentrification in developing cities. 
These processes of gentrification and their effects on the social and built 
environment of world cities are the subjects of investigation in this thesis. 
In the second part of the thesis (Chapters 4), the reasons for choosing this topic and 
Istanbul case are further discussed, and the research aims and the methods are set 
out. To present the critical realist approach to this research, the objectives and 
questions are explained in detail. My objectives range from dealing with abstractions 
to the concrete case studies. The first objective is to explore the deep processes 
involved in the creation of world cities and of gentrification, in order to have an 
insight into their abstractions and historical and spatial backgrounds. A further 
objective is to analyse the social and economic context of gentrification in the 
historic centres of Istanbul since the 1950s and monitor the changes caused by this 
context that are closely related to the process of gentrification in Istanbul since the 
8	  
	  
1980s. By exploring the abstractions first and analysing the processes and historical 
background in Istanbul, I enrich the explanation of these processes in 
neighbourhoods in their historic environment. After this, my objective is to examine 
the behaviours of the land and house owners in these neighbourhoods and the 
changes in their built environments and investigate the state’s role in the urban 
‘renovation’ and gentrification of the historic neighbourhoods.  Finally, my last 
objective is to investigate ways to enable the existing residents to remain in and 
improve the historic neighbourhoods.    
I have collected data on a range of issues to explore these objectives, and these 
issues are represented by the research questions. The research questions are: What 
are the causes of the recent wave of gentrification in inner areas of Istanbul? What 
have been the respective roles of classic and state-led gentrification in Istanbul? 
Why did the state start to lead gentrification after 2000? What were the mechanisms 
of ‘classic’ gentrification in terms of actors, property relations, and building? What 
were the mechanisms of state-led gentrification in terms of actors, property relations, 
and building?  How did the state manage the process politically? What were the 
experiences of the existing and former inhabitants? What were the experiences of the 
new ‘gentry’?   
I use mixed methods to conduct this research, which are, however, predominantly 
qualitative. I use general accounts of global processes in Turkey and Istanbul and 
document the historical events and their spatial effects in Istanbul with particular 
attention to historical neighbourhoods. In order to do this, I drew on academic 
literature reviewing and examining policy reports and legal documents, and I 
conducted semi-structured interviews. I examine two case studies in this thesis to 
illustrate the two processes of gentrification – market-led and state-led: – Galata and 
Tarlabasi. Galata is a neighbourhood experiencing market-led gentrification, while 
Tarlabasi is experiencing state-led gentrification. For Galata, the processes of 
gentrification are analysed through interviews with people in the neighbourhood, 
officials of the Municipality and academics. I analyse topics that were brought up in 
the interviews and which appeared through an analysis of data to explain the 
gentrification process in the neighbourhood. For Tarlabasi, these processes are 
analysed through interviews with people in the neighbourhood, the construction 
company, academics, officials of the Municipality, NGOs, and the MHDA. 
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The third part of the thesis (Chapters 5 – 8) analyses the historical and geographical 
background and the analysis of the data gathered during the fieldwork. World 
processes have to be analysed with regard to the particular country and particular 
city, and in Part 3, I examine the effects of global processes in Turkey and how they 
are expressed in a specific city, Istanbul. Chapters 5 and 6 explore social, economic 
and political changes in Turkey and Istanbul. The Turkish economy started to grow 
in the direction of FBS and construction sectors in the 1980s, and the state has aimed 
to increase and sustain this kind of growth by policies that were directed at world 
city status for Istanbul. The state involvement expanded in order to secure Istanbul’s 
place in the hierarchy of world cities. In these chapters, the housing market in 
Turkey and Istanbul is explained in detail, along with the state’s role in transforming 
the city.  
I discuss the two case studies in detail in Chapters 7 and 8. Galata and Tarlabasi are 
two historic neighbourhoods with similar histories and architectural heritage, but 
they are experiencing two different processes of gentrification. Galata was originally 
a middle class neighbourhood that became working class in the 1960s and has been 
experiencing market-led gentrification since the early 1990s. Many of the working 
class inhabitants have now left Galata and it is predominantly a middle class 
neighbourhood again, although with very different characteristics from its past. 
However, some of the old residents remain in the area, and this is causing some 
tension between the old and new inhabitants. There is also another type of tension in 
the neighbourhood between the first and second wave of gentrifiers. Both types of 
tension are explored in this chapter. Chapter 10 examines the state-led gentrification 
process in Tarlabasi, which was also originally a middle class neighbourhood that 
became working class in the 1960s. However, the difference between two 
neighbourhoods is that in the 1990s, Tarlabasi received a wave of migration from 
districts subjected to intense military activity in the east of Turkey. These 
immigrants, who were mostly Kurdish, were much more disadvantaged compared to 
the previous immigrants to the area because they were forced to leave their homes 
with little or no financial resources. Over the years, Tarlabasi became a 
neighbourhood housing the most disadvantaged segments of the population, and no 
middle class individual wanted to move to this area, even though it was as central 
and historic as Galata. The local and national state contributed to Tarlabasi’s 
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negative reputation by demonizing the residents and ignoring the needs for 
municipal services in the neighbourhood altogether. In the early 2000s, with a new 
law, a state-induced urban renewal project was planned for this neighbourhood, the 
implementation of which involved a harsh state-led gentrification process. The 
Tarlabasi Renewal Project led to a state-led gentrification process, brought about by 
illegal state actions and the eviction of residents. The social and spatial effects of 
this project, the aims of the state, and displacement process are examined in the 
Tarlabasi story in this Chapter. 
Part 4 (Chapter 9) discusses the big themes and issues of the thesis, and the last 
chapter of this part is the conclusion of the thesis. The beginning of Chaper 9 reflects 
on the whole thesis from world city theory to the concrete case studies. From this 
critical examination of processes of gentrification, I develop an approach to enable 
the current working class inhabitants to stay in their homes while the area can be 
physically and economically rehabilitated. I do not want this approach to be limited 
to two case studies in Istanbul, but I rather aim to develop a general approach to 
analysing gentrification in world cities that begins by identifying abstractions 
derived from an understanding of global economics and examining their influence 
on processes occurring in specific locations. To make sense of the complex and 
diverse relationships between economic change, housing markets, and property and 
land ownership, I examine global economic changes and practices, especially since 
the 1980s with the rise of neo-liberal economic policies around the world. In this 
Chapter, I provide an explanation linking different spatial scales and levels of 
abstraction discussed throughout the thesis and connect the more general to the 
specific neighbourhoods in Istanbul.  
Following this, rest of the Chapter 9 is the conclusion to the thesis. Three major 
theoretical issues and my alternative for gentrification in historical neighbourhoods 
of Istanbul are discussed. Firstly, the relationship between global North and global 
South is examined and how urban theories from global North can be applicable, and 
what the north and south can learn from each other is discussed. Secondly, social 
spatial segregation is discussed to analyse why this concept is important and what 
kind of concrete effects it has on gentrified neighbourhoods. Thirdly, neo-liberalism 
is discussed. This is a highly contentious concept that refers to the current economic 
era. Neo-liberalism refers to reduction of state intervention, yet we will see the state 
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intervention of Istanbul is massive, and I will discuss what that says about neo-
liberalism. Following this, suggestions for alternative policies for the historic 
neighbourhoods of Istanbul that consider the working class residents and their well-
being are discussed. In addition, I suggest that the critical realist research approach 
taken throughout this thesis presents itself as a framework for future research that 
aims to analyse similar processes in similar environments. In particular, it provides a 
powerful critical approach to analysing world city gentrification processes in 
developing countries.  
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PART I: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
CHAPTER 2: WORLD CITIES AND CHANGES IN THE GLOBAL 
ECONOMY 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Istanbul has seen the growth of control functions that are associated with world 
cities. The Turkish government has an explicit project that is to turn Istanbul into a 
world city, and following from that, this chapter looks at the concept of world city. 
In a world city like Istanbul, being middle class has been associated with being a 
gentrifier in previously working class neighbourhoods, and this connection makes it 
important for me to investigate these two concepts to better understand the 
gentrification process in Istanbul in the last 30-40 years.  
World city, in essence, is a locality in the world economic system where the 
workings of the world economy are largely centred and facilitated according to a 
hierarchy. This hierarchy is largely depends on the operation of the global finance 
and business services in every locality that is associated with the world city theory. 
These world cities and the way they have emerged and links that bind them together 
have direct and tangible effects on the changing world economy. The number and 
size of  world cities has grown with the growth of certain sectors. The top levels of 
these sectors have located themselves in a relatively small number of cities. This 
chapter considers these sectors and the local sectors that have grown as a result. 
This chapter investigates world city theory with regard to changes in the world 
economy, particularly in the last 30-40 years, and how these changes affect big cities 
in developing and developed countries. World city theory is important in developing 
a better understanding of the dynamics of world cities. The chapter starts by 
discussing the concept of a ‘world city’ and the historical background of the theory 
and global economy in relation to the changing nature of the world economy. This 
leads into an introduction to FBS in world cities. These are examined in detail to 
discuss the growth and decline of global employment in FBS and the manufacturing 
sector and the locations of these sectors in MDCs (such as USA, UK), newly 
industrialized countries (NICs) (such as South Korea, Mexico) and LDCs (such as 
Afghanistan, Nepal, Nigeria, Venezuela). Following this, the locations of FBS 
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sectors and the headquarters of big firms within nations and between cities/regions 
are discussed. 
World city economies as whole are discussed, which leads to an explanation of the 
internal geographies of world cities. This helps to investigate the economic 
dynamics operating in world cities and how these dynamics interact with each other. 
This section moves on to the flow and mobility of the labour force in world cities, 
explaining local and international migration to world cities and the composition of 
the work force.  
Finally, the role of the state in world cities and the world city’ economy is 
introduced. Many nation-states have sought to grow a world city, and there are many 
ways states can do that. Having a control centre for finance and business services 
such as a world city benefits that state’s economy and its place in the global 
economic system. These world cities that control a disproportionate amount of 
global businesses (Sassen, 1991) improve that country’s economy and its 
competitive capacity. There are things that private sector cannot achieve in a city to 
benefit capital, such as holding a prestigious event like the Olympics, and with the 
contribution and encouragement of the state, these things can be made possible. In 
exchange, having a world city in a country’s territory is beneficial to capital and the 
ways that country can secure its place in the world economy. Boosting gentrification 
in valuable inner city land is one of these ways and examined in detail later in the 
thesis. In this last part of this chapter, I mainly discuss the ways states serve capital 
by building a world city in their territory, state support for world cities, the ways that 
national states promote world cities, how this affects global economic changes and 
world divisions of labour.  
 
2.2 The Concept of the ‘World City’ 
This section considers the concept and definitions of the world city and the 
concentration of control functions and similar criteria that help to categorize world 
cities, and provides an overview of the processes that led to the emergence of world 
cities.   
The early work of Manuel Castells (1972) and David Harvey (1973) succeeded in 
linking city-forming processes to the historical movement of industrial capitalism 
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(Friedmann, 1986). From this perspective, the city was not only perceived as a social 
ecology based on ‘natural’ limits peculiar to the dynamics of population and space, 
but started to be seen as “a product of specifically social forces set in motion by 
capitalist relations of production” (Friedmann, 1986:69). Spatial flows of capital and 
class conflict became important in explaining how cities evolved.  
Since the 1980s, the study of cities has been very much connected to the world 
economy. As Friedmann (1986) argues, this approach focused on a spatial 
perspective on the economy that was not limited by national boundaries. World city 
theory was primarily thought of as a framework for research and intended to be a 
starting point for political inquiry about big cities. As Friedmann puts it “World city 
theory is about the spatial organization of the new international division of labour 
(Friedmann, 1986:69).” It provides us with an understanding of what is happening in 
major cities of the world economy and the economic and political conflicts in these 
cities. World city theory can suggest the mutual origins of world cities in the 
international system of market relations (Friedmann, 1986). The new international 
division of labour refers to the spatial shift of the manufacturing sector from 
developed countries to developing countries or for the case of LDCs and NICs, from 
city centre of large cities to the periphery of large cities.  
One example for the division of labour between world cities is that producer service 
firms in different cities operate in the division of labour. This division of labour can 
be thought as a network that connects world cities around the world by having a 
subsector in each city (Sassen, 2002). Because of this, relationships between world 
cities are not only competitive, but they are characterized by a division of labour. In 
Sassen’s (2002:15) words: “No such entity as a single global city could be a single 
capital of an empire; the category “global city” only makes sense as a component of 
a global network of strategic sites”.  
The ‘control functions’ of the world economy is unequally distributed and these 
control functions are concentrated in world cities. Control functions are sectors and 
activities that are most influential in the world economy. These control functions 
consist of the finance sectors and business services and the headquarters of 
important manufacturing and commercial firms. These sectors/activities provide 
services for firms beyond city or country and for outside clients around the globe 
(Sassen, 2002; Friedmann, 1986).  
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In this chapter, the ‘world city’ concept is examined in relation to developed and 
developing countries because the state’s urban policies for Istanbul have been 
focused on making it a ‘world city’. According to Friedmann (1986), there are few 
theses of world city theory: 
 
• World cities in developed countries are used as ‘basing points’ by global capital 
for spatial formation and joining point of markets.  
• World cities are characterised by the presence of control functions, and these 
control functions are leading sites for the concentration and agglomeration of 
FBS.  
 
In MDCs, sectors including finance and business services are located in world city 
centres, and headquarters of manufacturing companies are also located in the centre 
to be close to the other control functions. For NICs, control functions and highly-
skilled labour are still located in the city centre; however, different form MDCs, 
research and development sections of manufacturing firms are located in the big 
cities of NICs, but usually not in the city centre. Lastly, for LDCs, the only 
difference from the MDCs is that while they have production sections of 
manufacturing firms in their big cities, they are not located in the city centre, but on 
the peripheries. In this way, the new spatial division of labour in the last 30-40 years 
between cities can indicate the form and extent of a city’s integration into the world 
economy (Friedmann, 1986). 
The changes in the economy since the 1970s and flow of capital brought about 
changes in urban space and these changes varied from country to country, but 
especially according to whether it is a developed or a developing country. In most 
world cities (especially in MDCs), it is often stated that there seems to have been a 
shift from manufacturing to finance and business services in the last 30-40 years 
(Knox, 2001). This is not entirely correct: there has been an increase in employment 
in the finance and business sectors employment, but not a global decline in 
manufacturing. Rather, some parts of the manufacturing sector (e.g. production sites) 
have shifted from MDCs to LDCs. In NICs and LDCs, there has been a visible 
increase in the finance sector , but this has not led the manufacturing sector to leave 
these cities as it did in developed countries.  In developing countries, big cities still 
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accommodate a large proportion of the manufacturing production. For example, in 
Turkey, Istanbul is still the biggest manufacturing centre in the country. In 
developing countries, this growth in both sectors may give rise to some problems 
because of the lack of services (e.g. infrastructure, sufficient employment, housing). 
In MDCs, the manufacturing sector has declined in inner cities, but highly-skilled 
manufacturing still remains in the same country, moving out, however, from big 
cities to cheaper locations. The routine production part of manufacturing moved to 
LDCs.  
A hierarchy of world cities was suggested by The Globalization and World Cities 
Study Group and Network (GaWCSG) of Loughborough University, led by Peter 
Taylor and John Beaverstock et al. (1999). It is hard to establish a strict list of 
criteria for a hierarchy of world cities; however, it is possible to identify dominant or 
major world cities depending on the location of major financial centres and 
concentrations of business services. From this, a hierarchy of world cities can be 
distinguished in terms of complexity and sophistication of activities in the city and 
the size of territory it serves (nationally or globally).   
The GaWCSG define four criteria to identify the hierarchy of major cities in the 
world economy. Firstly, the dominance of a world city can be indicated by analysing 
the ranking of multinational corporation headquarters (MNC). This is followed by 
analysing the corporate activities and power of MNCs with regard to new spatial 
division of labour. A third criterion looks at city ranking within the urban hierarchy 
by examining tendencies to engage with international sectors such as finance and 
business services and concentration and type of producer services in the world 
economy (Hall, 2001; see also Sassen, 1991). Most importantly, a fourth criterion 
identifies the connections between major cities via the international finance sector. 
The GaWCSG research argues that many of the approaches to the study of world 
cities concentrate simply on measuring data on global city attributes, while ignoring 
the critical importance of the mutual relationships between members of a system of 
cities (Taylor, 1997:324-25). However, while there is not enough data to measure 
the mutual relationship between big cities, the GaWCSG Group identified three 
alternative indicators of the relationships between cities:  (1) content analysis of 
leading business newspapers; (2) personnel migration; and (3), in-depth analysis of 
producer services (Beaverstock et al., 1999, 2000). 
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This resulted in a list of 10 ‘Alpha’, 10 ‘Beta’, and 35 ‘Gamma’ world cities. These 
rankings indicate the hierarchy between world cities with regard to the criteria 
explained above. 
 
Alpha World Cities (Developed Cities): London, Frankfurt, Paris, Milan, New 
York, Los Angeles, Chicago, Tokyo, Singapore, Hong Kong,  
Beta World Cities: Developed Cities: Zurich, Brussels, Madrid, Moscow, 
Toronto, San Francisco, Sydney, Developing Cities: Mexico City, Sao Paulo, 
Seoul 
Gamma World Cities: Developed Cities: Copenhagen,  Amsterdam, Dusseldorf, 
Berlin, Munich, Hamburg, Geneva, Stockholm, Rome, Barcelona, Prague, 
Warsaw, Budapest, Montreal, Boston, Dallas, Houston, Washington, Atlanta, 
Miami, Minneapolis, Melbourne, Osaka, Developing Cities: Istanbul, Shangai, 
Beijing, Bangkok, Taipei, Kuala Lumpur, Manila, Caracas, Jakarta, Johannesburg, 
Santiago, Beunos Aires 
Table 2.1: Categorization of World cities, The Loughborough Group “GaWC” inventory of world 
cities, 1998 
 
The separation between developed and developing countries shows which type of 
economy each of these cities belongs to and some differences between the world 
cities. It is clear from the list that all of the ‘Alpha’ and most of the ‘Beta’ cities are 
located in MDCs. These countries have historically been commanding control in the 
world, and they have been most influential in the world economy even before the 
emergence of the current form of globalised economy identified in world city theory. 
Their dominance of the world economy continues and is evident in the ranking of 
the leading world cities as well.  
This hierarchy is important for categorizing world cities; however, as stated earlier, 
this can be misleading. Sassen (2001: 351) expresses this as: “my use of the notion 
of global city functions (is) to identify a particular case, that of a city which fulfilled 
[….] highly specialized set of functions in the management and servicing of the 
global economy”. Sassen defines world cities as places “from where the world 
economy is managed and serviced” (Sassen 1988:126) as well as “highly 
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concentrated command points in the organization of the world economy” (Sassen 
1991:3).  
As noted above, the world city concept is concerned with the spatial organization of 
the new international division of labour. It concerns the contradictory relations 
between production in the era of global management and the political determination 
of territorial interests. It is helpful to understand what happens in major global cities 
of the world economy and the political conflicts in these cities. In later chapters, the 
link between processes of gentrification and world city theory is discussed in detail. 
In addition to that, this theory is relevant to my research in Istanbul because Istanbul 
is a developing country’s world city that is experiencing pressure to secure its place 
in the hierarchy further with various urban regeneration and renovation projects that 
mostly result in state-led gentrification. This is examined further later in the thesis.  
 
2.3 The Historical Development of the World Economy 
In order to understand world cities in the present day, we need to look at the history 
of capitalism. Internalisation of trade, production, finance, and labour power has 
been going on in various ways for the last several centuries and evolving throughout 
this time and influencing the formation of cities. In this section, I consider various 
ways internationalization has affected the historical path of capitalism.  
Expansion of world trade between nations: Before the 16th century, trade between 
countries was only for luxury items such as silver; however, starting from the 16th 
century, raw materials and banking services became part of international trade as 
well. From the 19th century, manufacturers’ products became a part of world trade, 
which allowed firms to buy and sell material internationally and created a much 
more competitive economy. This was followed by business services in the 20th 
century, and competition in the world economy increased even further. The 
internationalisation of many sectors made the location of production very important 
for firms (especially manufacturing firms).  The reason for that is the increasing 
global competition between firms and the deregulation led firms to find the least 
expensive and regulated space with a cheap labour force. Developing countries 
provided many international firms with less regulations and a much cheaper labour 
force than developed ones (Barraclough, 1978). 
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Banking and finance: Banking in its modern sense can be traced back to the early 
Renaissance and medieval Italy when it was dominated by cities such as Venice and 
Genoa. In these early forms of banks, merchants negotiated loans to finance their 
exploration trips (Goldthwaite, 1995). The Bank of England started as private 
company in the 17th century and was lending money to the English state to build 
ships for the Navy (Bank of England Act, 1946). In the 20th century, with advances 
in transportation and telecommunication, banks grew in size and spread 
geographically. Since the changes in the economy that started to appear in the 1970s, 
banking and finance have become crucial for the world economy (Sassen, 2001). 
Increasing international debt and less regulated capital flow all around the globe 
have become relatively more important than production in the world economy than 
they were previously, and this importance is particularly visible in world cities as 
central locations for global banking and finance.  
Global production locations of traded goods and services: The production of raw 
materials and agricultural products is one of the first examples of global production, 
mostly associated with the supply of material to the centres of colonial empires 
(Rodrigue, 2013). During the colonial era, colonies were used to produce materials 
that were shipped to the imperialist country, which manufactured goods from these 
raw materials and traded them with the colonies and internationally. This separation 
between sites of materials supply and manufacturing production now exists in a 
different form. In the changing world economy since the 1970s, production sites of 
manufacturing firms started to decentralize from inner urban locations to ‘green 
field’ peripheral sites. Some manufacturers chose their production sites even further 
afield in developing countries because regulations were less restrictive and the 
labour much cheaper compared to developed countries (Rodrigue, 2013). 
By far, the most impressive of this process of extremely rapid rise happened in East 
Asia and China. China implemented economic reforms starting from the 1970s. This 
happened in two stages: in the first stage in the late 1970s, China allowed foreign 
investment to enter the country and gave permission to entrepreneurs to start a 
business. In the late 1980s and 1990s, the second stage started. Before that, most of 
the industry was state-owned, but with this stage, the Chinese government started to 
privatize and contract out China’s industry and decrease the trade regulations, price 
controls and policies that protected China’s internal market (Engardio, 2005). 
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Between the year 1978 and 2009, China’s economy was growing 9.5% a year 
(Scissor, 2009). 
International ownership: Transnational corporations are an important example of 
international ownership. With the internationalization of trade of raw materials that 
were mainly used for domestic markets, transnational corporations started to emerge. 
First, mining and agricultural firms in the 17th century acted as transnational 
corporations of their time. But transnational corporations in the modern sense 
emerged when some manufacturing corporations started using direct foreign 
investment in overseas production to penetrate foreign consumer markets (Knox, 
2001). 
Transnational companies are part of export sectors. Transnational companies seek to 
have commercial supremacy by focusing on the six or seven hundred million 
consumers in developed economies who can afford the kind of services they are 
selling (Knox, 1995). Transnational corporations are significant in the world 
economy, and the development of this significance can be identified as having three 
phases:   
Phase 1: Beginning in the nineteenth century until the 1940s, this phase was mostly 
investment for obtaining raw materials – mostly oil and minerals – for domestic 
manufacturing purposes.  
Phase II: After the Second World War, some leading companies used foreign 
investment in international production operations to enter foreign consumer markets. 
Meanwhile, the arrangement for the US dollar to be the world’s principle reserve 
currency at the 1944 Bretton Woods Conference had made it easier for US 
corporations to enter into foreign industries. Following this, US companies expanded 
their investment in all parts of the world, especially in Latin America: 
Bulova Watch provides a clear example. Bulova now manufactures 
watch movements in Switzerland and ships them Pago Pago, in 
American Samoa, where they assembled and then shipped to the 
United States to be sold. Corporation President Harry B. Henshel said 
about this arrangement: ‘We are able to beat the foreign competition 
because we are the foreign competition’ (Bluestone and Harrison, 
1982:114). 
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By the end of the 1970s, overseas profits accounted for a third or more of the overall 
profits of the hundred largest multinational producers and banks (Knox, 2001). 
Phase III: With the collapse of the Bretton Woods agreement in 1971, the value of 
the US dollar increased. This increase caused imported goods to become cheaper, 
and as a result, European and Japanese multinationals easily penetrated US trade 
markets. In response, US companies reorganized their production processes. This 
meant international companies withdrawing from places where unskilled and semi-
skilled labour is more expensive (i.e. North America and North-western Europe); 
and keeping existing facilities for skilled labour or high technology in their original 
places (Bluestone and Harrison, 1982). 
International flows of labour power: Slavery was the first way of internationalizing 
labour power under capitalism. Another example of the spatial mobilization of 
labour power was Europeans moving to settler countries in the late 19th century. 
More recent forms of the movement of labour power has been immigration from 
LDCs to MDCs, which increased greatly after Second World War. This immigration 
started within Europe and from colonies to MDCs, and immigration from NICs and 
LDCs to MDCs is still important and continuing. However, this is mostly unskilled 
labour immigration. Skilled labour migration, on the other hand, does not involve 
such large numbers, but with the internationalization of finance and manufacturing, 
skilled labour is mobile in search of better job opportunities (Bluestone and 
Harrison, 1982; Knox, 2001).  
As a result of a combination of these processes since the 1970s, what is called the 
‘new international division of labour’ (NIDL) emerged. Investment and production 
are not coordinated mainly within national economies anymore (Warf, 2010).  Many 
components can be produced in different countries and assembled in several. This 
situation created international devices to manage and steer capital beyond national 
boundaries, including offshore banking (Knox, 2001). NIDL has given rise to NICs 
such as South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore and has resulted in the reorganization 
of employment growth away from manufacturing towards finance and business 
services. 
The issue here is how the international division of labour develops and assigns role 
to localities. Historically, before the 1970s, national economies were more 
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important. The basic division of labour was within manufacturing industries, and 
this division of labour was organized within a national economy as were production, 
plants, firms, and industry: they formed a national market and created national social 
(class) divisions. Even though capital, labour and technology were imported or 
exported, they were subject to many regulations by national governments (Knox, 
2001). 
The spatial division of labour within national economies depended on different 
regional industrial specializations and their location within a particular national 
geographical space. National economies in that sense were, as a result, regionally 
differentiated. However, after the 1970s, national economies became less regulated, 
and with deregulation, the importance of local economies decreased. Nevertheless, 
inherited abilities of localities allowed places to promote their specific features in 
international markets. As the large scale division of labour developed, localities 
started to be recognized for their inherited capacities, especially in the production 
functions of manufacturing firms (Massey, 1984). Despite changes in the world 
economy, many regions that used to specialize in one sector (old industrial areas) 
can still maintain their inherited designation (e.g. Sheffield as Steel City, Derbyshire 
for coalfields). As Massey (1984) argues, development of large scale divisions of 
labour in sectors over time assign parts of production to continents, nations, and 
localities. This assignment depends on their previous (inherited) capacities: labour 
power, fixed capital, knowledge generating and so on. 
 
STAGE AREA 
Headquarters, control 
functions, 
finance 
World city or major city in developed countries 
(DC) or newly industrialised countries (NIC) 
Research and development Science region or cultural city in DC 
    Skilled production Old or stable region in DC (or NIC) 
Low skilled production Anywhere with communications and  cheap, 
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disciplined labour 
Table 2.2: New International Division of Labour (NIDL), Aysegul Can, 2013 
 
Following from Massey’s argument, skilled production continues to stay in 
developed countries’ cities that are inherently related to that kind of production. 
Labour in finance and business services is mainly located in developed countries and 
world cities. The labour force for skilled production and research stayed mostly in 
big cities in developed countries, and low-skilled production located itself mostly in 
developing countries with cheap labour. However, low-skilled labour stayed in 
world cities in developed countries as well and has been employed mostly in 
consumer services.  On the other hand, for NICs and LDCs, this is different. It is true 
that there has been an increase in employment in finance and business services; 
however, there has been an increase in employment in the manufacturing sector as 
well because producer services in NICs and LDCs remained in the big cities.     
Another example of the NIDL is in electronic consumer goods: in this case, the 
development of a division of labour has been rapidly transformed into an 
international division of labour in which the production process is constantly 
subdivided into smaller activities that are distributed geographically as a complex 
networked mosaic of production functions around the globe (Bryson, et al., 2004).  
 
STAGE AREA 
Headquarters, control functions, 
finance 
Tokyo, NYC,  San Fransisco, etc 
Research and development Silicon Valley, Southern England 
Skilled production ditto, or  London  
Low skilled production South Wales, S.E.Asia, Mexico 
Table 2.3: NIDL in electronic consumer goods, Aysegul Can, 2013 
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Table 2.3 above illustrates the geographical effects that increases in finance and 
business services created. These effects have been visible mostly in developed cities 
such as London, Tokyo and New York (Knox, 2001). The international dimensions 
of employment have been much more important, and the collapse of regional 
specialization within national economies became less relevant. In summary, an 
international division of labour has emerged in which investment or production is no 
longer organized around national economies.  
There is a period since the 1970s of relative economic stagnation and relatively low 
profits compared to the 1950s and 1960s, and the governments reacted to this new 
situation by adopting a strategy known as neo-liberalism. This economic situation is 
commonly (see Harvey, 1989; 1985 and Smith , 1996, 1990) explained with the 
narrative of political fallout in the United States during the 1970s about the OPEC 
oil embargo that resulted in recession for the American economy (Hackworth, 
2007). This event and some other events such as the growing productivity of 
German and Japanese automobile manufacturers undermined the dominance of the 
United States in that industry (Harvey, 1989). This oil crisis, the fall of Bretton 
Woods system (monetary arrangement that setted out commercial and financial rules 
between MDCs in the 20th century) and increasing competition in metal industry 
between the NICs and USA led to a state of stagflation where high unemployment 
and high inflation coincided (Hackworth, 2007).  
During the stagflation of 1970s, Milton Friedman’s (1962) free market economic 
system, free floating exchange rates were very influential. Friedman argued that 
state intervention in the form of printing money was in fact a cause for the 
increasing inflation because the shop owners were able to guess the increase in 
money supply, and this developed into the idea that all state intervention is useless 
as the free market regulates itself and can undermine all of state action. In addition 
to that, neo-liberalist scholars assumed that because of catallaxy, the market cannot 
be informationally wrong, and the  markets were self-regulating, therefore making 
any kind of regulations disruptive and useless (Graham, 2010). As Harvey (2005:2) 
puts it: 
Neo-liberalism is a theory of political economic practices that 
proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating 
individual entrepreneurial freedom characterized by strong private 
property rights, free markets, and free trade. The role of the state is to 
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create and preserve an institutional framework appropriate to such 
practices. 
 
The kind of ‘spatial fix’ formed for this crisis led local governments to be more 
entrepreneurial, to a decline in industrial production and a restructuring of the cities 
around the sectors of finance, insurance and real estate (Warf, 1999; Pine and 
Gilmore 1999; Harvey, 1989; Leitner, 1994 Fainstein, 2001). Many cities became 
very active in accommodating larger scale real estate investments close to their 
CBDs. One spatial result of this restructuring was increasing attraction towards inner 
city gentrification. This is examined in the next chapter. The shrinking welfare state, 
increasing the rate of profit by reducing wages, accelerating the internalisation of the 
economy by reducing trade barriers and barriers for international production have 
been crucial for neo-liberalism to succeed.  
Having explained the theory neo-liberalism, this programme is fraught with 
contradictions, and one of them is that state actually remained active in directly 
supporting sectors of capital. Especially in developing countries, increasing state 
intervention remains not to strengthen the welfare state, but to benefit the capital. 
One result of this is state-led gentrification and that is explained in detail later in the 
thesis. Another result is the state desire to build a world city in their territory to 
secure their place in the world economy. The ways in which they do that are 
explained in the final section of this chapter. In that section, the history of capitalism 
is discussed briefly to better understand the economic changes and the historical 
background that led to period of neo-liberalism. The emergence of world cities is 
strongly linked to the changing world economy since the 1970s, and as a critical 
realist, I believe it is crucial to have an insight of the long-term history of capitalism 
with regard to its spatial outcomes. Following this, I examine the long history of 
world cities concerning capitalism and its spatial development since the 1970s. 
 
2.4 The Long History of “World Cities”: Separation between capitalist control 
and productive activities 
It is in the context of these forms of internationalization of the capitalist economy 
over 400 years that world cities evolved.  As we saw in Section 2.1, the separation 
between control functions and production sites is one of the main issues in world 
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cities, but there has, in fact, been some separation of control functions and 
production since the beginning of capitalism. However, the differences between 
parts of the world regarding technology, language, culture, legal associations, 
politics and forms of policies are not always compatible with the development of a 
global economy, and a complex institutional infrastructure may be required to 
overcome them (Bryson et al., 2004). In the nineteenth-century UK, the 
development as an industrial society was associated with a complex service 
infrastructure, such as banking (Bryson and Daniels, 1998d). During the nineteenth 
century, international trade was inhibited because of the financial difficulties created 
by the lack of financial services for overseas clients. These problems were overcome 
by agencies of bill markets and banking facilities of the type connected with the flow 
of tea and silk from China to Europe between 1860 and 1890 (Hyde, 1973).  
In the twentieth century, the production sites of manufacturing companies started 
decentralize to the peripheries of big cities and then to LDCs, but the headquarters of 
manufacturing firms remained in big cities, rather than moving closer to their 
production sites. After the 1970s, the spatial division of labour altered, and the 
concept of regional specialization was challenged. Spatial divisions of labour are 
now organized according to the needs and features of a specific industry rather than 
historically located regional skills (Knox, 1995).  
These new international divisions of labour have been achievable because of the 
advances in technology of communication that have given firms the chance to 
decentralize their manufacturing activities, but yet retain their headquarters in core 
areas. It is now possible for a firm to have headquarters in places like New York or 
Zurich and locate the manufacturing facilities in a place that has a non-unionised 
labour force with less regulations or cost (LDCs) (Bryson et al., 2004). 
This section explained the decentralization of production sites of the big 
manufacturing firms from or to the periphery of world cities. With the advancement 
in technology and international transport, and world cities’ desire to concentrate the 
FBS sectors in the CBDs led to a spatial restructuring in world cities. One of the 
outcomes of this restructuring is economic export sectors that came with the global 
divisions of labour. The next section examines this.  
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2.5 Economic ‘Export’ Sectors, World Cities, and Global Divisions of Labour 
This section discusses the ‘economic base’ or export sectors that may be found in 
world cities. These sectors are relevant to my research as they are a crucial part of 
the spatial restructuring of world cities since the 1970s, and the growth of world 
cities wholly depended on export goods and services. The spatial arrangement of 
these sectors in a  world city and the employment in them have had effects on the 
urban population and the housing market in a world city and therefore have had 
important links with the concept of gentrification in world cities.   For each of these 
sectors, I firstly discuss the growth and decline of global employment in the sector 
since roughly the 1970s, and this is followed by sector locations between MDCs, 
NICs and LDCs and within nations, between cities/regions, particularly focusing on 
world cities. 
 
   2.5.1 Finance 
Since the 1970s, finance has been the major and increasing sector of the global 
economy. As outlined in previous sections, the growth in finance did not result in a 
decline in the manufacturing sector: firms changed location rather than scaling back 
or closing. But it is true that employment in finance and business services increased 
dramatically, especially in CBDs (particularly in big cities in MDCs). This transition 
in the economy had its consequences. As Amin and Thrift (1994:2-5) state:   
First, there has been marked increase in the power of finance over 
production. Finance capital now takes many forms and moves almost 
seamlessly and with great speed across the globe, especially between 
the world’s financial markets centring on stock and other exchanges. 
Electronic trading has ensured volatile and fast moving financial 
markets that can transform (either positively or negatively) the 
economic prospects of companies and, more importantly, of national 
or regional economies overnight. 
 
The reasons for the increase in finance over time can be explained under a number 
of headings:  
Internationalization of trade: Since the 1980s, with increasing deregulation, the 
internationalization of trade has had important effects on the increase of finance. 
With fewer regulations all around the globe, trade internationalisation increased and 
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this eventually led to further internationalisation of banking and finance services to 
steer capital beyond national boundaries. Some countries have made good use of 
this: Switzerland, for instance, has been successful in managing the circulation of 
capital through international networks (Knox, 1995). 
Internationalization of production: In the 1970s, the production functions of the 
manufacturing sector started to move from developed countries to developing 
countries, which dramatically increased the internationalization of production. With 
this increased international presence, transnational manufacturing companies grew 
in size, started to have more influence over the world economy and strengthened 
their connections with finance sector (Gough, 2011; Knox, 1995).  
Debt creation since the 1980s and international lending/debt:  After the 1970s 
crisis, the neoliberal approach was supported by the great majority of businesses and 
states. This meant the withdrawal of the state and increased mobility of capital 
between sectors and locations. Deregulation of finance was seen as a necessity for 
the mobilization of and speculation in capital. Deregulation on an international level 
allowed institutions, such as states and corporations, to borrow money with fewer 
restrictions and in higher amounts than they previously could. This led to a credit 
boom as a result of high demand for credit by states and consumers in response to 
the continuing fragile state of the real economy. There have been waves of lending, 
until each bubble bursts (over-accumulation) (e.g. Japan - 1990, world - 2008) 
(Eisenschitz and Gough, 2011).  
Speculation in assets, commodities, land and currency: Speculation of these kinds 
allowed people to make money out of money, with no relation to production. The 
changing political and economic situation had an impact on land and housing 
markets, which allowed people who could analyse the market to speculate on rising 
or falling prices of assets, commodities, land and currency (Smith, 2002).  
Considering all of the discussed above, when it comes to world city theory, the rise 
of finance and business services should be examined to explain the process of 
financialization. World cities emerged when, in the 1970s, the global financial 
system expanded dramatically and foreign investment was dominated, not by capital 
invested directly in productive functions, but rather by capital moving into and 
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between capital markets (Smith, 2002). In other words, the period since the 1970s 
witnessed the financialization of the world economy. 
Changes in the flow of capital around the world give an insight into the increase in 
the importance of finance in the economy. Firstly, in the 1980s and 1990s, different 
governments and international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) pursued neoliberal free market policies and encouraged the deregulation of 
financial markets and the liberalization of flows of capital across national borders 
(Pollard, 2001).  
 
   2.5.2 Headquarters of Manufacturing and Commercial Transnational 
Companies 
The development of transnational companies was discussed in the previous section 
(see Chapter 2.3), and in this section, the spatial arrangements of these companies 
and headquarters of manufacturing firms are examined. The headquarters functions 
of manufacturing firms and transnational corporations, but not their production or 
research and development operations, started to locate in the last 30-40 years in the 
centres of world cities to be close to other control functions (finance and business 
services) of capital. Many major finance and business services are located in world 
cities, and in addition to that, some of the world cities are capital cities (Bryson, et 
al., 2004; Daniels and Bryson, 2002). Being close to political centres and control 
functions is important for manufacturing firms to have more opportunities to 
improve their business, whereas controlling the production and research functions 
the companies is possible through advanced communications technology and 
international transportation.  
The benefits of being close to control functions are the business deals and 
networking that a company needs in order to make profits and have a bigger share in 
the international manufacturing market. These reasons lead firms to locate their 
headquarters in world cities, separated from their production sites. With the changes 
in the world economy (e.g. deregulation, stagnation) since the 1970s and advances in 
new technology, competition is becoming fiercer as well (Howells, 2002). In order 
to survive, some firms have not only had to locate themselves in the city centre, but 
have also had to change the way they produce goods. Manufacturing is becoming 
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much more service-and-design oriented, and the boundaries between what can be 
called a service firm or a manufacturing firm are becoming indistinct. According to 
Bryson, et al. (2004:56), this development is happening on many different levels: 
At its simplest level, many manufacturing companies, for example, 
ICL, the UK computer company owned by Fujitsu, no longer 
manufactures products, while over half of the turnover of companies 
like IBM and Siemens comes from selling services. The services that 
envelop manufacturing products take many forms: the financial 
package required to purchase a product; a product that cannot be used 
without the continued purchase of related services or the provision of 
a service instead of the provision of a machine. This also reflects a 
process by which the purchase of a product is not the end of the 
relationship between the producer and the consumer. Instead, 
producers are trying to create products that will ensure that consumers 
continue to interact with producers through ongoing and developing 
service relationships. 
 
The ways that firms are producing and consuming knowledge are also changing. 
Knowledge can be provided by in-house staff or by third parties. Using external 
providers of expertise gives firms a form of flexibility: they can use as much or as 
little of the service as required (Gallouj, 2002). Bryson, et al. (2004:50) state that a 
small group of manufacturing firms is developing an extreme form of flexibility: 
“They are becoming virtual manufacturing companies by subcontracting all 
elements of the production process, but retaining responsibility for the design and 
marketing of the products.”  
Manufacturing firms are not the only ones who desire advantage from being in the 
centre of a world city. The headquarters of commercial firms and property firms are 
mostly located in there as well. The headquarters of property firms benefit from the 
increasing land and housing prices in a world city and locate themselves in the city 
centre. In addition to this, most professionals who work in finance want to purchase 
a property in the city centre or in the inner city, and a significant part of property 
firms’ clientele consists of these professionals (Bryson, et al.,  2004).  
 
   2.5.3 Business Services 
Business services subsume legal services, advertising, engineering and architecture, 
public relations accounting, research and development and consulting. As the 
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command power of the control functions in the cities has grown in size and number, 
the operation and management of firms has become more complicated. As Sassen 
(2001:84) puts it: ‘management and coordination functions of global firms have 
become so complex that their headquarters increasingly outsourced these functions 
to specialized service firms.’ Sassen sees the rise of the service economy as 
integrating financial markets into global markets and into the increasing 
financialization of economies that ‘require a vast infrastructure of highly specialized 
services’ (Sassen 2001:84).  Another reason for this need is the deregulation that 
came with neo-liberal policies. Deregulation – the lifting of state controls on many 
industries – has increased the uncertainty faced by many firms and has had 
significant impacts on the profitability, industrial organisation, and the spatial 
structure of numerous sectors (Bryson, et al., 2004). To negotiate these complexities, 
firms need other firms to collect vast amounts of information and make strategic 
decisions; clerical workers to assist with large amounts of paperwork; researchers to 
study market demand and create new products; advertising and sales people to 
market their products; vast numbers of people to engage in public relations, 
accountancy and legal work; and financial experts to assist in negotiating the 
complicated decision-making environment. 
To understand how business services operate, we can take the example of two 
leading business services (legal services and accountancy). Hanlon (1999) discusses 
some criteria identified by Greenwood (1957) that he claims can be used to identify 
an activity as a legal and accountancy service: 
• They should be based on systematic knowledge. This means that becoming a 
professional involves detailed and extended training to develop professional 
competence.  
• A licence is required to practise as a professional and in some cases also a 
membership of a professional agency. 
Accountancy is one of the most important professions in business services. An 
annual audit undertaken by a professional accountant is a statutory requirement, 
although in the UK, SMEs (small and medium enterprises) with small turnovers – 
under £4 million – do not have to undertake an annual audit.  
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   2.5.4 Design of Consumer Products, Media and Culture 
So far, the last section has discussed the types of business services and the increase 
of business services in world city centres, and this increase is part of their 
restructuring. Media, culture and design centres have contributed to the growth of 
major sectors such as finance and business services. To examine this contribution, 
now I turn to the design of consumer products and the effects of media and culture in 
world cities. One of the most important product innovators for producer services is 
the design company. The industrial designer who is employed by the manufacturing 
company is responsible for analysing and suggesting changes in the product in order 
to increase demand. Designers are expected to be able to understand public taste and 
alter products to make them more attractive to the consumer. According to Bryson et 
al. (2004:69), design is “an integral part of the production process, but is separate 
from the actual manufacturing process.” In 2000, the UK Design Council surveyed 
firms concerning the advantages they had gained from using design and creativity in 
last three years (The UK Design Council, 2000). The majority of responses agreed 
that using design improved their products and service quality and increased 
profitability. According to this  (The UK, Design Council 2000), firms sought 
assistance about design from design consultants (65%), universities (27%) and the 
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) (11%) and needed most help with 
website/e-commerce design (47%) and product design (37%). These figures show 
how and for what purpose design assistance is used and where it stands in business 
services. 
Design is not only about the design of products, but it is also concerned with the 
design of  services, such as brands associated with the delivery of a particular 
service, paperwork and the improvement of a company’s identity as a corporate 
body. The shift in focus of design functions since the 1980s, from  design for 
manufacture towards design for the service sector, does not mean manufacturing 
design declined, but rather that growth areas in the design industry were in retail 
design, packaging, design of company documents and events (Julier, 2000). 
Design income and the number of independent design consultancies has increased 
dramatically in the last 20 years: “annual fee income of UK design consultants 
doubled from £175 million to £350 million between 1985 and 1995 (Julier, 2000: 
10).” According to Julier (2000:10), in 1966 there were only three design 
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consultancies in London; by 1999 there were 536, and employment in all creative 
industries increased by 34.9 per cent between 1994 and 2001.  
According to the UK body responsible for issuing the Certificate in International 
Trade and Finance (CITF, 2001): 
In Europe, Britain and Germany are the most important markets for 
design services with US$2.4 billion and US$2.2 billion spent 
respectively in 1994. France and Spain follow with an expenditure of 
US$0.9 million. The growth in Germany has been generated by 
product development and civic design projects while in Britain 
graphic communications and environmental design have dominated. 
The UK is the most important exporter of design services, exporting 
over £1 billion of design consultancy in 2000. In 1999, the leading 
export markets for UK design expertise were the US, Benelux 
countries, Germany and France. 
 
The media and culture are two other important sectors that work together with 
design. An important ancillary function of world cities is ideological penetration and 
control, and I think media are a crucial tool for this purpose. New York and Los 
Angeles, London, Tokyo and Paris are centres for the production and dissemination 
of information, news, entertainment and other cultural artefacts (Bryson et al., 2004). 
Many world cities in MDCs are leading the entertainment, media and culture sector. 
Most international prestigious events (e.g. the Olympics, the FIFA world cup) take 
place in world cities. 
Design centres, media and culture have played an important role for in the growth of 
sectors such as the FBS or headquarters of manufacturing firms in world cities. The 
design of consumer products and media helped firms to manipulate the market or 
make their products attractive for the potential consumers, and world cities, with 
their diverse urban population, represent a global sample for consumers around the 
world. For industrial and commercial companies, growth of these sectors has been 
important and they located themselves close to the control functions and as a result 
have had some effects on the spatial layout of world cities CBDs. It is important for 
my research to examine the impacts these sectors have had in world cities.  
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   2.5.5 Tourism 
One of the main growth sectors in world cities in recent decades has been tourism 
and in particular, urban tourism. It is heavily concentrated in city centres and has had 
strong links with the restructuring of the central cities for the sake of attracting 
tourists in world cities such as London, Rome, and Paris. Therefore, tourism is an 
industry that has important effects on world cities. The most important type of 
tourism investigated in this thesis is urban tourism and its increase. With the 
contribution of advances in international and local transport, international tourism 
has become more available to professionals, and this has resulted in some changes to 
tourist attraction sites and tourism services. In addition to advances in international 
and local transport, the rise in real income in the last decades has been important as 
well. This has created disposable incomes that have allowed middle and working 
class people (especially in MDCs) to have holidays abroad (Urry, 1995).  
Many urban tourist attractions in MDC cities are in historic areas that have been 
preserved through social activism in the 1960s in opposition to ‘bulldozer renewals’. 
In the 1960s, urban social movements demanded a cessation to the destruction of 
historic neighbourhoods, and intellectuals like Jane Jacobs (1961) in New York 
showed the importance of small scale and called for sensitivity in renewal of what 
were then considered ‘slum’ areas. The combination of street protests and the 
formulation of a coherent rationale for urban conservation resulted in a number of 
victories that safeguarded areas and subsequently became magnets for tourism. 
Tourist niches have appeared for tourists who are looking for different experiences. 
This interest has been leading developers to see that they can profit from urban 
conservation by investing in arts-related developments and adaptive reuse of old 
industrial buildings (Jacobs, 1961; Turken and Sen, 2009).  
When it comes to heritage tourism in urban areas, some cities have managed to 
preserve their historical heritage, but some of them have lost very substantial parts of 
it. For example, London has lost a massive amount of its historical heritage in the 
last 50 years (Sleath, 1984; Doward, 2013), and Istanbul lost more than half of its 
historical heritage in the last 20-30 years (Karaman and Islam, 2012; Yalcintan and 
Cavusoglu, 2012; Yalcintan, 2010). The reason for these losses has been the 
influence of property developers on the built environment and their desire to make 
profits from urban land. But on the other hand, areas conserved for heritage tourism 
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pose some dangers even in well-preserved cities. Advertising heritage tourism in 
historic cities all around world for the sake of profit rather than as introductions to  
the cultural heritage of a place can cause problems such as the loss of cultural 
heritage, uncontrolled increase in the service sector (e.g. hotels, cafés) and tensions 
between tourists and the inhabitants of the areas.  
Urban tourism is distinct from all other types of tourism because in this case, the city 
itself is the product. There are several things about a city that attracts tourists: 
• The built environment of a city 
• Historical heritage 
• Shopping areas 
• Cultural events 
• Business conferences 
• ‘Naughty’ tourism (prostitution, drugs) 
All or most of these things that are listed above come together in a world city, and 
this combination and being a world city leads large numbers of tourists to visit those 
cities. This may create congestion and overcrowding (traffic, pedestrians) and 
sometimes reduces the standard of living of the locals of that city. As noted by 
Mishan (1969), the spread of mass tourism does not indicate the ‘democratisation of 
travel’ and this applies for urban tourism in world cities as well. Urry (1995) uses 
‘democratisation of the travel’ to explain the increase in non-work travel by the 
middle and working class people. Up until the 19th century, travelling for non-work 
reasons was for the elite, but with the advances in transportation and usage of new 
forms of transportation (rail, air), different social classes were permitted to travel en 
masse. In fact, mass tourism leads to the destruction of the places that are being 
visited because geographical space is a limited resource, and the more popular the 
place becomes, the worse the experience of the journey because of the increase in 
tourist numbers. For that reason, a tourism market growing without any regulation 
threatens the very places that are the objects of interest for the tourists (Urry, 1995).  
 The theory of the social limits to growth (Hirsh, 1978) supports this point about the 
limits to the ‘consumption’ of places However, Hirsch (1978) is particularly 
concerned with ‘positional economy’: work, social positions, and social 
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relationships that are subject to congestion or crowding. If one person consumes 
more, that means another person will be forced to consume less, and this kind of 
consumption is different from the consumption of material goods that can be 
increased in the production process. Consumers’ satisfaction or dissatisfaction 
depends on consumption by others rather than individuals’ own consumption 
because of the nature of the consumption subject, which is a city, not a material 
good. For this reason, tourism is not entirely a market in which every person has a 
free choice whether or not to participate in an economic exchange for the use value. 
This, as Urry (1995:135) puts it, can be called “coerced competition”.   
It is normally assumed in economics that market exchanges are 
voluntary so that people freely choose whether or not to enter into the 
exchange relationship. However, in the case of coerced consumption 
people do not have such a choice. One has to participate even though 
at the end of the consumption process no one is necessarily better off. 
This can be summarised in the phrase: ‘one has to run faster in order 
to stay still. 
 
This process applies to cultural and urban tourism where there is limit to the 
consumption of a cultural heritage. If this cultural heritage is popular and visited by 
many tourists, that may mean the experience of it may not be pleasant. This is part of 
the coerced consumption that is mentioned above. In addition to that, for the case of 
urban tourism that is mostly concentrated in world cities, its core tends to be 
dominated by entertainment facilities and retail services. Consumption through 
tourism is becoming more and more important. Even though in the past, this kind of 
consumption was separated from activities such as shopping, culture, architecture 
and so on, nowadays, this difference is disappearing (Urry, 1995).  
Tourism led to not only to growth of employment in consumer services, but also 
considerable changes in the spatial layout of centres and inner parts of world cities. 
The growth of tourism in world cities contributed to FBS and the construction sector 
and as a result, tourism, by increasing the attraction of a world city and contributing 
to the gentrification process. 
 
 
 
38	  
	  
   2.5.6 Manufacturing Production 
As we saw in Section 2.3, manufacturing production went through many changes 
over the last few centuries. In this thesis, I examine in detail the changes in 
manufacturing production over the recent decades with regard to their spatial effects 
in world cities. Over the last 40 years, one of the main tendencies in the 
manufacturing sector has been retaining ‘complex manufacturing’ in MDCs. 
Complex manufacturing is the kind of manufacturing that uses high knowledge 
content and highly-skilled labour to produce high-tech products (e.g. aircraft 
manufacturing). This kind of manufacturing needs technical knowledge that is 
largely produced in MDCs, while in an overwhelming number of instances, the 
routine production with semi-skilled and low-skilled labour was moved to LDCs 
(Howells, 2002).  
While some of the previously important manufacturing sectors started to experience 
a decline in the post-war period, the most rapidly growing sectors in manufacturing 
in the 1980s and the 1990s were high-technology and craft-based production, and  
furniture, footwear, and clothing. The decline of certain forms of production has led 
to some reorganization of the labour market in the manufacturing sector, which has 
resulted in the loss of power for labour unions, the loss of contractual protections, 
and the increase of part time and temporary work forms (Sassen, 2001). Another 
result of this restructuring is the increase in the number of sweatshops and industrial 
home-work, replacing what used to be well-paid jobs in largely organized plants 
(McDowell and Massey, 1984).  
The expansion of low-wage jobs contributed to the spread of small production firms 
and the decline of large-scale factories. This situation came to a point where 
sweatshop production workers in London or New York had to compete with cheap 
labour or imports from Asia. Sassen (2001) argues that the needs of this workforce 
were met in the family, so they were really cost effective for employers enabling 
some competition with the cheap imports from Asia. 
In MDCs, manufacturing is mostly not in world cities, but is located in smaller cities 
and city regions, but complex manufacturing is carried out. In MDCs, there are also 
remnants of routine manufacturing production, but this is declining. One certain 
thing about manufacturing in MDCs is that it is being relocated from world cities 
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because of the high costs of a world city location. One type of manufacturing that is 
present in world cities in MDCs, however, is sweatshops that rely on the exploitation 
of immigrant communities. In LDCs, manufacturing is located in the cities and very 
big proportions of it are located in the largest cities and city regions of those cities 
(Bryson, et al., 2004). There are three reasons why manufacturing has not left big 
cities in LDCs such as London or New York (Bryson, et al., 2004).  Firstly, cities 
have historically been the manufacturing centres of these countries, so 
manufacturing is part of their inherited designation. A second reason is an 
infrastructure issue. Generally, in LDCs and NICs, efficient infrastructure for 
manufacturing exists in or around big cities and locating in a remote city in a LDC 
would require a large investment in infrastructure. For that reason, manufacturing 
firms prefer locations that already have the infrastructure systems they need. Lastly, 
rural-to-urban migration is continuing in LDCs, and these cities receive enormous 
reserves of cheap labour. This is an advantage for manufacturing firms. 
This section has discussed the distinction between MDCs and LDCs in relation to 
the location of manufacturing. Now I move on to the sector of international transport 
and communications.  
 
   2.5.7 International Transport and Communications 
Growth of major sectors such as finance and business services in world cities has 
depended on but also has been stimulated by the expansion of transportation and 
communication. For that reason, this expansion and its effects of control functions in 
world cities presents itself  as important for this thesis. 
Supposing that geography is the study of how human activities are extended over the 
earth’s surface, an important part of the study of geography is what we know, and 
how we feel, about space and time (Harvey 1990:418-434). Even though space and 
time seem ‘natural’ and outside of society, they are actually social constructions, and 
different societies develop different ways of handling and perceiving them. From 
this perspective, time and space are socially created and deeply shape individual 
perceptions and social relations. Telecommunications have been a very important 
part of this process for more than 150 years, advancing the flow of information and 
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bringing places closer to one another in relative space through time-space 
compression (Brunn and Leinbach, 1991). 
Improvements in international transportation have contributed to creating a world 
economy. Being able to take an airplane at any time of the day, on any day of the 
year, makes it easier for firms to manage their business located in different places. 
Because of the improvements in transportation and telecommunications, 
international and local airports, transportation links have increased dramatically, 
especially in and between world cities.  
In this section, there are three key points about transportation. The first one is the 
transport of goods that is relevant to manufacturing. Changes the transport industry 
faced in the last 40 years have altered the way goods are transported. One important 
mode of transportation that has been transformed in the last decades is shipping. 
Despite predictions of decline with advances in air travel and communications, there 
has been an increase in shipping trade. Building bigger ships and bigger ports for 
these ships has been possible in the last 40 years, and these changes brought cost 
reduction to the industry. That means that having a port in a city has become 
important again, and every world city has one or more international ports.  
A second way of transporting goods is through air freight. In the last decades, air 
transportation of goods has increased dramatically as well. These increases pushed 
world cities to build ever-expanding ports and airports. 
In addition, increases in air freight traffic led to developments in passenger transport. 
Increased efficiencies in air passenger transport have served the control functions in 
world cities. Air travel is usually used by people in control function positions. 
Another key point is electronic communications, most importantly, developments in 
computing. Starting with the oil crises of the 1970s, in the late twentieth century, 
global capitalism experienced important technological changes that deeply affected 
the production services. Some of these changes, such as the shift to floating 
exchange rates and the ending of the Bretton Woods agreement in the early 1970s, 
were motivated by global geopolitics and were confined to the world of finance. 
However, some other changes such as the microelectronics revolution have had 
effects on many sectors and caused enormous changes through the decline in the 
cost and the increase in the processing power of computers (Bryson, et al., 2004). 
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Technological changes in the last decade have made communications cheap and fast 
and made it possible for control functions to be based in the centre of world cities 
and still able to manage their production or research and development sites that may 
be located in different parts of the world.  
This development of digital capitalism allows huge quantities of information to be 
transmitted in real time over the planetary surface (Schiller, 1999). It makes it much 
easier for a large company to exist in multiple national markets simultaneously, 
managing the activities of thousands of employees within different corporate 
divisions of labour by accessing to complex channels of communication.  
One of the important features of world cities is that they are external information 
exchanges. Information presents itself in two ways: electronically and face-to-face 
exchange. The high-level intelligence and control functions of the global cities are 
distributed across a wide geographical area, but face-to-face interactions still have 
their power, and when it comes to important meetings about business and politics, 
face-to-face activity is still the first way to arrange these things. The importance of 
face-to-face activity contributes to the increase of international transportation as 
well. In addition, this activity indirectly contributes to the tourism sector. Business 
or academic related conferences and important meetings that are usually held in 
world cities allow the international participants to explore the city as  tourists. 
Having discussed effects of advancements in transportation and communication in 
restructuring world city-centres and the major growth sectors, I now turn to national 
state administration as a sector that affects world cities and its connection to the 
sectors such as FBS. 
 
   2.5.8 National State Administration and Regulators 
In the case of capitalist cities, national states – in addition to its other features –  
behave like an employment sector, so it is important to examine this function 
because since the 1970s and with the changing world economy, states started to take 
on a more entrepreneurial role, which contributed to the growth of the FBS sectors 
in world city centres, and as a result, to the restructuring of the cities. The national 
state claims to act in the interests of the whole country, but it is based in one city. 
There are some instances where the capital city of a country is also a world city and 
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the biggest city of that country (e.g. London, Rome, Paris). One of the examples for 
this is a spin-off version of employment in the state, which is ‘lobbying’. Every 
world city that is a capital city at the same time has many people, such as legislators 
and member of regulatory agencies, working in lobbying.  
There is another reason that the presence of the central national state is important in 
a world city. According to neo-liberal theory, the operations of the state should be 
minimal; however, this is not the case. If anything, state intervention (especially in 
LDCs) has increased since the 1980s, and this makes national state regulators 
important for a world city. However, this does not mean that there has been no 
deregulation, and in fact, this promotion of deregulation in neo-liberal economies 
creates a sense of competition between nation states as well. Transnational 
companies, which seek policies aimed at deregulation, especially of labour markets, 
benefit from this sense of competition, and they were encouraged to locate their 
production sites by national states in MDCs and LDCs. This resulted in 
headquarters, finance and business services locating in world cities in MDCs and 
LDCs (but mostly MDCs) because they require a close relationship with regulators.  
In LDCs, multinational corporations have influenced governments to soften their 
policies on labour market regulation and trade limitations. This situation results in a 
competitive state system where each state attempts to isolate itself from 
unpredictability of the world market while trying to turn the world market to its 
advantage (Gough, 2013; Knox, 1995; Bryson et al., 2004).  
 
2.6 Locally-Based Sectors 
Moving on from export sector and global divisions of labour, this section focuses on 
locally-based sectors to examine the spatial results in the world city centres with the 
growth of these sectors. Locally-based sectors are sectors supplying local firms and 
consumers, and they cannot exist outside the specific locality they are based in: in 
other words, they are local. Many of these sectors are consumer services that are 
greatly affected by the increase in FBS. The output of locally-based services comes 
from export services, and these services are provided directly. This means that there 
is no other mediating process happening between the clients and the service 
43	  
	  
providers, and there is a direct relationship between them. In almost all world cities, 
the largest sources of employment are in locally-based sectors (King, 1996).  
Locally-based sectors increase their effect on the economy by working together. 
Examples of locally-based sectors include:  
Commercial property development and land market as a whole: Existing stocks of 
offices in the city are part of this sector as well as the new spaces being continually 
built by developers. Land is inherently limited and expensive, and land itself cannot 
be transferred to another location. These features of this important commodity lead 
to speculation that affects the internal economy of the world cities. Speculation and 
competition for land are a crucial part of the land and property sector. Therefore, 
they feed on the internal economy of world cities, and they contribute to them 
(Gough, 2013). 
Internal transport and communications: The need for intra-city railways, bus lanes 
and motorways in world cities is dependent on the internal economy of the city, and 
since these services are provided for the specific city, they are locally-based 
(Bryson, et al., 2004). 
Consumer services: Services such as shops, catering, and entertainment are 
dependent on the localities in which they are based, and they rely on consumer 
habits or the internal economy of world cities. These services do not include 
multinational chains that do not rely on single locations. Illegal services such as 
drugs and prostitution can also be identified as locally-based services. Lastly, 
domestic workers in big cities are providing consumer services as well. These 
workers are usually immigrants and almost always work for affluent employees of 
international corporations who are paid well above local standard rates, as well as 
receiving large bonuses. In addition, these cities have high-profile visitors who come 
to business meetings and conferences being held in world cities. This results in 
growing numbers of local people receiving income from core sectors and from other 
high-profile residents, which leads to a dramatic expansion in up-market 
consumption and increasing numbers of domestic workers (Gough, 2013). 
The presence of finance and business professionals in a world city has usually been 
associated with increases in consumer services (Sassen, 2001). New kinds of culture 
in urban areas and different consumer preferences and lifestyles have emerged.  New 
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York, London and Tokyo have had a core of wealthy residents for a long time, but 
the new FBS professionals are different from this wealthy stratum of upper class 
residents. Their income is usually not enough for big investments, but is used mostly 
to sustain their lifestyles – spending rather than saving, postponing having children 
and setting up two-career households (Urry, 1987). However, the point here is that 
these expenditure patterns have increased demand for high-priced goods and 
services. This demand in turn produces demand for unskilled labour in low-paid jobs 
in cafés, bistros, and hotels in the city centres (Bryson, et al., 2004).   
Basic services: Basic Services include public and private services in education and 
health. Private services in this sector consist of private hospitals and private schools. 
Because of the increase in incomes of professionals, the provision of private services 
in world cities has increased as well, and world cities have many more of these 
services than other cities. 
Housing ownership and development: Housing as such is a major area of investment 
for capital. Increases in land prices fuel property investment. As already noted, the 
existing stock of housing in the city is part of the sector, and since land is limited, 
competition between firms over land is a crucial aspect of this sector. These conflicts 
are one factor in the increases in land and house prices. Another is that high paid 
employees who work in export sectors would like to live in the centre to be close to 
both their work places and city centre lifestyles (Gough, 2013). This leads to 
increased rents and property prices, making it hard for low-skilled (and some middle 
class) employees to live in or close to the inner city or city centre. This forces low-
paid workers to live on the peripheries of large metropolitan areas and fuels 
gentrification of many formerly working class neighbourhoods in the city centre (see 
Chapter 3). Lastly, social housing is part of this sub-section. Because of high rents 
and property prices, the poor have many problems living in the city centre. 
Especially in the MDCs, social housing creates a way for the poor to afford living in 
world cities.  
These services (consumer, basic, housing) are highly differentiated because of 
income polarization and rich tourists and business visitors in world cities. A whole 
section of these services are directed to the well-off.  
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2.7 World City Economies as Wholes: Interaction of Sectors  
This section examines the internal economy of world cities and its connection to 
changing world economy. The restructuring of the world city centres and inner cities 
is very much related to the spatial distribution of the control function in the city 
centre and the ways in which these major sectors interact with each other.  
Manufacturing firms based in MDCs located themselves in developing countries or 
outside of the world city in another region in the same country. However, in NICs 
and LDCs, even though the finance and business sectors increased dramatically, 
manufacturing did not decline or even leave the big cities. Rather, manufacturing 
relocated in the periphery of world cities. In addition, even though production was 
decentralized in many cases, headquarters of manufacturing firms chose to stay in 
the city centres of all world cities, close to the control functions that mostly involve 
the export sectors (Knox, 2001).  
In the current world economy, it is clear that finance, business services and 
headquarters are very much connected to each other. National states can also be 
added to these connections, in the sense that the state is in continual contact with the 
senior management of these sectors, concerning laws and regulations relating to 
finance and business services and to privatization processes. This applies to MDCs, 
NICs and LDCs. However, for NICs and LDCs, the connection between the state 
and finance and business sectors is much stronger because of the LDCs and NICs’ 
need to catch up with the MDCs economically.  For this reason, the state is 
encouraging FBS sectors by cutting taxes or loosening regulations (Sassen, 2001).  
There are two other connected sectors, the creative sector and tourism. The creative 
sector includes design, media and culture (see Section 2.5.5) and has many 
transactions with the tourist sector, mostly in the form of culture and heritage 
tourism. 
In addition to all these, in a world city centre with all these connections, land prices 
are dramatically higher than any other cities in the same country. The speculation 
created by the finance and real estate sectors contributes to the increase in land 
prices, especially in non-housing, commercial business areas. In the short term, this 
increase in land prices results in some businesses being squeezed out of the centre 
and leaving their places to mainly big chain corporations that can afford to locate 
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there. In the long term, in capitalism in general, the price of buildings in a city is 
determined by the supply on the one hand and strength of demand on the other. It is 
the balance between them. The strength of demand depends on locational advantage 
of a firm and how much a firm is willing to pay ‘ground rent’, and this willingness to 
pay a high amount for ground rent is particularly visible in world cities. Ground rent 
is created by the profit (‘surplus profit’) that is made above the national average in 
the form of technical or design rents. This profit gives core sectors their political and 
economic advantage in the city region. This profit ‘appropriated’ by land and 
property owners is considered ground rent (Gough, 2013). The demand and price of 
property is determined by the dynamics of the occupying sectors. In this case, the 
FBS and construction sectors are the occupying sectors. As Gough (2013:15) puts it: 
On the one hand, a ‘successful’ world city is based on high surplus 
profits in the core sectors.  On the other hand, these lead to inflation 
in wages in the core and to some extent in the non-core sectors, and to 
high prices for both commercial and housing land; these latter lead to 
a decrease in the surplus profits of the core, to profits in the non-core 
sinking below the national average, to weakening of non-core sectors 
in ways which damage the core, to reduction in the standard of life of 
non-core workers and residents, and to fiscal strains.  Successful 
growth in territory of the core sectors thus logically undermines itself 
as well as harming other social actors.  
 
Following this section, I move on to the labour force and their local, 
international movement in and out of world cities world cities and the spatial 
effects that are caused by the employment practices. 
 
2.8 The Population and Labour Force of World Cities  
The dynamics of the sectors mentioned in this chapter and their employment 
practices determine the dynamics of population and labour force in world cities. 
When it comes to occupations, world cities exhibit dichotomized labour forces: a 
high percentage of professionals in control functions on the one hand, and on the 
other, a large army of low-skilled workers engaged in manufacturing, personal 
services, hotels and tourist and entertainment industries, serving mostly 
professionals or upper class people (Sassen, 1984). Over the last 30-40 years, this 
has meant an increase in part-time jobs requiring few qualifications.  
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Part time jobs can create greater flexibility in filling various shifts, 
and reduce labour costs by avoiding various benefits and overtime 
payments required by full-time workers. […..] In its analysis of the 
retailing industry, the National Economic Development Office 
(NEDO 1985) in Britain found a substitution of full-time jobs for 
part-time ones and that much of the employment growth in the 
industry was actually a function of this substitution  (Sassen 
2001:290) 
 
 In world cities in developed countries, a significant part of the low-skilled labour 
force consists of international migrants from LDCs. For this reason, labour flow in 
and out of world cities is highly affected by migration trends shaped by the world 
economy and national migration laws.  
Here, I consider the labour force of world cities in two parts. The first part examines 
the situation in developed countries; the second examines the situation in developing 
countries. The reason for this distinction is that population, skills, types of jobs, and 
wage levels are very different in developed and developing countries. This is 
important to have a better understanding of the effects the movement of labour force 
causes in the spatial layout of and the interaction between major sectors in a world 
city.  
Developed Countries 
Over the last 30-40 years, the number of jobs in MDCs increased in almost every 
sector except manufacturing. However, this increase has not been as dramatic as it 
has been in LDCs. In Developed countries’ cities, increases in employment have 
taken place in finance and business services, media, tourism, sometimes in public 
employment, while employment in the manufacturing sector has been declining. 
This has led to a decline in proportion of employees with medium incomes because 
with the increase in finance and business services, wages started to increase and the 
associated increase in consumer services led to an increase in the number of low 
wage jobs. With the increase in both high and low wage employment and the decline 
in middle incomes, polarization (in incomes) has been an issue. This polarization 
had effects in the built environment, such as, on the one hand, the construction of 
expensive housing and the provision poor quality housing for lower-income 
inhabitants, on the other. With the growing gap in income and finance growing 
fastest in CBDs, inner city areas started to change, often through gentrification (see 
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Chapter 3).  
As noted before, in MDCs, a large section part of the low-skilled workforce consists 
of immigrants. World cities are destination targets for large numbers of domestic 
and international migrants. International migrants mostly choose a developed 
country to settle and work where they create different kinds of urban culture. MDCs 
also receive another type of migration in the form of international migration of the 
professional and rich who are parts of the labour force of skilled and high-paid jobs. 
Professionals who migrate to world cities significantly contribute to the 
gentrification process in these cities (see Chapter 3). Lastly, some residents of world 
cities work partly in other cities. People mostly working in skilled and high-paid 
jobs visit world cities on daily, weekly or monthly bases and create a different kind 
of labour force. 
Unemployment and underemployment still exist in MDCs. Cities in developed 
countries have faced unemployment mostly because of the decline of the 
manufacturing sector. According to ILO (1996: International Labour Office, 
Geneva): 
Over the last two decades the average drop in manufacturing 
employment in G7 countries was 15 per cent. Among the larger EU 
countries, the UK's share of manufacturing employment declined by 
43%, France's by 23% and Germany's by 14%. Most EU countries are 
struggling with double-digit unemployment with the result that social 
exclusion, once relatively rare in western Europe, is now prevalent in 
large cities and towns. The US has low unemployment, but average 
real wages have stagnated in the last 20 years, and high pockets of 
unemployment do exist in some large U.S. cities. 
 
Developing Countries 
In developing countries, the situation has been a slightly different. Most of all, as 
stated before, the manufacturing sector did not decline in big cities; in many cases, it 
has been growing. Because of the lack of adequate infrastructure and urban policies, 
this transformation had many negative consequences in developing countries’ cities. 
High levels of underemployment are seen as a characteristic of a developing 
country, and urban labour markets are not capable of absorbing the number of job 
seekers. According to the International Labour Organization (ILO), between 20% 
and 25% of adults living in the urban areas of developing countries are without jobs. 
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Because of the lack of jobs in the formal economy, some of the urban poor are 
forced or choose to create their own employment in the informal sector.  
Many of the un- and underemployed workers in the low-paid and marginalized 
sectors in developing countries’ cities have migrated from elsewhere. Rural to urban 
migration involves mainly unskilled labour coming to big cities to find better jobs, 
increase their life standards and provide better education for their children. 
Developing Countries also receive international migration of the professional and 
rich as well as those who work partly in other cities across the world. However, the 
level of these two types of migration is significantly lower compared to MDCs (ILO, 
1996). 
Underemployment in developing countries is an important issue, in which people are 
obliged to take on any possible economic activities that are mostly poorly paid. 
There are few other alternatives or little social security in the form of unemployment 
insurance (ILO, 1996). This leads people to work in informal, marginalized sectors 
in developing countries. For example, in Latin America and the Caribbean, 83% of 
all new jobs created between the years 1990-1993 were in the informal sector. 
In summary, labour power in world cities both in developed and in developing 
countries consists of: Super rich; professional and creative class, medium pay 
(private sector; welfare services; infrastructure workers, manufacturing workers 
(varied pay); consumer service workers (low pay); semi and unemployed, petty self-
employed, illegal trades (drugs). 
 
2.9 States’ Support for World Cities 
As we saw in Section 2.3, even though neo-liberalism advocates for less state 
interference and free flow of exchange, states, until this day, have been active in 
regulating the markets. The difference is that this intervention is not to strengthen 
the welfare state system, but to benefit the capital. One way of doing this is to boost 
the large cities within the territory of a country (especially in LDCs and NICs) to 
turn them into world cities in order to attract more foreign and local investments.  
Activities such as hosting the Olympics cannot be performed solely by private sector 
and are not covered here.  
50	  
	  
States in capitalist societies function to further capital accumulation and world cities 
are major sites for state support for accumulation. The development of all the 
economic sectors discussed in this chapter has not proceeded simply through the 
actions of capital, but has been strengthened by all sorts of state interventions. For 
instance, national states often put in place regulations that favour of banking for the 
finance sector, and local governments can use urban plans and grant planning 
permissions in favour of business services and make it easier for big businesses to 
have a location in the city centre, regardless of the harm it may cause to the public 
space. An example for this is giving away green spaces such as parks in the city to 
businesses for the sake of profit (Knox, 2005; Sassen, 2001; Gough, 2013). 
World cities are mostly driven by the internationalization of sectors such as finance 
and business services and manufacturing, but especially in the case of developing 
countries, world cities are promoted by the state. This allows states to attract foreign 
and local investment to the city and create a place for themselves in the world 
economy. Two processes are important: 
• Promoting world cities within the world divisions of labour. 
• Supporting and organising world cities’ internal reproduction.  
As seen in Section 2.6, much  state policy aims to increase and foster finance and 
business policies in big cities, but this can have negative social consequences, such 
as increasing inequality in urban space,    
One result (of the decentralization restructuring of world economy 
since the 1980s) has been the acceleration of shifts in patterning of 
uneven development as more flexible corporate organization and 
production systems have been able to quickly exploit particular local 
mixes of skills and resources. Another outcome is that local 
governments are being forced to be much more competitive with one 
another as they attempt not only to protect their economic base during 
a time of upheaval and transition but also to identify and exploit some 
comparative edge with which to lure the newly-flexible flows of 
finance and production. This inter-governmental competition has bred 
so-called ‘entrepreneurial’ cities, whose governments have been 
drawn beyond questions of tax policies, infrastructure provision and 
service delivery to explore public-private partnerships, foster 
favourable ‘business climates’ and initiate controls on labour through 
contract negotiations with municipal workers (Knox, 2001:369). 
 
Neo-liberal theory indicates that the state should support deregulation, and in the last 
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30-40 years, certain forms of state regulation have been reduced, but not by as much 
as the theory would suggest. Especially in world cities, the nation state has if 
anything increased its intervention in the market. Even though MDC intervention is 
not as much as in NICs and LDCs, MDC states have a big influence on the 
organization of their world cities as well. In other words, despite the neo-liberal 
rhetoric in world cities, regardless of which country they are located in, there is still 
state intervention and control over the organization of the city. 
 
   2.9.1 Promoting World Cities within the World Division of Labour  
There are several ways in which nation states promote their big cities for capital 
accumulation (Knox, 1995; Sassen, 2001; Bryson et al., 2004).  
State support for financial capital accumulation: Deregulation allowed finance and 
business services and associated private firms to operate in world cities with less 
regulation and increased profits, attracting global corporations to locate in these.  
State support for cultural industries to create global prestige: States can support 
cultural industries in many ways. One way is through laws and regulations, such as 
special planning laws that allow the creation of tourist or entertainment areas, more 
tourists or tourism related investment.  World cities popular with tourists also attract 
potential organizers of prestigious international events (e.g. exhibitions, concerts) in 
that city.  
State support for tourism: State support for tourism can be through publicly-owned 
media and planning laws. In addition, some states can give loans to private firms to 
invest in these areas to support tourism.  
State support for airports and ports as major international hubs: With the advances 
in international transportation, transportation of goods and passengers has become 
crucial for every world city (see Section 2.5.7). For this reason, world cities are 
expanding existing and building new ports and airports. However, without the 
coordination of a state, it would be hard for private firms to undertake such projects. 
This expansion and new built ports and airports boost rest of the world city, earn 
foreign exchange and make it easier for big firms to operate in a world city.  
Place marketing of the city and hence the country through large-scale events: 
Without state money and coordination, it would be almost impossible for a city to 
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host a big event like the Olympics because these events are not profitable and the 
kind of infrastructure they need is beyond a private firm’s power to supply. For this 
reason, this kind of marketing can only be accomplished with the state support. e.g., 
the Olympics, and expos. 
In MDCs, national states do not need to use many tools to promote their world cities. 
Economic control functions are already located in top world cities in developed 
countries and many of these cities have been important for centuries (such as 
London). However, this does not mean there is no state intervention and control in 
MDCs. State control for the organization of a world city in MDCs very much exists 
despite the neo-liberal support for deregulation that was discussed in section 2.3.  
For NICs and LDC world cities, state intervention and control is even more 
significant. They are under much more pressure to catch up with MDCs in economic 
performance and have greater needs to promote their cities for capital accumulation. 
This is one of the reasons that national states in developing countries enact laws and 
regulations that favour transnational businesses and corporations, but which deepen 
the social polarization.  
 
   2.9.2 Supporting and Organising World Cities’ Internal Reproduction 
The organization of sectors in world cities have been challenging for nation states. 
Because of the international nature of world cities, their organizations are different 
and more complicated than other cities. World cities’ centres are concentrated with 
control functions such as finance, business services and the headquarters of 
manufacturing firms and because of this, concentration and the interaction between 
these sectors, internal transportation, consumer services and housing structure of the 
cities tend to be more complicated compared to the other cities around the world. In 
addition to that, it is mainly world cities that hold important international events 
such as the Olympics or World Cup and these events require additional 
infrastructure, development and in some cases, housing, which complicates the 
internal reproduction and arrangement of world cities even further. There are some 
tools states use to organize and support the development of their world cities 
(Bryson et al., 2004; Beaverstock et al., 1999; Daniels and Bryson, 2002):  
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Internal transport infrastructure: Improvements in internal transport infrastructure 
not only allow people living in the periphery to be able to work in the city centre, but 
also allows local and international tourists to see all around the city, and by 
decreasing the journey time in transport, the popularity of the city increases. 
Efficient internal transport infrastructure can make a world city easier to live and 
holiday in.  (e.g., London’s vast current investments in rail) 
Planning of commercial and office developments, and of grand events: International 
and prestigious events can increase the popularity of the city and attract foreign and 
local investments to the city.  (such as the Olympics) 
Boosting of centre/inner city luxury consumption: Development in luxurious 
consumption and housing attracts foreign and local investment and also attracts 
people with high income to live in the city. However, this can also lead to social 
polarization and class conflict in the city. Because making city centre mostly for 
luxurious consumption can bar working class people from being able to use the city 
centre as they would like to, this can eventually lead to social segregation. 
(especially in developing countries). 
Boosting gentrification: Similar to boosting of inner city luxury consumption, 
boosting for gentrification also attracts foreign and local investment to the city 
centre and attracts middle class people to live in the city centre. With boosting 
gentrification, cultural events such as exhibitions can increase as well and as a result, 
this can have ‘positive’ effects on the urban tourism and attract more tourists to the 
city centre. However, this can create social polarization in the city because 
gentrification can displace many working class people can be displaced from the city 
centre to the periphery of the city (especially in developing countries). This is 
discussed in details in Chapter 3. 
Providing affordable housing: Providing social, affordable housing can attract low-
skilled labour that is essential for consumer services to the city, and eventually 
efficient consumer services can attract more tourists and investments. In addition, 
providing affordable housing helps working class people live in a better way in the 
city and decreases some chance of social segregation (especially in developed 
countries). 
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 “Why is the private sector not enough for this support and organization?” There are 
several answers to this question. Firstly, some of the investments such as transport 
infrastructure, affordable housing, and grand events are not profitable for a private 
company, and these things need very high levels of coordination that only a state can 
have. Planning commercial and office developments and boosting inner city luxury 
consumption usually require buying off big amounts of land and transforming them, 
and only the state has the ways to organize land use with rights for compulsory 
purchase and planning permission. 
In this section, I have argued that the state serves capital by building world cities in 
its own territory, but there is another way of looking at this, which is the state, for its 
own interests, wants to grow world cities. This may be the case to the extent that all 
states have an interest in the growth in their economy. The notion of a state having 
social interest is highly controversial. In this thesis, I emphasized the ways in which 
capital uses the state. Undoubtedly, many nation-states have been extremely active 
and even pro-active in building world cities.   
 
2.10 Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed changes in the world economy over the last 40 years and 
restructuring the world city centres. The world city is a locality where the major 
growth sectors of world economy are facilitated according to a hierarchy. The 
changing world economy since the 1970s that is sometimes known as neo-liberalism 
and the certain sectors such as the FBS contributed to the number and size of world 
cities. One urban form that has been affected greatly by this changing world 
economy and world cities is inner city gentrification. Increasing employment in 
finance and business services and boosting luxury consumption in CBDs and inner 
cities attracted many young professionals to live in central residential areas. Many 
inner city residential areas that were previously working class started to be 
gentrified, and some of them became inaccessible by the urban poor (Smith et al., 
2001; Soja, 2000; Harvey, 1996). The next chapter discusses how the development 
of world city economy has led to gentrification. 	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CHAPTER 3: GENTRIFICATION 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
We have seen the growth of professional jobs in world cities (see Chapter. 2.8) and 
the changes in the housing market as a result of changes in the economy. One of 
these changes is the growth of professionals in inner cities and city centres with a 
slow process of gentrification that often takes a decade.  
This chapter starts with exploring the history and conceptualizations of gentrification 
over the last 50 years or so in major cities. It continues with the debate about supply 
and demand processes of gentrification to further understand the theorization of 
gentrification in the literature and the social life and culture of professionals to 
explain the increase of professionals in the inner city area and in the city centre. 
Following this, the supply of inner and central housing is discussed to answer the 
question: “Where do professionals tend to live?” This question is important in order 
to understand the kind of housing they prefer and the different kinds of tenure in the 
inner city. Types of tenure in the inner city have a direct impact on explaining the 
process of gentrification in those neighbourhoods. Having discussed housing in the 
inner city, the chapter moves on to the replacement and displacement of the working 
class to explain different mechanisms, different economic gainers and different 
impacts on the working class, and again in this section, tenure is examined to present 
the gentrification process and its consequences. The rest of the chapter is set out as 
follows. I examine the evolution of processes of classical gentrification, and this will 
be followed by the explanation of state-led gentrification. In this section, I provide 
particular attention to the recent debate on gentrification in the global South and 
whether or not Euro-American theories of gentrification can be applicable to the 
developing world. Finally, the chapter ends with the resistance of the working class 
in gentrified neighbourhoods. 
 
3.2 The History and Concept of Gentrification 
Since the 1960s, the life style preferences of middle-class people in developed 
countries have shifted from suburban living to inner city areas that were formerly 
working class residential areas. This shift in preferences has sparked processes of 
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gentrification. In this case, gentrification is more than just the global accumulation 
of capital; it is affected by changes in preferences and shifts in social dynamics.  
Gentrification – the transformation of an area from working class to middle-class – 
is a topic of extensive urban inquiry (Lees et al., 2008). Since the 1960s, there has 
been extensive analysis in gentrification in the global North (see Smith, 1977, 1996; 
Beauregard, 1986; Butler, 2005; Lees and Butler, 2006; Paton, 2014; Ley, 2003; 
Lees et al., 2008). In recent years, there has been considerable writing on 
gentrification in the global South; however, this has focused mostly on state-led 
gentrification (see Islam and Sakizlioglu, 2015; Hasan, 2015; Krijnen and 
Beukelaer, 2015; Abasa et al., 2012; Shin and Kim, 2015; Ghertner, 2014; Shih, 
2010). The underlying reasons of gentrification are economic and social changes are 
taking place irrespective of tenure, types of gentrification, or the role of property 
capital in a country. They underlie both processes of gentrification in the global 
North and global South. The processes of gentrification proceeds in very different 
ways in different cities or localities depending particularly on ownership, housing 
stock, the role of property capital in the country, the power of national and local 
state.  
The term gentrification has been widely used but between the 1960s and the present, 
the concept changed greatly. While in the case of London in the 1960s gentrification 
was a relatively marginal process in the market brought about by ‘urban pioneers’, 
today it is a multi-faceted process that has close links to urban regeneration 
processes (Smith, 2002).  
A major debate in gentrification research has centred on the theoretical explanation 
of the process. Early definitions of gentrification were closely aligned to Glass’s 
(1964: xviii - xix) description: 
One by one, many of the working class quarters in London have been 
invaded by the middle class – upper and lower. Shabby, modest mews 
and cottages – two rooms up and two down – have been taken over, 
when their leases have expired, and have become elegant, expensive 
residences. Larger Victorian houses, downgraded in an earlier or recent 
period - which were used as lodging houses or were otherwise in 
multiple occupation have been upgraded once again. The current social 
status and value of such dwellings are frequently in inverse relation to 
their size, and in any case enormously inflated by comparison with 
previous levels in their neighbourhoods. Once this process of 
gentrification starts in a district it goes on rapidly until all or most of 
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the original working class occupiers are displaced and the social 
character of the district is changed. 
 
Gentrification began before the term was coined, and Neil Smith (1996:32) gives 
Haussmann’s Paris as one of the very first examples of gentrification. Haussmann 
(1853) demolished residential areas that poor people were living in, displaced them 
to make room for city’s now ‘popular’ boulevards. The new residences became the 
most exclusive in the city. The current forms of gentrification emerged in post-war 
advanced capitalist cities in the 1960s. Run-down inner-city neighbourhoods were 
upgraded by pioneer gentrifiers, and the original working class residents were 
displaced.  
Post-war urban renewal meant the bulldozing of old neighbourhoods, to be replaced 
by modern housing and highways. As the destruction got bigger, so did the reaction 
against it. In the beginning, protestors were mainly historians and architects, but in 
time, young, middle class people joined this movement (Smith, 2002).  
Since the 1980s, gentrification has gone global and can be found in different sites all 
over the world. It is evident not just in English-speaking countries, but in Eastern 
Europe, South America, the Caribbean, South Africa, Asia, and holiday islands like 
Tenerife (Davidson and Lees, 2005:1167). 
Gentrification is usually identified by its physical appearance e.g, ‘Brownstoning’ 
(New York or ‘Whitepainting’ (Toronto) (Hamnett, 1984:285-6; Moore, 1982), and 
original studies focussed on describing the physical changes it creates: 
The first sign is a crisp white painted house front. Outside, one of 
those continental biscuit-tin cars, a Renault 4 or a Citroen 2CV is 
parked. Inside, through the window – it has blinds not curtains – one 
spots a Japanese paper lampshade, a smart little bookcase of the kind 
you get on mail order from the Observer, stacked with glossy 
volumes of reproductions, a stripped pine table, a long sealed and 
sanded floor with dead sheep for carpets. The middle interior wall has 
gone, and one can see through into the back garden with its breakfast 
patio. The knockers-through are here. 
 
Subsequently, some social and economic criteria were presented to describe 
gentrification (Warde, 1991:225).  First, it is seen as a process of resettlement, a 
process of displacement of a group of inhabitants with another of higher social status 
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and bringing about new patterns of social segregation. Secondly, there is a 
changeover of the physical environment, through construction work that presents 
common aesthetic features, and the emergence of certain types of local service 
provision. Thirdly, gentrification is a concentration of people who are assumed to 
share a common culture and life-style or at least share common consumer 
preferences.  
Both social and cultural changes and changes in built environment have been very 
varied over the history of gentrification. Early writers saw gentrification as a ‘back 
to city’ movement by the middle class who were not satisfied with suburban life and 
the time spent for commuting to the centre (see Hamnett, 1984, for a summary). But 
subsequent research has shown that gentrification is not only a return to the city 
movement. It is also a decision for middle class people living in the city centre to 
stay in the city for various reasons. These reasons cannot be limited to unsatisfactory 
conditions of suburbs, and they derive from the changes in economy and in 
consumer preferences (McDonald, 1986; Hamnett, 1984; Moore, 1982). With the 
changing economy, many young professionals started to live in city centres and 
chose to stay childless for a longer period of time than they did in the 1950s. These 
changes were part of the reasons that led them to stay in the city.   
In the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, gentrification in world cities was mostly through the 
private housing market, which is now usually referred to as classical gentrification 
(see Davidson, 2008; Lees et al., 2008; Huse, 2014).However, from the 1990s, 
gentrification processes were increasingly encouraged by state intervention (see 
Chapter 2.9) Gentrification through the private sector shows some households’ 
willingness to pay for housing in certain areas that were previously ‘undesirable’, 
even as the market price of housing in other areas remains constant or declines. The 
second type is state-led gentrification. Although changes in the world economy 
indicate that the role of the state is decreasing, state-led gentrification is gaining 
significance.  Local governments and district level governments are important in this 
because it is precisely the local urban policies – besides global economic flows and 
national policies – that can determine whether an area with a considerable ‘rent gap’ 
will be gentrified or not (Jelinek, 2011). Rent gap theory is used as an explanation 
for gentrification by Neil Smith (1979) and refers to the gap between the current 
rental income and potentially achievable rental income. Instead of the private 
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housing market being the only mechanism for transformation of inner city 
neighbourhoods, the state plays an active role in this transformation through eviction 
of the working class with compulsory purchase (see Tarlabasi Renewal Project, 
Birmingham Eastside). As mentioned in the previous chapter, some states want a 
fast transformation in the city to secure their places in the world economy by 
growing a world city in their territory. With the tools of the state, urban 
transformation happens quickly, effectively and with a lower price compared to 
gentrification through private housing market. This is explained later in the chapter. 
The differences between classical gentrification and state-led gentrification are the 
factors that trigger change in the built environment. Classical gentrification is caused 
by changes that happen as a result of the actions of individuals and private firms. 
Within these actions, patterns exist that reflect wider changes in the wider society 
and occur within both private and social housing. Classical gentrification is simply a 
way for social and economic forces to sometimes make it possible for people to 
create profits by investing in previously disinvested residential areas (Webb, 2010).  
The more recent research into state-led gentrification applies gentrification ideas to 
processes of reinvestment that are taking place as a part of more complex changes in 
urban space. Unlike classical gentrification research, these processes of urban 
change are not fully ascribed to socially and economically driven changes in the 
private sector; they incorporate a significant element of government policy. In state-
led gentrification, instead of economic processes driving urban change, the state is 
driving urban change and co-operating with private developers to deliver their plans 
(Cameron, 2003). 
 
3.3 Supply and Demand Processes of Gentrification 
Having discussed some criteria to describe gentrification, there have been some 
debates concerning the theorization of gentrification. In the gentrification literature, 
the initial debate about supply and demand processes is important, and for that 
reason, I am analysing this briefly. Supply and demand in gentrification processes 
should be articulated together. The supply aspect argument is that actors invest in a 
neighbourhood in a way in which capitalises on the value of latent characteristics of 
that area, the market value of which was not previously fully realised. Smith (1979a) 
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argues that gentrification is principally a phenomenon developed from the supply of 
housing opportunities appearing out of the operation of the urban land market. He 
rejects the approach that gentrification is a consequence of consumer preferences 
and only focuses on the manner in which the gentrified property is created. The 
resulting theory from this approach is ‘rent gap thesis’ (Webb, 2010:16). It is one of 
the explanations for the process of gentrification as the product of investment and 
disinvestment in the urban land and housing market. With time, development in the 
urban land and expansion create a tension between ‘capitalized ground rent,’ the 
economic return from the rights to use land with its present use and `potential 
ground rent,` the return that could be earned if the land were used at its ‘optimal 
highest use’ (highest rent). As the gap between potential and capitalized ground rent 
gets bigger, pressure for land use change increases, and residential gentrification is 
one way of realising the rent gap. Even when the ‘rent gap thesis’ acknowledges that 
there is a relationship between production and consumption patterns, the focus is 
predominantly on the production side (Smith, 1979:540) e.g., supply. However, the 
rent gap thesis suffers from its rejection of demand aspects of gentrification and their 
importance in theorizing gentrification. The rent gap thesis explains only one 
condition necessary for gentrification, but does not provide the explanation of the 
‘human agency’ involved. 
As well as supply aspect explanations, there are also demand aspect explanations, 
and gentrification should not be considered as solely a facet of capital accumulation. 
Demand aspect explanations suggest that processes of economic restructuring and 
changing cultural attitudes and preferences might create additional demand for the 
housing and neighbourhood qualities of a specific location (Webb, 2010:17). An 
explanation for this is the shift of a city’s employment from the working class to 
middle class and the desire of young professionals to live in the inner city. Another 
example might be the higher income group people taking interest in the cultural 
revalorisation of particular features of Victorian housing by those with higher 
incomes (Webb, 2010:17). Demand side explanations of gentrification have looked 
at the factors which have catalysed market adjustments, in terms of capital and 
population, in areas affected by supply and demand forces. The presence of artists, 
for example, has been identified as one of these catalysts, attracting higher income 
households by increasing the cultural status of a neighbourhood (Ley, 2003). 
61	  
	  
Neither side of this debate fully considers the other aspect, thus leaving the 
theorization incomplete (see Paton, 2014; Lees and Ley, 2008; Slater, 2006; Bondi, 
1999). Firstly, dynamics of a commodity are always a function of society and 
economy, and they are not two completely separate things.  The supply of gentrified 
housing would never occur without the demand and vice versa. Secondly, society 
and economy is not a system that has two components, but it is one system. The 
development of economy has social consequences, and this development leads to a 
change in labour force, and that leads to a change in consumption patterns. 
Therefore, separating supply and demand does not present an adequate explanation. 
They are not distinct are constituents of a single system that is in fact called a city. 
For this reason, gentrification is a concept that should be considered with both 
‘human’ and ‘economic’ agencies. 
As the debate developed, the two sides of the debate have converged; however, they 
still have very different emphasises. It had important impact on the research of 
gentrification and provided insight in different aspects of it. Hamnett (1984) argues 
and later Smith (1987) accepts that if supply side explanations were to be integrated 
with the demand side explanations, better gentrification theory would be possible.  
This would involve looking not only at the supply of land for gentrification (rent 
gap), but also at the supply of gentrifiers: 
The attempt to integrate consumption-side and production-side 
arguments – not in some mechanical resort to the notion that one 
‘crosscuts’ the other, but rather in the notion that production and 
consumption are mutually implicated – should at least be at the top of 
our agenda (Smith, 1987a:163). 
 
In addition, recently rent gap theory started to be brought into the discussion 
of gentrification not as an obsolete theory, but as an important explanation 
(see Slater, 2015). Slater (2015:10) argues that Smith was always aware of 
the effect of ‘human agency’ in the theory of gentrification, and he 
summarizes the importance of the rent gap theory as: 
A signal contribution of the rent gap was to show that, first, the 
individual, personal, rational preferences in the housing market much 
beloved by neoclassical economists, and, second, the ‘new middle 
class’ dispositions towards a vibrant central-city (and associated 
rejections of bland, patriarchal suburbia) that intrigued liberal-
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humanist and feminist geographers, are all tightly bound up with 
larger, collective social relations and investments (core to the rent gap 
concept is that ground rent is a product of the labour power invested 
in land, and that preferences are not ‘exogenous’ to the structures of 
land, property, credit, and housing).  
 
As mentioned above, I agree that consumer preferences and what is 
considered as ‘human agency’ in the processes of gentrification are not 
‘exogenous’, and considering or examining them separately from the 
economic explanations is an obstacle to creating a better conceptualization of 
gentrification. Identifying rent gaps, agencies, owners, developers who 
realize these rent gaps, and the underlying economic and social proceses is 
important for understanding the processes of gentrification (Slater, 2015). In 
other words, rent gap theory can be used to identify the capital gains made, 
by whom and for what purpose.  However, this means that rent gap theory 
can be a tool with other urban concepts, but not an adequate explanation by 
itself.  
 
3.4 The Social and Cultural Life of Professionals 
In most large cities in developed and some developing countries, until the processes 
of gentrification began to take hold roughly in the 1970s, the typical residential 
pattern was for middle class professional people to live in suburbs. Exceptions to 
that were mainly young, childless professionals living close to the city centres before 
getting married and moving to the suburbs to have children.. Households with two 
paycheques were not as common as they are now, and even when the woman was 
working, it was mostly in part-time employment.  
When FBS sectors started to increase in the city centres of big cities, employment in 
these sectors started to increase as well. In addition, manufacturing production began 
to move out of the big cities (in MDCs) or to move to the periphery of the big cities 
(in LDCs), so employment rates in manufacturing decreased in the city centres while 
employment rates in finance and business services increased dramatically, and the 
numbers of the professional class in city centres of large cities followed suit. 
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Professional class people started to move and live in the city centre and they 
changed (or gentrified) neighbourhoods according to their needs and tastes. 
In order to examine the increase in highly-skilled labour (professionals) and how 
they are involved in the process of gentrification, it is important to answer the 
question “where do professionals live in the city?” Professionals still tend to live in 
the suburbs of world cities, but with changing cultural and economic preferences, 
they have also come to live in inner city areas and city centres. This section of the 
discussion is concerned with the gentrified neighbourhoods in the inner city and 
sometimes in the city centre areas and the reasons that lead professionals to choose 
property in these areas and become gentrifiers because it is an important process for 
understading Istanbul. 
One of the reasons professionals are attracted to inner city areas is the postponement 
of marriage and childrearing. This has become more common in the last few decades 
and in more and more cases, remaining childless has become the decision of these 
households. This situation leads to differences between the consumption needs of a 
more traditional family that has moved to the suburbs and a childless or single 
person household (Beauregard, 1984). 
Another reason for choosing inner city lifestyles is the increase in women’s 
employment since the 1950s and 1960s. Professions in health, education, media and 
cultural industries now have many female employees. This does not mean gender 
inequality in dual career families, professions or wages has ceased to exist. 
However, since the 1970s, many middle class women have started to work, and now 
middle class women are expected to work full-time, as well as taking prime 
responsibility for childrearing (Butler, 1997). The shift from manufacturing to 
service sectors requiring highly-skilled, non-manual jobs was most evident in big 
cities such as London, and it became easier for educated women to find jobs in the 
city centre, which also makes it easier for couples to find a job in a big city rather 
than somewhere else (Fielding and Halford, 1993).  
For professionals’ households, especially those with children, living in inner areas 
can minimize travel to work times and costs. In addition, even for childless 
households, a long journey from home to work seems undesirable, while living close 
to the centre leaves more time for the enjoyment of inner city social life. Given the 
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higher levels of education among professionals, they are more likely to be attracted 
to the cultural infrastructure of big cities (Lyons, 1996). 
The consumption style of professionals is based on purchasing commodities for 
public display, which is made possible for this kind of household through 
postponement of familial responsibilities and consequent savings. Clothing, 
jewellery, vacations and luxury items such as automobiles and cameras are part of 
the identity of the potential gentrifiers. Consumption is also a public activity: 
entertainment at home is replaced by restaurants, movies, theatres and clubs. These 
consumption patterns are not so different from other professionals who are not living 
in the inner city, but what makes them important for gentrification is that these 
consumption patterns intersect with decisions about biological reproduction 
(Beauregard, 1986:35-55) because the postponement of marriage and childrearing 
makes it important for people to meet others and develop friendships. Single people 
seek to meet other singles, and to do that, they can choose to go to bars or clubs 
where they congregate. Couples need friendships besides their work place, and they 
wish to congregate in public places (Butler, 1997). These opportunities, possibly 
much more numerous in the city than the suburbs, lead people to remain in the city 
to satisfy their consumption habits (both inside and outside the house) and to meet 
people.  
The potential gentry (Glass, 1964) treat shopping as a social event, an enjoyable 
pastime and frequently use bars and restaurants. This is one of the reasons that 
gentrified neighbourhoods also experience an increase in service sector businesses, 
such as gourmet ice cream, a nouvelle cuisine restaurant, fashion designers’ shops or 
dance studios. According to Beauregard (1986:35-55), ‘the purchase and 
rehabilitation of existing commercial establishments as a neighbourhood begins to 
gentrify contribute to further residential gentrification. The two are mutually 
supportive.’ 
Consumer services such as entertainment, hotels, motels, elements of tourism, eating 
and drinking establishments, and personal services are mostly located in the city 
centre, creating spaces of up-market consumption. With changes in consumer habits, 
the growth of upmarket consumption in the city centre (especially in world cities) 
has increased dramatically. Considering the fact that gentrifiers or potential 
gentrifiers mostly prefer to move to a neighbourhood that is close to these consumer 
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services, it is not surprising that gentrified neighbourhoods in inner city areas are 
close to most of the entertainment and cultural elements.  
However, these are not the only reasons for the emergence of first wave gentrifiers. 
It also involves the desire to secure their life-style, which leads them to purchase 
housing in the city. Considering that the potential gentry consists of ‘educated’ 
consumers who know that they should have a future financial plan through savings 
or investments, they also realize the maintenance of their consumption habits cannot 
be left to the workings of the economy (Butler, 1997). On the other hand, when a 
group of gentrifiers cluster in a ‘desirable’ area, it leads to inflated prices for housing 
and services. This sometimes makes it hard for even for first wave gentrifiers to stay 
in that neighbourhood. For that reason, the professionals who are mostly young, 
trying to maintain a certain ‘taste’ in their surrounding and aware of the fact that 
they should have a future financial plan to maintain their life style, choose areas that 
are run down, but likely to increase in value as a form of investment in future 
financial gain.	  In countries where housing is dominated by owner occupiers, there is 
a particular attraction to areas where there is a promise that housing prices are going 
to increase.  As Beauregard (1986:35-55) puts it: 
Given the limited capital of this potential gentry, their desire to be 
close to their places of employment, their peculiar consumption 
needs, and the derivative desire to treat “housing” as both an 
investment item and as a statement of the image of affluence and taste 
which these individuals are trying to project, it is not surprising that 
they search for inner-city locations near central business districts, 
with amenities and with an architecturally interesting housing stock 
which has the potential to be rehabilitated and redecorated, and where 
housing costs are, for the moment, relatively inexpensive but prices 
are likely to rise. That is, the end result of these forces is the demand 
for a specific type of housing in specific types of residential area. 
That this is also recognized by developers, real-estate agents, and 
commercial investors reinforces the housing choices of potential 
gentrifiers. The point is that this is not the same as the generalized 
demand for inexpensive, inner-city housing. In most cities, there is a 
large amount of inexpensive housing, but not very much of it entices 
the gentrifiers. That which does not is left for lower-income groups, 
or as simply abandoned.  
 
Jager (1986) adds more to the discussion about the taste of professionals and argues 
that architecture and aesthetics have social significance for gentrifiers. He argues 
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that gentrification is one of the ways a new urban middle class attempts to establish 
itself a social entity. He calls it the ‘neither/nor’ class (Jager, 1986:1) that has to look 
continually to the classes below it in order to distinguish itself from them and 
reassure itself of its continued existence. . They do not look up to the upper classes, 
and they have a culture that is distinct from bourgeoisie.  Jager (1986: 79) draws 
parallels with a previous era by suggesting that the occupation of gentrified housing 
compares with that of owning servants in Veblen’s analysis of the leisure class: 
For Veblen’s leisure class, servants had a dual function; they had to 
work and perform, and they also had to signify their master’s 
standing. Gentrified housing follows a similar social logic. On the one 
hand, housing has to confer social status, meaning and prestige, but 
on the other it has to obey the social ethic of production: it has to 
function economically. 
 
From this it follows that urban conservation helps professionals to show a kind of 
social status because urban conservation and renovation displays social distinction.  
All of the reasons discussed above have led professionals to become gentrifiers and 
to protect their lifestyles and create environments that they feel comfortable with 
(Williams, 1986; Zukin, 1987; Kasinitz, 1988). This chapter discussed the changing 
consumer preferences and features of gentrifers in the last few decades, and now I 
move on to supply of housing in inner city area to discuss the housing market and 
tenure that professionals choose to have.  
 
3.5 The Supply of Inner and Central City Housing for Professionals 
There have been middle class people living in city centres in Europe since the 19th 
century, e.g., Paris, London, Berlin, Rome: professionals living in the CBD or inner 
city is not new. This long-standing built fabric that has always been middle class is 
the housing of professionals who have lived in the city centre or in the inner city 
since before gentrification. However, this housing supply is not part of the 
gentrification process as its inhabitants are not forced leave the area because of 
increased housing prices or rents. In addition to that, there were many inner city 
working class residential areas in large cities such as London. These neighbourhoods 
were the first ones to experience gentrification in the 1960s-1970s, and their 
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inhabitants left the area because of increased living expenses and rent or were 
displaced (Raban, 1974; Zukin, 1988; Marcuse, 1986).  
There are some historically working class neighbourhoods in inner city areas of 
world cities (e.g., London), and with the increase in finance and business services 
sectors, decentralization of the manufacturing sector, and with the loss of jobs, these 
neighbourhoods have become more valuable. In the 1970s, working class houses had 
this ‘cosy and cottagey atmosphere’ for the middle class: this ‘working class 
atmosphere’ imagined by the middle class attracted them to these neighbourhoods 
(Jager, 1986). In addition, some working class neighbourhoods were originally built 
for middle class, but became physically deteriorated because the middle or upper 
class inhabitants left for various reasons, (political, moving to suburbs) prices and 
rents fell, and the neighbourhoods became populated by working class people. 
However, they have become valuable again because of the social and economic 
changes discussed above. In terms of attracting professionals, the style and size of 
housing in working class neighbourhoods that were formerly middle class is 
architecturally more important and valuable than other central working class 
neighbourhoods.  
More recently, new build housing in the inner city has capitalized on demand for 
inner city housing. This partly follows from the discussion of moving into the city 
centre, but it is outside the scope of the chapter. Nonetheless, it is necessary to 
discuss this issue to have a better understanding of the housing supply for 
professionals. New build housing enables professionals to realize their ambition to 
live in the centre by different means. The new build developments were located 
largely on old abandoned industrial, railway and dock land that became vacant in 
and close to CBDs, which is valuable for housing because of its location and lack of 
recent inhabitants. Professionals buy these units in these developments because they 
are close to amenities, entertainment and culture centres.  
However, although some researchers include this process in definitions of 
gentrification (see Smith, 1996; Davidson and Lees, 2005; Paton, 2014), I do not 
consider new build developments gentrification.  In order for a process to be defined 
as gentrification, there must be a change in the social class of a neighbourhood. 
Empty land cannot be ‘gentrified’, even if it is specifically constructed for middle 
class people.  
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Having discussed the supply of inner and central housing, I now turn to the supply of 
working class housing to examine the effects of gentrification. 
 
3.6 Displacement and Replacement of the Working Class 
The displacement of working class residents from gentrifying areas is an outcome of 
economic and physical changes. The term can cover physical causes such as lack of 
heating that forces tenants to leave (landlord harassment) and also economic changes 
such as rent increases. An early study (Grier and Grier 1978:206) argues that 
displacement: 
• is beyond the household’s reasonable ability to control or prevent; 
• occurs despite the household’s being able to meet all previously 
imposed conditions of occupancy; 
• differs significantly and in a spatially concentrated fashion from 
changes in the housing market as a whole; and 
• [is a result of] occupancy by that household [becoming] impossible, 
hazardous, or unaffordable. 
 
Whether an inner city neighbourhood was built as a working class neighbourhood or 
it became a working class over time, the mechanisms by which the middle class 
replace the working class are crucially dependant on the existing tenures of the 
working class residents. For different kinds of tenure, there are different mechanisms 
operating in an area, different economic winners from the land price rises and 
different impacts on the working class. I consider two cases: the first is a 
neighbourhood with mainly owner-occupiers; the second is a neighbourhood with 
mainly private tenants. 
Displacement occurs when the working class inhabitants are forced to leave their 
environment. When an area becomes popular, renovations start, and these 
renovations can be made by an owner-occupier or a developer. Houses are then sold 
at a higher price to the middle class in-movers. The type of tenure plays a large role 
because if the working class area is mostly owner-occupied, displacement occurs in 
low numbers (Paton, 2014). I do not think it is displacement when a working class 
inhabitant realizes the ‘rent gap’ and sells his or her property and leaves the 
neighbourhood with enough money to buy elsewhere. This might be thought of as 
‘replacement’ (discussed below) (Butler and Lees, 2006). Displacement tends to 
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happen when working class people are mostly tenants and are evicted, whereas 
owner-occupiers’ decisions to move out of a neighbourhood are not because they are 
being evicted but because they lose their social environment, their neighbourhoods, 
and the living expenses and consumer services becomes too expensive for them. 
Those who avoid these direct displacement pressures may benefit from 
neighbourhood improvements, but may suffer as critical community networks and 
culture are dismantled (Newman and Wyly, 2006; Slater, 2006). 
The primary net effect of gentrification is to create economic pressures on lower 
income residents (both tenants and owners) through a number of mechanisms. 
Clearly, most of these effects are related to increased costs of housing and pressures 
on private tenants: if there is no rent stabilization in the gentrified area, landlords can 
increase the rents dramatically. The most usual methods creating displacement are 
raising rents to a level that the current inhabitants are not able to pay, landlord 
harassment, increased property taxes, and being replaced by the state (in state-led 
gentrification). 
In the neighbourhoods where the majority of working class people were tenants, a 
different kind of gentrification process has taken place. Developers buy several 
houses in the neighbourhood and evict the working class tenants. Most of the 
neighbourhood is displaced, and working class people are forced to leave the area 
without any kind of economic gain. On the contrary, they are economically crippled 
by this process and leave the area poorer than before. In these cases, however, the 
displacement process was mostly initiated by landlords rather than developers. 
Where there are laws protecting the tenant, landlords  may employ illegal solutions, 
such as hiring people to harass their tenants, cutting off their electricity, changing 
their locks without their knowledge, and so on. Economic winners from rising house 
and land prices, the ones who realized the rent gap, are landlords, developers and 
middle class people (Hackworth, 2002; Zukin, 1988; Harvey, 1989; Smith, 1996). 
Displacement does not only affect those who are displaced at any given time. When 
the inhabitants of a neighbourhood realize that all their friends are leaving 
(forcefully or voluntarily), that shops are going out of business and new unfamiliar 
stores are opening up, they feel the area is becoming less and less liveable. This 
creates pressures on them, and then, it is only a matter of time before they leave the 
area as well. Some families under displacement pressure might move away as soon 
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as they can rather than waiting to be displaced. Pressure of displacement, as Marcuse 
(1985:207) puts it, is relevant to process of displacement itself: 
We thus speak of the “pressure of displacement” as affecting 
households beyond those actually currently displaced. It is certainly a 
significant part of the displacement problem. Pressure of 
displacement can be distinguished from subjective fear of a remote 
possibility of displacement by looking not only at the perception but 
also the reality of what is happening in a neighbourhood: subjective 
concern plus rent prices rising over the city average, for instance, 
might be taken as a crude benchmark. 
 
Another aspect of displacement processes is based on changes in consumer 
preferences in a neighbourhood due to gentrification. New consumer habits drive 
existing shops out of the neighbourhood, and this situation increases the feeling of 
“out-of-placeness” for the existing inhabitants. Actual displacement occurs for the 
shopkeepers. Losing their customers and not being able to adjust to new consumer 
habits forces them to leave the neighbourhood (Davidson, 2008). One example of 
this is provided by Davidson (2008:2392): 
Recently, the New York Times ran a story about 82-year-old Calvin 
Copeland. Calvin had started his 547 West 145th Street Harlem 
catering business, Copeland’s, in 1958. For almost 50 years, his 
business had survived riots and looting and, later, crack cocaine and 
AIDS epidemics. Yet, the New York Times was reporting that this 
story of survival was coming to an end. Calvin’s soul food restaurant 
has been unable to overcome its latest challenge. Gentrification has 
pushed away many of the Black families who used to patronize his 
business. “The White people who took their place don’t like or don’t 
care for the food I cook,” he said. “The transformation snuck up on 
me like a tornado.” After falling behind on rent and bills a year ago, 
Mr. Copeland tried to hold on to his business, investing more than 
$250,000 of his savings, he said. Finally, in May, he acquiesced to 
defeat. Calvin’s loss of livelihood and Harlem’s loss of a soul food 
restaurant is a story of gentrification.  
 
In the case of replacement, in working class neighbourhoods that were mostly 
owner-occupied, the rent gap was realized not only by middle class people, 
speculators and developers, but also by working class people. This process of social 
replacement happened in many historical working class neighbourhoods in the inner 
city across the world, although Smith (1996) did not consider this case of working 
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class owner-occupiers because he was dealing with the US where most of the 
working class were tenants. But elsewhere (such as Australia), where working class 
owner-occupation has been more common, gentrification processes have resulted in 
social replacement rather than displacement. Working class inhabitants simply sold 
their flats for double or triple what they originally paid, making a capital gain that 
allowed them to move to less expensive neighbourhoods. They were able to profit 
from their property, but their moves were also because the changes in cultural and 
consumer preferences in the neighbourhoods were no longer suited to their needs.  
In the case of the developing part of the world, displacement commonly takes place 
in a much more brutal fashion and as a result of state-led gentrification process (see 
Doshi, 2015; Huang, 2015; Ghertner, 2014;2015; Betancur, 2014; Lopez-Morales; 
2010; Islam and Sakizlioglu, 2015). One of the case studies in this thesis examines 
this process in detail (see Chapter 8). 
In this section, outcomes of gentrification such as displacement and replacement 
were defined and examined. Both of the these are visibly classical (in other terms, 
market-led) gentrification, and now I consider in more detail the stages of classical 
gentrification to discuss gentrification in neighbourhoods that are owner occupied 
and privately rented. 
 
3.7 Timeline of Classical Gentrification 
A model was developed based on American neighbourhoods, for what is seen as the 
‘classical’ gentrification process, arguing that it took place in phases, from pioneer 
gentrification to maturing gentrification (Hackworth and Smith, 2001:467): 
Stage 1 
A small group of risk-taking people move in and renovate properties for their own 
use.  At this stage, there is little public attention and little displacement because the 
new comers mostly take vacant houses. The first group of new-comers are mostly 
design professionals who usually have the skill, time and ability to undertake 
extensive rehabilitation. Even though these  art and design new comers can be seen 
as middle-class, they do not have as much money as professionals who are employed 
in the control functions in a world city. 
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Stage 2 
Some of the same type of people continue to move in and renovate the houses for 
their own use. Small scale speculators may renovate few houses in visible locations. 
Some displacement occurs because vacant houses are getting rare.   
Stage 3 
At this stage, major media or official interest is directed to the neighbourhood. 
Prices begin to increase rapidly and displacement continues. New comers start to see 
the area as an investment opportunity, and tensions between old residents and gentry 
begin to emerge. If the new-comers have less tolerance towards the working class 
inhabitants, the tension between gentry and old inhabitants becomes serious.  
Stage 4 
A larger number of properties are gentrified, and the middle class continues to locate 
in the area. At this stage, the new comers are professionals who earn more money 
than the first wave gentrifiers and work mostly for the control functions in the city 
centre. Efforts may be made by the professional and middle class residents to win 
historic designation for the district. Buildings that have been held for speculation 
appear on the market. Small specialized retail and professional services begin to 
emerge. Displacement now affects not only renters, but some home owners as well 
(Lees et al., 2008:180).  
In addition to Hackworth and Smith’s (2001) Four Phases, more recent literature on 
gentrification has added another concept to the model above – ‘super-gentrification’ 
(Lees and Butler, 2006). I refer to this as the fifth stage of gentrification. 
Stage 5 
 Lees and Butler (2006) introduce the concept of “super-gentrification” in their paper 
about Barnsbury, London. Lees and Butler (2006) explain that they use the prefix 
“super” to show that there is a further level of gentrification that can be imposed on 
an already gentrified neighbourhood. This level of gentrification needs higher 
purchasing power and consists of people in an income bracket higher than “normal” 
middle class people (Lees and Butler, 2006:469).  
 ….we have chosen the term ‘super-gentrification’ precisely because 
it describes a further process of gentrification that has been occurring 
in Barnsbury since the mid-1990s, a process that includes a 
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significant step change in social class composition and evidence of 
social replacement (rather than displacement) with a significant 
transformation in community relations (Lees and Butler 2006: 469). 
 
This section has shown that gentrification is a dynamic process and does not simply 
end when the whole neighbourhood is gentrified. In addition to these stages, it is 
also important to examine the ways in which gentrifiers improve the built fabric. The 
next section discusses these ways. 
 
3.8 Renovation of the Built Fabric 
One of the typical features of classical gentrification is gentrifiers buying and 
renovating flats themselves. Gentrifiers use different ways to modify or renovate 
their property. In part, these repairs are afforded by loans and mortgages, and with 
these, there are three ways of renovating: 
1- Prospective owner-occupiers buy a house, rehabilitate it themselves with their 
own money or with a construction mortgage or loan, and use their own labour. When 
all the work is finished, they may sell to another as a commodity, but more 
frequently, live in the place themselves (Smith, 1979:538-48). 
2- An owner purchases a new property and employs a developer to renew it. This 
type of renovation, like the other two, is a linear process: purchase, rehabilitation, 
payment, habitation (Smith, 1979:538-48). The developer is paid by the owner (the 
one who purchased the property), and after the renovation, the commodity, which in 
this case is the renovation, is sold to the owner of the original structure. Under the 
present organization of the building trade, the labourer is paid by the builder and 
appears, therefore, to produce a commodity for him, a commodity (the 
rehabilitation) that the builder simply resells to the willing consumer (owner of the 
original structure).  
3- The transfer of the property from working class to middle class occupation can be 
mediated by developers who buy the buildings and improve them before selling. 
Typically, a private developer can rehabilitate a group of properties or an entire 
street, usually with the help of real estate agents, or the state may declare an area the 
urban regeneration site and encourage private (institutional) as well as public 
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investment. This had many negative effects on working class tenants (Merrett, 
1976).  
As described in Section 3.1, the type of tenure makes a big difference to the process 
of gentrification. Tenure types can have effects on the role of local government and 
political power of middle class. In a working class neighbourhood that is being 
gentrified through the private housing market, if the inhabitants are mostly tenants, 
the power of the middle class has a bigger impact in the transformation of the 
neighbourhood. One example for this kind of impact is that, for example, in Istanbul, 
middle class people tend to have better connections with the local governments 
compared to working class people, and since they pay higher taxes, their opinion 
sometimes is regarded more important than the working class. In many cases, the 
local government supports that power. It is easier for a private developer to buy out 
many plots with several houses on them and evict everyone living there. In this case, 
gentrification takes place quickly and creates many more forced evictions for the 
working class than in a previously owner-occupied neighbourhood because when the 
working class neighbourhood being gentrified is mostly owner-occupied, inhabitants 
have more power to negotiate the terms of the gentrification process. However, 
when they are only tenants, they do not have the same negotiatiating power.  
The situation is very different if a neighbourhood is being gentrified by the state. 
The next section examines this issue. 
 
3.9 State-led Gentrification 
As discussed in the previous chapter (see Chapter 2.9), states have various ways of 
promoting and supporting their large cities, and boosting gentrification is one of 
them. However, gentrification through the private housing market needs at least a 
decade to transform the urban environment of a neighbourhood (Paton, 2014). 
Sometimes states (especially in LDCs) would like to see the physical and social 
changes that come with gentrification take place much more quickly, and they 
decide to play an active role in the process of gentrification. This results in state-led 
gentrification.  
Gentrification started in MDCs, but the process of state-led gentrification has been 
clearest in large scale redevelopments in the developing countries, where the state 
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has many tools to initiate this kind of gentrification, including compulsory purchase, 
special planning permissions and planning laws. These allow states to buy up large 
amounts of land and sell or contract them out to developers. During a state-led 
gentrification process, the existing built fabric can be demolished and built again to 
fit the needs of its prospective new inhabitants (e.g., Tarlabasi Renewal Project). In 
most cases, this results in the complete eviction of the working class people from the 
neighbourhood. States tends to choose working class neighbourhoods with high 
tenancy rates because it is easier to evict tenants than owner-occupiers (Islam, 2010; 
Yalcintan and Cavusoglu, 2012).  
In developed countries, state-led gentrification is not as common as it is in 
developing countries, and since there are more laws protecting tenants in privately 
rented neighbourhoods, this process mostly happens in social housing areas. In this 
thesis, I focus on state-led gentrification in world cities. The reason is that the 
process of state-led gentrification is more common in world cities all around the 
world; however, this does not mean that it does not happen in non-world cities (e.g. 
Housing Market Renewal Pathfinders in northern English cities).  
Another important question about state-led gentrification is why the state gets 
involved at a certain point. Since the 1970s, states in developing countries have felt 
the need to catch up economically with the developed countries. As discussed in 2.9, 
this has led developing countries to look for a “quick fix” for their large cities and 
their world cities in order to accelerate urban transformation in physically 
deteriorated neighbourhoods in the city centre or inner city. State-led gentrification 
is a much faster process than classical gentrification because of the intervention of 
the state. This intervention allows states to bring middle and upper class people in 
and attract investments to the inner city and city centre to ‘improve’ the economy of 
the city and sometimes of the country. Even though this process has many negative 
effects (e.g. social segregation, displacement) in the long-term as it does not take 
into account of the poor of the city, it is a preferred solution by some states in the 
short-term. These reasons apply for developed countries as well; however, as stated 
above, this process commonly occurs in developing countries. Now I turn to the 
explanation of state-led gentrification processes and how they operate in world 
cities. 
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3.10 Interpretation of State-led Gentrification in World Cities 
In Europe and the US, gentrification started through housing markets rather than a 
state policy. The state provided some help for the gentrifiers such as loans for 
renovations, but mainly, gentrification has been a process through private market 
with minimum state intervention in developed countries. It is fairly recently that 
states realized the economic gains they can achieve from gentrification and urban 
projects that can lead to gentrification. State-led gentrification is an action that is 
encouraging higher income populations to move into lower income areas. 
Researchers in the field argue that making profits out of restructuring the built 
environment for higher income groups is now a goal that is driving the states (Lees, 
2009; Smith, 2002; Glynn, 2008).  
Over the last 30-40 years, regulation of the market by the state has changed and now 
they support and copy market processes: states attempt to further and expand market 
processes instead of trying to constrain their damaging effects on the public with 
adjustments to redistribute income and provide welfare (Weber, 2002; Moulaert, 
2000). The transformation of gentrification from individuals acting to renovate 
housing in inner cities to large-scale urban strategies forces the development of new 
concepts for the role of governance networks in the process (Slater, 2004; Weesep, 
1994).  
Observers argue that reasons that are used, such as generating social order to make 
gentrification process run smoothly, eventually harm the interests of poor 
inhabitants. Rather, these policies aim to bring more middle class people to live in 
the inner city and the city centre and to increase the profit margins of developers and 
the tax bases of local governments (Smith, 1996). According to this view, the state 
acts in the interests of professionals and legitimates itself by stigmatising the victims 
of its policies (Smith, 1999).  
Words such as ‘liveability’ and ‘inclusion’ used to present these urban policies aim 
at certain people who are economically active into the physically deteriorated areas 
of the city centre. For example, in the US, the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD) HOPE VI and Section 8 programmes have emphasised similar 
urban policies, and they have replaced public housing with mixed-income, mixed-
use urban development. These policies aimed to scatter some of the poor residents 
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into more well-off areas and hope that they would be ‘civilised’ and ‘integrated’ into 
mainstream society (Popkin et al., 2004). Programmes that promote social-mix, 
deconcentration of poverty in a neighbourhood and social mobility have been 
characterized as gentrifying agendas (Lees, 2003; Smith, 2002). However, these 
kinds of urban policies and urban schemes do not match the traditional gentrification 
process. These are presented as development programmes for the society and 
deprived neighbourhoods, and they are supposedly beneficial to existing inhabitants. 
Nevertheless, the outcomes of such policies can end by producing total social 
transformation of a neighbourhood and displacement of the poor. These state-
induced policies sugar-coat the gentrifying agendas of national and local authorities. 
State-led gentrification started to take shape through such policies in developed 
countries, while in developing countries, policies are implemented in a rather more 
brutal fashion. In these countries, where the laws protecting tenants are limited or 
non-existent, the gentrifying agendas of state-induced urban regeneration or 
renovation projects are more visible. The displacement process, usually handled with 
no social agenda for the working class or compensation for their financial losses, 
results in stigmatization of the poor and further social inequality (see Chapter 6). 
 So it is important to ask: “Whose interests does state-led gentrification serve?”  
National and international national capital has an interest in rapid gentrification for 
the sake of transforming the city centre. This type of gentrification benefits 
gentrifiers, local government and large developers.  Except for the aim of re-
structuring the city, similar interests apply as in classical gentrification, but 
presumably, it is different from state-led gentrification partly because of the 
involvement of large scale developers in the state-led process This is important for 
my case study because in Istanbul, state-led gentrification has been empowered 
considerably by large developers. In addition, the difference between state-led and 
classical gentrification is that in state-led gentrification, these interests are fulfilled 
by the state instead of the private market and in a shorter time compared to classical 
gentrification; practices of state-led gentrification have more devastating effects on 
the tenants and even on the owner occupiers (e.g. displacement, forced eviction, 
state compulsorily purchasing houses below the market value). Some of the interests 
governing the process of state-led gentrification include (Butler, 1997; Smith, 1996, 
2007; Uitermark J, Duyvendak J W, Kleinhans R, 2007): 
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The desire of professionals to live in these places: Because of changes in the world 
economy, increases in professional jobs in the city centre and changing consumer 
habits, professionals prefer to live in central places and can afford to buy, often 
architecturally significant, dwellings in inner area working class neighbourhoods, 
and renovate the houses to suit their needs.  
The possibility of capital gains for developers: A developer can choose to work with 
the local or national state in an urban regeneration project. This way, the state is 
providing valuable land for the developer and the developer promises to invest in 
that location. In other words, enabling a developer make capital in this way can 
bring investment to an area.  
The removal of working class people from now valuable land:  State-led 
gentrification often results in displacing the poor from now valuable inner city land. 
This way, the local or national state makes it appear that the physically deteriorated 
neighbourhood is “improved” and brings more investment in the inner city and city 
centre. 
Gain for social housing from developers (mostly in developed countries): In many 
developed countries, when  private developers buy up publicly owned land and 
housing (non-vacant) or work with the state in urban regeneration or renovation 
projects, they promise to build a proportion of social housing along with the middle 
class housing. This way state can increase social housing without actually spending 
money.  
Social gain for professionals from living in a certain area: Considering that most of 
the state-led gentrification processes favour the middle classes, creating social gain 
for professionals (e.g., living close to entertainment and cultural amenities) and 
attracting them to the once physically-deteriorated areas are some of the reasons 
local or national states prefer state-led gentrification. By attracting middle class 
people to these neighbourhoods, states can have a fast transformation of the city 
centre and inner city.  
State re-structuring and transformation of the city for the growth of FBS: This is 
related to removing working class people from valuable land. Creating an inner city 
area and a city centre without the poor helps states (especially in developing 
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countries) to transform the city for growth of FBS, attract foreign and local 
investment. 
Creating conditions for a world city: Following from above, state-led gentrification 
can be seen as a tool for states (especially developing countries) to create and 
promote their large cities as world cities. 
However, the process of state-led gentrification has its price. Displacement, as 
discussed, has become increasingly common. Another problematic aspect of state-
led gentrification is that the influx of middle class residents does not increase social 
cohesion: on the contrary, it creates tension between the new and the old inhabitants 
of the neighbourhood (Beckhoven and Kempen, 2003; Veldboer et al, 2002). There 
is evidence that these consequences are taking place in developing cities such as 
Istanbul, Mumbai (Mckinsey, 1996; Harris, 2008; Ghertner, 2015). After ‘urban 
renovation’ and ‘renewal’ projects in these cities, the current inhabitants are being 
displaced by the state: in some cases they are being moved to peripheries of the city, 
and in other cases, they are not provided with replacement housing.  Because of the 
lack of infrastructure, unemployment and poverty in cities in developing cities, these 
urban policies tend to increase inequalities between social classes, creating housing 
for middle class people in the inner city at the expense of poor inhabitants.  
The next section examines state-led gentrification with particular attention provided 
to developing country world cities and what that means for the concept of 
gentrification. 
 
   3.10.1 Southern Gentrification? 
Above, I have talked about the concept of state-led gentrification, the reasons it may 
occur in a developed or developing country city. However, state-led gentrification, 
or in other words, gentrification processes that are actively facilitated by state or a 
body of authority, are more visible in developing countries. As mentioned in the 
introduction, there have been some concerns from various urban scholars about the 
proficiency of the concept of gentrification when it comes to researching cities of the 
developing world. With the economic changes since the 1970s, especially places 
such as China, Brazil, and India have experienced significant transformation (Less, 
2012).  With this transformation, particularly since the 2000s, many cities of the 
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developing world started to experience gentrification; however, these processes have 
not always been comparable with the Anglo-American understanding of 
gentrification.  
Some scholars (Lopez-Morales, 2015; Krijnen and Beukelaer, 2015) argue that we 
should ‘unlearn’ the Eurocentric concept of gentrification and conceptualize an 
understanding of gentrification for the global South. I do not agree with that. Even 
though there are different forms of gentrification emerging in the ‘peripheral’ cities 
of the world, the concept of gentrification that is theorized in the global North has 
useful tools to contribute and provide an insight for what is happening in the 
developing world. At the same time, gentrification in the global South can contribute 
to the global North as well. In addition, Merrifield (2014:x) talks about the ‘urban 
fabric’, the redundancy of the making strict distinctions, and the necessity to upgrade 
the ‘chaotic conceptions’. This is because nowadays, peripheries and centres, cities 
and suburbs, and urban and countryside are interwined. As Lees et al. (2015:443) put 
it: “The gentrification process itself has become much more suburban and multi 
centric. The conventional Western distinctions between inner city and suburb makes 
less sense globally, and, indeed, are more complex in the global South (but also the 
global North) these days.” This certainly is the situation in a huge metropolitan city 
like Istanbul. In a world where the boundries of old descriptions of concepts and 
processes are starting to blur, there is a need to further conceptualize a crucial 
concept like gentrification and bring what were once known as the peripheries into 
the discussion. This does not mean the main ideas of gentrification concept are 
inapplicable anywhere in the Global south or that we need to ‘unlearn’ all that comes 
from Western Europe and Northern America. 
As mentioned earlier in the chapter, even though not every urban regeneration or 
renewal project is to be followed by gentrification, in developing countries that 
experience state-led gentrification, this more often seems to be the case. There may 
be many reason for urban regeneration being regarded as a process of gentrification, 
but in this thesis, the reasons that are explored are social and ethnic cleansing and 
the state’s desire to ‘upgrade’ certain neighbourhoods economically (see Chapter 8).  
Maloutas (2012) has argued that gentrification is an ideological and political 
process, and it is a process that is used on other forms of urban processes. I agree 
that gentrification is a highly political process, and state-led gentrification in the 
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global South is the example for that. It also gives way to highly political movements 
against displacement that does not happen as much for the process of market-led 
gentrification (Lees et al., 2015; Ghertner, 2015; Lopez-Morales, 2015). Maloutas 
(2012:42) also added that gentrification’s dominant features are fuelled by neo-
liberal policies. It does seem that local and national states in the global South (and in 
the global North) are facilitators of state-led gentrification, and they often make 
policies that will benefit capital; however, calling this tendency ‘neo-liberal’ may be 
over stretching the term. Whether or not these policies are considered neo-liberal is 
examined in the Conclusion Chapter.  
It is clear from the growing gentrification literature that the term has a somewhat 
flexible and changing meaning, and to be able to have a better conceptualization of 
processes of gentrification globally, it is useful to start looking at other parts of the 
world rather than the ‘usual suspects’ (Lees et al., 2015), while keeping in mind the 
lessons and processes dıscussed in the Anglo-American literature.   
The next section moves on to the details of displacement in a gentrified 
neighbourhood through state-led gentrification and the resistance of working class 
against this process. 
 
3.11 Resistance by the Working Class 
As discussed in Section 3.4, displacement has been the most important consequence 
of any kind of gentrification, and it creates many disadvantages for the working class 
people who are living, or used to live, in the city centre or in the inner city. This 
occurs through landlords and the harassment that has been performed by them to 
evict their current tenants, such as cutting off water and electricity. Regardless of the 
intentions of the gentrifiers, who may show some interest in social mix, their 
existence in the housing market replaces existing low-income tenants. Although 
gentrification has been associated with the attraction of diversity and social mixing 
(Lees et al., 2008) because “it is said to be a relief from the subcultural sameness and 
‘boredom’ of many suburban communities” (Allen, 1984:31-32), it “has frequently 
been found to produce racial and class conflict. There is no evidence that it will 
necessarily lead to ‘social mixing’” (Legates and Hartman, 1986:196). As Rose 
(2004:280) puts it, there is an “uneasy cohabitation” when it comes to gentrification 
82	  
	  
and social mix. Several gentrification studies have recognized that gentrifiers change 
the kinds of public facilities in a neighbourhood, the ways governance is handled 
and affect neighbourhood identity (Butler and Robson, 2003; Freeman and Braconi, 
2004; Slater, 2002; Zukin, 1989). Forms of resistance organizations against 
gentrification in a neighbourhood are usually affected by this (re)creation of place 
and current inhabitants’ loss of power (Davidson, 2008). In many case studies (Lees 
et al, 2008; Paton, 2014; Zukin, 1988), the arrival of gentrifiers has been shown not 
only to change the physical appearance of the neighbourhood, but also to change the 
social balance, leading to a transformation of community. Claiming rights to stay 
and creation of place are key features to a resistance against gentrification 
(Davidson, 2008). This resistance commonly comes in a non-governmental 
organization (NGO) form. It is possible for working class inhabitants to become 
organized and claim their right to stay and create a network with other urban 
organizations, professional chambers, and media. Even though resistance is a long 
process that does not always reverse the displacement process, it creates public 
awareness, creates an example for neighbourhoods in the early stages of 
gentrification and strengthens the neighbourhood relationship in the area.  
Resistance to gentrification is more seen during a state-led gentrification process. 
One reason is that there is only one organization  – the state – that’s initiating the 
process, and it is easier to organize against one target. Nevertheless, gentrification 
through the private housing market has met some resistance (Lees and Butler, 2006) 
as well (e.g., Islington, London), but in general, since there are many elements such 
as private developers and individual middle class buyers involved this kind of 
gentrification, it is harder to organize a movement. In most state-led gentrification, 
neighbourhoods with a high percentage of tenants are targeted and bought up by the 
state (Islam, 2005). This results in the displacement of many working class tenants 
from the neighbourhood with little or no compensation for their loss, which gives 
them more reasons to organize a resistance against the process of gentrification and 
displacement since also, a larger number of people are forcefully evicted.  
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3.12 Conclusion 
This chapter described the process of gentrification, different perspectives on 
gentrification and some consequences of this process. The loss of historical heritage 
and the level of displacement are more visible in state-led gentrification cases than 
classical gentrification ones. Since the displacement process is harsher in state-led 
gentrification, the resistance from the working class people is stronger as well. As 
Lees et al. (2015) argues, resistance against gentrification has been significant, 
especially against state-led gentrification and in developing cities in the global 
South. Because of the visible, immediate and brutal effects of this process in the 
developing countries, it is even possible to say that resistance has been more 
successful in the global South (e.g., Karachi, Seoul). This does not mean 
gentrification has not met any resistance in developed countries. It is also important 
to note that resistance against gentrification should be considered within the 
historical, geographical, economic and cultural limits of the neighbourhood in which 
it is happening. On that note, resistance in the Tarlabasi case is examined in detail 
later on in the thesis. 
Another important point discussed in this chapter is the increase in state-led 
gentrification, its relevance to changing world economy since the 1970s and the call 
for a different understanding of gentrification happening in the developing part of 
the world. The developed part of the world experienced the withdrawal of industrial 
production and therefore the decrease of the primary circuit of capital (Merrifeield, 
2014). Real estate that works as a ‘secondary circuit of capital’ started to increase, 
and the capital has shifted over to this, as the primary circuit of capital slowed down. 
Lefebvre (2003) and Harvey (1978) talked about these changes and unpacked them 
many times. This rise in the real estate sector has become the main factor of 
urbanization in the developing world (Lees et al., 2015). In developing countries in 
need of catching up with developd countries economically, urban regeneration 
projects and state-led gentrification started to become a ‘quick fix’ for transforming 
the urbanized area. This change in economy helps improve the understanding of 
gentrification not only in developing world, but also in the developed countries as 
well. As Lees et al. (2015:449) puts it:  
Given that the rise of the secondary circuit of the built environment 
and the real estate sector is geographically uneven, it is important to 
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understand the geographically and historically uneven ways in which 
various agents of capital investment, as well as the functions of a 
range of state apparatuses and hegemonic ideologies, have contributed 
to both the safeguarding and reproduction of (often speculative) 
investment in the built environment.  
This transformation is examined later in this thesis in the case of Turkey and 
Istanbul, subsequently. The next chapter moves to the second part of the thesis that 
considers research aims and methods. I introduce the research methods and approach 
I used and the problems I faced in the field, along with the methodological issues of 
this research. 
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PART II: RESEARCH AIMS, QUESTIONS, METHODS AND 
METHODOLOGY 
 
CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH AIMS AND METHODS 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In some respects, this thesis aims to make a contribution in gentrification research in 
developing countries or as some (Lees et al., 2015; Roy, 2009) may call it, ‘the 
global South’. Istanbul is sometimes categorized as a Middle Eastern city, yet it sits 
awkwardly between East (Asia) and West (Europe). For that reason, it was 
somewhat difficult to decide on the research approach and the methods that would 
give the best results in a city like Istanbul, with regard to examining the complex 
processes of gentrification. Istanbul not only shows the ‘text book’ symptoms of a 
state-led gentrification process under a relatively authoritarian state, but also signs of 
a typical market-led gentrification process that one can see in Islington or Brooklyn.  
To be able to present the twists and turns in this research, this chapter is divided into 
five sections. I firstly discuss the research aim, objectives and questions. Following 
this, the motivation for this research and the research approach are introduced. The 
reasons for this research, issues that led me to choose this topic, goals for the 
research, and approaches for the explanation of the research are set out. Then I move 
on to the explanation and description of the research methods that were used in this 
research. The fourth section discusses the methodological issues that come with 
using the described research methods, and finally, I set out the difficulties I 
experienced during the fieldwork of this study. 
 
4.2 Research Aim, Objectives and Questions 
The aim is to research the complex and diverse relationships between economic 
change, housing markets, property and land ownership, and the state, which has led 
to gentrification in historic inner areas of Istanbul, and to explore how poor 
inhabitants might be enabled to stay. 
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The research has been conducted in the historic areas of Istanbul. To conduct this 
project, world cities, FBS, manufacturing, tourism in urban areas, and gentrification 
have been examined. In addition, the Turkish economic system and housing markets 
are examined in the next chapters. But the main concept for the research is 
‘gentrification’ and its effects on urban space and what gentrification does to the 
lives of the poor. 
Until recently, most gentrification research has been about developed countries, but 
now, it is a world-wide phenomenon (see Chapter 3). This research contributes to 
theorising and understanding the process of gentrification and the consequences of 
gentrification in cities in developing countries. 
One of reasons for choosing to carry on this research in the historic environment of 
Istanbul is that even though in some cases, gentrification is presented as a tool to 
preserve historic environments, in reality, it does not work out that way. After the 
gentrification process, there is no link between the old and the new social and 
physical structures that are created in the historic environment (Sulukule Patform, 
2009; Islam, 2010; Turkun, 2011). Some cases of gentrification, different from the 
classic gentrification process, are not concerned with the restoration and renovation 
of existing buildings, but carry out the reconstruction of the whole historical 
environment. This leads to the recreation of historical heritage as a decorative 
element, used to label and market these new buildings with the concepts of 
preservation and cultural heritage (Dincer and Dincer, 2005).  
Another reason for choosing Istanbul is that gentrification has mostly been taking 
place in historic environments here, and these places have adequate data to explore 
the concept in developing country cities such as Istanbul (see Chapter 7). It is 
observed that gentrification has been the result of the urban renovation and 
regeneration projects in Istanbul, particularly in historic environments (Islam, 2005; 
Turkun, 2009).  
State-led gentrification (see Chapter 3.7) is an important issue that is considered in 
the research because rather than gentrification through housing markets as in 
developed cities, state-led gentrification is more common in developing countries. 
This is partly because the state started to see gentrification as an efficient way of 
applying neo-liberal urban policies in the inner city and to satisfy its middle and 
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upper class people’s housing demands. As discussed in previous chapters, neglecting 
working class and poor inhabitants’ needs in the process can cause various problems 
such as displacement and social polarization.  These problems are investigated in 
this research.  
A further reason for choosing Istanbul is that before the 2000s, the gentrification 
process took place through private housing market, but after the year 2000, the 
process mostly became state-led gentrification, which has proven to have worse 
social consequences than housing market-led gentrification (see Chapter 3.5). The 
research explores this change and investigates possible ways to keep the current 
inhabitants in their neighbourhoods instead of experiencing total displacement by 
gentrification.  
To explore the aims of this research and the outcomes of two types of gentrification 
in the historic environment, the two neighbourhoods in Istanbul examined were 
chosen on the following criteria:  
• A neighbourhood that has been gentrified in the historic city centre of 
Istanbul without state intervention and through housing market processes is 
chosen to demonstrate the changes in the policy before and after the year 2000. 
• A comparable neighbourhood t h a t  has been gentrified in the historic city 
centre of Istanbul after an urban renovation project and with state intervention 
is chosen to in order to understand the state-led gentrification process in Turkey. 
Galata and Tarlabasi have been chosen for detailed examination and comparison.   
Galata was selected because it was gentrified before the 2000s, and the gentrification 
process was through the private housing market.  This allows an understanding of 
changes in urban policies and the tendency to state-led gentrification in Istanbul. 
Another reason for choosing this area is that the process of gentrification is still 
continuing. It is possible to observe the process in motion and easier to gather 
data about and information from people who move out of this area. 
The reason for choosing Tarlabasi is that the renovation period is about to start and 
it is in the stage of gentrification and displacement. In addition, the area is 
experiencing a renewal project that is solely being implemented by the government 
and is a very good example of state-led gentrification. All of the inhabitants who 
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used to live in the project area have been evicted, demonstrating the process of 
gentrification and its negative impact for the people of the neighbourhood. 
Developing a critical account of the two types of gentrification processes in 
historical Istanbul as examples of direct and total displacement under a somewhat 
authoritarian state, this thesis addresses these research objectives and subsequent 
questions: 
Research Objectives 
1. Explore what deep processes at a world level are involved in gentrification. 
2. Analyse the social and economic context of gentrification in the historic centres 
of Istanbul since the 1950s. 
3. Examine changes in the social nature of historic areas of Istanbul since the 
1980s. 
4. Examine the behaviours of the land and house owners in these neighbourhoods 
and the changes in their built environments.    
5. Investigate the state’s role in the urban ‘renovation’ and gentrification of the 
historic neighbourhoods.   
6. Investigate possible ways to allow existing inhabitants to remain in their 
neighbourhoods while at the same time improving the historic neighbourhoods.  
 
Research Questions 
1. What are the causes of the recent wave of gentrification in inner areas of 
Istanbul?  
2. What were the mechanisms of ‘classic’ gentrification in terms of actors, 
property relations, and building?   
3. What were the mechanisms of state-led gentrification in terms of actors, 
property relations, and building?  How did the state manage the process 
politically? 
4. What have been the respective roles of classic and state-led gentrification in 
Istanbul?  Why did the state start to lead gentrification after 2000? 
5. What were the experiences of the existing/former inhabitants? 
6. What were the experiences of the new ‘gentry’?   
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4.3 Research Motivation and Approach 
As mentioned in the Introduction, this research has two types of motivation: the first 
is political, and the second is intellectual. Firstly, I am concerned by the way 
government treated the working class people living in the historic neighbourhoods of 
Istanbul. Seeing the government’s methods of evicting them more or less against 
their will caught my attention and motivated me to choose this topic. In addition, the 
destruction of some of the historical environment has led me to develop these 
concerns. 
My second motivation is intellectual. It is to understand the processes that are 
leading to gentrification in Istanbul, to explain what is happening, how and why. 
What happens in the historic neighbourhoods of Istanbul cannot be understood 
without a broader context that includes economic power and various spatial scales 
and the time dependent ‘wider context’ that involves economic, social, political 
processes that influence the operations of the housing market.  
In social sciences, there are many ways of explaining the results of research. From 
an epistemological position, it is important to choose the best explanation that suits 
the research. Epistemology is concerned with whether ways of knowing are valid or 
sound. Critical realism (Archer et al., 1998; Bhaskar, 1989; Campbell, 1974, 1988; 
Cook and Campbell, 1979) is the approach that is used to for this research because 
this approach emphasises the importance of historical contexts in observing the 
economic change in the process of gentrification.  
Realists argue that world is real and exists outside our perceptions of it. As a critical 
realist I agree with this. Where critical realism differs from empiricism is that critical 
realist analysis goes deeper into the processes that affect concrete cases in the urban 
environment. Empiricism here refers to the theory that sensory experience is the 
only or primary source of data for knowledge (Psillos and Curd, 2010). In addition, 
while post-modernist approaches examine discourses and consciousness, which I 
think are crucial, discourses cannot be understood outside of the material world 
(Frazer and Lacey, 1993; Putnam, 1999).  
To be able to explain the approach to the research, it is essential to understand the 
role of economic change in the process of gentrification because without it, the 
explanation of the process would be incomplete. However, these long-term changes 
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are not immediately observable, which means that they are not subject to empiricist 
research. The data that used for empiricist work is immediately observable, which 
makes it insufficient to develop a theoretical understanding about the process of 
gentrification. Another reason for using a critical realist approach is that even though 
some things (such as the concept of class) are abstract, this does not mean that they 
are not real. To be able to develop a deeper understanding, it is necessary to explore 
them, which is something that is considered in the critical realist approach. I take 
into account historic, spatial, economic, political abstractions as well, treating them 
as part of the research approach rather than presenting them only as a theoretical 
background.  
As mentioned, the historical context is the important element of the kind of 
explanation this approach can offer. In this case for the process of gentrification, the 
historical-spatial context is also important because without exploring the historical 
reasons and the changes (economic, political), it is hard to have a deeper 
understanding of gentrification. Spatial and historical contexts are more concrete 
than abstractions and they present a middle level of analysis, historically longer than 
the case study, between abstract concepts and local particularities (Bhaskar, 1987; 
Sayer, 2000, 2009) 
One of the implications of critical realism in mixed methods research is that it brings 
in the importance of ontological questions about the events that the research is 
studying (Lawson, 2003; Tilly, 2008). Mixed methods research refers to use of many 
methods by mixing qualitative and quantitative data, methods and methodologies for 
a research study (Creswell and Plano, 2011; Johnson and Christensen, 2014; Teddlie 
and Tashakkori, 2009). If our concepts refer to real events and not some intellectual 
construct produced from data or solely our own construction, it is valid to ask, to 
what events or area of events do particular concepts refer? That is why in my 
approach I start with the abstract concepts and narrow them down to a concrete case 
study and present the research in such a way that each level of research is informed 
by preceeding levels. 
To be able to understand the picture of Istanbul, a combination of abstractions (e.g., 
world city theory, gentrification) needs to be analysed. Istanbul is a combination of 
these abstractions, but they combine with new structures. In this case, it can be 
suitable to treat Istanbul as an ‘emergent property’ (Korotayev et al., 2006). 
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Emergent property appears when a number of entities operate in one environment, 
and they create a more complicated action as a collective. There is often a top-down 
feedback system when it comes to emergent properties. In Istanbul, it is a 
combination of relevant abstractions and the processes they create. Istanbul does not 
combine abstractions in the same way as the examples discussed in the previous 
chapters. There are new processes that emerge, but they are forms of the abstractions 
discussed. This is why I use critical realism to better analyse and understand the 
abstract processes that are in action in the case of Istanbul. 
 
   4.3.1 Research Approach: Generalization? 
It is sometimes said that researchers should be able to generalize the findings of their 
work. But as seen in the discussion of critical realism (see Chapter 4.2), abstractions 
develop and contribute to emergent properties that are unique, so even though every 
city is affected by the same global economic, social, political processes, the way 
they are affected and the outcomes of these are unique. Therefore, it is not suitable 
to say urban policies created for the gentrified historic neighbourhoods of Istanbul 
would fit or have the same consequences if they were to be implemented in another 
historic neighbourhood in another developing country world city.  
Research based on critical realism (see. Chapter 4.2) can generalize the methods and 
the abstractions used. The way this thesis analyses the abstractions with regard to a 
world city can be positively generalized. The whole thesis shows how to analyse 
gentrification and how to oppose gentrification in a particular contemporary world 
city (Lawson, 2003; Tilly, 2008). The explanation has proceeded through 
abstractions, applying them to a specific case (Istanbul) and then to two 
neighbourhoods, from which could be derived a framework for urban policies. It is 
that intellectual process or the entire analysis of the thesis that is generalizable. For 
instance, if one looks at historical neighbourhoods in Mumbai, then one would need 
to look at the specifics of social and economic processes of India as well as Mumbai.  
However, the approach I have taken here to world cities and gentrification could be 
applied to the case of Mumbai. This is in my view an efficient way to get an 
objective view and an objective way of creating alternative urban policies.  
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Critical realists frequently emphasize that explanation requires more than prediction, 
that realism, while it is anti-positivist, is not anti-scientific, but more rigorously 
scientific than positivism (Sayer, 1997). Theoretic explanation ought to provide 
`some insight into the structure and workings of the mechanism, above and beyond 
capability of predicting and controlling its outcomes` (Railton, 2000:208). 
 
4.3.2 Research Approach: From Abstraction to Concrete 
This approach that analyses concrete cases studies with their connection to concepts 
that are operating on a more global level is the motivation for the analysis of the 
material. This section presents how the approach and analysis I chose is applied to 
this research and shows how the whole thesis is part of the analysis process. By 
starting from a broad context and narrowing it down, I examine how abstract 
political, economic, and social processes operate in a concrete case, and in turn, 
what a case study says about these abstractions. To be able to explore this broader 
context, I first examine world city theory. The emergence of world cities, the  
changing global economy, the spatial division of economic sectors in world cities, 
and their development throughout time and agglomeration on local economies have 
been examined. These help in understanding the economic, social and political 
processes that affect world cities and their place in the global economy. In addition 
to these processes, the geographical scale and spatial divisions of labour in different 
geographies are important to my research. For that reason, I examined migration 
patterns for the world cities in developed and developing countries. I started with the 
concept of the world city because the growth in finance and businesses in the 1980s 
has driven the rise of gentrification since. Finance and business services started to 
increase in the city centres of large cities. It is also worth noting that since the 
production sector of manufacturing moved out of the big cities in developed 
countries or moved to the periphery of the big cities in developing countries, 
employment rates in manufacturing have decreased in the city centres while 
employment rates in finance and business services have been increasing 
dramatically. This led many young professionals who are interested in lively city life 
and working in FBS sectors to move in the inner city and city centre (Friedmann, 
1986; Castells, 1989; Sassen, 2001). 
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Following this, I explored the concept of gentrification. Finance and business 
services are sectors that can affect urban processes and lead to gentrification in some 
cases. The changes these sectors create in economic policies have effects on the built 
environment. There has been a shift in the housing stock of residential areas as the 
preferences of middle-class people started to shift from suburbs to inner city areas 
that have been mostly working class residential areas. In this case, gentrification is 
more than just economic change; it is also affected by preferences and shifts in 
social dynamics. I firstly discussed market-led gentrification, the reasons for middle-
class people to be become gentrifiers and the outcomes of gentrification process 
once it started. Following this I, considered state-led gentrification. State-led 
gentrification is more recent than market-led gentrification, and it is commonly 
practised in world cities of developing countries; however, it is also seen in 
developed countries (Jager, 1986; Lees, 2009; Lees et al., 2008; Ley, 1996).  
After outlining my research methods, I move onto examining the Turkish political, 
economic and housing system from the 1950s with regard to the world level 
processes discussed in previous chapters. Following this, I focus on the same 
processes in Istanbul in particular. Looking at the abstractions and how they 
contribute to processes that are specifically operating in Istanbul is an important part 
of the analysis and my research approach. 
Then I go on to examine all the historic neighbourhoods of Istanbul. These 
neighbourhoods are presented as an overview to examine gentrification processes in 
historic neighbourhoods and how each of them is connected. In order to gain a better 
understanding about these historic neighbourhoods in Istanbul and how abstract 
processes affect them, I investigate in detail the two case studies of Galata and 
Talabasi. I want to investigate how powerful sources on world level that affect 
gentrification  have effects in specific cases in order to enrich our understanding of 
the processes.  
 
4.4 Researching Gentrificaiton with Qualitative and Quantitative Methods 
The methods I use are examined in detail in this section. They include a mixture of 
qualitative and quantitative methods. The research questions ask about patterns that 
give us a description of what is happening, and this description is partly quantitative 
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and partly qualitative. The research questions also ask about processes, explanations, 
and reactions, people’s experiences of the processes, and these are essentially 
qualitative information. Qualitative methods are particularly useful for probing the 
underlying reasons and motivations of social actors, especially through semi-
structured interview methods.  
The mixed methods used in this research are appropriate for the framework of the 
research approach discussed in the previous chapter.  
Critical Realists’ Use of Quantitative, Qualitative, and Mixed Methods: According 
to Olsen (2010:8): “Critical realists argue that structures exist, and critical realist 
presuppositions therefore tend to support the use of structural variables as either 
independent or dependent variables in regression. Critical Realists often interpret 
data tables causally.” Structures might have two closely related meanings. First, a 
structure can be a group of many objects whose relationships produce a single object 
that has a structure. Secondly, structure can be a whole that has properties, which 
differ from the properties of the things that are inside it. For example, even though 
the institution of marriage is changing over time as a whole (civil partnership, 
cohabiting coupledom), some basic internal relationships (i.e. sharing resources of 
the household, living together) and properties stay the same. Another example is 
from my thesis: FBS have some features that can be observed globally; however, in 
each city, FBS sectors differ and take a unique shape according the nature of that 
city.  This is the reason research from a critical realist approach needs many methods 
rather than using only one method to examine a single structure. In the research 
process, there can be close links between qualitative methods and the analysis of 
quantitative data. 
Realism and Mixed Methods: Critical realists have advocated for the use of mixed 
methods for several decades (Bryman, 1988; Carter and New, 2004). It is important 
to make coherent links between the interpretation of the statistics and the results of 
qualitative research (Walby, 2001), which means that a critical realist approach in 
research is often supported with mixed methods. Mixed methods are important 
because many governments and other powerful agents use statistics, and a researcher 
often needs to analyse and deconstruct the statistical evidence. According to Olsen 
(2010:14), a mixed methods approach: 
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(a) authorises the use of statistics by critical realists: (b) is required if 
realists are going to analyse data: and (c) is advised in order to temper 
all factual interpretations with a historical sense of why one is 
couching an interpretation in a particular discourse........) For most 
mixed methods writers, theories are discourses and they are 
embedded in particular concrete societies. (……) Case-study methods 
usually mix quantitative data with qualitative analysis. 
 
Even though I used mixed methods throughout this study, it is dominantly a 
qualitative one. These qualitative methods involve semi-structured interviewing in 
order to collect information about the experiences of residents of the selected 
neighbourhoods, the views of the construction firm, NGOs and government officials. 
This is explained in details later in the chapter. In addition to that, the literature 
review, government documents such as census data, neighbourhood plan reports, 
and statistics related secondary data have also been examined. The examination of 
this data is done through documentary analysis. This is explained in the next section. 
 
   4.4.1 Documentary Analysis 
The abstract concepts that frame this research – world cities and gentrification – 
have been derived from a critical discussion of the academic literature (See Chapters 
2 and 3). Social, political and economic change in Turkey and the Turkish housing 
market will be discussed in Chapter 5 to provide context for an analysis of state 
documents (census data, development plans, employment data) and statistical data 
collected from the Turkish Statistical Institute (TurkStat). In this way, I create a link 
between abstract concepts, the changing global economy and the Turkish experience 
of gentrification and the inner city housing market.  
To analyse the situation in Istanbul, I chose methods of collecting secondary data 
and analysing state documents. These documents consist of plan and policy reports, 
five year development reports, official reports prepared by TurkStat, reports about 
Tarlabasi Renewal Project prepared by The Chamber of Architects (organizations in 
Turkey equivalent of Royal Institute of British Architects), press reports, legal 
documents collected from NGOs that are interested in the Renewal Project and 
leaflets and reports prepared by the construction firm. The main criteria for the 
selection of the documents to be analysed was firstly their relevance to the Renewal 
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Project. For that reason, I first collected legal documents and reports concerning the 
Renewal Project. Following that, I collected data on neighbourhoods. These were 
urban conservation plan and master plan reports on Galata and Tarlabasi. To be able 
to analyse the historical and spatial background of these neighbourhoods as a critical 
realist, I also used statistics and government reports on the economic and political 
development of Istanbul and Turkey. This is aimed at having a better understanding 
of the process of gentrification, the dynamics that are leading to gentrification and 
how these dynamics operate. This data is analysed through document analysis. 
Document analysis refers to a form of analysis where the gathered documents are 
interpreted by the researcher to provide evidence and give voice to the topic being 
researched (Roche, 2005). There are two kinds of challenges to analysing this kind 
of data: intellectual and technical. While dealing with legal documents and 
government documents, it is important to remember the power these documents 
possess as evidence and to show power relations. These documents can make the 
researcher understand the dominant groups of people involved in the research. The 
technical difficulty refers to the challenges understanding certain – particularly legal 
– documents. Quantitative data is mostly gathered from TurkStat and from related 
municipalities. Both processes have different effects on the built environment, and it 
is important to investigate the reasons behind the increase in state-led gentrification 
process in Istanbul and how this relates to classic gentrification.   
 
   4.4.2 Semi-structured Interview 
Semi-structured interviews refer to a type of qualitative methods in which the 
interviewer and the interviewee engage in a formal interview where there is a 
prepared list of topics and issues to be discussed. Unlike structured interviews, 
where there is a strict interview schedule with specific questions, semi-structured 
interviews allow both parties to divert and be flexible. This also allows the 
interviewer to discuss different things than the prepared list with the new ideas and 
issues brought by the interviewee (Bjornholt and Farstad, 2012). However, at the 
same time, the interviewer should cover all the topics he/she prepared beforehand, 
and for that reason, it is beneficial for the interviewer to prepare an interview guide 
to help him/her focus on the important topics that should be discussed (Bjornholt 
and Farstad, 2012). 
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All the people I approached in NGOs and in universities were willing to talk to me 
about Tarlabasi and Galata. However, this was not the case in governmental 
institutions. I approached 15-20 people, but only nine of them agreed to talk. I also 
tried to conduct some interviews in Istanbul Institution of Monument Preservation, 
but they were not willing to talk. On the other hand, they were willing to share 
previous urban conservation plans on Galata, but not on Tarlabasi. Two 
neighbourhoods are chosen for the detailed case studies,  Tarlabasi and Galata.  
Semi-structured interviewing is the method used for this part of the research. In this 
research, to understand the gentrification process in Galata, the experiences and 
views of actors in classic gentrification, such as the new and old inhabitants and the 
municipality are explored. The aim is to have an insight into how these actors are 
connected to each other and how (individually or as a group) they reacted to the 
processes of gentrification. This can help to understand the classic gentrification 
process in Istanbul and its consequences in the urban area. In addition, semi-
structured interviewing with academics was also undertaken in order to further 
explore how the whole process operated from their point of view.  
The criteria for choosing the case studies involve their location and the type of 
gentrification they are experiencing. Galata was chosen because it is a gentrified 
area in the historic city centre of Istanbul without direct state intervention and 
through the housing market. The reason for that is to demonstrate the changes in the 
policy before and after the year 2000. Tarlabasi was chosen because it is 
experiencing state-led gentrification in the historic city centre of Istanbul after an 
urban renovation project. In addition to the reasons stated above, understanding the  
state-led gentrification process in Turkey is another important one. The fieldwork 
lasted four and a half months. In total, I conducted 45 interviews. Eighteen of them 
were conducted with inhabitants and displacess of Galata. Fifteen of them were 
conducted with inhabitants of Tarlabasi. All of these interviews happened in 
interviewees’ homes, and each interview lasted between 20-45 minutes. Interviews 
with gentrifiers and people who stayed in the gentrified areas were conducted in the 
neighbourhoods, in their homes, but interviews with the displacees were conducted 
in their new environment. To find these new environments, chambers and NGOs in 
the areas were contacted. For the case of Galata, I found some of the displacees and 
had a chance to talk to them; however, in the case of Tarlabasi, it was not possible to 
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find any of the displacees. In Galata, I was able to contact the displacees through my 
personal connection with a Jewish retirement house.  
Interviews were conducted with 12 professionals from different agencies. These 
agencies are the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality, Beyoglu Municipality, 
Chamber of Architects, academics from Yildiz Technical and Mimar Sinan Fine 
Arts Universities, Mass Housing Development Administration, the Association of 
Owner Occupiers and Tenants in Tarlabasi (NGO), the Tarlabasi Platform (NGO), 
and Gap Insaat – the construction firm responsible for the Tarlabasi Renewal 
Project. Four of them were conducted with academics and another four of them were 
conducted with NGOs. Finally, four of them were conducted with government 
officers and people from the construction company. These interviews were 
conducted in interviewees’ offices and lasted between 40 minutes to an hour. All of 
the interviews were conducted and transcribed in Turkish, and they were later 
translated into English. Some cultural features of the language can be lost during the 
process of translation, but I tried to translate and express people’s statements in a 
way that would sound as close to Turkish meaning as possible. 
Interviews with the residents of Galata are categorized into three sections depending 
on their tenure and current living conditions, and the type of questions asked differ 
depending on which categorization the interviewee belongs to: 
1. Galata displacees 
• Information about the interviewee and household 
• Reasons of moving away from Galata 
• Information about present accommodation 
• Present problems 
2. Galata owner-occupiers 
• Information about the interviewee and household 
• Information about the previous owner-occupier 
• Information about the building 
• Information about the neighbourhood 
3. Galata tenants 
• Information about the interviewee and household 
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• Information about landlord 
• Information about the previous tenant 
• Problems of the building 
• Information about the neighbourhood 
People displaced by gentrification have been interviewed in order to understand their 
points of view about change in the neighbourhood and discover the circumstances 
that meant they had to leave. Newcomers (owner-occupiers and tenants) were 
interviewed to understand their behaviour, including their thoughts and attitudes 
toward the old inhabitants. How they are affected by the overall process and what 
they think about gentrification through their own experiences are crucial points to 
the interviews. Lastly, questions were asked in order to understand how the housing 
policies and processes of urban renovation and gentrification are reflected in the 
behaviours of the new comers. 
For Tarlabasi, semi-structured interviews were conducted with the current 
inhabitants, officers of municipality, the Mass Housing Development Association 
(MHDA), people from the construction company, NGOs interested in the urban 
renovation projects and with the officers in Chamber of Architects. From these 
interviews, I aimed to gain an understanding of the role of the state in the 
gentrification and hear from the people who are actually involved in the process. 
This also contributes to understanding the effects of state intervention. The point is 
to understand the experiences of the inhabitants themselves, and at the same time, 
gain insight into the attitudes and aims of other agencies. The MHDA, the 
municipality and the construction firm have been important actors in the whole of 
the process, and the information they agreed to share has been very important for the 
research. In addition, academics were also interviewed about Tarlabasi.  
Interviews with the residents of Tarlabasi are divided into three categories (like 
Galata), and the type of questions asked differ to some extent, depending on the 
interviewee categories belongs to: 
1. Tarlabasi displacees 
• Information about the interviewee and household 
• Reasons for moving away from Tarlabasi 
• Information about present accommodation 
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• Present problems 
2. Tarlabasi owner-occupiers 
• Information about the interviewee and household 
• Information about the previous owner-occupier 
• Information about the building 
• Information about the neighbourhood 
3. Tarlabasi tenants 
• Information about the interviewee and household 
• Information about landlord 
• Information about the previous tenant 
• Problems of the building 
• Information about the neighbourhood 
Unfortunately, there were no interviews conducted with the displacees of Tarlabasi, 
as explained in the next section.  Interviews with current residents are categorized by 
tenure because tenants and owner-occupiers experiences differ greatly, and this 
difference is important to an understanding of the state-led gentrification process in 
the area. 
 In addition to the current situation, interview questions involved alternative plans to 
oppose gentrification. ‘Alternative plans’ refers to the suggestions that inhabitants of 
Tarlabasi proposed. This question was not asked in Galata as there is no renewal 
project in the neighbourhood. This was asked of academics, NGOs, the Municipality 
and MHDA. For the sake of anonymity, I cannot give the names of the positions of 
the people that I interviewed in the Municipality, MHDA and the construction firm 
because some of the people I interviewed can be recognized by the name of their 
positions.  It is important to understand the aims of the agencies that can make the 
policies and decisions for the improvement of the historic neighbourhoods, to 
understand the aim of the people who are working for the state by talking to them, 
and to examine to what extent state can cause the negative outcomes (e.g. 
displacement, social polarization) of gentrification.   This question was asked of the 
residents of the neighbourhoods in order to understand their perception of “the right 
to stay”, to see the effects of state intervention in the social structure, and to see how 
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people are affected. In addition, it was important to understand what inhabitants felt, 
how they reacted to the interventions, what they feel about keeping people in their 
neighbourhoods and what they would suggest about this matter. This way, the future 
paths that are intended by the state and desired by the public can be understood and 
compared in the study. 
Having discussed the qualitative and quantitative methods I use for this research, I 
think it is important for me to discuss the issues that are brought up with the use of 
qualitative methods since this is predominantly qualitative research. The next section 
explores these issues. 
4.5 Methodological Issues 
Some methodological issues related to this research are introduced and examined in 
this section. These issues involve validity of qualitative results, data analysis, 
writing-up qualitative studies, and understanding the experience of others.  
Validity of qualitative results 
Many researchers are concerned about the link between the abstract concepts they 
propose and their observations of the empirical world that lead them to use these 
concepts. Lincoln and Guba (1985) present four trustworthiness criteria for 
qualitative research: credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability. Of 
these criteria, three of them are relevant to my research. I do not discuss 
dependability. The reason for that is because dependability is mostly used for 
participatory studies where the researcher is exposed to the environment he/she is 
studying, and this research is not participatory. 
‘Credibility’ alludes to the appropriate representations of the structures of the social 
world being researched, and the study can be subject to both the processes used in 
drawing out those representations and the credibility of those representations for the 
community under research (Bradley, 1991). Lincoln and Guba‘s (1985:301-28) list 
for activities to increase the credibility are:  
a prolonged stay in the field, persistent observation, triangulation, the 
search for various cases, the establishment of referential adequacy by 
setting aside some portion of the data for testing of conclusions, discussions 
or debriefing with peers, and checks of results with members of the 
community under study.  
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In this research, I stayed in the field as long as possible and analysed many cases. I 
increased my observations by also interviewing organizations and other researchers 
who are interested in the same topic. 
‘Transferability’ is about how applicable the researchers’ working hypotheses about 
one context can be to another context. It refers to the extent one research can be 
generalizable for similar cases. According to Bradley (1991:436), this criterion is not 
entirely the responsibility of the researcher:  
This is a judgment that can be made only by comparing the two 
contexts, the burden of which falls not on the researcher but on those 
who wish to make the comparison. The researcher's responsibility is 
to provide enough data, through rich, ample description, to allow 
these judgments to be made.  
 
I applied this criterion in the generalization of my research (see Chapter 4) in 
the analysis of specific concepts with regard to each other.  
The third criterion, ‘confirmability’, is about how much others who read the 
study can confirm the source and location of the data that is presented by the 
researcher.  According to Marshall and Rossman (1989:148), adequacy of a 
qualitative research process can be assessed through written reports, meaning 
other people assessing one’s research. I have presented this research at various 
conferences to academic audiences and have presented some parts of my 
research to my peers. This has been my way of receiving feedback for my 
research. Ely (1991:93) presents another criterion for qualitative research 
when she talks about the trustworthiness of the researcher:  
Being trustworthy as a qualitative researcher means at the least that 
the processes of the research are carried out fairly, that the products 
represent as closely as possible the experiences of the people who are 
studied. ……. Trustworthiness is more than a set of procedures. To 
my mind, it is a personal belief system that shapes the procedures in 
process.  
 
I applied all these three criteria throughout my fieldwork and the interviews I 
conducted.  
Data analysis 
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In qualitative research, all of the data gathered are often divided into smaller 
units to identify similar or different patterns, themes and concepts. Bogdan and 
Taylor (1975:79) define data analysis as:  
A process which entails an effort to identify formal themes and to 
construct hypotheses (ideas) as they are suggested by the data and an 
attempt to demonstrate support for those themes and hypotheses. 
There are many guidelines for describing qualitative analysis; however, there 
are no strict rules for doing qualitative analysis as there are for quantitative 
analysis. According to Bradley (1991:443): 
Numerous guidelines for analysis are available; some describing 
practices common to a particular tradition, some advocating a specific 
approach, and others attempting to describe a generic "qualitative" 
approach. Guidelines and advice for data analysis cover conceptual 
issues underlying the breaking down and reassembling of data to 
reveal patterns as well as the procedural issues that focus on activities 
that accomplish this regrouping.  
For the analysis, I separated my data into different topics and themes which made it 
possible for me to show similarities and differences between cases, as well as show 
the operations of concepts in various cases. Data analysis is closely related to the 
writing-up of qualitative studies, and I discuss this in detail later in this chapter. 
Understanding the Experience of Others  
Most qualitative studies – including this one – try to understand the experience of 
others. Patton (1990) talks about a distinction between ‘indigenous meanings’ – the 
meaning that phenomena have for the people who are being studied and ‘analyst-
constructed’ meanings – the concepts that the researcher develops from the data in 
the form of analysis (cited in Bradley, 1991:433).  
The extent to which people share the same meaning is a complicated issue. One 
view says that meanings are objective and the meanings of the phenomena exist in 
the phenomena themselves (Bradley, 1991:433). For example, during my fieldwork 
in the Galata neighbourhood, I asked some questions about the Romani population 
who used to live in the area, but had to leave because of the gentrification process. 
When I asked some gentrifiers about their experiences with the Romani population 
and how they felt about the fact that they had to leave because of gentrification, they 
replied as if they were upset about their leaving.  They commented that Romani 
worked as a natural security system for the neighbourhood as they were ‘criminals’ 
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themselves, and other criminals were intimidated by them. Interviewees shared this 
opinion as a ‘positive’ part of living with Romani or to show that they were not 
excluding them and were happy to live side by side with them. However, even 
though that was what they meant, the examples they provided and the expressions 
they used led me to an interpretation that the ‘gentrifiers’ were excluding the 
Romani and were never actually sharing the same social environment with them.   
For that reason, it is useful for a researcher to determine the extent that participants 
might mean the same thing by responding in a similar way to the others. In addition 
to that, researchers should also determine the extent to which differences in 
meanings are important in formulating the research questions. If the researcher 
thinks that a specific meaning in an issue is important, the data collection should be 
designed in a way that brings up similarities and differences in meaning. Most of the 
time, the researcher and the interviewee have a different set of opinions and the 
researcher is trying to understand the interviewee’s viewpoint using his/her own 
critical faculties.  
Understanding the experience of others is also helpful for the researcher to tease out 
the information from the interviewee. For this, interviewing government officials is 
easier than interviewing residents because answers or the motivation behind the 
answers of government officials can be understood more easily. The reason for that 
is because it is easier to predict a government official’s motive for answering a 
question in a certain way since what they represent is more evident in the light of of 
their job compared to the inhabitants of a neighbourhood. However, private people’s 
(e.g., residents) motivations for sharing or not sharing any kind of information are 
much more complicated and hard to predict. For this reason, I tried to not pressure or 
insist people that talk about specific subjects, but I rather tried to talk about what 
they were passionate about and tried to channel that subject towards the subject that 
I was really interested in. For example, during my fieldwork, I listened to an 
interviewee complaining about his doorbell and people sometimes accidentally 
ringing his doorbell for 20 minutes before I had my opening for the things I really 
wanted to talk about, which were his opinions of the newcomers in a gentrified 
neighbourhood. I believe understanding the experience of others is crucial for most 
qualitative studies, and I tried to solve this issue in the best way possible. 
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“Writing up" Qualitative Studies  
During the process of research, qualitative researchers ‘write up’ in many phases. 
These ‘writing ups’ are sometimes informal and for the use of the researcher 
himself/herself, and sometimes they become part of a formal journal. As Lincoln and 
Guba (1985:301-28) point out, memos, notes, questions to oneself, reports, and 
presentations to share with peers are a part of the thinking process and evidence to 
planning the next step.  But when it comes to any kind of formal writing-up, the 
format becomes important; however, there is no fixed format for writing-up 
qualitative research analysis. Instead, there are some expectations and criteria for 
effective writing. One of the criteria relates to descriptions of the data and 
clarification of the abstractions developed from the data. These things are always 
present in a qualitative research.  
Another important problem in writing-up qualitative research includes showing the 
connections between the concepts that researcher used and the data in which those 
concepts are based. Qualitative data are usually very diverse, wide and hard to 
handle to present to the audience. There are some ways to show these connections, 
including elaborated and extensive description and the use of typical examples 
(Bradley, 1991:444). 
Following this, I move on to the difficulties I experienced during fieldwork while 
collecting the data and engaging with people that were important for my research. 
 
4.6 Difficulties Experienced 
During the fieldwork for this research, I experienced many difficulties. The one that 
affected my research the most is the fact that I could not interview any displacees 
from Tarlabasi. The MHDA gave priorities to purchase flats to the people who were 
evicted from Tarlabasi in a low-cost housing development that was constructed by 
MHDA in the periphery of Istanbul (Kayasehir), and one hundred and fifty six 
families (all of them displaced) agreed to buy flats from the development. I visited 
the development and tried to reach an agreement with the local government officials 
of that district to help locate some of the families because it was almost impossible 
for me to find any of the 156 families independently, in a development that has 
60,000 flats. At first, the local government officials seemed helpful: we exchanged 
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contact information, and they informed me they would let me know after they talked 
to some of the families. I called them several times in the course of 3-4 months; 
however, in the end, the decision of the families was not to talk to me. They did not 
want to be involved anything related to Tarlabasi Renewal Project as they did not 
want to say anything that might be ‘wrong’ in the eyes of the local or national 
government. These 156 families are only a small fraction of all the people displaced 
from the area, but they were the only ones that I could track down. What happened 
to other displacees is not recorded in any official document.  
I also had several problems establishing communication with government officials 
and people from the construction company. I spent almost two months trying to get 
an appointment with GAP Insaat. I had to call them and insist many times to be able 
to get an appointment. For the governmental officials, even though it did not take as 
much time to get an appointment, it was hard to find their contact numbers, and 
many times I had to talk to the lower governmental officials first rather than the 
people who were actually involved in the decision making process. After talking to 
many lower level governmental officials, I was able to interview some people who 
were involved in the decision making. When I finally interviewed the state officials, 
I provided them proof for every accusation made by inhabitants and controversial 
question I asked. They were very well trained in giving interviews about this matter, 
and sometimes it was hard to get an unbiased view from them. For that reason, I 
used some legal documents as proof to help me during the interview process. These 
legal documents are collected from NGOs, and they showed that there were still 
lawsuits going on against the project. This was necessary because two of the mottos 
of the municipality and the construction firm have been ‘transparency’ and winning 
every lawsuit that was filed against them. These documents were contradicting both 
of these and therefore important for me to use.   
Not only did I have problems with interviewing some key people, but I also had 
problems with gathering data because of the urban planning hierarchy in Turkey. I 
was not able to access all of the urban preservation plans for the Galata 
neighbourhood. Galata Tower and the surrounding area are declared a tourism area, 
and once an area is recognized as such, the planning authority is transferred to the 
Ministry of Culture and Tourism. In the case of Galata, local government no longer 
had any authority over the area, and I needed the permission of the Ministry to 
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access the plans. It was impossible for me to get such permission because it would 
take months (maybe more) of paper work and many trips to Ankara where the 
Ministry is located.  
Finally, there were some difficulties during the residents’ interviews over different 
political opinions. As the interviewer, I did my best to not to lead them to give the 
answers I wanted to hear nor to show any political opinion of my own. On the other 
hand, sometimes, when I realized that an interviewee had any kind of opinions that I 
personally found offensive, such as racism against Romani, I pretended to be sharing 
their opinion to draw them out and allow them to share their opinion freely.  
 
4.7 Summary and Review of Methods 
The material presented in this research is based on secondary data gathered from 
local and national governmental institutions, NGOs, academics and semi-structured 
interviews that were conducted with people in both neighbourhoods, displacees, 
government officials, academics, people from the contruction company and from 
NGOs. Interviews were conducted on the course of 4-5 months and analysed by 
transcribing them first and then categorizing them into topics. As mentioned above, 
there are not any strict rules when it comes to writing up qualitative studies. I firstly 
separated the data gathered according to the organizations and people I interviewed, 
and secondly, into themes depending on the answers and focus points of the 
interviewees. This way, I first had four categories: government officials and people 
from the construction company, neighbourhood interviews, academics and NGOs. 
Secondly, I separated every category into sub-categories that are examined in detail 
in Chapter 7 and 8.  
Documentary analysis complimented the findings from the interviews and helped me 
provide quantitative evidence for this research. As a critical realist, I used these 
interviews and data gathered to construct the closest version of the true account of 
gentrification processes in Istanbul. While doing that, I do not only use the data 
gathered during fieldwork, but also provide the abstractions such as world city and 
the concept of gentrification and the historical and political background of Turkey 
and Istanbul.  
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In this section, I return to and represent the research questions briefly and discuss 
how the chosen methods relate to each question.  
What are the causes of the recent wave of gentrification in inner areas of Istanbul? 
To explore this question, analysing secondary data, documentary analysis, and case 
studies are done. This targets a better understanding of the process of gentrification 
in Istanbul, the dynamics that are leading to gentrification and how these dynamics 
operate. The census data and employment data of Istanbul are examined. 
Quantitative data is mostly gathered from Turkish Statistical Institute (TurkStat) and 
from related municipalities.  
What were the mechanisms of ‘classic’ gentrification in terms of actors, property 
relations, and building? This is mostly a theoretical question, and to explore this 
question, analysis of secondary data is done from the abstractions. I narrow down 
these actors and relations from global processes to specificity of Galata.  During this 
narrowing down, I analyse world city theory, processes of gentrification, how these 
abstractions operate in Turkey and Istanbul subsequently, and finally, I arrive at the 
case studies. For the Turkey and Istanbul part, documentary analysis is also used. 
For Galata, documentary analysis and semi-structured interviews are employed.   
What were the mechanisms of state-led gentrification in terms of actors, property 
relations, and building?  How did the state manage the process politically? The 
same methods and approach described above are used explore this question. The 
case study to answer this question is Tarlabasi.  
What have been the respective roles of classic and state-led gentrification in 
Istanbul?  Why did the state start to lead gentrification after 2000? To investigate 
this question, extensive documentary analysis for Turkey, Istanbul, Galata, and 
Tarlabasi is used. In the Galata case, semi-structured interwiews are conducted with 
the Municipality, academics, and inhabitants of the neighbourhood. The Tarlabasi 
case study is particularly important to answer the second part of the question. Semi-
dtructured interviews with the Municipality, people from the construction company, 
MHDA, NGOs, academics, and inhabitants of Tarlabasi are conducted. To provide 
an efficient answer for this question, I construct a story with all the perspectives that 
I collected from each of the actors of both gentrification processes and analyse them 
deeply starting from global processes to specific localities. The answer to this 
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question can also be a contribution to the gentrification experiences that are 
happening in the developing part of the world and help enrich the understanding of 
gentrification and different actors at play in the global South.  
What were the experiences of the existing/former inhabitants? To investigate this 
question, I conducted semi-strcutured interviews with not only inhabitants of both 
neighbourhoods, but also the Municipality, MHDA, academics, NGOs and the 
construction firm to see what these experiences are how they are perceived from 
different actors of the gentrification process.  
What were the experiences of the new ‘gentry’?  To explore this question, I 
conducted semi-structure interviews with different groups of inhabitants in Galata 
(since Tarlabasi does not have any new gentry at the moment) and academics. 
I now turn to the historical and political background of Turkey to give a detailed 
account of the spatial processes that have been in operation since the 1950s.  
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PART III: ANALYSIS OF THE PRIMARY RESEARCH 
 
CHAPTER 5: SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN TURKEY 
 
5.1 Introduction 
In 1922, the Ottoman Empire was overthrown, and Ataturk came into power with 
the founding of the Republic of Turkey. Over the next 100 years, Turkey was 
completely transformed from an overwhelmingly agricultural and rural society to an 
overwhelmingly urban society, based on manufacturing and subsequently on FBS. 
Over the last 30 years, the economy of Turkey has undergone a further revolutionary 
transformation, and this is especially visible in Istanbul (Temizel, 2007). 
As outlined in the Methods Chapter (Chapter 4), as part of my critical realist 
approach, I started my research with abstractions such as world city theory and 
gentrification and will now narrow it down to concrete case studies. As already 
discussed (Chapters 2 and 3), the processes of formation of world cities and 
gentrification take place across the world, but are different in every nation; even 
though there are features in global economy that affect many nations at the same 
time, the results of these effects are different from one nation to another. Every 
country has a different kind of development of the economy, a different government 
and different legal and political systems. This chapter discusses how the processes 
and theories examined in Chapters 2 and 3 operate in the case of Turkey. There are 
some similarities with other developing and sometimes developed countries in how 
these abstractions operate, but there are also specific incidents and processes that is 
unique to Turkey.  
Firstly, I discuss the political events dating from the Ottoman Empire period to the 
1950s involving ethnic minorities that affected the gentrification process. Following 
this, I provide an overview of the political situation, economy, population and 
regions since the 1950s. I move on to a discussion of the leading economic sectors – 
FBS, the manufacturing sectors, tourism and agriculture – in Turkey (Temizel, 
2007). I examine in turn the agriculture, the manufacturing, FBS and tourism 
sectors. The Republic of Turkey started as an agricultural country, but after the 
1950s, like other countries with increasing industrialization, the importance of 
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agriculture decreased, and the manufacturing sector started to become more 
important (Dincer, 2011). As discussed in Chapter 2, in developing countries, even 
though FBS sectors started to increase (after the 1980s), the manufacturing sector 
did not decrease. In the major cities in Turkey, in addition to the increase in the FBS 
sector, the manufacturing sector still preserves its importance. 
In the last two sections of this chapter, I discuss the housing system in Turkey from 
the 1920s until the present time, with regard to each period in relation to private 
housing and squatter areas (gecekondus). I conclude this chapter with state policies 
and the effects of these policies on the urban environment since the 1950s (Tekeli, 
1998; Altay and Turkun, 2006; Turkun 2009b).  
 
5.2 The Expulsion of the Ethnic Minorities in the First Half of the 20th Century 
The Ottoman Empire had been a multi-cultural empire without a notion of a national 
identity (Kabadayi, 2011); however, from its beginning in 1922, the Turkish 
Republic has been a ‘Turkish’ country and the notion of national identity had been 
strongly emphasized during the foundation of the Republic. In the last period of the 
Ottoman Empire and in the beginning of the Republic of Turkey, ethnic minorities 
(non-Turkish) experienced a series of political events that forced them to leave the 
country. Even though the role of ethnic minorities as merchants of Istanbul goes 
back to the Byzantine period and continued right up to the birth of the Republic, as a 
result of this Turkish nationalism, ethnicities were suddenly repressed.    
The historic neighbourhoods of Istanbul that this thesis examines had mostly been 
built for ethnic minority merchant communities.  The reasons that led them to leave 
range from the Armenian Genocide, the population exchange between Turkey and 
Greece, Capital Tax to the Istanbul Pogrom and the Kibris event.  
1914 – 1924:  Minorities leave the country because of the Armenian genocide1 and 
population exchange between Greece and Turkey: During this period, there were 
two incidents that forced Ottoman and Turkish citizens of Armenian and Greek 
origins to leave the country. The first was the exile of Ottoman citizens of Armenian 
origin in 1915 (Winter, 2004). During the First World War, a temporary law called 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Armenian Genocide is not officially recongnized by the Republic of Turkey 
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“Tehcir Law” was passed by the Ottoman Parliament that authorized the deportation 
of the Armenian population of the Ottoman Empire (Dadrian, 2003). This law was 
allegedly about the measures taken against groups of people who were opposing 
government order and resettlement of towns and villages that were found to be 
engaging with espionage (Takvim-I Vekayi, 1919). With the adoption of this law, 
many Armenian citizens were relocated, and this led to other political events 
(referred to as the Armenian Genocide) (Sevk ve Iskan Kanunu, 2010). On 
September 13, 1915, the Ottoman Parliament passed the "Temporary Law of 
Expropriation and Confiscation," stating that all property belonging to Armenians 
was to be confiscated by the authorities (Dadrian, 2003). 
The second event in this period was the population exchange between Turkey and 
Greece in 1923. This arrangement was decided by the two countries as a result of a 
war between Turkey and Greece (in Turkish literature referred to as ‘Turkish war of 
Independence’). The agreement was based on a religious identity, and the exchange 
was between Turkish citizens of Greek Orthodox origins and Muslim Greek citizens 
(Andriotis, 2008; Keyder, 1987). This mandatory population exchange or mutual 
expulsion was based on solely on religious identity and included the exchange of 
native Turkish speaker Orthodox and native Greek speaker Muslim citizens 
(Howland, 1926). The two events discussed under this subsection are separate from 
each other, meaning they did not affect each other. 
1942:  Changing ownership due to the introduction of Capital Tax. In 1942, a bill 
enacting wealth levy was passed by Turkish Grand National Assembly.  This law 
was presented as fund raising countermeasures for Turkey’s possible entry into the 
Second World War.  However, it also intended to ruin the economic position of non-
Muslim minorities as part of the economic ‘Turkification’ of the Turkish Republic. 
This Bill was concerned with fixed assets, such as industrial enterprises, businesses, 
building owners and estates of all citizens, but the most affected were Jewish, 
Armenian, and Greek Turkish citizens and Levantines (Latin-Christians who lived 
under the rule of the Ottoman Empire). These groups used to control a large portion 
of the economy, and as a result of this law, they were heavily taxed (Nowill, 2011; 
Smith, 2001; Guven, 2005), due to much higher tariffs being imposed on non-
Muslim citizens. In the end, this law led the financial ruin of many non-Muslim 
families. 
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1955: The event of September (6-7 of September, 1955 or the Istanbul Pogrom). The 
‘Istanbul pogrom’ was organized mob attacks directed primarily at Istanbul's Greek 
minority. A Turkish mob that gathered into the city in advance attacked Istanbul’s 
Greek community for nine hours. Even though this mob did not openly call for 
Greeks to be killed, as a result of beatings, arson and attacks, more than a dozen 
people died. Armenians were also harmed. The pogrom increased the rate of the 
emigration of Greek origin Turkish citizens from Turkey and especially Istanbul 
(Vryonis, 2005; Birand, 2005; Guven, 2005). 
1974: The Kibris event and emigration of the Greeks: The Turkish invasion of 
Cyprus and the conflict between Turkey and Greece in 1974 led many Greek 
Turkish citizens in Istanbul to leave the country. There are some claims that the 
Turkish government at the time used this conflict as an excuse to cancel the 
residency permits of many Greek Turkish citizens (Vryonis, 2005; Birand, 2005; 
Guven, 2005).  
As we see in the next two chapters, the long-standing presence of these ethnic 
minorities in Istanbul and their subsequent expulsions have been key to the story of 
the historic neighbourhoods. 
Having discussed the events that affected the historical neighbourhoods of Istanbul, I 
now turn to political background of Turkey to provide an insight of the political 
events and developments that affected the processes in Istanbul and the historical 
neighbourhoods. 
 
5.3 Politics since the 1950s 
From the founding of the Republic to 1946, Turkey was controlled by one strongly 
state-regulated nationalist party (in common with other developing countries at the 
time), the Republican People’s Party (RPP), founded by Mustafa Kemal 
Ataturk.This political party supported the capitalist economy, but it was strongly 
state-regulated in the hopes of fostering the emergence of a Turkish bourgeoisie. 
RPP’s founding ideology was based on ‘Kemalism’.  Kemalism was defined as 
radical social, cultural, political and religious reforms to separate the Turkish nation 
from its Ottoman predecessor and encourage a ‘Westernized’ way of living with the 
establishment of democracy and secularism. However, in this ideology, secularism 
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took a fierce form where anything that did not fit with this was repressed and mostly 
used to increase nationalism in the society (Heper, 2006).    
In the 1946, the first opposition party (Democratic Party) of the Turkish Republic 
was elected, and for the first time in the Republic’s history, there was more than one 
political party in the Parliament. The Democratic Party (DP) gained popularity 
because it tried to give the impression to voters of being less secular and because it 
had a more liberal economic programme than RPP.  The DP came to power in the 
1950 supporting the liberalization of the economy and encouraging foreign 
investment.  Nevertheless, until the 1980s, Turkey had state-led industrialisation and 
a strongly state-regulated economy. The DP stayed in power until 1960, and in their 
third term, there were violent street clashes between the supporters of opposition 
party and the DP. In response, in some parts of the country, the politics of the DP 
became authoritarian, while in other parts, they ignored the social and political 
tensions. This political conflict and tension in the country finally led to a coup d’etat 
in 1960. A new constitution was drawn up in 1961 and was accepted by the public in 
a referendum. After this coup d’etat, RPP was in power (Heper, 2006;Tevfik, 1996; 
Dilipak, 1991).  
The 1961 Constitution was known for its reforms on freedom of speech and the 
independence of legal system. In the period between 1961 and 1971, there was an 
economic recession in Turkey that led to social unrest with street demonstrations, 
political assassinations, and labour strikes. Many left-wing workers’ and students’ 
organizations were established and were involved in clashes with Islamic and 
nationalist movements. Meanwhile, the government party had troubles in the 
Parliament and split into many factions, with the result that  the government party 
lost its majority, and the legislative process was eventually brought to a halt (Heper, 
2006; Palabiyik, 2008).  
By 1971, Turkey was in a state of chaos. University professors were assassinated by 
far-right movements, universities were almost unable to function, and Islamist 
parties openly rejected Ataturk and Kemalism, which led to a frustration in the Army 
that was traditionally known as a Kemalist institution. The government party seemed 
paralyzed in the political arena. In 1971, another coup d’etat took place via a 
Memorandum handed to the Prime Minister, Suleyman Demirel which demanded: 
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the formation, within the context of democratic principles, of a strong and 
credible government, which will neutralise the current anarchical situation 
and which, inspired by Ataturk's views, will implement the reformist laws 
envisaged by the constitution, putting an end to the anarchy, fratricidal 
strife, and social and economic unrest (Zurcher, 2004: 258).  
 
If the demands were not met, the Army would "exercise its constitutional duty and 
take over power itself.” (Zurcher 2004: 258)   
Demirel resigned after a three hour meeting with his cabinet.  However, chaos 
continued until 1973 and martial law was imposed and renewed every two months. 
Amendments were made to the 1961 Constitution, restricting some of the liberal 
rights it had contained and making it possible for the government to withdraw 
fundamental rights in cases of ‘abuse’ (Ahmad, 1993). In 1973, a new government 
was formed under the Prime Ministership of Bulent Ecevit, who was the leader of a 
left-wing party called Democratic Left Party (DLP). 
Between 1973 and 1980, the conflict was an important event between Turkey and 
Greece over Cyprus and Turkey’s invasion of the island in 1974. Political and social 
conflicts at home continued in this period as well, and different governments were 
formed and collapsed. In the 1979, Prime Minister Demirel presented an economic 
stability program prepared by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). This program 
allowed foreign investment to enter the Turkish economic market, a significant event 
for Turkey’s strongly state-regulated economy (Heper, 2006).  
In 1980, in response to social unrest, violent clashes between left-wing and right-
wing movements and a far right (Islamist) demonstration in east Anatolia, another 
coup d’etat occurred. As a result of this coup, left-wing movements were 
suppressed. In 1982, a new more authoritarian Constitution was drawn up and many 
of the rights that contained in the 1961 Constitution were further restricted, many 
political rights of opposition parties were abolished, and public participation in 
politics was limited (Beki, 1997; Heper, 2006).  
National and local governments implemented policies aimed at deregulating state 
control over major industries; reducing corporate taxes; privatizing public services; 
reducing or ending  welfare programs; enhancing international capital mobility; and 
liberalising trade in an attempt to improve capital accumulation. The stabilization 
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and structural adjustment program that was introduced in January 1980 was, like 
other developing countries, instituted with the guidance of IMF and the World Bank 
bringing about some radical changes in economic policies. For instance, export 
growth was successfully increased with the help of intense state intervention by 
means of generous incentives for investment and export as well as direct or indirect 
subsidies through tax rebates, tax exemptions and duty-free imports (Heper, 2006; 
Palabiyik, 2008; Beki, 1997).  
Between 1983 and 1997, left-wing movements and political parties were weakened 
and right-wing parties became stronger. Left-wing political parties tried to find ways 
to unite under one movement, but this was never achieved, and most Turkish 
governments in the 1990s were right-wing. In 1997, the government was a coalition 
of two right-wing parties (Bila, 1999).  
The army blamed the government for the increase in public Islamic movements, and 
after a meeting with the President and Chief of the General Staff, a military 
Memorandum was handed to the Prime Minister, Necmettin Erbakan.  Erbakan 
resigned and in 1988, and his party was suspended by the Constitutional Court of 
Turkey for violation of the separation of religion and state clause of the Constitution. 
Erbakan was banned from politics for five years, and the former MPs from his party 
founded another party called Virtue Party (VP). Soon after, Recep Tayyip Erdogan 
(the current President), the VP Mayor of Istanbul, was imprisoned because he read 
an Islamic and nationalist poem in public, and he was banned from politics for five 
years. The VP was also closed by Constitutional Court of Turkey in 2001 for the 
violation of separation of religion and state clause. Although Recep Tayyip Erdogan 
was banned from politics, he managed to form the Justice and Development Party 
(JDP) in 2001. Another important event in 2001 was the Turkish economic crisis 
that affected the general elections in 2002. I discuss this episode in the next section 
(Aydin and Taskin, 2014; Ozatay and Sak, 2002). 
From 2002 until the present day, the JDP has been the government party in power 
and are now in their third term.  The JDP began by supporting the tradition of Islam; 
however, it has now publicly abandoned this ideology and embraced ‘conservative 
democracy’. ‘Conservative democracy’ has meant the politics of the JDP has 
become more and more authoritarian, and one of the results of this politics was the 
Gezi protests in 2013. The Gezi protests started because of an urban planning 
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decision about a park (Gezi Park) in the inner city of Istanbul, and the government 
reacted to this small protest with excessive police force, which produced the spread 
of the protests all over the country (Kuymulu, 2013).  
In addition to the authoritarian politics, the JDP has followed a form of patronage 
politics that favours their own voters over others. One good example is the 
neighbourhood of Tophane. Even though Tarlabasi and Tophane are close together 
and share similar histories and architectural heritage, Tarlabasi is the neighbourhood 
experiencing state-led gentrification (see Map 6.1). Tophane is – just like Tarlabasi – 
a working class neighbourhood that used to be a middle class, populated by Greek 
and Armenian originated citizens. The important difference between the two 
neighbourhoods is the ethnicity of the population. Tarlabasi is a dominantly Kurdish 
neighbourhood at the moment, and those who are not Kurdish are mostly Romany. 
On the other hand, Tophane is a mostly ethnically Turkish neighbourhood and in 
addition is a very conservative and right-wing area known for its support for the 
JDP. For this reason, Tophane has not experienced gentrification pressures from the 
state because they are one of the most loyal groups of voters. This mentality is 
embedded in the JDP’s way of governing and deepens not only economic, but also 
social segregation in the society.  
 
 
Map 5.1: Connection between Tarlabasi and Tophane neighbourhoods taken from Istanbul Metropolitan 
Municipality 
 
Tophane	  
Tarlabasi	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Now I turn to the economic policies and population change of Turkey since the 
1950s and give an overview to provide a better understanding of the dynamics that 
affected political and social change in Turkey.  
 
5.4 Economy, Population and Regions since the 1950s 
Until the 1950s, Turkey’s economic growth was led by the state, but it was not as 
great as was expected by the public. After 1950, the DP followed a more liberal 
economic system (Erkan, 2008), and the motto was “one factory in every city”. 
However, site selections for these factories were mostly influenced by political 
interests, and in the end, many of the sites selected for these factories were not 
suitable with inefficient connections to labour market, and the factories became a 
burden on country’s economy rather than a source of development. In this period, no 
economic plans or policies were prepared for the economically deprived areas of 
Turkey (Dinler, 2010:55-56), but nevertheless, the export of agricultural goods grew 
and agricultural industry started to develop.  
In the 1960s, as a reaction to the unsystematic economic decision-making of the DP, 
the new government created the State Planning Organization and started to prepare 
five year development plans to monitor economic development and decrease the 
inequality between regions of Turkey (Dinler, 2010). The first five year 
development plan was prepared to cover the years 1963 to 1967, and currently the 
tenth five year development plan is in operation for the years between 2014 and 
2018. From the 1960s to the present day, rural to urban migration increased 
dramatically. The agricultural sector decreased mainly due to the mechanization of 
agriculture. The manufacturing sector increased and industrial production became 
concentrated in few areas. The concentration of unemployed and underemployed 
cheap labour in major industrial areas avoided the decentralization of industry.  
Istanbul, the core of industrial production, along with surrounding cities in the 
metropolitan area, such as Bursa, attracted masses of people from rural parts of the 
country. On the other hand, the urban areas were not prepared for such a rapid 
transformation, and the cities were continuously surrounded by low-quality illegal 
housing. Some parts of the cities were developed according to the principles of 
modern planning during the same period; consequently, segregation and a dual 
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structure started to manifest itself on urban space (Tekeli, 1998; Altay and Turkun, 
2006; Turkun 2009b). 
After the coup d’etat of 1980, Turkey adopted neo-liberal economic policies, but 
state intervention did not decrease. There were still high levels of state intervention 
in the economy, but this intervention was not in favour of the working class. 
However, it rather benefited capital and helped capital accumulation. One of the 
elements of neo-liberalism adopted by Turkey was privatisation. Privatisation in 
Turkey started around 1984, when 129 public institutions were privatised. In order to 
regulate the privatisation process, a privatisation law was enabled n 1994, which 
broadened the powers of the Privatization Administration, founded in 1984.With an 
amendment made to the Law on Development in the same year, the authority to 
make and approve plans concerning estates included in the privatization programme 
was transferred from local authorities to the High Council of Privatisation. This not 
only provided development rights to the owners of valuable properties located in city 
centres, but it also undermined the authority of the traditional planning and 
administration institutions (Dincer, 2011; Dinler, 2010; Cavdar, 1992). In other 
words, the official planning organizations had less authority over the location and 
usage of important estates of the cities of Turkey.  
Another element of neo-liberalism that was visible in Turkey was the increase in 
FBS sectors. Istanbul became the centre for FBS and most of the manufacturing 
sectors decentralized to the periphery of the city; however, unlike developed 
countries, the manufacturing sector in Turkey did not decrease as the FBS sectors 
increased. Manufacturing remains an important sector. The result of all these (plus 
migration) has been a complete transformation of urban economy in Turkey and 
massive growth in big cities. Table 6.1 shows employment in different sectors in 
Turkey. These tables show the change in employment sector sand the sectoral 
growth in Turkey over the years. This information shows the increase in finance and 
business services and how the manufacturing sectors do not decrease as they would 
in a developed country (see Chapter 2). 
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Sectoral Growth Rate in Turkey by Years 
Years  Agriculture (%) Manufacturing (%) Services (%) 
1924-1929 15,9 8   
1930-1939 6 11,7   
1946-1953 14,2 9,8 10,7 
1955-1979 2,9 8 6,5 
Table 5.1: Sectoral Growth Rate in Turkey by years. (Turkish Statistical Institute (TurkStat) 1950-
2014) 
 
 
Table 5.2: Employment between 1998-2011 (Turkish Statistical Institute (TurkStat) 
 
 
Table 5.2: continued 
 
Sectoral Distribution of Employment (1000 people) 
Years Agriculture Mining Manufacturing Energy Construction 
1962 9740 64 912 19 300 
1967 9556 11 1082 39 384 
1972 9307 95 1343 53 454 
1977 9100 15 169 90 537 
1978 9085 159 1653 94 549 
1989 8390 222 2224 133 898 
Sectoral Distribution of Employment (1000 people) 
Years Transportation Business Banking 
Services (including, 
restaurants) Unknown 
Employment 
(Total) 
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1962 261 366 52 711 18 12.643 
1967 312 434 87 916 327 13.238 
1972 391 537 157 1298 252 13.917 
1977 496 632 188 1644 270 14.726 
1978 506 639 196 1694 270 14.845 
1989 1726 648 394 2167   16802 
Table 5.3: Sectoral Distribution of Employment, 6th five year development plan, (Turkish Planning 
Organization) 
 
Employment and basic indicators in financial intermediary institutions by economic activity 
Economic activity Annual average number of employees (by years) 
Banks(Central Bank 
included),Special Finance 
Houses 
1993 1995 1998 2000 
158 582 153 941 170 654 180 375 
Financial Leasing Companies 
571 658 2047 1942 
Factoring Companies and 
activities of other financial 
intermediation 183 183 1877 1873 
Insurance Agency 4774 4774 7088 10 902 
Table 5.4: Employment and basic indicators in financial intermediary institutions by economic activity (Turkish 
Statistical Institute (TurkStat), Statistical Indicators 1923-2013) 
 
Employment and basic indicators in financial and insurance activities 
Economic activity Annual average number of employees (by years) 
Financial service 
activities (except 
insurance and pension 
funding) 
2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 
146 676 140 509 159 471 192 473 205 371 215 386 
Insurance, reinsurance 
and pension funding 
(except compulsory 
social security) 10 018 11 930 13 192 15 520 15 875  17 473 
Activities auxiliary to 
financial services and 
insurance activities 28 846 44 870 40 776 50 289 58 651 61 352 
Table 5.4: continued 
In the 1990s, rural to urban migration in Turkey continued with an additional form 
of migration characterized by people who were forced to leave their hometowns in 
the East and South-east of Turkey. These urban immigrants were Kurdish people 
who were forced to leave their environment because of the conflicts in the area. 
From the 1920s, the Republic had repressed the Kurds and failed to make economic 
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investments in Kurdish areas. In the 1990s, when the Kurds increased their attacks in 
and around the area of East and South-east of Turkey, the Turkish Army responded 
with violent military activity, adding to the stream of migration into the cities 
(Turkun, 2009b; Turkun, 2011; Turkun 2009a).  Kurdish villages were emptied or 
pulled down completely by the state on the grounds of security and ease of control 
of Kurdish groups, and by using the war-like atmosphere as an excuse, state support 
and investments were halted and educational and health services were not provided 
at adequate levels to this most backward region of the country. As a result, the 
problems of the provinces in the region have worsened, with dense emigration of 
people from villages with no savings or capacities for starting life in urban areas. 
This type of migration was different from the previous phases of rural urban 
movement because it was not based on a decision to migrate with considerable 
mental and financial preparation before, and people could not secure any kind of 
income supplement from their family as a form of support because of the unsafe 
urban environment with high military activity.  One of the most important cities in 
the region of South-East Turkey, Diyarbakir, attracted large numbers of people: the 
population almost doubled between 1990-1995 (from 380,000 to 550,000). 
Inadequate employment opportunities and lack of urban services led to acute 
problems that are getting harder to resolve (UNDP, 2006; Turkun 2009a).  
Turkey depended heavily on foreign investment in the 1980s and the 1990s, and the 
government and the banking system did not have the means to support the desired 
economic growth. By the year 2000, there was a huge budget deficit, and the 
government hoped to manage this by selling large numbers of high-interest bonds to 
Turkish banks. As a result of increasing flows of foreign capital into Turkey, 
inflation continued to increase, and this meant the government could avoid 
defaulting on the bonds in the short term. In the end, Turkish banks became heavily 
dependent on these high-yield bonds (Ozatay and Sak, 2002; Yeldan 2002). In 2001, 
Turkey experienced the biggest financial crisis in the history of the Republic.  
The real gross domestic product (GDP) which has fallen by 5% in 
1999, expanded at a rate of 7.4% in 2000; but drifted into negative 
quarterly rates of growth following the first quarter of 2001. Of the 
expenditures over gross domestic product the deepest slump was 
witnessed in fixed investments, with contractions of –41.5% and –
50.2% in the second half of 2001. Fixed investment expenditures are 
observed to follow their contractionary trend during the first two 
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quarters of 2002 with rates of real growth of –26% and –1% (Yeldan 
2002:2): 
 
This crisis created many political problems, and it is one of the major reasons why 
the JDP came to power in 2002. The JDP’s motto has always been stability in the 
economy, which they partly achieved in their first term with foreign capital flow to 
the country.  
This section summarized the important economic changes and events in the history 
of Turkey that had important spatial effects. Having discussed an overall picture of 
Turkey in relation to the politics and history of ethnic minorities and the 
development of economic sectors since the 1950s, I move on to discussing economic 
sectors in details with regard to specifics about Turkey. 
 
5.5 Sectoral Change and Corresponding State Policies since the 1950s 
 
   5.5.1 Agriculture and to Urban Migration 
It is important to look at agriculture because the huge portion of Istanbul’s 
population is the result of rural to urban migration under the Republican 
government. Until the 1950s, Turkey was characterized as an agricultural country, 
and the share of agricultural employment in total employment was 84%, while 88% 
of the population lived in districts of less than 10 000 people (TurkStat, 2011). In the 
1950s, agriculture was still the major sector of the national economy, but by 2010, it 
constituted only 16% of employment (TurkStat, 2011). The economic policies of the 
right-wing Democratic Party after 1950 were in favour of the development of 
industry and infrastructure for industry. As a result, in the early 1950s, most of the 
state industrial expenditure was diverted from agriculture to transportation, 
communication and construction investments (Gülalp, 1987).  
Marshall Aid from the USA in this period was aimed to increase agricultural 
production through mechanization (Turkun, 2011). In parallel with the changes in 
the rural structure after the 1950s, radical changes began in urban areas of the 
country: the share of people living in rural areas decreased to 74% in 1970 and to 
55% in 1980 (State Statistics Institute, 1995).  
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After the Second World War, migration from rural to urban increased and 
urbanization accelerated greatly. There are several accepted causes for this change: 
first there was a national increase in the population; second, there was an increase in 
the mechanization of agriculture. Farm animals were able to cultivate only 5.5 
hectares of land, whereas one tractor could cultivate 75 hectares of land. This led 
agricultural establishments to increase the amount of land they owned (Tekeli, 
1982). 
The third cause was the improvement in technology and transportation, which 
enabled large firms to enter the agriculture market all around the country, leading  
them to specialize in one product rather than producing many products (Tekeli, 
1982).  
The last cause of increased rural to urban migration was the transformation of small 
agricultural firms that was connected to large firms buying up land and farms. A 
minority of small agricultural firms managed to transform themselves into big 
capitalist enterprises by networking in political parties, using loans from banks and 
increasing the number of tractors they owned (Tekeli, 1982). People who sold or 
leased their land to other firms migrated to urban areas. All these changes led to a 
decrease in agricultural employment, which is still continuing. Table 6.5 and 6.6 
shows the percentage of employment in agriculture since the late 1980s. It is evident 
from the table that employment in agriculture decreased dramatically throughout the 
years, and as mentioned before, the employment growth shifted to finance and 
business services. 
 
Employment in Agriculture between 2000-2014 (1000people) 
Years Population  Total Employment Employment in Agriculture 
Employment in 
Agriculture (%) 
1998 62.865 21,580 7,769 36 
1999 62.865 21,524 8,089 37,5 
2002 69.626 21.354 7.458 34,9 
2003 70.363 21.147 7.165 33,9 
2004 71.152 19.632 5.713 29,1 
2005 72.065 20.067 5.154 25,7 
2006 72.974 20.423 4.907 24,0 
2007 70.586 20.738 4.867 23,5 
2008 71.517 21.194 5.016 23,7 
2009 72.561 21.277 5.24 24,6 
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2010 73.723 22.594 5.683 25,2 
2011 74.724 24.11 6.143 25,5 
2012 75.627 24.821 6.097 24,6 
2013 76.668 25.524 6.015 23,6 
2014 76.668 26.169 5.625 21,5 
Table 5.5: Employment in agriculture between 2000-2014, regional indicators 2013, (Turkish 
Statistical Institute) 
Growth rate in Agriculture Sector 
Years  Growth rate (%) 
1924-1929 15,9 
1930-1939 6 
1946-1953 14,2 
1955-1979 2,9 
1980-1988 1,6 
1989-2002 1 
Table 5.6: Growth rate in agriculture sector, , 8th, 9th and 10th five year development plan (Ministry of 
Development) 
 
Before the mechanization of agriculture and increase in rural to urban migration, the 
size of one family in villages consisted of around 8-9 people. Extended families 
functioned to hide unemployment inside the family and presented a ‘solution’ to 
unemployment. The agriculture work done by these big families was solely to make 
enough money for the future of the family (Tekeli, 1982:85). The members of the 
family who did not work could live their lives supported by other family members. 
This kind of unemployment had not been a problem for the families at that time 
because having some members of the family not working (in some cases for all their 
lives) was culturally accepted.  However, in changing times, this became a problem 
for productivity, income and work aspiration.  
Families who lost their land in various ways started to lose part of their income and 
this loss of income led to the fragmentation of the family. If the family was losing 
land by selling their land or because of the decrease in employment in agriculture 
sector, their first option would have been sending the young male in the family to a 
neaerby town or city to work, but often, this was only temporary. According to 
research in 1966, 28 % of families had some members working in a city (Tugac et 
al., 1970). If the family continued to lose land, other options would have been 
discussed. In such cases, a nuclear family inside an extended family might migrate 
to a big city, losing the support of their extended family. At the same time, this 
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allowed these big families to have connections with big cities, and sometimes they 
used this connection in sending other members of the family or contributing a 
business deal through the members of the family that had migrated. According to 
Timur’s (1972) research on Turkey, by 1968, the proportion of small families in 
rural areas was 47.8%, indicating a decrease in the proportion of extended families. 
The share of net migration in population increase in cities reached 56% in the 1965-
70 period. This rate gradually declined, but it was still 45% in the 1985-90 period 
(Tekeli, 1982).  
Rural to urban migration did not depend only on what was happening in countryside, 
but also on what was happening in the city. The marginal job opportunities (in 
sweatshops, people working in the undocumented economy such as street sellers) in 
urban areas were also encouraging people from rural areas to migrate.  
This section discussed the ways in which the agriculture sector changed in the last 
60-70 years and lost its importance as a growth sector with changes in economy and 
technology. This section is also important because of the insight it provides about 
the rural to urban migration. In the following section, the development of 
manufacturing sector in Turkey is examined to give insight on how the leading 
sector in the country changed and how this affected the built environment and the 
distribution of the labour force.  
 
   5.5.2 Manufacturing 
During the 1930s, industrialization was led by the state because the private sector 
was weak, and the state strongly regulated many sectors, including manufacturing. 
Until the 1950s, Turkey was still an overwhelmingly agricultural state. After the 
1950s, the manufacturing sector increased dramatically, especially in big cities. 
Most influential manufacturing companies of that time consisted of big family 
holdings and large conglomerates. The economic policies of the 1960s and 1970s 
mainly import substitution industrialization (ISI) and the protection of the domestic 
market. State Planning Organization (SPO) had some authority over the decision of 
benefit from tax exemptions, import privileges and subsidies (Pamuk, 2007). 
Spatially, the manufacturing sector was mostly concentrated in the Marmara Region 
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and centred in Istanbul. The central role of Istanbul in manufucaturing is examined 
in detail in the next chapter.  
The increase in the manufacturing sector mostly depended on the domestic market 
until the mid-1970s. Up until then, economic policy for manufacturing still strongly 
promoted ISI, but ignoring export sectors then started to be a problem. As Pamuk 
(2007:284) puts it: 
While industry and government policy remained focused on a large 
and attractive domestic market, they all but ignored exports of 
manufactures, and this proved to be the Achilles’ heel of Turkey’s 
ISI. The export sector’s share in GDP averaged less than 4 per cent 
during the 1970 s, and about two-thirds of these revenues came from 
the traditional export crops. 
 
The rapid transformation that was brought about by industrialization also created an 
informal (marginal) sector providing spare parts or repair services as well as 
providing cheap products for the consumption by low-income people settled in 
urban areas. This marginal sector produced spare parts or repair services and cheap 
products, so it filled the missing links in industrial production, and in contrast to the 
products of unregistered and secondary industrial establishments, explored and used 
new production or services according to current demands of consumers from 
different income levels. This sector helped low-income people not only by providing 
jobs, but in some cases, by making low-cost goods. This structure and labour force 
after marginalization can be described as “working class segmentation with 
migration” (Icduygu, Sirkeci and Aydingun, 1988). In the first phase of migration, 
people kept their relationship with their birth places. This labour force brought about 
the first segmentation in the working classes, and each influx of new migrants 
appeared to increase this segmentation by providing a disorganized and usually more 
unskilled reserve labour pool, which would decrease the negotiating power of the 
more experienced and organized workers (Turkun, 2009b). 
When the 2000 census is examined (Table 6.7), it is clear that industrialized areas 
attracted the highest migration rates. Conversely, northern and eastern areas of the 
country that depended mostly on agricultural production lost considerable 
population (Demirci and Sunar, 1998). Table 6.7 shows incomes and migration rates 
129	  
	  
in Turkey by regions, and it can be seen that Marmara Region receives the most 
rural to urban migration due to the concentration of manufacturing. 
 
  1985 1990 2000 
Regions 
Migration 
(%) Income (%) Migration (%) 
Income 
(%) 
Migration 
(%) 
Marmara 3.9 36.5 7.1 36.5 3.5 
Aegian 1.4 15.8 2.7 15.1 2.2 
Mediterranean 1.6 12 2.1 12.3 0.04 
Central 
Anatolia -0.6 16.6 -1.7 16.9 0.01 
Black Sea -2.9 9.7 -5.8 9.8 -4.2 
East Anatolia -4.9 4.1 -9.2 4.3 -3.9 
South-east 
Anatolia -1.9 5.3 -2.7 5.1 -3.8 
Table 5.7: Comparison of migration and income according to regions in Turkey (Turkish Statistical 
Institute (TurkStat); Migration and income rate of the regions in Turkey, 1985-2000) 
 
By 2005, 22 million people were employed and Istanbul had 16% of the 
employment in the whole country. By 2008, 3,923,000 people were employed in 
Istanbul, and the increase in employment was in FBS sectors.  At the same time, 
most of the manufacturing activity had been relocated to the periphery of Istanbul, 
and the city still had 35% of the industry rate. This means Istanbul still has the 
position as the industrial centre of the country (Ercan, 2003). 
 
   5.5.3 Finance and Business Services 
Since the 1950s, Turkey’s economy and urban housing have been completely 
transformed. Over time, the state has become interested in the increase in FBS 
sectors, actively sponsoring FBS and the construction sector. Now, FBS and 
construction sectors are the main sectors of the economy receiving the state support 
from many governmental institutions (e.g., MHDA) and state-led urban projects (i.e. 
Istanbul Finance Centre).  
As discussed in Section 6.4, after the 1980 coup d’etat, trade and payment regimes 
were liberalised. These changes pointed to the start of a more neo-liberal era in 
Turkey, and they opened up the ISI structures to competition. However, the 
regulations and revisions of these liberalisation policies together with the favours 
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provided to certain businesses close to the government created an uncertain and 
unstable environment (Denizer, 2000; Celasun et al., 1999).  
The IMF and the World Bank supported liberalization as part of their structural 
adjustment programme, which aimed to create more neo-liberal economies in 
developing countries. This programme also aimed to relax the entry barriers for the 
banking system and promote competition. In addition, the controls on interest rates 
were relaxed, and this was important for Turkey as these rates had been heavily 
controlled since the 1940s, in line with state-regulated development on import 
(Denizer, 2000; Celasun et al., 1999; Denizer, 1997). This relaxation had several 
outcomes: 
This led to non-price competition by banks already in the system 
through opening up of new branches. Directed credit programs 
absorbed almost 75% of loanable funds. Entry, especially after early 
1960s, had been highly restrictive. This situation, coupled with the 
exit of a large number of banks during the 1960-80 period, resulted in 
a concentrated market dominated by large private and public banks 
with extensive branch networks. Of the 42 banks in 1980, only four 
were foreign (Denizer 2000:3)  
 
By the end of 1980s, interest rates were determined by the finance market, and this 
attracted many foreign and Turkish banks: the number of foreign banks increased 
dramatically. By 1990, there were 23 foreign banks operating in Turkey, and they 
were seen important in attracting external capital by the Turkish financial system. In 
the late 1990s, these numbers increased even more.  
At the end of 1997 there were 59 commercial banks, 13 investment 
and development banks, more than 100 brokerage houses, and some 
64 insurance companies. Focusing on the banking sector, it can be 
seen that since 1980 there has been a significant number of entries 
and exits. State-owned commercial banks declined in number from 
eight in 1980 to four in 1997. This decline has been due to the 
privatization or merger of some of the smaller public banks. Private 
banks increased in number from 24 in 1980 to 38 as of end of 1997, a 
net entry of 14. … In 1980 there were only four foreign banks - by 
1990 there were 23. This number then declined to 17, mostly as a 
result of some of the foreign banks merging with smaller Turkish 
banks. … Most of the foreign banks came in the 1980-1985 period 
and were owned by large banks of European, United States or Middle 
Eastern origin (Denizer 2000:7:). 
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Another reason was the expectation that Turkey would sign a customs agreement 
with the European Union in 1995, which raised some expectations that Turkey 
would maintain a liberal policy environment in general (Denizer, 2000). This 
expansion of banking and liberalization of the Turkish financial system has been 
crucial for the FBS sectors of Turkey, and these sectors are heavily concentrated in 
Istanbul. The spatial effects of FBS sectors in Istanbul examined in the next chapter. 
 
   5.5.4 Tourism 
After 1980, changes in the Turkish economy had significant effects on the tourism 
sector. As the economy became more export-oriented, tourism gained more 
importance (Gezici and Kerimoglu, 2010). A law was passed in 1982 that enabled 
state subsidies for the purpose of encouraging of tourism, and coastal and developed 
areas of the country received large amounts of investment.  However, as Gezici and 
Kerimoglu (2010:254) put it, “property development interests and the idea of 
expanding bed capacity decided the level of subsidies, rather than an integrated 
approach which took into account cultural attractions.” 
In the 1990s, the focus on coastal tourism only was not enough to increase the 
overall tourism demand. The idea was to provide other alternatives to coastal 
tourism that would attract local and international tourists not only in specific 
seasons, but also all through the year. This idea was emphasized in the 1996-2000 
five year development plan, and new alternative types of tourism were proposed in 
order to increase number of tourist coming in the country (SPO, 2000). In the 2000s, 
this idea of promoting other types of tourism rather than just coastal tourism shifted 
focus to cultural tourism and to promoting the cultural variety and richness of 
Turkey (Ministry of Culture and Tourism, 2004). Following this policy, Istanbul was 
chosen the European Cultural Capital in 2010 (see Chapter 5). Turkey’s share of the 
world tourism market increased to 2.6% (SPO, 2007).  
 
   5.5.5 The Construction Sector 
After the 1980s, although the manufacturing sector was still increasing in Turkey, 
metropolitan municipalities, big construction firms and development agencies 
realized that increasing land rents to be captured through urban development 
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projects were profitable. In other words, the urban projects were a means of 
increasing the rents. In the early 1980s, the second most important sector after 
textiles and clothing was the construction industry, enhanced by tourism investments 
in different tourist attraction spaces as well as big urban projects, such as office 
blocks, hotels and shopping malls, cultural and convention centres and luxury 
housing estates. Under these circumstances, Istanbul was suitable for important 
urban projects and developments (Turkun, 2007; Brenner and Theodore, 2002; 
Swyngedouw, et al., 2002; Weber, 2002). Investing in urban land started to bring 
higher profits on capital than any kind of industrial production and had substantial 
spatial impacts in and around cities. 
The effects of deindustrialization were similar to other developing countries (see 
Chapter 2). In Istanbul, the goal of becoming an international finance, business and 
tourism centre guided urban policies aimed at catching up with the developed world 
cities and furthering capital accumulation. These policies mainly encouraged the real 
estate development and construction sectors. In addition, construction companies 
played a crucial role in land development, which often increases the value of the 
land and the developer makes a profit simply on the appreciation of the land. This 
adds to the speculative nature of the land market.  
As we will see shortly, the construction sector expanded not only through 
commercial buildings, but also in housing. The next section examines the Turkish 
housing market. 
 
5.6 The Turkish Housing Market 
This section discusses the Turkish housing market to give an insight concerning the 
changes of the housing system over the last 60-70 years and their effect on the 
processes of gentrification in Istanbul.  The need for housing policy emerges with 
urbanization because with the increase in urbanization, housing problems occur. 
With increased urbanization and the emergence of housing policies, tenure became 
an important issue. Tenure in Turkey was mainly owner-occupied, and it was not 
until the 1990s that rental housing became common. The lack of social or affordable 
housing has always been a problem for Turkey, and these issues are examined later 
in this chapter.  
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Building contractors and small development firms were the main creators in private 
housing in Turkey until the 1950s. They came to agreements with the owner or 
owners of the land and contracted out construction to other construction firms. 
Construction of buildings was mostly done by small developers working on single 
housing units. Essentially, there were two types of profit from the housing market. 
The first was profit on asset value, which is capital gain from the appreciation of the 
value of building as a result of supply and demand. An owner occupier makes the 
capital gain over time through their ownership of the property. The second was 
profit for the builder from construction.  Building firms construct housing and gain 
profit from that by selling the flats one by one (Tekeli, 1982).  
From the 1950s, different forms of housing started to appear. These forms are 
examined in the next stages of the chapter, but one important thing about them is 
that they were mostly for middle class owner-occupiers based on purchasing a house 
rather than renting it.  Social housing and affordable housing was not part of Turkish 
housing system, and until this day, there is no efficient social housing policy. This 
has led to the emergence of squatter areas called gecekondus (Turkun and Yapici, 
2009a; Sen, 2008, 2009). Gecekondus are the form of informal housing in Turkey, 
and they have had many effects on the urban layout. Even though I do not primarily 
study this kind of housing, their existence around the central city had many effects 
on the urban regeneration projects and urban laws and therefore, the way the housing 
system developed over the years. The MHDA was founded in 1984 for the purpose 
of producing affordable housing; however, it turned into a very powerful 
governmental institution with wide-ranging control over almost every aspect of the 
housing market. MHDA was initially an institution that provided low-cost housing 
with cheap credits and low monthly instalments, but these houses were for sale and 
this institution did not create any rental social housing. Most of the working class in 
Turkey did not have enough financial savings or security to commit for a 10-20 year 
contract.  This is examined in detail later in this chapter. 
I examine the housing market by dividing it into time periods for the purpose of 
making it more understandable to the reader. The next sub-section examines the 
housing market in the 1920s, and following that, I respectively discuss the periods of 
the 1950s and the 2000s. 
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   5.6.1 Housing Policy from the 1920s to the 1950s 
Since the 1920s, there has not been an efficient housing policy because of financial 
and institutional problems and weaknesses. Housing policy did not have a social 
aspect, and the housing for low-income people was not considered. Some measures 
were taken to solve the acute problems of certain groups in some localities, such as 
constructing houses for civil servants (especially after Ankara was proclaimed as the 
capital city in the 1920s) as well as houses for immigrants mostly from Greece and 
East Europe or houses built for the victims of natural disasters (Turkun, 2011).  
In some periods, there were several attempts to support cooperative housing for 
workers by means of credits provided by the Real Estate Bank and the Credit Bank 
founded in 1926 and 1946, respectively. These banks were founded to provide the 
financial and institutional set up to help solve the housing problems of especially 
low-income people without social security by using state resources: however, they 
were insufficient in serving this purpose (Tekeli, 1982). These banks targeted clients 
were middle class people who were not able to buy real estate property without 
housing credit. Before this, middle class families simply saved up for years to buy a 
property or had other means besides housing credits (such as inheritance). The 
resources for these and similar banks were limited, and because they mostly 
provided credit to the middle class with a low interest rate and a long-term payment 
schedules in an inflationist environment, this meant using the capital of the bank in 
the short term. Since there were no public funds, nor a good social security system at 
that time were available to create resources for these banks, this solution for housing 
was limited to a small group of the middle class who were able to afford the credit 
payments (Tekeli, 1982).  
 
   5.6.2 From the 1950s to the 2000s 
The social security system became common only after the 1950s. In Turkey until the 
late 1940s, there were no state income transfers and no state pensions. In 1945, the 
Social Security Institution started to give credit to workers’ housing cooperatives, 
but the supply was limited since only a small number of people were part of the 
system. These social security funds were not fundamental for resolving housing 
problems, as they were for creating a personal social security for individuals: they 
135	  
	  
were only good for purchasing housing individually rather than a solution for the 
housing problems of the society (Tekeli, 1982). In 1951, the Law of Local 
Governments (Law No. 5656) gave municipalities the responsibility for producing 
the necessary housing, and in 1958, the Ministry of Development and Real Estate 
was founded to provide low-cost housing at reasonable prices. These measures were 
only realized in a few cases (Turkun and Yapici, 2009a; Sen, 2008, 2009); these 
examples were successful, but insufficient to solve the low-cost housing problem in 
Turkey. 
Creating rental housing was not encouraged through this system. Rents were almost 
half of a worker’s stipend. Even though this was too expensive for most workers, the 
landlords were receiving rents below 10% of the property’s value, so that while the 
rents were too expensive for the working class, the profits from property were too 
small. The reason for this was the high housing prices because of land asset value. 
Gaining money from the asset value and creating land asset became the main two 
purposes. As a result, there was not much rental housing stock. In such an 
environment, the owner’s main purpose is not having an income from the rents; it is 
rather earning money from the land asset value. This situation was happening mostly 
in major cities of Turkey with industrial workers (Tekeli, 1982).  
In an environment in which housing ownership depended on personal savings, no 
big housing complexes were being built explicitly for sale. To change this and create 
supply for the demand for housing, ‘housing cooperatives’ started to appear. 
‘Housing cooperatives’ in Turkey are different from those in Britain. In Turkey, an 
investor would buy a large piece of land, gaining planning permission from the 
municipality to build a large housing complex and selling it off flat by flat. People 
buying in these developments paid a monthly fee to the ‘housing cooperatives’ for 
decades (depending on the project), and when the development was completed, they 
became the owner-occupiers. The housing cooperative option was more efficient 
than building one’s own house because of the time consuming bureaucratic process 
for planning permission (Tekeli, 1982; Senyapili, 1982).  
These developments in the housing market created another form of investment 
called “yap-sat”. Yap-sat meant constructing a building or a small complex using 
bank credit and selling it off flat by flat.  When it was possible by law to have more 
than one property title in a single lot, it was also possible for an investor or builder to 
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buy some of the lots from the owner of the land in exchange of property titles from 
the buildings that they were going to build. In that way, after the construction was 
completed, an owner can have several properties in the same lot. This investor is 
called “yap-satci”. The Yap-satci is not a building contractor. A building contractor 
is the person who constructs a building with a specific design given to him/her for a 
specific amount of money. The profit that a building contractor makes is negotiated 
beforehand; in the “yap-satci” system, the flats are sold after construction on the 
open housing market. This kind of housing investment became very common in the 
1960s, and after the 1960s, big housing credits had the requirement of being a 
‘housing cooperative’, and the “yap-satci” was forced to construct building on 
expensive land, therefore creating a housing stock for the middle and upper class. 
Because they did not have the title of being a housing cooperative, they were not 
able to take big credits for the purpose of building housing, and they were forced to 
buy small amount of land in the central city.  ‘Yap-sat’ was not effective for creating 
social housing stock or housing for the poor.  This form was mostly abandoned, and 
around the mid-1970s, ‘cluster housing’ was presented as a housing solution. Cluster 
housing is a form of multiple unit development, in Turkey. Cluster housing is a 
group of residential units built around an open area that provides extra green and 
recreational space in a development.  It allows the developer to build houses on 
much less land and obtain the same amount of profit as for detached houses (Tekeli, 
1982).  
Because there was no policy for low-cost or social housing at the time, working 
class people created their own solution, the “gecekondu”. Gecekondus are squatter 
housing areas built overnight – sometimes literally but not always, but that is where 
the term comes from – on state land. To be able to understand the concept of 
“gecekondu”, the high rate of urbanization and the expanding squatter housing areas 
(“gecekondus”) should be analysed in an underdeveloped economy. There were two 
reasons for the emergence of gecekondu areas: attracting cheap labour and lack of 
political will to create affordable housing stock. Firstly, urban areas perform the 
function of forming and reproducing capital and labour power. In the reproduction 
of the labour power, housing determines the price of labour power in the market. 
Low cost housing enables the cost of reproduction of labour to be kept low without 
transferring state spending to housing investments, so that the state can directly 
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support capitalist investments (Tekeli, 1982; Turkun, 2011; Turkun, 2009a; 
Neuwirth, 2004). Although gecekondus were illegal, they were built by the users 
using their own labour, and this not only allowed the state to have low-cost housing 
in large cities, but also meant free labour in the production of gecekondu housing 
stock. Secondly, when the number of gecekondus in the 1980s and 1990s increased 
dramatically in the big cities of Turkey, the middle class and state officials 
overlooked this type of housing even though they were illegal because they did not 
want to be bothered with social housing policies. 
In the early 1970s, almost one third of the urban population had been living in 
squatter areas with an even larger proportion in the big cities (Turkun, 2011). Due to 
the increasing number of migrants in metropolitan areas and their political power in 
affecting elections, various measures were taken to integrate them into the system by 
giving their houses legal status, especially in election periods (Turkun, 2011). This 
meant many gecekondus started with one storey houses constructed between 1920 
and 1980 that were extended by the owners to become 3-4 storey low quality 
apartment blocks.   
The status of squatter housing areas established after the 1980s shows variations and 
poses a more problematic situation. In those years, local governments demolished 
the housing blocks, and there were some fierce confrontations between the police 
and the inhabitants that sometimes led to death (Aslan, 2004). In later decades, 
various laws were passed to give gecekondu houses legal status through pre-title 
deeds that would be converted into official title-deeds after the completion of 
development plans.  However, it is still the case that in many housing areas, people 
are vulnerable in the face of new neo-liberal housing policies and the ambiguous 
legal status of their houses (Turkun, 2011). 
 
   5.6.3 From the 2000s to Present  
In the 2000s, official attitudes to squatter areas changed direction, and the state 
claimed that people in gecekondus were invaders. These districts were claimed to be 
the reason for increased crime rates, which led the public to think that people living 
there were the criminals. The authorities started to say that urban regeneration and 
transformation was needed in squatter areas and in the historic districts that had been 
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‘invaded’ by the urban poor. There were many laws enacted to bring about these 
transformations with the justifications like the need for “organized and planned 
development” or to reduce risks of damage from earthquakes.  However, when 
examined in detail, the legal framework for the urban regeneration projects does not 
represent comprehensive planning for urbanization (Turkun, 2011). What these laws 
have in common is that areas that were declared as urban regeneration, and renewal 
areas have been specifically either historic or squatter housing districts that are now 
considered high-priced urban land.  
In addition, the housing sector is highly affected by the MHDA, which is examined 
in detail in the next section of this chapter. After its foundation (1984), laws and 
regulations helped the MHDA gain the power it has now. There are seven important 
laws that have made this possible. One of these laws is Law No. 5162 of 2004, 
which gave the MHDA the authority to make master plans in squatter areas. A 
second important law is the Municipality Law of 2005, under which the urban and 
provincial municipalities in Turkey gained the power to create urban regeneration 
and development projects. A third makes reasons for the MHDA’s establishment 
clear – the “Mass Housing Law” passed in 2004. According to this law, the MHDA 
is not only responsible for mass housing, but also responsible for renovations and 
regenerations in urban areas (Yilmaz, 2010).  
A fourth law, enabled in 2005, is “The Law for Preservation and Usage of 
Deteriorated Historical and Cultural Monuments”. This law allowed the MHDA to 
carry out urban regeneration projects in historic environments and displace the 
people living there to housing areas on the periphery of the city (Yilmaz, 2010). 
A fifth bill was passed in 2006 relating to urban regeneration areas, but because of 
the reaction from Chambers and NGOs, it was never applied. The Bill was supported 
by MHDA and the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality (IMM), which indicates that 
public institutions are trying to use laws and regulations as a tool to get rid of all the 
‘unwanted inhabitants’ in the city (Yilmaz, 2010). 
In addition, in 2007, the new law gave the MHDA responsibility for all gecekondus 
and the authority to take over state land with the approval of the Prime Minister 
without charge. This Law No.5069 amended Law No.775 relating to squatter areas, 
giving all the authority the Environment and Urban Ministry had for squatter areas 
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to the MHDA, which was now becoming the ultimate planning authority and state 
land owner. 
In 2008, a seventh, ‘omnibus’ law made changes to a number of relevant laws and 
regulations. This law amended 27 laws (Turkun and Yapici, 2009a) and increased 
the MHDA’s authority area. Many Chambers such as the Architects’ Chamber and 
the Civil Engineers’ Chamber prepared reports on the negative effects of this law.  
Also in 2008, changes were made to the law on Public Finance Management and 
Control. With these changes, the MHDA gained the most authority for squatter and 
public areas of any institution and became a governmental body able to sell public 
schools in the city centre.  
With all these laws, the MHDA gained the sole power to deal with gecekondus 
(Turkun and Yapici, 2009a). It became the biggest land speculator and the perfect 
example for neo-liberal urban politics in terms of creating and implementing policies 
and urban regenerations and transformation projects that only benefit the capital.  
Having the discussed the changes Turkish housing market experienced over the 
years, I move on to state policy and urban change that came with it to supply an 
understanding of the changes government plans created spatially.  
 
5.7 Urban Change and State Policy 
Between the 1980s and the 1990s, there were consistent discussions about urban 
policies related to low-income housing. Central and local authorities were explaining 
squatter housing in relation to the economic situation of the inhabitants, and the 
MHDA was founded in 1984 to solve the housing problems of low-income people 
by encouraging the establishment of housing cooperatives supported by cheap credit 
(Turkun, 2011). There were many laws that were enacted in the mid-1980s for 
squatter housing owners that gave them pre-title deeds to be converted into official 
title-deeds after the development plans were prepared. The idea was to put 
gecekondu areas to the market for the purpose of transforming them, but this led to 
an increase in rent gaining potential of these houses, and people tended to increase 
the rents through house ownership instead of claiming for the right to housing 
(Turkun and Yapici, 2009a). Because over the years some of the gecekondu owners 
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managed to build 3-4 storey apartment buildings in the area and they left while 
renting out their property to other working class people.  
In the 1990s, the turn towards neo-liberalism in Turkey entered a second phase. 
Against the background of fragile growth, extreme inflation and excessive public 
sector debt (Boratav, 2003), the powers of the institutions representing and 
executing modern planning approaches in Turkey were diminished further. An 
example was the State Planning Institute, one of the most prominent Turkish 
planning institutions, which transferred an important share of its functions to the 
Under-Secretariat of Treasury and Foreign Trade. The most important feature of the 
laws that were enacted throughout the 1990s was that they sought to encourage 
national and international investments, the most significant of which was the law 
encouraging investment in tourism and granting exceptional concessions in terms of 
development rights (Ekinci, 1994). 
Increases in the FBS and tourism sectors led to the restructuring of whole cities, and 
this is one of the reasons why the construction sector has become so important. In 
the 1990s, people living in squatter areas started to be labelled as invaders and 
criminals, and with these excuses, the state started to remove them from their houses 
(not every gecekondu owner was able to benefit from the law that gave them official 
the titles). Demolition of gecekondus became part of daily life, which the state 
presented as ‘cleaning up’ the areas. Both national state officials and local 
authorities started to pronounce the necessity of urban regeneration and 
transformation in squatter housing areas and also the historic urban areas usually 
inhabited by the urban poor (Turkun, 2011). Areas declared as ‘urban regeneration 
and renewal areas’ are either part of historic areas where there are limitations on 
construction and planning rights or squatter areas that had recently became valuable 
because of the urban growth around these areas (Turkun, 2009). 
In 2002, the MHDA managers talked mostly about urban regeneration projects and 
called for private construction firms and real estate speculators to join the projects, 
even though it was not clear where a project was going to take place, nor were 
inhabitants of the possible areas given any information. The former President of the 
MHDA (Erdogan Bayraktar) stated at the Fifth Real Estate Investors Convention 
that (2002, retrieved from the archives of The Chamber of Architects, February, 
2013): 
141	  
	  
MHDA has the capacity and legal means to do business with local 
and international real estate investors, this privilege is given to us by 
law and we can create projects with least bureaucracy (translated by 
the author). 
 
The former MHDA President not only called for investors, but also gave hints about 
the projects the MHDA may propose in the future.  
A governmental body that had been founded to construct social affordable housing 
for the poor changed its purpose and policy and started to lead capital looking for 
profitable places to invest in the city. The MHDA gained power with the recent laws 
and was seen as a way to dispose of the effects of the economic crisis back in 2001 
by the current government (Turkun and Yapici, 2009a). In 2004, the Land Use 
Office was closed and all the lands were passed on to the MHDA, increasing the 
MHDA’s land stock from sround 17 million m2 to 200 million m2 (Sonmez, 2012). 
The MHDA took over all urban development powers when former Prime Minister of 
Turkey (Recep Tayyip Erdogan – now the President of Turkey) was elected as an 
M.P in 2003 and immediately became the Prime Minister. The former MHDA 
president (Erdogan Bayraktar) stated that (retrieved from the archives of The 
Chamber of Architects, February, 2013): 
When I became the president of MHDA Mr. Erdogan was not the 
prime minister. It was Mr. Abdullah Gul [current president of Turkish 
Republic]. Three months after I had started my duty Mr. Erdogan 
became the prime minister and I tried to do a short presentation to 
him about MHDA. I studied the background of MHDA and found out 
that 43 thousand houses were built in 20 years and said if we can do 5 
times of this, meaning 10 thousand houses in a year, we would be 
considered very successful. Prime minister got really angry when he 
saw my predictions and said “go and get proper predictions! And he 
added: “Tell me about 100 thousands and 500 thousands.” 
 
Bayraktar did everything he could to achieve these predictions. Just before the 2007 
elections, Erdogan attended all the events of the MHDA and supported every 
investment that the MHDA made. MHDA has been the institution for Erdogan to 
prepare and implement any kind of urban projects. By these means, he used the 
MHDA in his election propaganda. During that time, MHDA gained massive 
authority over every form of housing all over the country by new laws and became 
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an essential tool for the economy. Even though MHDA started as a solution for the 
low-cost and social housing, after 2003, it became a profit organization that is 
equipped with great authority. Even though MHDA is supposed to be a publicly led 
social housing agency, recently it has behaved like a privatizing agency. Sonmez 
(2012, reflectionsturkey) states that: 
On the surface, MHDA seems simply to be a public agency. But 
taking into account that it is administrating USD $35 billion of 
investments to build for half a million people, it could well be also 
named as a “Public Enterprise in Housing”. Yet this is only part of the 
story; the reality is far from it. Unlike an active public enterprise, 
MHDA is essentially a second privatization agency administrating the 
sales of public properties and public buildings -that normally belong 
to the state, thus all its citizens- to private commercial parties. While 
the public economic enterprises are being privatized by the 
Privatization Agency (OIB), the real estate properties of the state are 
being sold or appropriated for use by MHDA or OIB. It should be 
noted that MHDA does not receive any allocations from the public 
budget or any other public resources. The Agency uses public lands 
and other real estate properties as its capital. 
MHDA has received its “capital” from the National Land Office 
(under the Ministry of Finance) and has contracted these properties 
with high market values to private construction groups under highly 
attractive revenue sharing schemes. These projects were mostly 
luxury housing projects where the revenues generated were put back 
to contracting of middle and low income housing projects, creating 
new construction projects through quite lucrative contracts for yet 
another group of selected contractors. 
 
According to MHDA records, 419 thousand units of housing have been constructed 
between 2003 and 2010. Even though 90% of these units are categorized as social 
housing, this categorization does not correspond with the reality. The MHDA sold 
around 390,000 of the 420,000 units constructed on land that was originally publicly 
owned. The establishment managed around 1,500 projects with a total investment 
around 32 billion TL. Almost 30% of these projects were in Istanbul and 11% in 
Ankara.  Twenty-three of 25 top projects of the MHDA are in Istanbul. Even the 
geographical distributions of these projects show some of the inequality in MHDA’s 
planning (Sonmez, 2012). 
These so-called social housing projects were mostly for middle or upper class 
people. Sonmez (2012, reflectionsturkey) states that:  
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MHDA identifies itself as a social housing producing agency; 
however, a study of its top 25 projects provide a clear contradiction to 
this claim that MHDA actually functions as a rent-distributing agent 
for high income social groups through luxury housing and shopping 
mall projects, mainly in Istanbul. MHDA has mostly consumed real 
estate investment trust (REIT) model. Studies reveal that while the 
number of units completed remains below 20% of the total units 
under construction, the cost of the units under the REIT scheme 
exceeds 50% of the cost of the total units built in all the projects. This 
vividly illustrates MHDA’s position as a social housing agency is an 
urban myth. More importantly, although MHDA projects have been 
realized on land and capital owned actually by the public, data and 
information regarding the returns on these investments are kept 
strictly implicit. There is a big question mark over whether these 
investments justify the use of public assets in given projects. There 
exist no official mechanisms to ensure any accountability on the use 
of public resources, either. It is worth noting that MHDA is not 
subject to any of the available public inspection practices and public 
audits. As such, the Agency has grown into huge holding entity, 
based entirely on the personal directives of Prime Minister Erdogan. 
 
This situation leads to an unchecked authority by the ruling party and gives the 
political elite full ownership and operational rights over public lands, public 
facilities and high-value properties, especially in Istanbul (Sonmez, 2012, 
reflectionsturkey.com).  
And there are some family and networking connections between the big 
construction firms and politicians. Sonmez (2012, reflectionsturkey) also adds 
that: 
The newly established Ministry of Environment and Urbanization, 
now headed by the former chief of MHDA [Erdogan Bayraktar – 
however now he is also the former minister of Ministry of 
Environment and Urbanization because of corruption and bribery 
claims], is currently envisaging to consolidate all the regulatory and 
administrative powers for zoning and planning activities in all of 
Turkey. This move signifies one of the biggest transfers of authority 
from municipalities to central government in the recent years. Land, 
as the fundamental element of capital formation in a developing 
economy like Turkey, is being capitalized by the central political 
authority through these new measures. The message from the ruling 
party is very clear that all authority is effectively and singly 
consolidated under the ruling party and that the ruling elite is now in 
the position to allocate and distribute property-driven wealth at its 
own will as a reward mechanism for support for its policies. 
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5.8 Conclusion 
This chapter described the social, political and spatial changes that Turkey 
experienced since the 1920s. It is important for me to discuss these changes in 
Turkey with regard to the global processes to provide a better explanation for the 
gentrification processes in Istanbul. Until the 1950s, Turkey was a dominantly 
agricultural country. With the industrialization and the drastic increase in the 
manufacturing sector in the late 1950s and the 1960s, the agriculture sector started to 
decerase, and many people in the rural parts of the country started to migrate to 
urban areas with the hopes of better jobs and living standards. As it happens in many 
developing countries (see Chapter 2), the manufacturing sector did not decrease as it 
should have until now, but the FBS sector increased dramatically since the 1980s as 
well. This meant that big Turkish cities like Istanbul became not only the centre of 
the FBS sector, but also the centre of the manufacturing sector. Istanbul is examined 
in detail in the next chapter.  
This fast transformation in Turkey that started with industrialization and continued 
with finance and business services was not complemented with adequate social 
housing policies or infrastructure system. As a result, informal settlements 
(gecekondus) started to appear. To deal with his situation,  the MHDA was founded 
in 1984, but as it was examined in this chapter, instead of creating social housing 
policies for the vulnerable population, this establishment produced housing stock for 
the middle class and participated in or initiated massive urban regeneration projects 
all around the country. This is in line with what was discussed in Chapter 2 and 3, 
that the increase in real estate and construction sector in the urbanized area in 
developing countries had more devastating and radical changes in order to catch up 
with the developed part of the world economically. Turkey is no exception, and the 
MHDA is a good example of the state intervening in every aspect of urban 
development and transformation for benefiting capital without considering the 
consequences of these projects for the poor. Even though the MHDA is a 
governmental organization, it shows the basic elements of neo-liberal politics and 
how this organization fits in the neo-liberal perspective is examined in detail in the 
conclusion of this thesis.  
Now I turn to the urban transformation of Istanbul over the same period and the 
effects of state policies on Istanbul. 
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CHAPTER 6: SOCIAL POLITICAL CHANGE IN ISTANBUL 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Istanbul is the largest city (around 16,000,000 people) in Turkey, and it is the 
economic and cultural centre of the country. It is a transcontinental city, with its 
historical and commercial centre on the European (West) side and mostly residential 
areas on the Asian (East) side. Istanbul was founded on what is now called 
Sarayburnu around 660 BC. Subsequently called Constantinople, it became the 
capital city of the East Roman and Byzantine Empire (330–1204 and 1261–1453) 
and the Ottoman Empire (1453-1922). This city now known as Istanbul is one of the 
most important cities in history. Istanbul’s strategic position on the historic Silk 
Road, its closeness to Europe and Middle East and on the only sea route between the 
Black Sea and Mediterranean Sea have made it attractive for many different groups 
throughout time. It was a significant instrument for the advancement of Christianity 
until 1453, and when the Ottomans conquered it in that year, it became an Islamic 
stronghold. Istanbul’s most important attraction is still its historical centre, parts of 
which are listed as a UNESCO World Heritage Site (Istanbul Territorial Plan 
Report, 2009). 
In this chapter I discuss historical background of Istanbul as a whole to describe the 
story of Istanbul with features of the city that are important to this research. Then I 
explore the urban transformation in Istanbul and state policies that are specific to the 
city, and this is followed by the dominant sectors in Istanbul and their change 
throughout the time. As the leading sectors, I examine the manufacturing, FBS and 
tourism sectors. In addition, I investigate the housing market in Istanbul. This 
section has many similarities with the Turkish housing market (see Chapter 6.6), but 
I also examine the effects of the changes in the Turkish housing market in Istanbul.  
Following this, the formation of potential gentrifiers is discussed to investigate in 
details the features and consumption patterns of gentrifiers in Istanbul with regard to 
issues discussed in Chapter 3. Then I describe the overall processes of gentrification 
in historical neighbourhoods and continue to discuss the historical neighbourhoods 
in details by dividing them into two sections: neighbourhoods gentrified through 
private housing market and state-led gentrification.  
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6.2 Historical Background of Istanbul as a Whole 
Since the founding of the Republic, Istanbul is no longer the capital city that was 
shifted to Ankara, but finance and business centres remained in Istanbul.  Istanbul is 
being utterly transformed by a fast-growing population and rapid growth in FBS. In 
the last 25 years, the majority of the neighbourhoods built in the 1900s in the centre 
of Istanbul have been gentrified. These are neighbourhoods primarily built by the 
bourgeoisie and subsequently became poor, but in the last 25 years there has been 
massive gentrification, first market-led, second, state-led.  State-led gentrification 
has been justified in terms of the earthquake risk in Istanbul (see Chapter 10). This is 
a real risk, and Istanbul has experienced many destructive earthquakes in the 20th 
century. The most recent was on 17th of August, 1999, badly affecting not only 
Istanbul, but also other surrounding cities. There were 17,000 deaths as a result of 
this natural occurrence, which showed how unprepared Istanbul’s housing was for 
earthquakes, even though the city is located on the highest risk zones. The Map 7.1 
below shows the earthquake risk zones in Turkey. Earthquake risk in Istanbul is used 
as a justification for the urban regeneration and renewal projects. That is why I 
discuss the effects of Earthquake in Istanbul here, and these effects are examined in 
more detail in the analysis chapter (Istanbul Territorial Plan Report, 2009).  
 
 
Map 6.1: Earthquake Danger Zones in Turkey (Turkish National Insurance Catastrophe Insurance Pool, 2007, 
http://www.wfcatprogrammes.com/c/document_library/get_file?folderId=12508&name=DLFE-545.pdf) 
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Map 7.2 below shows details of the earthquake risk in Istanbul. The red area shows 
the highest risk, the pink area shows the second highest risk, the orange area shows 
the third highest risk, and the yellow area shows the lowest risk for earthquake 
(Istanbul Territorial Plan Report, 2009; Turkish National Insurance Catastrophe 
Insurance Pool, 2007). 
 
 
Map 6.2: Earthquake zones in Istanbul (Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality, 2015, www.ibb.gov.tr) 
 
As already noted, Istanbul is the financial and tourism centre of the country, but also 
still preserves its identity as an important manufacturing centre, which leads the state 
to support and promote Istanbul as a world city through many reports and policies 
aiming to promote this status. The main economic policies until the 1980s were 
related to the manufacturing sector, which was one of the main reasons that the 
massive rural to urban migration need for housing contributed to the formation of 
gecekondus, a common feature of a developing country economy. Since the 1980s, 
the growth of FBS and the financialisation of the economy have influenced the 
gentrification of historic neighbourhoods and the decentralization of manufacturing, 
further fuelling the expansion of the city to the outskirts. As a result, Istanbul’s 
population has reached unmanageable numbers (almost 16,000,000 in 2014: see 
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Table 7.1), which is another common feature of developing countries’ world cities. 
With migration from all over the country, the social polarization and the distinction 
between social classes in Istanbul became more visible. With the rise in importance 
of the finance and construction sectors, transformation of the city – both state-led 
and market-led – has been an attack on the working class. This is explained further 
in this chapter and in the next chapters (Istanbul Territorial Plan Report, 2009; 
Turkun and Sen, 2009).  
 
Population of Istanbul by 
years 
Years Population 
2013 14.160.467 
2012 13.710.512 
2011 13.483.052 
2010 13.120.596 
2008 12.697.164 
2007 11.174.257 
2000 8.803.468 
1990 6.620.241 
1980 4.741.890  
1970 3.019.032  
1960 1.466.535 
1950 1.166.477 
1940 991.237 
Table 6.1: Population of Istanbul by years (Turkish Statistical Institute, Regional Indicators 1923-
2013, 2013) 
 
Istanbul has the biggest share in national employment. According to the IMM 
(2009), 27% of national employment is in the Marmara Region (see Map 7.3), 51% 
of the employment in the Marmara region is in Istanbul, and overall, 14% of the 
overall employment is in Istanbul. To understand the economic situation of Istanbul, 
it is important to examine the sectoral distribution in addition to the employment. 
Most of the people work in finance and business services, banking, consumer 
services, and tourism, and this is followed by manufacturing (Istanbul Territorial 
Plan Report, 2009). 
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Map 6.3: Location of Marmara Region in Turkey, "Latrans-Turkey location Marmara Region" by Own work. 
Licensed under CC BY 3.0 via Wikimedia Commons - http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Latrans-
Turkey_location_Marmara_Region.svg#/media/File:Latrans-Turkey_location_Marmara_Region.svg, 2015 
 
Table 6.2 below shows the employment rate in Istanbul in comparison with Turkey 
and the Marmara Region. 
 
Sectoral Indicators for Istanbul for the year 2000 
  Turkey Marmara Istanbul 
Istanbul's place in 
Turkey 
Employment in Manufacturing (%) 13.35 25.67 32.15 1 
Employment in Business services 
(%) 9.69 14.28 18.73 1 
Employment in Finance (%) 3.11 5.39 8.16 2 
Table 6.2: Sectoral Indicators for Istanbul for the year 2000 (Turkish Statistical Institute, Regional 
Indicators 1923-2013, 2013) 
 
Because my critical realist approach to this research starts with abstractions before 
narrowing them down to concrete case studies, I have argued that Istanbul shares 
many of the national-level processes discussed in Chapter 6. However, there are 
specific processes in Istanbul that do not happen across Turkey.. These specific 
processes in combination with processes observed at the national and global scales 
and with the abstractions discussed in Chapters 2 and 3 bring out Istanbul as an 
emergent property. For example, the processes occurring in the FBS sectors in 
Turkey are valid for Istanbul, but at the same time, there are others in the FBS 
sectors specific to Istanbul, and these are based on the general processes.   
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6.3 Sectoral Change and Corresponding State Policies 
 
   6.3.1 Land Use and State Planning since the 1930s 
Urban transformation that is influenced by state politics was examined in the 
previous chapter (see Chapter 6.7) with regard to whole of Turkey. In this section, I 
examine state politics that particularly affected Istanbul and discuss the planning 
process for the city since the 1930s.  
In 1936, French urban planner Henri Prost was invited to prepare a master plan for 
the whole of Istanbul to change this Ottoman city into a Kemalist city. The plan he 
prepared covered a fifteen year time period and was put into action in 1940 (Istanbul 
Territorial Plan Report, 2009).  
Prost suggested that industry should be concentrated around the Golden Horn and 
the existing residential areas should be demolished. (The Golden Horn forms a 
natural harbour, a major waterway and primary basin of the Bosphorus. It is the 
water that is shaped like a horn, and the land right next to it is known as the 
historical peninsula of Istanbul.) In addition to industrial areas, Prost suggested two 
large city parks. One of these is the green belt that used to exist between Macka, 
Harbiye and Taksim. Gezi Park is part of this plan. Map 7.4 shows the location 
described as the Golden Horn (Istanbul Territorial Plan Report, 2009). 
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Map 6.4: Location of Golden Horn in Istanbul "IstanbulGoldenHorn1-01" by Kaidor - 
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Ottoman_Istanbul_-_ru.svg. Licensed under CC BY-SA 
3.0 via Wikimedia Commons - http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:IstanbulGoldenHorn1-
01.png#/media/File:IstanbulGoldenHorn1-01.png, 2015 
 
In 1943, Prost’s plan was reviewed and accepted as a ten year master plan, but by 
the 1950s, this plan was found insufficient because it did not predict the huge 
increase in population after the Second World War. In 1957, another urban planner, 
Hans Hogg from Germany, was invited to Istanbul to prepare another development 
plan for the city. Hogg’s plan was not well accepted by the public, and in 1958, an 
institution (İstanbul İmar ve Planlama Müdürlüğü) was founded for Istanbul’s 
planning, and this institution hired yet another urban planner,  Luigi Piccinato from 
Italy (Istanbul Territorial Plan Report, 2009; Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality, 
www.ibb.gov.tr, 2015).  
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Instead of focusing on the increase of the manufacturing sector, Piccinato prepared 
his plan for Istanbul, focusing on increasing the cultural and commercial areas. In 
1959, to accomplish these aspects of his plan, a committee was appointed with 
Piccinato as the Chair. However, the policies and plans this committee prepared 
were not approved because of the lack of detailed mapping of Istanbul (Istanbul 
Territorial Plan Report, 2009; Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality, www.ibb.gov.tr, 
2015).  
In 1973, with an agreement between the Turkish government and The World Bank, a 
project to develop a land use model and transportation plan for the whole of the city 
was suggested and contracted out to four different foreign firms. The project’s aim 
was to emphasize the cultural heritage of Istanbul. Even though the Cabinet 
approved this project in 1975, it was never implemented (Istanbul Territorial Plan 
Report, 2009). 
In 1980, for the first time, a 15 year metropolitan master plan for Istanbul at a scale 
of 1/50000 was prepared and approved.  In 1984, a new law was enabled (Law No. 
3030), which gave planning authority of the cities to the municipalities. Before this 
law, planning was centralized and carried out by institutions connected to the 
national government. With this change to the planning system, a new metropolitan 
master plan for Istanbul was prepared and approved by the Istanbul Municipality in 
1994 (Istanbul Territorial Plan Report, 2009; Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality, 
www.ibb.gov.tr, 2015).  
In this plan, the metropolitan region of Istanbul included the whole of Marmara 
Region, including Thrace and the metropolitan area of Istanbul starting with 
Tekirdag and ending with Kocaeli (Izmit) (around 28,000 km2 of land, excluding 
Istanbul). Defining the boundaries of the metropolitan area in this way allowed the 
Municipality of Istanbul to have a say in the planning of cities close to Istanbul, and 
they were able to prepare written plans (i.e. planning guidelines) for the 
development of these cities. This plan was approved and applied, and it covered the 
time period 1994 – 2010 (Istanbul Territorial Plan Report, 2009). Map 7.5 shows the 
1994 boundaries of the metropolitan area. 
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Map 6.5: Effect area of Istanbul Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality, Istanbul Territorial Plan Report, 
2009 
 
In addition to the wide-ranging planning powers the MHDA had gained (see Chapter 
5.6 and 5.7), between 2004 and 2007, the JDP (with the majority in the Parliament) 
enabled a series of laws redefining the judicial status of metropolitan and provincial 
municipalities, giving them the right to carry out ‘urban transformation projects’ in 
collaboration with the MHDA (Karaman, 2012). Law No. 5366 was the essential 
law used in almost all the urban regeneration, renewal and transformation projects 
prepared for the historic neighbourhoods of Istanbul. This law, along with the 
existing laws (Law No. 5216 : metropolitan municipalities; Law No. 5393 
municipalities; and Law No. 5449: regional development agencies), allowed 
municipalities to implement renewal projects in physically deteriorated historic 
neighborhoods; to declare some neighborhoods as urban renewal areas; expropriate 
private property; and participate in public-private partnerships  (Karaman 2012:10). 
The Tarlabasi Renewal Project was the first project prepared according to this law. 
Details about this law and the project are examined in the next chapters.  
Having discussed various types of urban policies and laws, I turn to major growth 
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sectors in Istanbul to give a clear description of the economic change and 
development there. 
   6.3.2 The Manufacturing Sector 
One of the first attempts to plan for the manufacturing sector in Istanbul was the 
1947 master plan prepared by Henri Prost. This plan suggested that Golden Horn 
area should be opened to industrial development, and from that point on, the Golden 
Horn area remained an Industrial area until the 1980s. In the 1950s, other parts of 
the historical peninsula (Eyup, Mecidiyekoy, Topkapi) were added to this industrial 
development area, while further industrial development continued at the periphery of 
the city. During these years, there were alcohol, glass, and coal factories by the 
Bosphorous (Istanbul Territorial Plan Report, 2009).  
The increase in manufacturing sector and many new factories triggered rural to 
urban migration, and because of the lack of low-cost or social housing, gecekondu 
areas started to appear (see Chapter 6). Until the 1980s, the peripheries of both sides 
of the city (Asian and European) were occupied by many factories that led these 
areas to become gecekondu sites because the workers needed to be close to work 
(Turkun, 2011).  
The decentralization of the manufacturing sector from the Golden Horn area started 
in the 1980s. With the decentralization of manufacturing from the inner city to the 
periphery, some environmental rehabilitation projects were begun to repair the 
damage caused by the factories. From the 1980s to the late the 1990s, textile, steel, 
and leather industries enlarged their share of the manufacturing sector, and they 
were mostly located in the periphery of Istanbul or cities (i.e. Kocaeli) near Istanbul. 
In addition to large manufacturing firms, with increasing rural to urban migration 
and the lack of low-cost products, sweatshops started to appear all over the city. 
After the 1990s, with the increasing effects of the changing world economy, the 
manufacturing sector started to feel the effects of global competition. To overcome 
this, some encouragement (e.g., bank loans) was provided to increase the numbers of 
small and middle-sized manufacturing firms (Istanbul Territorial Plan Report, 2009). 
Istanbul still has a significant amount of the manufacturing sector in Turkey, and the 
sector still preserves its importance in the country’s economy. However, with 
increasing numbers of production sites on the periphery of Istanbul, these 
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establishments started to threaten the environmental safety of the city, as some of 
them were located in forest areas, dangerously close to the watersheds of the city.  
 
   6.3.3 Finance and Business Services 
In the 19th century, as a result of the trade agreements with Europe, the 
transportation system of the city was strengthened with new railway systems and 
harbours. Galata and Pera became strong trading and finance areas. Most of the 
banking sector situated itself in Galata. This is why a bridge was constructed 
between Galata and the CBD (Eminonu) in 1845. In addition, Pera, which is close to 
Galata, became the entertainment centre of the city, and many people started to 
move to this district. These improvements led the city to spread even more, and in 
this period, Tarlabasi district started to improve and become important (Istanbul 
Territorial Plan Report, 2009).  
These two centres, Galata and the other side of the bridge, and the changing life 
styles enabled by improved transportation and entertainment facilities, continued 
through the 20th century (Ortayli, 1996). With the fall of Ottoman Empire and 
foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923, all the administration and governmental 
buildings moved to the new capital of Ankara.  
Istanbul did not experience much development after the First World War, and it was 
not until the 1950s that urbanization processes began to change in Istanbul. Even 
though Istanbul was not the capital, it has always been the economic capital of the 
country. For that reason, finance and business sectors and manufacturing 
headquarters preferred to locate themselves in Istanbul (Berkoz, 1998). In the 1950s, 
the commercial and manufacturing sectors were located in Galata (in Beyoglu 
district) and in Eminonu (in Fatih district). Between the years 1950 and 1965, 
Eminonu became the heart of the historical peninsula and the core of the CBD 
(Ciraci and Kundak, 2000). On the other side of the Golden Horn, Karakoy (in the 
Beyoglu district) was a sub-section of CBD with some of the finance sector, and 
Kabatas (also in Beyoglu district) where there were business office buildings and 
administrative centres, acted as an extension of Karakoy. Until 1965, the CBD grew 
with the population of the city and because of this expansion, previously residential 
areas became surrounded by and eventually transformed into the CBD, and as a 
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result, they experienced a change in function. For example, Harbiye (in Sisli district) 
and Sisli, which used to be residential areas, gained CBD features (e.g., increasing 
administration and commercial buildings). This transformation continued to spread, 
and Mecidiyekoy’s (in Sisli district) transformation began (See Map 7.6) 
 
Map 6.6: The connection between Harbiye and Mecidiyekoy Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality,	  
sehirrehberi.ibb.gov.tr, 2015 
 
With the construction of the first Bosphorus Bridge in 1973, the expansion of the 
CBD continued:  
This changed the hierarchy of prestige areas in the urban context, 
opened new areas up to speculative activities and created a new 
hierarchy of business centers, decentralization and car ownership 
increased. As part of city’s expansion after the 1970’s, new 
subcenters of employment and commerce started to develop along the 
highways. Those subcentres arose because the economic, cultural and 
physical fabric of the old CBD was not compatible with the traffic, 
parking and space needs of modern office and retail buildings. Sisli 
and Besiktas developed as office district due to transit roads linked to 
the Bosphorus Bridge (Ciraci and Kundak 2000:5). 
 
After 1975, CBD functions expanded towards Besiktas, and with the help of 
Bosphorous Bridge, Kadikoy started to improve and became the centre of the eastern 
side of Istanbul. Over the last 20 years, the old CBD and the sub-centres became 
inefficient for the whole of population, and a new CBD started to form in the 
Levent-Maslak axis (Levent is in Besiktas district, and Maslak is in Sariyer district) 
Harbiye	  
Mecidiyekoy	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(See Map 7.8). However, this new CBD developed without efficient planning and 
infrastructure (e.g., road system, sewage system). On the Asian side, in addition to 
Kadikoy, Uskudar, Kartal, Maltepe and Pendik also developed as sub-centres. 
Recently, because of the Istanbul International Finance Centre Project, Umraniye is 
developing and becoming an important subcentre (Istanbul Territorial Plan Report, 
2009).  
 
 
Map 6.7: The developing District of Istanbul between the 1970s and 1990s, Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality, 
sehirrehberi.ibb.gov.tr, 2015 
 
According to IMM (2009), 76% of the Turkish finance sector and 92% of the bank 
headquarters are located in the CBD of Istanbul. In addition, 10% of the FBS sectors 
have their own research sites in Istanbul. This FBS growth in Istanbul’s CBD makes 
it significantly influential not only for the whole city, but also for the whole 
Marmara Region. Map 7.8 shows the spread of FBS sectors in Istanbul and the 
connection between various CBDs. 
Uskudar	  
Kadikoy	  
Umraniye	  
Maltepe	  
Kartal	   Pendik	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Map 6.8: Connections between Istanbul’s old and new CBDs Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality, 
sehirrehberi.ibb.gov.tr, 2015 
 
Even though Istanbul is the finance centre of Turkey, according to the report 
(Istanbul Territorial Plan Report) prepared by IMM (2009), the global 
competitiveness level of the city is not high. This competitiveness level is a list 
prepared by the World Economic Forum. To increase this level, making Istanbul a 
world city, there have been many state-led projects. The most recent and influential 
of these is the ‘İstanbul International Finance Centre Project’. This project was first 
mentioned in the ninth five year development plan (2007-2013) and became 
operational in 2010. The State Planning Institution manages projects with the 
purpose of creating Istanbul as a global finance centre. The master plan and urban 
design for the project, located on a 690 ha site on the Asian side of Istanbul, was 
prepared by the Ministry of Environment and Urban Planning. The Finance Centre 
will contain 560,000 m2 of office space; 90.000 m2 of shopping area; 60.000 m2 of 
residential area; a conference centre and social amenities 
(istanbulfinansmerkezi.com, retrieved in 2015). 
Having discussed features of FBS in Istanbul and various urban projects that 
affected this sector, I turn to tourism sector, which is another important growth 
sector in Istanbul and discuss the effects of state policies regarding this sector as 
well as the development of tourism.  
 
Mecidiyekoy	  
Harbiye	  
Levent	  
Maslak	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   6.3.4 Tourism 
Istanbul, with its significant historical background and diverse cultural and 
architectural heritage, is an enormously important attraction for local and 
international tourists. It had been an imperial capital for three empires, and the long 
and diverse historical heritage gives the city attraction that is the potentially 
important source of tourist income. The Turkish state wants to use and promote this 
attractive aspect of the city to further secure Istanbul’s place as a world city. In 
addition to the increasing FBS sectors in the city, there have been tourism related 
projects to attract more international tourists and increase Istanbul’s share of the 
world tourism market.  
Turkish tourism has been coastline oriented, and until the late 1990s there was no 
policy or strategy to change that. In the  seventh five-year development plan (1996-
2000), alternative types of tourism, such as urban tourism and heritage tourism, were 
suggested to attract tourists to other parts of the country rather than just the 
coastlines (SPO, 1995). Istanbul has been the most promoted by this policy because 
of its importance in urban heritage and culture tourism. As discussed in Chapter 2, 
developing countries often promote their big cities for tourism-related reasons when 
trying to promote them as world cities, and Istanbul follows this pattern, promoting 
tourism as well as the FBS sectors.  
This type of promotion of Istanbul allowed real estate developers to build many 
consumption-led projects, such as shopping malls and high-standard hotels in the 
1990s (Gezici and Kerimoglu, 2010).  However, by the early 2000s, Istanbul still 
was not as important as expected by the authorities when it came to the global 
tourism market. While Turkey’s share was 2.6% of the world tourism market, the 
share of Istanbul was only 0.6% in 2005 (SPO, 2007). Nevertheless, there had been 
significant increase in visitor numbers. Between 1990 and 2000, the number of 
tourists visiting Istanbul increased by 110%, a higher rate of increase in tourist 
visitors to Turkey as a whole, which was 93% (TURSAB, 2002). In 2004, the 
number of international tourists visiting Istanbul was 76% percent of the number of 
tourists visiting Barcelona, 30% of the number for London, and 14% of visitors to 
Paris (IMP, 2006). The number of tourists visiting Istanbul is still increasing every 
year, and this increase year by year, illustrated in table 7.3:      
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Number of Arrivals to Istanbul by years 
years Istanbul Share of Turkey (%) 
1996 2,006,413 26 
2000 2,420,541 23.21 
2001 2,517,139 21.66 
2002 2,705,848 20.41 
2003 3,148,266 22.44 
2004 3,473,185 19.83 
2005 4, 849,220 22.96 
2006 5,346,681 26.98 
2007 6,453,598 27.69 
2008 7,050,748 26.77 
Table 6.3: Number of Arrivals to Istanbul by years (Ministry of Culture and Tourism annual 
statistics, www.kulturturizm.gov.tr, 2008) 
 
The 2005 master plan for Istanbul, prepared by The Istanbul Metropolitan Planning 
and Urban Design Centre, included 19 tourism oriented regeneration projects 
(Gezici and Kerimoglu, 2010;258). These projects are mainly categorized into two 
types: cultural heritage projects, and flagship projects. Cultural heritage projects are 
mostly prepared to preserve the historical peninsula of Istanbul in response to 
UNESCO’s threats to remove Istanbul from the World Heritage list. They consist of 
open museum projects (e.g., Historical Peninsula Museum City), urban regeneration 
projects and plans such as The Historical Peninsula Heritage Management Plan. 
Flagship projects are mainly outside the historical areas of Istanbul and focus on 
creating cultural attraction points like entertainment and convention centres that will 
attract important events to Istanbul. 
Local authorities (e.g., IMM) in Istanbul have started to emphasize the city’s 
historical and cultural heritage in regeneration projects and include it in official 
reports with the stated goal to ostensibly preserve the city’s historical, cultural and 
natural resources, providing the city with a global status (IMM, 2007).   
Therefore, the development of the tourism function could be the 
most suitable tool for the promotion of both Turkey and Istanbul 
on the world stage. However, Istanbul lacks strategies for cultural 
tourism development within the national perspective, while the 
development and appraisal of the current potential and the role of 
culture in urban regeneration have to relate to local plans and 
policies. (Gezici and Kerimoglu 2010: 254) 
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Istanbul was chosen as the European Capital of Culture in 2010. Many projects and 
public funds were transferred to tourism. With a law (No. 5706) that was enabled in 
2007, an account was set up in national bank for this purpose. According to this law, 
IMM, Istanbul Chamber of Commerce and Istanbul Chamber of Industry transferred 
some funds to this account in 2007, 2008 and 2009. In addition to that, some funds 
from the European Union Commission projects were transferred to this account as 
well. It is not clear in the law how much these funds were (‘Resmi Gazete’, 2007).  
This event was seen as a chance to increase Istanbul’s role as a world city, but many 
of the projects planned for the European Capital of Culture year were not completed 
by 2010, and the expected increase in  Istanbul’s share of the global tourism market 
failed to occur. 
This section discussed the tourism sector its spatial effects in Istanbul. Even though 
many projects use the justification of ‘preserving the heritage’, in reality, they 
mostly damage it to benefit capital (see next chapter). Now I discuss the housing 
market and how it operated specifically in Istanbul.  
 
6.4 The Housing Market 
Housing policies and changes in the housing market in Turkey as a whole were 
examined in the previous chapter (see Chapter 6.6). In this chapter, I examine the 
details of Istanbul’s housing market. 
As shown in previous sections, increases in the manufacturing sector in Istanbul 
since the 1950s contributed to an increase in the numbers of gecekondu settlements. 
In 1951, there were 8,500 gecekondus in Istanbul, and by 1957, a whole 
neighbourhood consisting only of gecekondus (26.000 houses) appeared. This 
neighbourhood, ‘Zeytinburnu’, was declared as an official district of Istanbul in 
1957. Map 7.9 shows the location of Zeytinburnu in the city (Istanbul Territorial 
Plan Report, 2009). 
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Map 6.9: Zeytinburnu’s Location in Istanbul ("Istanbul location Zeytinburnu" by The Emirr - Own work. 
Licensed under CC BY 
3.0viaWikimediaCommonshttp://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Istanbul_location_Zeytinburnu.svg#mediav
iewer/File:Istanbul_location_Zeytinburnu.svg, 2015) 
 
The increase in manufacturing and the increase in rural to urban migration continued 
in the 1960s: 36% of all internal rural to urban migration in Turkey was directed to 
Istanbul, but in the 1970s, this share decreased to 22% (Istanbul Territorial Plan 
Report, 2009). By the 1970s, 40% of Istanbul’s population were residents of 
gecekondus. Map 7.10 shows some of the important gecekondu areas that are 
undergoing regeneration to give an idea of the concentration of gecekondu in 
Istanbul. The circles represent the significant gecekondu, but there are many others 
(Istanbul Territorial Plan Report, 2009). 
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Map 6.10: Gecekondu areas in Istanbul (Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality, sehirrehberi.ibb.gov.tr, 2015) 
 
Until the mid-1990s, ‘tenure legalization’ was the way that Turkish government 
dealt with gecekondus.  
Up until the mid-1990s, Turkish policymakers relied on ‘tenure 
legalization’ as the primary strategy for addressing informal 
settlements. During the early 1980s, a total of five pieces of 
legislation (numbered 2805,	  2981, 3086, 3290 and 3366) regulating 
gecekondus’ path to legalization were passed. Among these, Law 
2981 — passed in 1984 — was the most significant, as it effectively 
issued an ‘amnesty’ for all gecekondus that were built on state-owned 
land before 1984. Gecekondu ‘owners’ were issued ‘title assignation 
documents’ (tapu tahsis belgesi) (TTBs). The TTB is a document that 
recognizes the occupant’s right to use the space, entitling the 
document holder to legal ownership after a ‘cadastral plan’ and a 
subsequent ‘improvement plan’ (imar islah plani) are prepared and 
approved by the local municipality. It certifies transitional status 
(Karaman 2012:8) 
 
This approach did not result in adequate regulation of informal housing, but rather, 
converted gecekondus in low-quality 2-3 storey apartments (see Chapter 6.6). This 
transformation was mostly initiated by small developers or contractors who would 
make a deal with the former owner of gecekondu. The consequences of this low-
quality housing stock were particularly evident after the 1999 earthquake. As a result 
of the earthquake, thousands of lives were lost because of the poor quality of the 
existing housing stock, and this event was a turning point for many in urban policy 
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circles (Karaman, 2012). As noted in the previous chapter, minimizing earthquake 
risk became a high priority in most urban policies, and even now, many urban 
regeneration projects such as Tarlabasi Renewal Project use earthquake risk as a 
justification for large-scale regeneration.  
The MHDA has been the main institution responsible for implementing a more 
earthquake resilient built environment. (The foundation of the MHDA and the legal, 
financial, and social tools it uses were discussed in the previous chapter (see Chapter 
6.6 and 6.7).  
The MHDA operates either on state-held land or uses acquisition rights to purchase 
large amounts of land to create new housing stock. In these projects, the MHDA 
gives the existing inhabitants priority in purchasing a new house in the project area 
at ‘affordable’ prices. About 10-40% of the cost of the housing is taken as a deposit 
by MHDA, and the residents are responsible for paying monthly instalments for the 
next 15 to 20 years (Karaman, 2012).  If residents fail to pay these instalments, 
ownership is transferred back to MHDA, and the MHDA eventually sells these 
properties in secondary markets (Cavdar, 2008). This system is the recent way of 
trying to remove informal settlements, and by doing so, as Karaman (2012) puts it: 
MHDA thus simultaneously fulfills two crucial functions. It 
eradicates squatter settlements through urban renewal projects, and … 
enlists overwhelmingly involuntary participants into the mortgage 
origination market. The evicted residents are offered what are 
essentially mortgage loans with long maturities for obtaining the 
houses in the new development (Karaman 2012:8).   
Now I move on to the formation of gentrifiers before summarizing the two 
processes of gentrification in the historical neighbourhoods of Istanbul. 
 
6.5 The Formation of the Potential Gentrifier 	  
As noted earlier, the beginning of the 1980s was a turning point for Turkey. The 
state-managed market economy was abandoned and a free market economy that 
allowed import trade mainly took over (Islam, 2006; Keyder, 1999c). Between 1980 
and 2001, import and export trade capacities increased by 5 and 10 times 
respectively, whereas foreign capital inflow increased 28 times (Coskun and Yalcin, 
2007:3), resulting in a dramatic rise in the number of foreign companies active in 
Turkey. 
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The inhabitants of Istanbul became familiar with the globally changing patterns of 
consumption, and the economic and cultural changes made it easier to obtain all 
kinds of consumer services. As a result of the changing economic situation and 
increases in employment in the finance and business sectors in the CBD, many 
young professionals started to move back to the city centre and the inner city (Oncu, 
1997).  
Middle class people looking for an architecturally and historically significant 
identity in a neighbourhood rediscovered the old settlements with a more 
cosmopolitan character (Aksoy, 2001). They tried to impose a new character on the 
value that old settlements already had. In other words, they created another level of 
identity for the historical neighbourhoods. These young professionals working in 
one of the sectors in CBD developed after the 1980s became the main actors in the 
gentrification of inner Istanbul (Coskun and Yalcin, 2007). As discussed earlier 
(Chapter 3), over the last 20-30 years, gentrifiers have been drawn to these areas by 
desires to live close to their work and the cultural centre of the city and by the 
historical importance of the neighbourhoods. 
These gentrifying areas are in different locations in Istanbul, but one thing they have 
in common is that they are all historic settlements. In the Cihangir and Galata cases, 
their nearness to Beyoglu – the cultural and finance centre of the city – has always 
been important for gentrifiers in choosing these locations. Small seaside settlements 
on Bosphorus such as Kuzguncuk and Arnavutkoy are kind of urban focal points 
with unique characters. Fener, Balat and Ayvansaray are also seaside settlements 
with significant urban heritage and close to the entertainment centres of Istanbul. 
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Map 6.11: Historical districts of Istanbul, Istanbul Territorial Plan Report, 2009 
 
Map 6.11 shows the locations of all these historic neighbourhoods in the whole of 
Istanbul. All of the neighbourhoods are inner city neighbourhoods and located 
alongside the coastline, which is another factor for their dramatically increasing land 
value. 
Gentrification is a long-term and irregular process. Each settlement has experienced 
different forms of change. On the other hand, some of the settlements such as 
Kuzguncuk (the first to experience gentrification in the 1980s), Arnavutkoy, 
Cihangir and Galata were gentrified through the operations of the housing market 
without direct state intervention, whereas other settlements such as Tarlabasi, 
Sulukule, Fener-Balat, and Ayvansaray have been gentrified by state intervention in 
the decades after the year 2000, when state-led gentrification became more common 
in Turkey. The reasons for this are discussed later in this chapter.  
Now I present a brief historical background for the CBD and the inner city of 
Istanbul to show how this neighbourhood architecture and historical atmospheres 
developed. 
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6.6 Overview of Gentrification 
Gentrification in Istanbul started as a classical gentrification process (that is, through 
the private housing market). However, in the last 10-15 years, state-led gentrification 
has become much more common. This section introduces a timeline of gentrification 
in Istanbul, tracing the transformation from classical gentrification to state-led 
gentrification.  
After the 1950s, the population in Istanbul increased dramatically, and lifestyles in 
Istanbul started to change. The transformation of the CBD reflected the economic 
transformation that the city was experiencing. Growth in the finance and insurance 
sectors expanded the CBD, and with the construction of the first bridge on the 
Bosphorous in the 1970s, the CBD expanded to the north of the city (Dokmeci and 
Berkoz, 2000). In this expansion, the importance that had been given to 
transportation was essential. When the distance between home and work places 
became easily travelled, the settlement in the city spread to the peripheries. Like 
other developing countries (see Chapter 3), the middle class moved out of the 
historic city centre, and the centre began to decline and become ‘undesirable’. At the 
end of the 1970s, the historic city centre lost its prestige and became a place for the 
poor. But in the 1980s, the middle class started to move back to the city centre and 
inner city. 
In the neighbourhoods that had been experiencing gentrification since the 1980s and 
that accelerated in the 1990s, some significant political events shaped the process 
itself, such as the Capital Tax and Istanbul pogrom (see Chapter 6.2). Most of the 
historic neighbourhoods examined in this chapter used to be inhabited by middle 
class Turkish citizens of Armenian, Greek and Jewish origins, living in mainly 
timber or masonry houses that are important examples of residential architecture of 
the 19th century (Islam, 2006).  
The attraction for gentrifiers in these neighbourhoods was and is not entirely 
locational. The motivation was also about what the place means: memories that 
belong to this particular place are an important element of gentrification. The 
appropriate word to describe this aspect of the process is ‘nostalgia’. The 
neighbourhoods that are gentrified or being gentrified used to be multicultural places 
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(Islam, 2006; Can, 2013). As happened in other gentrifying neighbourhoods after the 
1980s (see Chapter 3), this character of the neighbourhoods fulfilled the professional 
class desire to create a new cultural identity with their imaginaries of these places 
(Aksoy 2001). Professionals wanted to define themselves as the people who cherish 
and realize the multicultural past of Istanbul that has been an element of the national 
market economies (Oncu 1997).  
Since 2000, Istanbul has entered a new era of urban transformation and urban 
regeneration projects that are followed by gentrification. The regeneration and 
renewal projects have had negative outcomes for working class residents including 
job losses, financial difficulties, not being able to adjust to the new neighbourhood, 
and in some cases, they have come back to the city, but with less money because of 
the losses they experienced during the urban regeneration projects (Sen, 2011:1-21). 
The procedure in ‘regeneration/renewal/transformation’ projects is almost the same 
all over Turkey (Turkun and Sen, 2009:1-20). First, the local or national state 
calculates the value both of the dilapidated flats and the recently built ones, either in 
the same neighbourhood or somewhere else (chosen by the municipality). Next, the 
owner has to decide whether to sell the flat at the estimated price to the construction 
company and accept paying the gap between the price of the old and the new 
property by using bank loans. This system is especially problematic when the 
decisions about regeneration are given in a top-down manner and the timing of 
changes is decided by the central and local authorities, without the consent of the 
inhabitants. In many cases, these changes result in increases in rents, which the 
current inhabitants are often unable to afford. Therefore, most often, they do not 
have any alternative than relocating to the periphery of the city, for which they are 
obliged to repay long-term loans to the banks. The result is usually a loss of jobs, 
their supporting social relationships, and naturally, their flats, if they are not able to 
pay the loans to the banks, especially in high unemployment periods. In other words, 
if they become unemployed and cannot pay the mortgage, they are at risk of losing 
their new flats as well (Turkun and Sen, 2009). 
It is not only the historical neighbourhoods are affected by this kind of 
gentrification, but also some gecekondu areas. With the continuing expansion of 
Istanbul, some of the gecekondu areas became more ‘central’ than they used to be, 
and land became more valuable. Since these neighbourhoods started as gecekondu 
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areas and the housing stock has never been of good quality, they are not usually 
gentrified through the private housing market, even though their locations are now 
considered more desirable than in the past. One example of such a neighbourhood is 
Basibuyuk. Basibuyuk is located by the highway on the Asian side and has been a 
gecekondu neighbourhood for more than 30 years. This neighbourhood was declared 
an urban renewal area in 2006 by joint protocol between the municipality and the 
MHDA (Islam, 2010). As Islam (2010:58-63) describes it: 
High-rise apartment blocks are now under construction on a former 
park, and the gecekondu residents have been asked to move into the 
new units and pay the difference between the construction costs of 
these units and the current value of their existing gecekondu houses in 
instalments over 10 to 15 years. This led to high levels of protests 
from local residents who did not want to lose their previous gains. 
However, despite this, the first stage of construction (the high-rise 
blocks) is almost completed, [but] residents succeeded in keeping the 
project on hold by refusing to move into the units under these terms.  
 
After this incident, there was a local government election in 2009, and now the 
neighbourhood is under the jurisdiction of another political party. This means 
another political party may not blindly follow the urban policies of the government 
party, and there may be more opportunities for progressive policies. However, the 
uncertainty about the neighbourhood’s future still continues (Islam, 2010).  
All these urban regeneration, transformation and renewal projects influenced by the 
local or the national state serve the purpose of starting a gentrification process in the 
inner city, and the state hopes to attract larger waves of gentrification to the 
surrounding areas once these projects are completed. This situation leads to high 
levels of social segregation in the city. 
All the gentrification areas explored in this thesis were led by or created for middle 
or upper class people. The intention was never to create any social or low-income 
housing. Two types of gentrification in two different types of neighbourhoods are 
explored in this thesis: the first type is gentrification of the historic neighbourhoods 
without state intervention, and the second one is through state-led gentrification. The 
first ones are areas gentrified during the 1990s: Kuzguncuk, Cihangir, Arnavutkoy 
and Galata districts. These four districts have been gentrified without state 
intervention, but after the year 2000, this situation changed, and districts such as 
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Sulukule, Tarlabasi, Suleymaniye, Fener-Balat, and Ayvansaray have had some kind 
of state intervention. In particular, Sulukule is an example of state intervention and 
complete displacement of all the inhabitants. One of the objectives of this research is 
to explore the reasons behind this change. Among these neighbourhoods, I chose 
Galata and Tarlabasi as case studies.  
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Map 6.12: The Gentrified Historical Neighbourhoods examined in this thesis, 
Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality, sehirrehberi.ibb.gov.tr 2015 
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6.7 Summary of Market-led Gentrification Patterns 
Kuzguncuk, Cihangir, Arnavutkoy and Galata are gentrified through the private 
housing market. All of these neighbourhoods used to be populated by Armenian, 
Greek and Jewish originated Ottoman citizens, and they left in the mid-1950s and 
early 1960s because of political reasons (see Chapter 6) such as the Capital Tax and 
Istanbul Pogrom. Kuzguncuk is the first example of market-led gentrification in 
Istanbul and shows the known features of this kind of gentrification (see Chapter 3).  
Cihangir is another example of market-led gentrification similar to Kuzguncuk. 
Cihangir was a place where immigrants from Anatolia, university students and 
‘unwanted elements’ such as transvestites and transsexuals were living. Once the 
Istiklal Street became the center of entertainment again, people who would like to 
live close to this centre started to be interested in living in Cihangir. In this case, the 
Beyoglu area and Istiklal Street affected the gentrification process in Cihangir 
greatly.  
Arnavutkoy’s main difference from Kuzguncuk and Cihangir is that the 
gentrification of Arnavutkoy is generally framed by a young middle class working in 
finance, advertising or education that can afford to be independent. They have been 
in search of a residential area reflecting their choices, shaped around a longing for a 
multi-cultural past (Islam, 2006; Sen, 2005). This change in inhabitants is aligned 
with the increase in employment in the FBS sector.  
Finally, Galata is a district in the historical centre of Istanbul; it is an old Genoese 
quarter located on the north shore of the Golden Horn. Gentrifiers in Galata were 
mostly singles or childless couples that were either postponing childrearing or had 
adult children who already left the family. There were high rates of unmarried 
couples living together (Islam, 2006). Although the prices today are much higher 
than in the 1980s, more people, including scholars, journalists and writers, are keen 
on living in Galata. New cafés and restaurants are opening up, and offices have 
moved to this area. The restored interiors, the buildings and the care given by the 
local authorities to the public areas have made the neighbourhood extremely popular 
among middle and upper class people (Islam, 2006). 
Gentrification through the private housing market has not been organized by 
national or local government bodies, but the process has been supported indirectly 
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by the state. This support has occurred in improvements in infrastructure (sewerage, 
road systems), municipal services (rubbish collection, street cleaning) and better 
safety services (quick police response times).  But the state has not been involved in 
any construction or renovation projects to start the gentrification process in these 
neighbourhoods. The gentrification process was mostly started by intellectuals and 
artists (but it has moved on to business professionals) moving into the working class 
neighbourhoods situated in the inner city. 
National regulations to protect natural and historical assets, municipal tourism and 
culture-led revitalization interventions in the historical centres, initiatives to 
revitalize the inner city centre, and the provision of infrastructural investments 
played a crucial role in the formation of the setting for gentrification and hence, the 
speed and extent of gentrification processes in these neighbourhoods. To exemplify 
the role of the state in these gentrification instances, the pedestranization of the main 
axis Istiklal Road in Beyoglu fueled the gentrification processes in adjacent 
neighborhoods Cihangir and Galata (Inci, 2003; Islam, 2003; Uzun, 2001).  
As shown in previous chapters (see especially Chapter 3), gentrification is a 
dynamic process and is still continuing in these neighbourhoods. It is an ongoing 
process that sometimes leads to different types of tension not only between the old 
residents and new comers, but also between new comers. This is examined in detail 
in the Galata chapter (Chapter 7).  
In Galata and Cihangir, residential gentrification is much more extensive than the 
other gentrified neighbourhoods. Gentrification developed slowly in Galata and even 
15 years after the first signs appeared, most of the neighbourhood still was not fully 
gentrified. Nevertheless, with improvements in city transportation, Galata continues 
to experience gentrification. In Cihangir, gentrification was very fast and rapidly 
created a middle class neighbourhood. Galata and Cihangir are close together, and 
the difference between their experiences of gentrification is because of the 
commercial retail area located in Galata. The noise and pollution created by this area 
meant people were reluctant to buy property in this neighbourhood, and their first 
choice became Cihangir (Sen, 2005). 
Even though Beyoglu district, and especially Istiklal Street, became the centre of 
entertainment and cultural events for the city after the pedestrianization of the street 
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in 1990, the first gentrification wave started in the neighbourhoods located by the 
Bosphorous. Istiklal Street is located close to Galata neighbourhood, and as 
discussed before, its pedestrianization triggered market-led gentrification for some 
of the neighbourhoods (i.e. Cihangir, Galata) located close to it. Istiklal Street was 
physically deteriorated in the 1980s, and the neighbourhood only thrived after it was 
pedestrianized, making the adjacent historical neighbourhoods more attractive for 
potential gentrifiers.  
Having discussed the gentrification process through the private housing market, I 
now continue by discussing the summary of state-led gentrification processes and 
the reason why these have become more common in recent years. 
 
6.8 Summary of State-led Gentrification Patterns 
Sulukule, Suleymaniye, Fener-Balat, Ayvansaray and Tarlabasi are being gentrified 
through state-led gentrification. These neighbourhoods have similar backgrounds to 
neighbourhoods discussed above, with the exception of Sulukule. Sulukule has been 
associated with the Romani people for long time. There is some research that says 
that Romani are from India and settled in this area around 1054 in the Byzantine 
period (www.mimarizm.com, 2008).  
All of these neighbourhoods have been experiencing state-induced urban renewal 
projects that aim to encourage middle and upper class people to move in to the area 
while displacing the current working class inhabitants. These projects have been 
challenged by the inhabitants, NGOs and academics, and as a result, the ones in 
Sulukule, Fener-Balat, Ayvansaray and Tarlabasi have been cancelled by lawcourts. 
However, the eviction, demolition and construction process in Sulukule and the 
eviction and demolition process in Tarlabasi have been completed. 
There is significant social transformation taking place in Istanbul. An important part 
of that transformation is conducted through urban regeneration and renewal projects. 
There are a number of common features of the regeneration and gentrification taking 
place. The locations selected for urban renewal and urban regeneration projects have 
mostly been areas that are physically deteriorated. Most of the investments and 
urban policies have been about profit and creating new residential areas for the 
middle and upper class. Many of the housing investments and housing policies are 
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prepared without including public opinion, with as little information as possible 
provided to the public. This means urban planning that is supposed to be a tool for 
the public is becoming a tool for the business sector and financially privileged.  
Apart from Sulukule, state-led urban renovation was first directed to the deprived, 
historic neighbourhoods inhabited by immigrants from all over Turkey, and as 
discussed in Chapter 3, the realization of the value by the state and developers of 
these areas after the renovation projects triggered the state-led gentrification 
processes. Even though in the past gentrification took place through the housing 
market, more recently, the state started to initiate urban renovation projects, and 
gentrification was brought about by a state-led process. 
Considering all the discussed points, the transformation of Istanbul has been very 
speculative and unequal (Sakizlioglu, 2007). This speculative urbanization has been 
mostly shaped by private market dynamics, the ad hoc solutions of various actors 
with various interests in the city and political balances between various levels of 
national and local governments, rather than being driven by strategic plans and 
programs (Turel et al., 2006). In this situation, the state uses state-led gentrification 
and urban renovation to restructure the city both physically and socially. By sending 
working class people to the periphery of the city, the state wants to keep the CBD 
and the inner city of Istanbul for middle and upper class people. This is part of a plan 
to make Istanbul a world city and increase the importance of FBS sectors in the city 
(see Chapter 3, 5, and 6). However, the long-term effects of this tactic strategy, such 
as social polarization, are overlooked. 
The state and state agencies have been crucial actors in this transformation and are 
still supporting the rapid growth of the city and leading the unequal distribution of 
urban rents among different social classes. The public and private actors (e.g., 
construction firms, media, municipalities) have no intention of creating social or 
low-cost housing for the poor or even to compensate their losses during state-led 
gentrification processes. This is why the displacement process has been so brutal in 
these neighbourhoods. As Kurtulus (2005: 161-186) puts it clearly, this neoliberal 
urbanization experience was marked by the transfer of resources from lower to upper 
classes and from the public to the private sector.  
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Now I turn to two case studies – Galata and Tarlabasi – to examine the gentrification 
process in these neighbourhoods in detail in order to bring together the abstract 
context with local specificity. 
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CHAPTER 7: THE GALATA STORY 
 
7.1 Introduction 
Galata is a strong example of market-led gentrification, and indeed, it received two 
waves of gentrification, sometimes referred to as super gentrification (see Chapter 
2). It shows kinds of tensions between old and new inhabitants and certain 
antagonisms between different groups of gentrifiers. Although Galata falls into the 
category of market-led gentrification as we will see, municipality has had a 
considerable role.  
What I am analysing in this chapter are different point of views of the same process, 
and my aim is to tease out the closest version of the truth. This chapter analyses the 
interviews and documents collected during fieldwork in the Galata neighbourhood. I 
discuss the thoughts and problems of new and old inhabitants and how gentrification 
affected the social dynamics in the neighbourhood.  
This chapter starts with an overview of the gentrification processes in Galata since 
the 1980s, and this is a non-controversial account of easily verifiable facts. 
Following that I respectively analyse the interviews I conducted in the 
neighbourhood with the inhabitants and the ones with academics. After the analysis 
of the interviews, I move on to reconstructing the story of gentrification in Galata 
with regard to document analysis and interviews. Lastly, I present a conclusion for 
the whole of the analysis of this case. 
 
7.2 An overview of Galata as a Case Study 
As discussed in previous chapters (see Chapter 6 and 8), from the 19th century 
Ottoman era to the 1950s, Galata had been a middle class neighbourhood. The 
population of Galata mostly consisted of Turkish citizens of Armenian, Greek and 
Jewish origins. These groups were the merchant class in the Ottoman Empire, but 
with the founding of the Turkish Republic in 1923, they started to be suppressed. 
Between the Armenian Genocide in 1915 and the Cyprus invasion in 1974, many 
political events led them to leave the country (see Chapter 6).  
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Map 7.1: Location of Galata, Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality, sehirrehberi.ibb.gov.tr, 2015 
 
Since then, some neighbourhoods in the historical part of Istanbul have become 
working class because after the departure of the minorities, Galata and other 
historical neighbourhoods were abandoned, and housing became very cheap. Many 
of the immigrants from Anatolia purchased flats and formed another identity in the 
neighbourhood. However, the historical buildings were not well maintained because 
of the complicated and time-consuming bureaucracy of the conservation law that 
requiring legal and architectural assistance that poor residents were not able to 
afford. But this enabled them to change the interiors of these buildings to suit their 
own needs for small ground floor workshops and storage areas (Belge, 2002). 
However, in the late 1980s, some historical neighbourhoods caught the attention of 
middle-class intellectuals, and they started to buy and renovate houses in these 
neighbourhoods. This started a process of gentrification, and with the change of 
inhabitants, local governments started to provide better services in these areas, and 
the number of hotels, cafes, designer shops, and art galleries increased dramatically. 
Houses and apartments in these areas were renovated, but there have been some 
examples of bad restoration, and not all listed buildings have been renovated with 
respect to their original form. Socio-economically, even though many years passed 
until all the old inhabitants had moved away, eventually, most of them sold their 
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properties and moved to another area. Galata is a very good example of this process 
(Bektas, 1999).  
The historical neighbourhood of Galata has been experiencing gentrification through 
the private housing market with no direct state intervention since the 1990s (See 
Chapter 8). Galata experienced gentrification quite slowly, triggered by the 
pedestrianization of Istiklal Street that was run down until the 1990s. After the 
rehabilitation of this street, the area started to become more and more popular and 
well-used by middle class people, and land prices in Galata started to increase. 
Following this, there was an urban preservation plan for the Galata Tower and the 
surrounding area, prepared by the Ministry of Tourism and Culture. The reason 
Galata is not included in the urban preservation plan for Beyoglu, the Municipality 
responsible for the area, is that in the Turkish planning system, Galata is designated 
one of the tourist areas that are planned by the Ministry of Culture and Tourism. A 
blank area was left on the Beyoglu plan covering the Galata district. As stated by 
many interviewees during the interviews, the latest development plan (2009) 
prepared by the Ministry made many inhabitants (mostly first wave gentrifiers) 
unhappy because of the decision to allow construction on every vacant site. They 
were concerned that this decision would harm the original built form of the area. 
Considering the changes Galata is experiencing, another interviewee stated that: 
I mean these changes had positive and negative effects, of course. The 
positive side is: Buildings are being renovated, streets are livelier. 
Because, before, there were buildings next to ours that looked like a 
complete ruin, and now it has become these really luxurious flats that 
value around 1-2 million dollars. The negative side is: There is a new 
1/1000 master plan prepared by the Ministry, and they opened every 
single empty lot to development, like the area was not crowded 
enough. These planning decisions are not made to conserve the 
historical texture of the neighbourhood. Galata is becoming more and 
more like a construction site rather than a heritage site, and it makes it 
really hard to live in here (Translated by the author) (interview with 
Galata gentifier; 16, January, 2013). 
 
The spatial analysis below (Map 9.1) is taken from the official report of the Galata 
Tower and the surrounding area master plan (2009) and shows the vacant space in 
the lots in Galata. White lots are 100% fully built, and dark red lots are 100% 
vacant.  The yellow colour shows 5-39% vacant land in the lots; the orange colour 
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shows 40-59% empty lots, and finally,  the red colour shows 60-99% empty lots. It 
is clear from the map that most of Galata is built up, and there is little space for 
further development. Despite this, the same plan also proposes many new 
development areas for Galata (The Galata Tower and the Surrounding Area Master 
Plan Report approved 2009:95). 
181	  
	  
  
Map 7.2: Galata Neighbourhood,The Galata Tower and the Surrounding Area Master Plan Report, 
approved 2009:95 
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There are several reasons why the study of Galata can make an important 
contribution to the gentrification literature. First, Galata is a neighbourhood where 
there are various types of tension, and here the tension among gentrifiers themselves 
is examined in detail rather than the more usual examination of the tensions between 
old and new inhabitants. Galata is a fairly unusual case because tensions among 
gentrifiers is affecting the neighbourhood. Galata shows many features of the 
phenomenon of ‘super gentrification’ – what I present as the fifth stage of classic 
gentrification (see Chapter 3 and examined later in the current Chapter).  Second, the 
gentrification of heritage-listed residential areas has not been a major focus of 
gentrification literature. The role of the historic fabric and the tension created around 
it is discussed in this chapter. Third, this neighbourhood partly transferred into an 
entertainment centre, and the literature is not concerned that much about places 
partly turned into entertainment centres. 
The interviews conducted in Galata are examined later in this chapter, but here I 
would like to give an overview of the people I interviewed and the reasons for 
choosing them. I interviewed 18 people in the neighbourhood. They include 
inhabitants who have been in Galata since before the 1950s; inhabitants who arrived 
in the 1960s and the more recent gentrifiers. The first group has experience of the 
minorities who left the neighbourhood for political reasons and ethnically Turkish 
people who started living in Galata before the 1950s. The second group represents 
immigrants from Anatolia who moved to the area after the minorities left; and the 
gentrifiers include first wave gentrifiers who moved to Tarlabasi in the late 1980s 
and the early 1990s and second wave gentrifiers who moved to the area in the last 7 
years.  
The reason I chose these groups of people are to gain perspectives on the area from 
several different points of view. In addition to the old and new inhabitants of Galata, 
I interviewed four academics who have researched this area. All of them carried out 
their research in the first stage of gentrification and had intensive knowledge about 
the first wave gentrifiers, the Anatolians, and how the gentrification process 
developed in the area during the 1990s. Two of them had an intention to do a follow-
up study to examine the changes and the current process of gentrification in Galata. 
These interviews gave me first-hand information about the early stages of the 
gentrification process in order to make connections with the current form of 
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gentrification in the neighbourhood. All the interviews were conducted in the first 
half of the year 2013. 
It is possible to detect many types of tension between the current inhabitants of the 
area. There is a slight tension between the old inhabitants and the foreigners 
(expatriates in Istanbul) who moved to area recently. Even though they get along, 
Anatolians think that the foreigners are corrupting their neighbourhood culture, but 
at the same time, they are grateful for their presence in the area because the 
Municipality is providing better services since they moved in.  
There is also another type of tension amongst new inhabitants. People who cherish 
the historical heritage of the area are not pleased about those who moved in only 
because the area is popular, and they see them as harming the historical heritage of 
the area. In addition, another tension is between first wave gentrifiers and the 
Municipality. Because the latest development plan encourages development of every 
vacant lot, some inhabitants think this plan will harm the historical heritage. A 
further tension is between those who have lived in the area for generations and the 
rest of the inhabitants. The oldest inhabitants think none of the people are suited to 
live in Galata since they do not know how to maintain the area or understand its real 
historical value. Finally, there is the resentment felt by people (mostly minorities) 
who moved out of the area but still work there and feel they have been unjustly and 
needlessly exiled from their area.  
Now I turn to analysing these types of tensions within the interviews conducted. 
 
7.3 Neighbourhood Interviews 
Eighteen interviews were conducted in this area with three categories of people: 1. 
people who have moved out of the area; 2. current tenants; 3. current owner-
occupiers. 
Three broad topic areas were covered corresponding to the experiences of each 
group: 
- Attitudes of people who left 
- Tensions experienced by old inhabitants 
- Tensions experienced by new inhabitants 
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These topics are summarized from all of the questions asked to all of the 
interviewees. Galata has had inhabitants with various origins, and to make it easier 
to understand, Table 8.1 below shows the backgrounds of different groups of people, 
the period in which they were in the majority in Galata and when and why they left 
the neighbourhood. The Table includes the number of interviews with people from 
these backgrounds. 
Groups	  of	  People	  in	  Galata	  
Inhabitants	  from	  before	  the	  1950s	  
Number	  
of	  
Interview
s	  
Inhabitants	  who	  have	  been	  in	  the	  
area	  for	  generations	  (mostly	  
Turkish	  ethnicity)	  
They	  are	  still	  residing	  in	  the	  area	  
2	  
Inhabitants	  who	  were	  displaced	  
(Armenian,	  Greek,	  Jewish	  origins)	  
They	  mostly	  left	  in	  the	  late	  1950	  
because	  of	  political	  pressures	  	   3	  
Inhabitants	  from	  between	  the	  1960s	  –	  late	  1980s	   	  	  
Immigrants	  from	  central	  and	  
eastern	  Anatolia	  (Turkish,	  Kurdish	  )	  
and	  Roma	  
Many	  of	  them	  left	  in	  the	  1990s	  when	  
the	  area	  started	  to	  gentrify.	  As	  owner-­‐
occupiers,	  they	  were	  able	  to	  sell	  their	  
houses	  for	  a	  profit.	  Tenants	  moved	  
away	  because	  rents	  started	  to	  become	  
too	  expensive	  for	  them	  to	  afford.	   5	  
Gentrifiers	  since	  the	  1990s	   	  	  
First	  wave	  gentrifiers	  from	  the	  
early	  1990s	   They	  are	  still	  residing	  in	  the	  area	   8	  
Second	  wave	  gentrifiers,	  since	  2008	  
They	  are	  still	  residing	  in	  the	  area	  
N/A	  	  
Table 7.1: Groups of People in Galata 
 
   7.3.1 Attitudes of People Who Left 
Three interviews were conducted with people who left the area. Of the people who 
moved out, some left because of political pressures and others left because they did 
not like the immigrants from Anatolia or the Romani and also because they had now 
lost almost all of their old neighbours and connections.When asked if he misses 
living in Galata, one interviewee (the Turkish citizen of Jewish origin) stated that:  
No, no! We ran from Galata (because of the Istanbul Pogrom), and I 
am surprised that anyone would like to come back Galata. However, 
now, people are very satisfied with living in here, since it has been 
renewed, restored and many intellectuals are living here now. I really 
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do not understand why they like this place so much. There is an 
Italian girl living on Tatar Street, and she tells me she is in love with 
this street. I asked why you like it so much. I do not understand how 
this is possible. (Translated by the author) (13, January, 2013).  
 
When asked what kind of problems they experienced while they were living in 
Galata, one interviewee (Jewish originated Turkish citizen) stated that: 
The only problem we encountered was the Istanbul Pogrom, and it 
was a really big problem for us. I can remember it quite clearly. It 
affected me very deeply. They plundered my father’s shop, and that 
should not have happened, but it did. We turned off the lights and 
were looking through the windows of our house, and we had this iron 
gate in front of our apartments. I remember our gatekeeper had to stay 
put in front of the door so that no one can come in. After this incident, 
the migration from Galata began. People were feeling agitated and 
scared. Some moved to France, and some moved to Israel. For 
example, I had two aunts, and one of them was of Greek origins . She 
moved to Canada. (Translated by the author) (21, January, 2013). 
 
Romanis who used to live in Galata were mostly tenants and left years ago because 
of the increasing rents, so I was not able to interview anyone about their situation. 
 Most of them not only left Galata, but also Turkey altogether, although a few are 
still left in other parts of Istanbul. When asked why they had left, the two people I 
interviewed both said that they lost all their connections to the neighbourhood, 
everyone left and they were not able to get along with the people who came from 
Anatolia. When asked if they would like to live in Galata right now, their answer 
was “No” because Galata would never be the same as it was, and they would never 
have their old neighborhoods back. So even though now the people from Anatolia 
whom they did not like have mostly left, they are not pleased with the new 
inhabitants either. They do not miss Galata as it is in the present, but they miss how 
it was 40-50 years ago. These people I interviewed mostly feel resentment when 
they think about Galata. 
 
   7.3.2 Tensions Experienced by Old Inhabitants  
Seven interviews were conducted with the old inhabitants. This section analyzes the 
problems and tension between old and new inhabitants, and the next sub-section is 
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an analysis of the tension between different groups of gentrifiers. First, I discuss the 
interviews with people who have been living in the area for generations (before the 
1950s).  
In the opinion of one of the interviewees (an inhabitant residing in Galata for 
generations):  
Galata is a very cosmopolitan place and that is Galata’s main feature. 
There are people from all nationalities such as Greeks, Armenians, 
Jews, and we grew up here together. However, now there has been 
some [other kind of migration [talking about gentrifiers] into Galata 
and there are people, even though they are college educated, they do 
not know how to use toilet. They do not take out their garbage 
properly, and they pollute the streets. This is not even about lack of 
education because these people are well-educated, or they think they 
are. It is very ugly; when I was a kid no one was able to scream in the 
streets, but now people are screaming at nights, throwing their 
garbage into the street. Then we have to warn them about how to 
behave, and they do not take that well, either. Overall, they do not 
respect the neighbourhood they are living in like the older inhabitants. 
This place was not like this in the past and we had respect and 
common courtesy, but now people are pretending like they are some 
big shot before finishing their school [university education] and not 
showing respect to anything at all. (Translated by the author) (02, 
February, 2013).  
 
Anatolians talked about several changes Galata has experienced in the last 20-30 
years. Whereas they are sometimes unhappy and concerned about the social 
changes, they are happy with the physical changes. The Municipal services in the 
neighbourhood have been better compared to the past, and Anatolians think this is 
because of the arrival of the gentrifiers. On the other hand, there is some antagonism 
between the old inhabitants and the foreigners who have recently moved to the area. 
Antagonism here refers to a strong feeling of dislike and acting upon this feeling, 
such as confronting the other party if there is a face-to-face meeting. The Anatolians 
I interviewed do think the foreigners are corrupting their neighbourhood culture and 
neighbourly relations have been ‘lost’, but at the same time, they are grateful for 
them being in the area because the Municipality is working better since foreigners 
(in addition to the gentrifers) moved in. Many of the people I interviewed were 
concerned that the area has been becoming increasingly expensive, and if it 
continues like this, they will not be able to afford living here. In Galata, concerns 
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about high prices usually refer to living expenses because most of the Anatolians 
who are still living in the area are owner-occupiers and are not worried about rising 
rents. There are almost no working class tenants living in the area. Their concerns do 
not include displacement because of high rents. 
Although the Anatolian respondents seem pleased with the current version of the 
neighbourhood, they do not socialize with the new inhabitants and do not have any 
interactions with them besides seeing them around. The old inhabitants are just 
pleased with the effect that the new inhabitants create rather than having them as 
friends or neighbours.  
When one interviewee (migrated to Galata in the seventies from Anatolia) was asked 
about what she thought about the changes Galata has been experiencing, she replied: 
 In the past (in the 1970s and 1980s), this place was like a dumpster 
and now, it is much cleaner. The Municipality is actually picking up 
the garbage, cleaning the streets now, and there are many tourists 
around the area, so Galata became much better. I am very happy with 
this change; my only concern is that there is too much noise now 
because of all the cars and tourists. (Antolian, migrated to Galata in 
1907s) (Translated by the author) (29, January, 2013). 
 
To summarize: one kind of tension demonstrated here is the antagonism towards and 
indirect conflict with first and second wave gentrifiers and Anatolians by old 
inhabitants. I interviewed people who have been living in the neighbourhood for 
generations. Indirect conflict refers to a state of dislike towards a group of people, 
but no confrontation. These inhabitants are not happy about any kind of social or 
physical changes that Galata has experienced. They are not happy about the 
immigrants from Anatolia and think that they do not ‘fit’ in the area. On the other 
hand, they are not happy about the gentrifiers either and think gentrifiers do not 
know how to appreciate the historical heritage and take care of the houses or the 
historic environment as they should. Some of them see the gentrifiers as people who 
just have money, but no respect for the historical heritage and the people in the 
neighbourhood. Indirect conflict plays out in the form of complaining to authority 
about the disliked group of people. People I interviewed stated that they openly 
share their opinions about the other groups of people in the neighbourhood in any 
platform possible.  
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The other type is anomie from the Anatolians I spoke to towards the rest of the 
neighbourhood. Anomie refers to a state of indifference where no social conflict 
exists. It is a social condition one group of people has towards another (Gerber and 
Macionis, 2010). While they seem happy with the physical and service 
improvements to the neighourhood, they do not socialize with or are indifferent to 
the gentrifiers.  
 
   7.3.3 Tensions Experienced by Gentrifiers  
Eight interviews were conducted with the gentrifiers. All of the problems mentioned 
in this section are expressed by first wave gentrifiers because they are the only group 
of gentrifiers I had the chance to interview. The second wave gentrifiers I was able 
to contact did not want to participate in the study without giving a specific reason. 
First wave gentrifiers have a strong sense of place and take the whole phenomenon 
of old Istanbul seriously. This is what led them to buy and renovate their own houses 
and at the same time create an imaginary. They value the history of Galata and do 
not connect well with other groups of people who do not show the same kind of 
appreciation. According to the first wave gentrifiers, the second wave of gentrifiers 
did not share this sense of place and they mostly moved to this neighbourhood 
because it is popular, central and close to the entertainment centres of the city. 
The first wave gentrifiers I interviewed had several ideas about the neighbourhood. 
They are pleased to live in such an historical and central area, but are not happy 
about the second wave gentrifiers who moved to the area in the last seven years. 
Some of the interviewees think that not all new inhabitants understand or care about 
the value of the houses and the historical heritage they live in. In their opinion, some 
upper middle class or upper class people only move there because the area is popular 
and it shows some kind of social status to live in Galata. They agree with the old 
inhabitants about this matter, even though they do not mix with them. Some of the 
gentrifiers also stated their discomfort towards Anatolians: 
My personal opinion is that, some of the old buildings are not 
maintained properly and naturally this creates pollution around the 
neighbourhood. Behind my flat, there is a mountain of garbage and I 
think, old inhabitants of Galata [she is referring to Anatolians] refuse 
to clean this mess. I mean, I am against gentrification but at the same 
time, people who come here [gentrifiers] are making this place 
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[Galata] better and more beautiful. (Translated by the author) (02, 
February, 2013). 
 
When asked how he would compare the present with before the 1950s, one 
interviewee stated that: 
I mean, of course I do not have such Utopian ideas, but there is the 
fact that I have been living in this house for four years now and all of 
the people who used to live here when I first moved in are gone now. 
We were not neighborly or anything, but there were more people from 
Anatolia. Now, there are people (mostly males) aged between 25-35, 
living alone, probably educated abroad or people aged between 35-40, 
upper class, too lazy to rent a holiday place outside Istanbul. 
[meaning even though they can afford to have a holiday place in the 
south which is the most common, they just stay in Istanbul only 
because they can]  The latter come and rent a place for 2000 dollars a 
month, and then they are partying all the time. Then I have to call the 
police at 2 a.m. in the morning because they are making too much 
noise. I cannot blame them really; I know that they have no idea about 
how to be a decent neighbour because all these people grew up in 
gated communities. You know the neighbourhood next to us: 
Tophane? It is a very conservative place, and these people just do not 
fit in with those people in Tophane, creating tension. I am sure you 
heard about the exhibition incident [this is explained in the 
conclusion]. For instance, when I first moved here, there were many 
Romani people and now they are all gone. I was coming home at 
night and every day they (Roma) had some sort of entertainment. 
They were colouring and decorating the street and celebrating all sorts 
of things. However, they always finished their celebration 11:30 p.m., 
and they were sitting outside until 3-4 a.m. in the morning during the 
summers. It was like a natural safety for the neighbourhood. Now, 
people here are drinking and partying until the morning, and I cannot 
take it after some time. Also, they are not clean or anything. We used 
to have garbage on the streets in Migros (Turkish version of Tesco) 
bags, and now we have garbage on the street in Dolce & Gabbana 
bags, but people are still throwing garbage in the street. (Translated 
by the author) (10, February, 2013). 
 
As mentioned in the previous section, the first wave gentrifiers I interviewed are 
unhappy with the decisions of the Municipality, such as allowing many places to 
become hotels, cafes, art galleries or designer shops. All of the eight people I 
interviewed said that it was only to make more profit in the area, and with the 
increase in these retail areas, Galata was losing its original features. One gentrifier 
stated his discomfort about the change in Galata: 
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I can say this since I have been living here for such a long time [11 
years]; until 2008 this was an expected change [further levels of 
gentrification]. It was a classical process. First the bohemians arrived 
then their friends arrived and after that, some foreign citizens started 
to live here. However, after 2008, some companies and therefore 
capitalism discovered this place, and the process started to be 
managed by actors such as international real estate companies and the 
Municipality. The Municipality had some plans to turn specific streets 
into fashion and art streets. (Translated by the author) (05, February, 
2013). 
 
Tension amongst gentrifiers is partly affected by external factors, such as speculators 
and big real estate companies. People (second wave gentrifiers) who came to the 
neighbourhood by buying property from  these real estate companies have not been 
welcomed because they were accused of coming to Galata for the wrong reasons. 
According to some of the first wave gentrifiers, they did not renovate their own 
houses or care about the heritage of the environment at all; they came to live in 
Galata only because it is popular and close to entertainment amenities.  
 
7.4 Academics 
Four interviews were conducted with the academics chosen from several who have 
studied Galata. They all agree that the gentrification process in Galata was slower 
than other neighbourhoods gentrified through the housing market, and that is one of 
the reasons the neighbourhood is still experiencing gentrification. The issues 
discussed with academic respondents included changes that the neighbourhood is 
facing, displacement, reaction of the old inhabitants, thoughts on gentrifiers, and 
various tension between these different groups of people. I analyse these issues later 
in the chapter. 
When asked about gentrification and displacement processes in the area, the 
academics suggested a classic gentrification process that took place. The process 
started with middle class people buying and renovating their houses, and one of the 
reasons to prefer Galata was that in the 1990s, it was cheaper than other gentrified 
areas (e.g., Cihangir), but with same kind of features and close to the centre. The 
process seemed to take place without government intervention, but there were some 
indirect interventions that old inhabitants, especially experienced. 
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When asked about the gentrification and displacement process in Galata, one of the 
academic respondents replied that:  
With the renewal and pedestrianization of Istiklal Street and this area 
becoming the entertainment centre of Istanbul, the gentrification 
process started in the 1990s reached Galata in the mid-1990s. First, 
Cihangir started to experience gentrification very intensely, and only 
after that, Galata started to experience bits of that gentrification 
process. However, even though the gentrification process started very 
slowly in Galata, in the 2000s, gentrification process accelerated. One 
reason for that, the high fashion industry started buying and renting 
shops and fashion designing studios in Galata. This had a big effect 
for Galata. I had a chance to have chat with the first gentrifiers of that 
area, and they were saying they cannot recognize the people recently 
moving in, and they surely are not happy with them. Besides that, 
there is also the issue of shops around the Galata Tower. Since there 
are no regulations about the entertainment businesses there, they are 
open until 2-3 a.m. in the morning, and people who are actually living 
there are not happy with that either. I mean it also makes sense. Think 
about it. If I was younger, I would go to the place around Galata 
Tower as well. It is basically free to sit there, and there are grocery 
stores where I can buy drinks with no regulations. Now the 
municipality closed down that area and they are going to make some 
landscape arrangements and try to prevent  people from gathering in 
that area. I do not know what is going to happen this summer. On the 
other hand, the gentrifiers are also complaining because there are no 
public toilets around the area, so people just go to any free space 
around the tower and I do agree that this is disgusting. (Translated by 
the author) (15, February, 2013).  
 
In terms of displacement, the academics did not find that there had been much 
eviction in the area. Only one of the interviewees talked about harassment by an 
owner-occupier (harassing the tenant to leave the premises, creating false 
accusations) to evict his/her tenant from the flat for the sake of profit. Apart from 
this, the displacement process was mostly people selling their houses for large 
profits and moving somewhere else to avoid the increasing living expenses in the 
area. According to one interviewee, owner-occupiers continue to think about selling 
their houses and moving to another place that suits their lifestyle better (according to 
them).When asked about the changes that Galata has been experiencing, one 
interviewee stated that:  
The process there became very visible after the year 1995. I studied 
that place on 2005, and I criticised the gentrification process that has 
been going on in the area.  What I experienced there was social mix. 
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There is still social mix on some level. Think of an apartment: on the 
top floor there is an Italian musician; the floor below that there is 
middle class person who is a teacher in a private school; the floor 
below that there is a working class family from the east of Anatolia; 
and finally the floor below that there is a Roma family. This situation 
was possible then. When you start talking to gentrifiers, first they 
were praising this social mix in the area; however, as the conversation 
progresses, they start complaining about the very situation they were 
praising before. They say things such as: “These people are ignorant 
anyway, they do not know how to do anything, they break things and 
all ... . To be honest, I did not have one good interview when it came 
to people from different social classes and cultures living together. 
Everyone was spying on each other, or there was this silent desire by 
new inhabitants to make the old inhabitants leave the neighbourhood. 
The old inhabitants were not leaving because they had hopes that state 
will make some kind of arrangement here and make the 
neighbourhood better. I also interviewed many businesses and asked 
them why they do not invest in this area more. They said they were 
expecting a much higher level of gentrification, and they were 
unhappy since that did not happen. Hotels were not complaining that 
much then, but now, when I walk around the area, I see these new 
developments, constructed for international tourists. I guess they have 
a different network of clients. They were quite luxurious. (Translated 
by the author) (8, February, 2013). 
 
She added some things about the housing market in the area at the beginning 
of gentrification: 
Besides this fake social mix [the interviewee does not think that there 
is any social mix in the area], people who have been living there since 
the 1970s are mostly from the east of Anatolia, and they turned into 
this real estate agent [interviewee meant that inhabitants started only 
think about the profit they can make from their properties] once the 
land prices started to increase. They had illogical demands for their 
property, and they were asking four times what the flat was actually 
worth. I cannot blame them because the prices had gone up so fast 
they tried to benefit from that. They also had this very illogical 
reasoning: “My neighbour sold his house for four, so I will be asking 
four for my house as well. Why would I not?”  People started 
thinking about how much they can get from the sale of their house 
because gentrification creates this incredible speculation in the 
housing market. I do think this speculation itself created some kind of 
degeneration. (Translated by the author) (08, February, 2013). 
 
There is one forced eviction story that was mentioned during the interviews: 
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Lastly, I have never seen any forced eviction in the area; however, I 
only heard about one incident. There was a family from Mardin (a 
city in the south-east of Turkey), and I still remember the face of the 
man who told me this, he was so proud of himself. He basically threw 
them out of the flat. He said, and I quote: “If we have not gotten rid of 
them then, they were going to stay there forever, and these people are 
from Mardin, so they were going to do these petty jobs like selling 
mussels and turn this place into a marginalized or rural area.” He 
thought what he did was basically a charity work for the real 
inhabitants of Galata. (Translated by the author) (16, February, 2013). 
 
This section analysed the interviews conducted with academics on the topic of 
gentrification processes of Galata. Academics I interviewed who studied Galata 
agree on process of market-led gentrification in Galata and how I operated in the last 
30 years or so. Now I turn to summarizing all of the interviews conducted and 
construct the story of Galata from different points of view. 
 
7.5 Reconstructing the Story  
In this chapter, I have examined many stories about the same process, and since I am 
a critical realist, I believe there is a single truth of what happened that is seen 
differently by different groups of people. Being highly a political process 
gentrification has different viewpoints on it, and I, being a critical realist, analysed 
one single process and will construct the closest version of the story to the truth 
possible from the evidence that I presented above.  
In Galata, it is clear from the statements of the Anatolians I interviewed that the 
local government ignored the working class people in the neighbourhood by not 
providing them with adequate municipal services. However, my respondents did not 
realize that, and instead, they felt grateful when the first wave gentrifiers arrived 
because that is when the Municipality started to provide better services. This is one 
reason why my Anatolian respondents felt no antagonism towards the gentrifiers. 
However, this is not true for all the working class people from Anatolia who moved 
to the surrounding neighbourhood. As stated by one of the academics, the 
inhabitants of an adjacent neighbourhood called Tophane were very unhappy about 
the gentrifiers’ ‘way of living’. The conflict was so great that people from Tophane 
raided one of the exhibition openings and beat up some of the participants. This was 
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an important incident in the media and showed the extent of the conflict between 
two groups of people.  
Even though there was this one incident from Tophane’s inhabitants, the first wave 
gentrifiers in Galata I spoke to did not show any signs of tension with Anatolians. 
Gentrifiers who were aware of the old inhabitants of Galata when they first moved in 
and were looking for (or claiming to look for) some form of social mix did not 
express antagonism towards Anatolians at the start of the interview, but did not talk 
about wanting to socialise with them either. However, after four or five questions, 
some respondents started to complain about how dirty or crowded the flats are and 
claimed that the flats are mostly inhabited by the Anatolians.  It is also important to 
add that many of the Anatolians sold their property and moved out of the area and 
the ones who stayed are a small number compared to the gentrifiers. In other words, 
there are not many Anatolians left to complain about and the tension between first 
wave gentrifiers and Anatolians decreased compared to the past (Sen, 2005).  
In summary, this empirical research reviewed various types of tension in a gentrified 
area to demonstrate the effects of the process of gentrification. As seen in this 
section, according to the first wave gentrifiers, second wave gentrifiers demonstrate 
anomie towards the first wave gentrifiers. the first wave gentrifiers stated that, they 
are indifferent to them, and they do not share any opinion or socialize with them in 
any way. The first wave gentrifiers openly show antagonism and in some cases, 
indirect conflict (e.g., calling the police) towards second wave gentrifiers, and they 
do not think second wave gentrifiers should be living in Galata. The first wave 
gentrifiers show anomie toward the old inhabitants. In addition, gentrification still 
continues to create new types of tension (e.g., tension between different groups of 
gentrifiers). Even though there were not many forced evictions, it is possible to 
detect many kinds of tension between the current inhabitants of the area.  
 
7.6 Conclusion: Analysis and Interpretation  
Classical gentrification has been an important phenomenon in Istanbul, and what 
underlies it is some of the same processes that have been observed in the global 
North. The main elements such as rise of the FBS, transformation of the economy, 
the rise in the numbers of professional workers and the culture and taste of these 
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professionals are things that have been observed in many cities in the world and 
cities in the global North, but which are also observable in Istanbul, although there 
are some differences. For example, Istanbul is only now developing to become a 
world city, and while there is classical gentrification, Istanbul is also experiencing 
massive urban regeneration and transformation projects often seen in the global 
South. All of these processes indicate that even though Istanbul is a city in a 
developing country and in the global South, the urban and gentrification theories 
from the global North are applicable, and they are also important to understand the 
underlying reasons for both type of gentrification. However, at the same time, it is 
necessary to add new set of cities from different parts of the world with different 
political and social elements to enrich the theorization of both types of 
gentrification.  
In this section, I analyze and interpret this story deeper and look at four points: 
tensions in Galata, relationships between old and new inhabitants, indirect state 
involvement and social justice, and the social relations gentrification sets up. 
The first point is that tensions in gentrified areas are not limited to those between old 
and new inhabitants. Gentrification is a process that creates many levels of tension 
between different groups and between groups of gentrifiers as well: these are 
anomie, antagonism, and indirect conflict. People who moved to the district because 
of its history, architectural beauty and narrow streets that remind them of Istanbul in 
the 19th century and who like to enjoy exhibitions in  nicely-restored buildings that 
used to belong to the Levantines do not want other middle class people moving in 
only because the district  is popular and ‘trendy’. This is an interesting kind of 
tension that is not commonly emphasized in the literature on gentrification. The first 
wave of gentrifiers’ complaints are mostly directed towards second wave gentrifiers 
for not being part of this kind of community.  
Galata’s current identity has many traces from its Ottoman past, and these traces are 
what attracted middle class people there in the first place; more recently, the area is 
being transformed into something different. Even though the houses are still 
historical, there are no neighbourhood traditions such as social gatherings, 
celebrating weddings and special days together. Instead, there are gatherings in 
bistro cafés or in art galleries.  Most of the shops (electricians, carpenter shops, lathe 
operator shops) that used to be located in Galata have moved away. Gentrification is 
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not only bringing different inhabitants to the area, but also changing its previous 
identity and culture. Gentrifiers’ consumption habits affected the identity in the 
neighbourhood greatly. Currently, most of the retail areas in the neighbourhood are 
designed to attract professionals (the second wave gentrifiers).  
The second point relates to the details of the relationship between old inhabitants 
and gentrifiers. Recently opened art galleries, cafés, restaurants have certainly made 
the district much more popular and improved the demand for housing in the district, 
but old inhabitants are not in the market for designer clothes or vintage bags. This 
makes them feel excluded and not part of the neighbourhood anymore, which creates 
tensions between the old and new inhabitants. I found little evidence of social 
mixing between the old and new inhabitants. Even though Galata has been gentrified 
since the early 1990s and most of the Anatolians left the neighbourhood because of 
gentrification, those remaining did not have social interactions with any of the 
gentrifiers. In the case of Galata, it is clear that it is not only old and new inhabitants 
who do not mix, but also first and second wave gentrifiers do not mix either. 
The third point I found is that although this is not state-led gentrification and it has 
been led by the private housing market, the local municipality played a significant 
role in promoting the gentrification of the area. In Galata, this happened with 
planning permissions in favour of construction firms, making it easier for them to 
build new apartments on heritage sites that do not necessarily fit in the 
neighbourhood or allowing second-rate renovation practices. This involvement of 
the state also includes providing better municipal services (picking up garbage, 
cleaning the neighbourhood) once the area is gentrified and controlling the 
permissions for the sale of  alcohol in cafés and restaurants, which has direct effect 
to the entertainment sector in Galata. This contributes partly to the tensions between 
gentrifiers. On the one hand, some first wave gentrifiers demand better restoration 
and urban conservation projects, while on the other hand, second wave gentrifiers 
demand more hotels, cafés, bistros and overall, more development in the 
neighbourhood.   
Gentrification is a process that can generally improve a neighbourhood’s physical 
condition and its place in the private market, but in doing so, does not really take the 
current inhabitants into account. Gentrifiers create this imaginary sense of 
neighbourhood and neighbourhood relations that actually help satisfy new 
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consumption habits of the middle class. The Galata case demonstrates that 
gentrification continues to be a dynamic process, in the course of which the existing 
tensions between old and new inhabitants continue, while other kinds of tensions are 
added to the area, creating a neighbourhood with many identities that do not blend 
well.  
I now turn to the Tarlabasi case to examine the brutal state-led gentrification process 
that has been taking place in the area since 2008.   
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“What we do in Tarlabasi is not only urban regeneration,  
we are healing a poisoned princess” 
Ahmet Misbah Demircan, Mayor of Beyoglu, 17 August 2012, Star Newspaper  
 
CHAPTER 8: THE TARLABASI STORY 
 
8.1 Introduction 
Tarlabasi is an important example of state-led gentrification. There is a huge contrast 
between Galata and Tarlabasi when it comes to processes of gentrification, even 
though they are closely located and have a similar historical background. Tarlabasi 
has been experiencing a brutal displacement process, and being a quite political 
project, there are even more different points of views compared to Galata explained 
and analysed in this chapter. While analysing these different and frequently 
contradictory different points of view and stories about the same process, I tease out 
the closest version to the truth. 
In this chapter, I first discuss the overview of the gentrification processes of 
Tarlabasi since the early 2000s and following this, I examine the earthquake risk in 
Tarlabasi because it is one of the justifications used by the authorities for the 
Tarlabasi Renewal Project. As I will argue, this is an excuse rather than a reason for 
implementing the renewal project. Following this, I analyse Law 5366, which has 
allowed the acquisitions and demolitions to take place to give a better explanation of 
the legal processes relating to the redevelopment project. I then move on to examine 
the five interviews I conducted with the officers of Beyoglu Municipality, the 
MHDA and Gap Insaat to present the story from the authorities’ point of view and 
hear their justifications.  I wanted to know their reactions to some of the things that 
have been said or written by NGOs, journalists, the inhabitants of Tarlabasi and 
academics in opposition to the project.  
This is followed by the 15 neighbourhood interviews I conducted around but not in 
the project area of Tarlabasi. The reason I was not able to interview anyone from the 
project area is that all of those who were evicted and displaced who I was able to 
track down refused to talk to me because of the reaction (e.g., being harassed further 
by the police force or the local government) they might face from the local or 
200	  
	  
national state. I interviewed people living in neighbourhoods around the project area 
to learn their experiences about state-led gentrification and their concerns about the 
future. In addition, I interviewed four academics who were interested and conducted 
research in the area and the gentrification process in order to gain insights from their 
interpretations. I interviewed five people from various NGOs who worked in or were 
interested in the area to understand their influence on the process and the tools they 
used oppose the project. These NGOs include the Tarlabasi Platform, the Tarlabasi 
Association of Owner-Occupiers and Tenants, and The Chamber of Architects. I 
conclude this chapter with my interpretation of the story and some reflections on the 
socio-political effects of the project in the area with regards to state-led 
gentrification processes.  
 
8.2 The Overview for Tarlabasi as a Case Study 
Tarlabasi is a historical neighbourhood located in Beyoglu district, Istanbul (see 
Map 9.1). It is five-minute walk away from Istiklal Street and has a similar historical 
heritage and background to Galata. Tarlabasi, too, started in the 19th century as a 
middle class neighbourhood populated by Ottoman citizens of Armenian and Greek 
origins. Its population was affected by the political events surrounding the 
introduction of the Capital Law and the Istanbul pogrom (See Chapter 6), and like 
Galata, immigrants from Anatolia bought these architecturally significant properties 
for very cheap prices, and the municipal services started to deteriorate. However, 
unlike Galata, Tarlabasi did not experience gentrification through the private 
housing market, even though it is equally close to entertainment and cultural centres 
and has the similar historical heritage.  
There are several reasons for this. First, Tarlabasi Boulevard was widened during the 
pedestrianization of Istiklal Street, and Tarlabasi became isolated from the rest of the 
neighbourhood, cutting off Tarlabasi’s connection to the entertainment and cultural 
centre of the city (Islam, 2006).  Following this development, the local government 
demolished many historical buildings and forced the people living on the main street 
to move away from the neighbourhood, hastening the physical deterioration of the 
area (Islam, 2006; Dincer et al., 2008).  
Second, in the 1990s, Tarlabasi received a different kind of rural to urban migration. 
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As has been explained in previous chapters, Kurdish people who were affected by 
military activity in the east of Turkey were forced to leave their home lands and 
were left without any means of financial support. These people started to move to 
the Tarlabasi neighbourhood because the rent was very cheap and the area was very 
central. With the arrival of this poor and marginalized population, the Municipality 
and the police force ignored the area almost altogether. This led to further physical 
deterioration of the area (Islam, 2010).  
 
 
Map 8.1: Tarlabasi’s connection with Istiklal Street, Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality City Guide, 
sehirrehberi.ibb.gov.tr, 2015 
 
By the 2000s, Tarlabasi became a neighbourhood populated by the most 
disadvantaged segments of the population, including Kurdish people from the 
southeast, Romani, foreign and immigrants as well as a gay and transsexual 
community. In this district, people either work in the service sector in the tourist 
areas nearby for very low wages or as street vendors selling food produced in small 
workshops in the district (Turkun and Sen, 2009).  
According to Law 5366 enacted on 5 July, 2005, which enables regeneration in 
historic areas, nine lots in Tarlabasi were declared as “urban renewal” areas on the 
20 February, 2006. It was intended to convert the buildings into hotels, shopping 
spaces and residences. This initial stimulus was expected to trigger a complete 
Tarlabasi	  
Istiklal	  
Street	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physical change and gentrification in the area (Turkun and Sen, 2009; Turkun, 
2011). On 16 March, 2007, Beyoglu Municipality put the preliminary project for 
Tarlabasi renewal area up for tender. In the tender, the Municipality demanded that 
the work be completed in two and half years from the day both parties signed the 
contract. On 17April, 2007, Gap Insaat (a construction company) won the tender. 
The preliminary project prepared by Gap Insaat proposed the demolition and 
reconstruction of all historical buildings in the renewal area (The Chamber of 
Architects 40th report, 2008-2010).  
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Map 8.2: Tarlabasi neighbourhood (Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality City Guide, sehirrehberi.ibb.gov.tr, 
2015) 
 
 
Map 8.3: Tarlabasi Renewal Project (Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality, www.ibb.gov.tr, 2015) 
 
 Map 8.2 above shows the whole neighbourhood of Tarlabasi, and Map 9.3 is the 
Tarlabasi renewal area. This area consists of nine blocks and 278 (20.000 m2) lots. 
In the renewal area, all the buildings in the project area are to be demolished, even 
though 70% of the housing stock is made up of listed buildings, and their facades 
will be rebuilt as in the originals. The interior of the buildings will change 
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completely to fit the needs of the new users. Courtyards will be created by 
decreasing the depth of the buildings. To provide a ‘safe’ environment for the new 
users, access to the buildings will be located towards the interior courtyards. Parking 
garages will be built under the buildings (Dincer et al., 2008).  
There are some models that show the proposed future Tarlabasi. Image 9.1 shows a 
street in current Tarbalasi, while Image 9.2 is taken from a Project leaflet, depicting 
the proposed future of Tarlabasi, a future that has nothing to do with Tarlabasi now. 
 
 
 
   
 
This project was heavily criticized by the Chamber of Architects, academics and 
NGOs are interested in the area.  Nevertheless, on 30 September, 2007, the project 
was accepted by the Urban Renewal Commission working under the authority of the 
Ministry of Culture and Tourism – in other words, the national state. The Chamber 
of Architects requested a copy of the project from the company for their own 
observation, but even though the construction company claimed that they prepared 
this project with the participation of the public in an open and transparent way, they 
did not send a copy of the project documents to the Chamber (The Chamber of 
Architects 40th report, 2008-2010). 
Photo 8.1: 
Picture of 
Tarlabasi as it is 
now 
,http://kamilpas
ha.com/?p=258
5 , retrieved in 
2015 
Photo 8.2: Models for 
Tarlabasi Renewal 
Project ,Gap Insaat 
project leaflet, 2013 
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The Chamber of Architects filed a lawsuit against the project and against Law 5366 
on 22 April, 2008. During the lawsuit, an expert report, written by academics from 
Istanbul Technical University who were appointed by the local government that 
supported the decision to carry out demolitions in the area and which antagonized 
the inhabitants of Tarlabasi was handed to the court. This report is examined in 
detail later in the chapter. The Chamber objected to the report and requested that the 
court should order a new report to be written by more objective academics, but on 16 
June, 2010, the law court decided the case in favour of Gap Insaat without 
responding to the requests of the Chamber. On 28 August, 2010, the demolition in 
Tarlabasi officially started. When the demolition started, not all of the inhabitants 
had left the area. The eviction process took place between 2008 and 2012, and the 
start of demolitions was used to intimidate the inhabitants who were reluctant to 
leave or sell their property to the construction firm (Chamber of Architects, 2008). 
During this time, an acquisition process operated for the owner-occupiers, but there 
were no arrangements for tenants. Owner-occupiers were able to purchase a flat in 
one of the housing developments of the MHDA located on the periphery of Istanbul. 
This process is examined later in the chapter. People living in the area, faced with 
pressures from the local Municipality and the construction company to sell their 
property at very low prices under the threat of expropriation, set up a neighbourhood 
association of house owners and tenants to defend their rights. In the district, owners 
in particular are aware of the high rent potential of their properties, while the prices 
offered by the construction company are very low. They prefer to improve their 
places and receive the rent increases themselves. On the other hand, the project 
aimed to convert the area completely to be used by the richest segments of the 
population and tourists to achieve the highest returns, so the construction company 
did not want to compromise on these terms. Under these conditions, the inhabitants 
of the district, having been exposed to unjust treatment and pressure, developed 
oppositional tactics towards the current urban regeneration attempts (Chamber of 
Architects, 2008; Dincer at al., 2008).  
In addition to the attempts by the Chamber of Architects to oppose the 
redevelopment, there have been many individual lawsuits filed against the project 
and the acquisition process by the owner-occupiers in Tarlabasi. These lawsuits were 
mostly decided in favour of Gap Insaat.  However, in 2014, the Council of State 
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decided the acquisition process has not been in the best interest of the public and 
cancelled the acquisitions made by the Municipality throughout the project. At the 
moment, the future of Tarlabasi Renewal Project is unclear. 
 
8.3 Earthquake Risk in Tarlabasi 
One of the major justifications for the project used by Municipality and the 
construction firm is the earthquake risk in Istanbul and the fact that Tarlabasi’s 
housing stock is not sound enough (see Chapter 8). In this section, I examine this 
assertion, according to data gathered from official documents and reports.  
Some of the important earthquakes that affected Istanbul in the 20th century are 
(Istanbul Territorial Plan, 2009): 
- 9 August 1912 Saros-Marmara Earthquake (Magnitude: 7.4), 
- 4 January 1935 Marmara Earthquake (Magnitude: 6.2), 
- 18 March 1953 Gonen-Yenice Earthquake (Magnitude: 7.2), 
- 18 June 1953 Edirne Earthquake (Magnitude: 5.2), 
- 18 September 1963 Yalova Earthquake (Magnitude: 6.4), 
- 6 October 1964 Manyas Earthquake (Magnitude: 6.9), 
- 23 August 1965 Saros Earthquake (Magnitude: 5.9), 
- 22 July 1967 Mudurnu-Sakarya Earthquake (Magnitude: 7.1), 
- 27 March 1975 Saros Earthquake (Magnitude: 6.6), 
- 17 August 1999 Kocaeli Earthquake (Magnitude: 7.8) 
According to this historical record, it is clear that any development should be 
planned carefully. However, this does not mean demolishing every historical 
building and reconstructing them. Even keeping the façade and renovating the 
interior of the historical buildings is a better option than what was proposed, because 
historical heritage is an important part of Tarlabasi and losing that would be against 
public interest (Beyoglu Heritage Site Urban Conservation Master Plan Report, 
2009).  
During and before the Tarlabasi Renewal project, it was emphasized that the project 
was about the earthquake risks faced by Istanbul and Tarlabasi. In addition, there 
had been instances of the historical buildings ‘collapsing on their own’ and creating 
danger for the inhabitants. For example, a historical building collapsed May, 2002 
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trapping two children in the ruins of the building (Cumhuriyet, 2002). However, this 
building was actually located next to another building that collapsed couple of 
months before the one mentioned reported. This means that before the project, there 
was not any attention towards Tarlabasi from any of the authorities.  In other words, 
the neglect from the local government led to the current risks that the building stock 
in Tarlabasi carry, and they used something they created to justify the demolition. 
According to report by Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) (2002), there 
are 45 small districts in Beyoglu, and they spread across 889 hectares of land. The 
population is around 234,964, and the number of persons per hectare is 9 
(person/building). In other words, there are many parts of Beyoglu or indeed 
Istanbul that need rehabilitation in terms of earthquake risk. For that reason, 
focusing only a specific part of Tarlabasi and demolishing the historical fabric based 
on this reason rather making the existing buildings earthquake safe is unconvincing. 
This shows that there should be some policies and rehabilitation projects in the area 
(not only Tarlabasi, but the whole of Beyoglu). However, even though the project 
presented itself as a necessity to mitigate earthquake risk, it is not rehabilitating the 
area, but demolishing it. As seen in the official reports (Istanbul Territorial Plan 
Report, 2009; 9th Development Plan, 2007-2013), the importance of Tarlabasi’s 
heritage is seen to be extremely important, and many of these reports argue complete 
demolition is not a way of urban preservation. However, in the end, the authorities 
chose to ignore their own reports and decided in favour of complete demolition.  
Earthquake risk as a justification for the Tarlabasi Renewal Project is unpersuasive. 
Now I turn to examine the legal act that the project is based upon to further discuss 
the preparation process of the project.  
 
8.4 The Legal Context for the Project and The Role of National Government 
The law for the project is Law No. 5366, which states that: 
The object of this Act is by reconstruction and restoration in line with 
the progress of the area of zones which are registered and declared as 
SIT (Conservation) areas by boards of conservation of cultural and 
natural assets which have been worn down and tending to lose their 
characteristics, by metropolitan municipalities, district and first level 
municipalities within the boundaries of metropolitan municipalities, 
provincial and district municipalities and municipalities with 
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populations over 50,000 and outside the scopes of authority of such 
municipalities by provincial special administrations, formation of 
residence, commerce, cultural, tourism and social facility areas in 
such zones, taking of measures against the risks of natural disasters 
and restoration and conservation of and use by living in historical and 
cultural immovable assets. This Act covers the terms and procedures 
relating to the determination of the restoration areas to be created in 
line with the foregoing objects, setting of technical infrastructure and 
construction standards, formation of drawings and on application, 
organization, management, supervision, participation and use thereof. 
(inuraistanbul2009.files.wordpress.com/2009/06/law-5366-1.pdf ) 
 
In other words, the object of this act to maintain the listed cultural and natural assets 
that are run down without the time-consuming bureaucracy for the purpose of 
commerce, tourism and social facility. There are some rumors that the law was 
especially enabled for Tarlabasi, but it became the law that has been used for almost 
all the urban renewal projects in Turkey. Even though the law aims to conserve 
historic areas, it is usually used to justify the declaration of historic areas as renewal 
areas and implementing renewal projects that have little to do with the actual 
architectural character of the area itself. 
The fundamental approach of this law is to move all the socio-economic problems in 
the central city to the periphery of the city, which will have the effect of increasing 
the land value and the number of investments in the city centre (Islam 2006, 2010). 
This approach has some problematic points: 
• It opens the way to changes to historic buildings that are not compatible with 
urban conservation policies. 
• Tenants and owner-occupier living in these neighbourhoods will be displaced 
without policies for compensation of their loss. 
As noted in Section 10.2, in 1986, there was an earlier project in Tarlabasi. The 
Tarlabasi Boulevard was extended by the demolition of the buildings facing the 
Boulevard, which led to the physical deterioration of the rest of the neighbourhood 
because Tarlabasi was cut off from Istiklal Street with a wide boulevard. After that, 
not much was done to rehabilitate Tarlabasi. After this law that was enabled in 
2005, to rehabilitate this area, there were proposals of small renewal projects in the 
neighbourhood, but they did not have the purpose of rehabilitating the area, and 
they were not implemented (Islam; 2006, 2010).  
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Seventy one per cent of the inhabitants of Tarlabasi are tenants, and although the 
law does not say anything about the displacement of tenants, the project foresees 
the displacement of all these tenants.  The inhabitants of Tarlabasi are already 
marginalised by society and experience various disadvantages. There is no real 
concern about the tenants in the law or in the contract of the renewal project. The 
tender for project was won by Gap Insaat in 2005, and according to the contract 
they signed with the municipality, the construction company (with municipality) 
would lead the negotiation process for buying up the land from the owner-
occupiers and landlords. In addition, if owner-occupiers insists on getting a flat 
from the project, they would have to pay large amounts of money because 
according to the agreement with the municipality, the construction firm was to own 
58% of the built area, and the owners and owner-occupiers would have had 42%, 
so after this decision went public there were many lawsuits. It turned out that the 
company was calculating the price of the land without the building on it. The 
reason they presented was that all of the built environment would be demolished. 
That meant if owner-occupiers have a 100 m2 land, after the project, they can only 
get a property – in exchange of their land – of 42 m2, but the smallest flat will be 
80 m2. This means owner-occupiers have to pay extra money and they cannot 
purchase a flat by selling their land to the company because the company was 
calculating the price of the land below market value, claiming that at the moment, 
Tarlabasi was deteriorated. However, the company was selling the flats at prices 
starting from 5000 to 7000 dollars per m2, claiming once the project will be 
finished, the area will be much more valuable. This means an owner-occupier 
cannot purchase a flat from the Project without getting into debt for around 
600,000 to 700,000 Turkish Liras (around £140,000). Many thought this was an 
utterly unfair decision. However, the law court enabled a verdict for Urgent 
Acquisition, which made many owners decide to sell their property to the 
construction firm because they were afraid that they did not have the power to fight 
against the state (The Chamber of Architects, 2008). 
The firm was exempted from all forms of  taxation by the law itself, even 
providing that should the firm decide to bring in construction equipment from 
abroad, they would be exempt from customs duty (The Chamber of Architects, 
2008).  
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Law No. 5366 was enabled in 2005, and it was an attempt to put an end to all the 
complicated bureaucratic arrangements created by previous urban conservation 
laws. However, the real purpose of the law was made clear by the Mayor of 
Beyoglu (Misbah Demircan) (Radikal Newspaper, 5, July, 2005) : 
When I first started my duty, I had a conversation with our Prime 
Minister (Recep Tayyip Erdogan). He said to me: “You have to do 
something about Tarlabasi. Tarlabasi is one of your most important 
jobs.” He was right. Tarlabasi is really one of the most important 
issues of Beyoglu, but we have some legal obstacles ahead of us for 
any kind of intervention to this neighbourhood. When I told our 
Prime Minister about these obstacles he told me: “You prepare the 
law and bring it to me.” A commission which I am also personally 
involved in worked on this law for about a year… . In the end we 
prepared the law and it passed through the Parliament, and now we 
have the opportunity to renew Tarlabasi (Translated by the author). 
 
The mayor continued his statement by saying everyone living there is now very 
fortunate because of this law and because of this renewal project. However, he 
continued that everybody has to give up some land to the private construction firm to 
fulfil the agreement (The Chamber of Architects, 2008).  
This law gives advantages to private firms who win tenders related to projects 
proposed under it. These advantages are the kinds of tax exemptions and discounts 
outlined above, and free beneficiaries from having to deal with the bureaucracy of 
the current conservation laws. The fact that the Tarlabasi renewal project is carried 
out by a private construction firm indicates that it is an arrangement to attract private 
investors to the historic city centre, rather than encouraging inhabitants to renovate 
their own property. According to the law, it should be encouraged for owner-
occupiers and landlords to renovate their own property, and as examined later on in 
this chapter, some of the owner-occupiers applied to the municipality to renovate 
their buildings, but were rejected without a solid reason.  
When asked about Law 5366, one of the interviewees from The Chamber of 
Architects (40th report, 2008-2010) explained that: 
It has always been rumoured that 5366 was prepared for Tarlabasi. 
That is why people sometimes call it the “Talabasi Law,” and I do 
agree with that. Tarlabasi is one of the first neighbourhoods declared 
as a renewal area. The first application of the Law 5366 was in 
Sulukule; however, Tarlabasi is the first neighbourhood that has a 
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urban regeneration project. So, first this Tarlabasi project was a 
matter of discussion, then they [the state] established urban renewal 
councils. To be honest, the establishment of these urban renewal 
councils was also kind of weird. Because, that means there are two 
councils for the same neighbourhoods. I mean, there was a council 
that was responsible for Beyoglu (Tarlabasi is in Beyoglu district.), so 
that meant there were two councils for Tarlabasi that are doing the 
same thing.  
Another thing about this law was that before 5366, there were (and 
still are) very strict preservation laws (e.g. Law 2863), and because of 
these laws, people couldn’t do anything with their historic properties, 
and now there is this new law that even allows many historic 
buildings to be demolished. There is also the controversial expert 
report that says all of the buildings should be demolished, even 
though the experts admit that they did not actually go inside the 
neighbourhood. And when you look at the project, they have to 
demolish all the buildings because there are some big constructions 
proposed with only one function such as a shopping mall. Lastly, it 
would be good to state that all the planning permissions were based 
on the preliminary architectural project, not the final one. It is even 
scandalous to think that a governmental organization can give all the 
permissions to demolish so many historical buildings based on an 
unfinished project (Translated by the author).  
 
This section discussed the legal base the renewal project uses and examined how 
local government interpreted the law. In the next section, the interviews that were 
conducted in the district are examined. First, I discuss the interviews with 
government officials and the construction company. Then I move on to the 
neighbourhood interviews. This is followed by the interviews with academics and 
NGOs, and finally, I finish the chapter with a discussion of all the interviews. 
 
8.5 Interviews with the Authorities and Contrary Evidence to Their Claim 
Five interviews were conducted with government officials in the Beyoglu 
Municipality and the MHDA and with representatives of the construction firm. In 
this section, I do not only use the interviews conducted with the interviews, but also 
other accounts from other agencies such as NGOs. Interviews were structured 
around the following topics: 
1. Crime and Demonization of the Inhabitants of Tarlabasi 
2. The Transparency of the Project 
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3. Using minorities as a justification 
4. Interactions with the inhabitants 
5. Preserving the heritage 
 
   8.5.1 Crime and Demonization of the Inhabitants of Tarlabasi 
In the interviews with officials from the Municipality, the MHDA and 
representatives of the construction firm, one common point was expressed by all the 
interviewees: the criminality of the inhabitants of Tarlabasi.  This was usually 
brought up in reference to the fact that some of the residents of the neighbourhood 
were there without paying rent. These inhabitants were often portrayed as ‘invaders’, 
and this was used to justify the project since, it was claimed, these residents did not 
have the right to live there in the first place. These kinds of statements ignored the 
fact that most of the people living in the neighbourhood were Kurdish people who 
had been forced to migrate to Tarlabasi because of the military conflict in the east of 
Turkey. At the same time, the state was both condemning people for losing their 
land and hometowns and exiling them for a second time. The sense of racism against 
Kurdish people was strong in all of the interviews. One of the interviewees stated: 
I mean, people who are living there are different from people who 
would like to live there because most of the current inhabitants are 
invaders. People who were not able to live in that neighbourhood 
because of the crime and social deterioration left that area, and other 
people came to these flats and invaded them illegally. They broke 
down the doors of the houses and broke inside the apartment and just 
started living there (Translated by the author) (government official, 10 
March 2013) 
 
The crime rate in the neighbourhood is a justification that is used to manipulate 
public opinion. Denigrating people as drug dealers, sex workers, and thieves and 
conditions the public reaction to the project. Thus, public opinion is formed in such a 
way that the injustices that inhabitants have experienced during the project have 
been ignored.  
One of the interviewees from the NGOs explained the way officials behaved in the 
neighbourhood: 
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I remember when the expert team from the Municipality visited the 
neighbourhood; all the inhabitants took a shower, hung the projects 
on the walls and tried to talk to this expert team. However, they could 
not make the team understand their demands or concerns. The 
inhabitants faced such options. For example, the owners were forced 
sell their property to the Municipality without any tenants. Can you 
imagine living with your neighbour as neighbours for years and years, 
and suddenly, you have to evict them? (Translated by the author) (18 
February 2013) 
 
Crime was used as an excuse to demonize inhabitants of Tarlabasi and as a social 
cleansing tool to make the project operate smoothly with the least resistance from 
the public possible. It has always been assumed that Tarlabasi has one of the highest 
crime rates in Istanbul.  But according to research that examined the crime rate in 
Tarlabasi (Unlu et al., 2005), while the rate was high on the main roads, it was much 
lower in the backstreets (Unlu et al., 2005), apparently reflecting the solidarity 
between the inhabitants of the neighbourhood.  
 In day-to-day interactions, and with the contribution of the women living in 
Tarlabasi, the backstreets of the neighbourhood were a safe environment.  A form of 
unspoken social communication created this solidarity between the inhabitants and 
within the neighbourhood. All the balconies, oriel windows, door steps, apartment 
entrances are not simply places where social interaction happens, but also where 
social control of the neighbourhood begins (Unlu et al., 2000).	  
In addition, the crime rate before the evacuations by the project area was a 
consequence of poverty, lack of municipal services and being ignored by the 
Municipality (The Chamber of Architects’ report, 2008-2010). It has been stated in 
the interviews by the inhabitants and the NGOs that the crime rate increased 
dramatically after the evictions from the project area due to lack of adequate 
policing, even though there is a police station situated close to the neighbourhood.  
 One of the promises of the project is to eliminate crime from the area, but since the 
current residents are presented as the main reason for the high crime rate, their 
evictions are justified. During the interviews, when the government officials and 
construction firm interviewees were asked what should be done about the crime rate, 
the main answer was that after the project was completed and new people started 
moving in, the crime rate would automatically decrease. This answer is based on the 
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assumption that the inhabitants of Tarlabasi are the reason for the high crime rate 
and implies that there are only criminals living in the area: 
Actually, when the project will complete and new owners will move 
into the area, the crime rate will drop by itself. What I think is that 
some of the owner-occupiers will move in, and I heard some of the 
flats will be sold dollar weighted. So this will mean a change in the 
profile of the inhabitants of the projects area. In that case, people who 
are living in the surrounding area will have to change to not be 
isolated or they will have to move out. (Translated by the author) 
(government official, 10 March 2013) 
 
In case of Tarlabasi, the aim of the state is to create a profitable neighbourhood for 
upper class people and evict the people they do not want to the periphery of the city, 
thereby creating a more homogenous middle or upper class social and physical 
environment in the city centre. One of the interviewees from the state stated: 
It is even in its name, right? Gentrification, so we are gentrifying the 
area, we are making it more noble. How this can be a bad thing? 
(Translated by the author) (Interviews with the authorities, 04 April 
2013)  
  
   8.5.2 The Transparency of the Project 
During the interviews with officials of Municipality, the MHDA and the 
construction firm, some of the interviewees offered opinions that contradicted the 
official documents I had collected during fieldwork.  In addition, some of the 
respondents’ answers contradicted those of other respondents. For example, some 
said that there had been some negative news in the press about the renewal project, 
while others denied any such news. False statements were made, such as denying 
that lawsuits were still going on against the project; in fact, none of the interviewees 
admitted the existence of any continuing lawsuits against the project. However, 
when presented with a document and a reference, some of the interviewees did admit 
that lawsuits were still going on about the acquisition process of the project. These 
statements lead me to think that the improper aspects of the project are kept hidden 
unless one has proof.  
This does not accord with the ‘transparent policy’ of the project that is being 
advertised everywhere in the media. Some of this news include: “Tarlabasi will be a 
rose garden in three years. Tarlabasi is a poisoned princess and we are healing her. 
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Tarlabasi will be a safe place.” (see 11 May, 2012, Sabah; 16 June, 2012, Haberturk; 
3 July, 2012, Sabah; 17 August, 2012, Star; 26 August, 2012, Vatan; 31 December 
2012, Yeni Safak). The state used the mainstream media and intimidation to 
influence public opinion about the inhabitants of Tarlabasi, and this is an example of 
the JDP’s increasingly authoritarian governance practises affecting mainstream 
media (see Chapter 6). One interviewee stated that: 
The information that the construction company and the municipality 
is spreading is wrong. [the information is that they reached an 
agreement and amended the losses of the inhabitants fully] Because 
you know, the company has the national state supporting them and 
when they say anything negative about the inhabitants, the police 
force or the municipal police force is sent to the neighbourhood for 
patrolling. If I had the same negotiation options that the construction 
company has had, I would love to negotiate the hell out of everyone. I 
mean I am sure I can convince everyone. (Translated by the author) 
(Interviews in NGOs, 5 March 2013)  
 
Under the JDP, many big media organizations were sold to the supporters of the 
government (e.g., family members of the MPs) or were intimidated by the state with 
threats to harm their reputation and censorship. It is commonplace that lawsuits are 
filed against many journalists who say anything slightly against the government. 
This authoritarian system was in practice during the Tarlabasi Renewal Project, and 
many media organizations were in favour of the project or simply ignored the 
injustice happening in the neighbourhood. In addition, inhabitants facing the 
injustices of the Project were too afraid to speak up precisely because of this system 
and lack of financial and legal support.  
According to legal documents and meeting reports collected from the Chamber of 
Architects, there were many meetings in urban renewal councils about the Tarlabasi 
Urban Renewal area. These councils are a part of the Tourism and Culture Ministry 
and are connected to the national state. During these meetings, even though many 
council members criticised the Tarlabasi Urban Renewal Project, in the end, the 
project was approved by majority of votes on 30 November in 2007 (The Chamber 
of Architects 40th Report, 2008-2010). One interviewee from the NGOs who 
attended the meeting said: 
I was an observer member of the urban renewal council at the time, so 
I was able to follow the process. All of the mechanism, ethics and 
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function of these councils were changed….. But the thing that 
surprised me the most was the reaction from some academics. 
Because, they legitimized the whole project by demonizing the people 
who were living there. They kept saying that there is an important 
architectural heritage in the area, but the people who were living there 
such as transvestites, Kurds, Romanis, and their social status were 
deteriorating the area. I felt like if they were able kill all the 
inhabitants, only then they would be able to renovate the area. I 
remember like yesterday there was a financial advisor in the meeting 
who were very much interested in cultural heritage who said: “You 
say that this place is filled with crime, but there is a police station 
right next to it. Why have not no one done anything until now?”. That 
person was one of the few who opposed the process. I still remember 
how uncomfortable I felt. (Translated by the author) (interviews from 
the NGOs, 15 March 2013). 
 
In addition, these contradictions are not limited to local plans or isolated incidents. 
They can be spotted in many official plans and reports. Well-prepared seemingly 
acceptable technical plans and projects on paper can lead to something completely 
controversial in practice, and this is how JDP governs.  
As shown in Chapter 6, since the 1960s, Turkey has had five year development plans 
that deal with the economic and social development of the country and seek to 
reduce inequality between regions. The ninth development plan (2007-2013), 
prepared by the Development Ministry (2007: 81-85), has this to say about historic 
neighbourhoods: 
• The effect of urban development process on cultural and historical heritage 
should be reduced to maintain sustainable conservation.  
• Local and individual ownership should be encouraged for urban conservation. 
• The legislation for urban preservation should be simplified, and the 
associations that are interested in urban preservation should work to EU 
standards.    
The project does not conform to these points in the sense that clearly the effect of 
urban development in the project is obvious, and existing local ownership is over-
ridden during the project because the Municipality did not give the inhabitants the 
choice of renovating their own houses.  
Another governmental report (Istanbul Territorial Plan Report, 2009) makes points 
about urban regeneration and renewal processes:  
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Urban renewal and regeneration are necessary concepts for a city to 
redefine itself. However, in our cities these concepts are usually used to 
increase the development rights and to destroy the current urban texture and 
constructing them from the beginning. The main purpose of urban 
regeneration and urban renewal should be rehabilitation and revival of the 
neighbourhoods. (p. i) 
“Rehabilitation and revival of the neighbourhoods are modest processes that 
require keeping the inhabitants in their current places. In order to transform 
physically deteriorated areas, the negative conditions in the neighbourhoods 
should be repaired and the problems such as inadequate infrastructure, 
insufficient car parking should be included for a sustainable urban texture.” 
(p.i) 
“During most of the urban renewal projects, local governments used private 
construction firms and they did not really do anything financially besides 
maintaining the infrastructure. However, since rehabilitation is a much 
more social term, the local governments should start doing more about the 
neighbourhoods socially and financially. One way could be bank credits 
could be given to every landlord who wants to renovate their own 
properties.” (p.ii) 
 
The Tarlabasi project does not appear to be carried out in accordance with these 
aims either. In Turkey, one needs to be sceptical about national plans. Some public 
statements made by government officials also contradict the statements above. 
 
   8.5.3 Using minorities as a justification 
Another point used to justify the project by the officials of the Municipality and the 
construction firm who I interviewed was that the project claims it will give houses 
back to the real owners, meaning the minorities who left more than 50 years ago. As 
discussed in previous chapters (see Chapter 6 and 7), Ottoman Greek, Armenian and 
Jewish minorities lived in Tarlabasi until the 1960s, but left the neighbourhood 
under political pressure. Few of them maintained their houses in Tarlabasi after they 
moved abroad, and most did not come back.  To say that houses will be returned to 
their rightful owners is a misleading statement. When the interviewees were asked if 
they had managed to locate any of the owners or convince them to come back and 
live in Tarlabasi, it emerged that they were not referring to the ones who left long 
ago, but to a very small percentage of the minorities who still reside in Tarlabasi. In 
fact, most of these properties do not belong to individuals; rather, they belong to an 
association founded by Armenian or Greek minorities currently living in Istanbul. So 
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for this small group, it is true that the minorities who were living or had a property in 
the project area agreed to sell and to participate in the urban renewal project. When 
asked how they managed to track down the people who left because of political 
events in the 1950s and 1960s, one interviewee stated that: 
Now we reached an agreement with some individuals, but mostly 
with associations. In Tarlabasi, there are three important associations 
for minorities, and they had some properties in the area…… When 
the project started, we immediately reached an agreement with these 
associations, and they all purchased a property from the new 
development. These associations anyways were not getting any rent 
from any of their properties in Tarlabasi because these were mostly 
invaded by other people. [she refers to Kurdish minorities] Now with 
the project, we changed this situation for them and provided them 
with profit from their properties. (Translated by the author) 
(interviews in the construction company, 01 April 2013). 
 
In addition, the attitudes evident in these answers indicate that according to the local 
and national state, there are ‘bad’ and ‘good’ minorities. In this case, the Kurdish 
population in Tarlabasi are ‘bad’ minorities that cause trouble and increase crime 
rates, whereas Turkish citizens of Greek or Armenian origins are ‘good’ minorities 
and are needed back in the central city. This is another example of the social 
segregation that JDP is encouraging. 
 
   8.5.4 Interactions with the Inhabitants 
According to the interviewees, informational meetings were held in the 
neighbourhood, during which the residents  (owners, owner-occupiers and some 
tenants) were provided with information about the project. Subsequent meetings 
were negotiations about the prices that the Municipality and the construction firm 
were prepared to pay the owners and owner-occupiers for their houses. According to 
the interviewees, these meetings were arranged in a peaceful environment, and they 
did everything they could to make the conditions better for the inhabitants. During 
the interviews, the officials from the Municipality claimed that they provided some 
options for tenants: 
• Rent help for a year 
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• Not charging working class tenants rent for two years so that they could save 
their money to move out of the neighbourhood 
In return, the Municipality and the construction firm wanted the tenants to evacuate 
the flats without causing problems. However, interviews with residents of the 
neighbourhood did not confirm this information, and it was also denied in interviews 
with people from NGOs and the academics. There is no actual proof that all of the 
tenants in the project area received this kind of help from the Municipality or from 
the construction firm. The company did not provide me with such records and none 
of the inhabitants I interviewed confirmed this. 
In addition, according to the Tarlabasi Owner-occupiers and Tenants Association, 
the Urgent Acquisition verdict, issued by the state in the early stages of the project, 
was used as a threat to force them to participate in the project: 
The relevant firm and the Municipality used Urgent Acquisition as a 
threat during all the negotiation meetings. For that reason, it was not 
actually a negotiation process to begin with. They told us: ‘we already 
have the Urgent Acquisition verdict and if you do not sell your 
property to us, we can just use it. (Translated by the author) 
(interviews with the NGOs, 20 March 2013) 
 
On the other hand, the Urgent Acquisition verdict was never used because, by law, it 
is forbidden for a Municipality to sell the properties to a private firm if it uses the 
verdict. It is only used as a threat. The same interviewee from the Association stated:  
When you look through the Agreement that the construction firm 
prepared for the landlords, it is clear most of our rights are being 
disregarded. According to the 17th Article of the agreement, the 
landlord must deliver his/her property empty and free of furniture. 
This article clearly encourages conflict between the tenants and the 
landlords.  
Besides this, a five-storey building owner is offered only one storey 
from the project area. According to this, even though now it seems 
the owner can have 20% of the new building and if the building is 
constructed as an eight-storey building the percentage of the owner 
becomes 12%. The value of our land is not considered with the value 
of our buildings  
Last but not least, it came to our attention that one of the tenants who 
was paying 100 TL (Turkish Liras) rent for his shop received an 
official warning that said his rent had become 500 TL, right after the 
construction firm purchased the building his shop was situated in. 
This means a 500% rise. This disproves the construction firm’s 
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statement claiming they give out rent help to the tenants. In addition 
to that, the information meetings were not held with all the landlords. 
Out of 439 landlords, only 239 attended a meeting. (Translated by the 
author) (interviews with the NGOs, 20 March 2013) 
 
This section summarized the way that authorities communicated and interacted 
with the inhabitants of the project area. I discussed the section from different 
point of views and presented different stories. Now I turn to other 
contradictory accounts I gathered from the interviews I conducted. 
 
   8.5.5 Preserving the Heritage 
The project team claimed that they would preserve the historical heritage in 
Tarlabasi. It is stated in a leaflet for the project that: 
Working with a project team that specializes in physical renovation, we launched a project 
aimed at conservation and preservation of historical heritage as its main objective. (Gap 
Insaat, Tarlabasi Urban Renewal Project leaflet, 2013:32) 
First, the expert report about the project area clearly states that all the buildings in 
the area should be demolished, and there is no building sound or worthy enough to 
preserve, even though there were 210 listed buildings. 
Second, the plans for the project show clearly that the proposed buildings have little 
in common with the current buildings. In addition, the plan proposes several storeys 
of car parking under every building and 9 apartment-blocks that have nothing to do 
with the original architectural fabric of the neighbourhood.  
In the end, even though the project offers preservation of the neighbourhood, in 
practice, there is no evidence of this.  
Photos 8.3 – 8.9 below show Tarlabasi as it is currently and what it will become 
once the project is finished. 
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Photo 8.3: Comparison between current and projected Tarlabasi, Tarlabasi Bouluvard, Tarlabasi Urban 
Renewal Project Leaflet, prepared by Gap Insaat, 2013 
 
Photo 8.4: Comparison between current and projected Tarlabasi, Tarlabasi Boulevard Tarlabasi Urban Renewal 
Project Leaflet, prepared by Gap Insaat, 2013 
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Photo 8.5: Comparison between current and project Tarlabasi, Sakiz Agaci Street, Tarlabasi Urban Renewal 
Project Leaflet, prepared by Gap Insaat, 2013 
  
Photo 8.6: Comparison between current and project Tarlabasi, Ficici Abdi Street, Tarlabasi Urban Renewal 
Project Leaflet, prepared by Gap Insaat, 2013 
 
223	  
	  
 
Photo 8.7: Comparison between current and project Tarlabasi, Halepli Bekir Street, Tarlabasi Urban Renewal 
Project Leaflet, prepared by Gap Insaat, 2013 
 
Photo 8.8: Comparison between current and project Tarlabasi, Eski cesme Street, Tarlabasi Urban Renewal 
Project Leaflet, prepared by Gap Insaat, 2013 
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Photo 8.9: Comparison between current and project Tarlabasi, Tarlabasi Boulevard, Tarlabasi Urban Renewal 
Project Leaflet, prepared by Gap Insaat, 2013 
As can be seen from these images, the proposals for new Tarlabasi are not only 
historically unsympathetic or incorrect, but also depict a life style where there are 
only luxurious apartment building with cafes and bistros and young professionals 
walking its streets.  
 
8.6 Neighbourhood Interviews 
In Tarlabasi, 15 interviews were conducted with people living in the vicinity of the 
project neighbourhood. The project area itself was empty, and people who had lived 
there had all been displaced. For that reason, interviews were conducted with people 
living next to the project area. In this area, 80% of the residents are tenants.  Many 
of the tenants I approached to interview refused to participate to the research 
because they were afraid that their name or identity would be exposed.  
But 15 people agreed to participate, and they raised similar topics. These briefly 
were: 
1. The behaviour of the police  
2. The process of eviction 
3. The possible future effects of the Tarlabasi Renewal Project 
4. The increasing crime rate 
These problems are explored in the next sections of the study to give insight about 
the effects of the project on the living conditions in the surrounding neighbourhood. 
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   8.6.1 The Behaviour of the Police 
The inhabitants were afraid of the police force that has been operating in the 
neighbourhood. Their complaints were that the police force was not working for 
them, but against them. One of the interviewees stated that: 
I was in jail for 16 months for a crime that I did not commit. After 
these 16 months, I was found innocent, but no one can give me back 
the time I spent inside, and all this happened just because one police 
officer thought that I did something wrong. They do not care about 
people who live here. They just take it for granted that we are all 
criminals. (Translated by the author) (interviews with the inhabitants, 
03 March 2013) 
 
In addition, some of the inhabitants complained that police took part in the evictions 
of people who used to live in the project area. In some cases, police used force to 
evict people from their homes or harassed them by patrolling the neighbourhood and 
searching people in a way that the inhabitants described as offensive. Respondents   
added that the police had not given residents a chance to defend themselves before 
they were searched or taken to the police station, and this often happened without 
the police producing a search warrant. 
 
   8.6.2 The Process of Eviction 
Residents interviewed said that they had not had an information meeting with the 
Municipality or any other organization before the project started. The only 
information they had came from rumors they heard. Some of the inhabitants with 
relatives who had been evicted from the project  area stated that the Municipality 
had paid under market value for the houses, and the amount people received was not 
enough to start another life anywhere in Istanbul: 
My sister was living in the project area, which is empty now. She had 
a flat, and a shop under the flat. They gave her only 70.000 TL 
(Turkish Liras) (£17420) for both of them. Considering how much 
they are going to sell those apartments for, it is really unfair. 
(Translated by the author) (interviews with the inhabitants, 01 March 
2013) 
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In addition, no provisions were made for the tenants living in the area. One of the 
former tenants stated that: 
We were living in the project area. One day, we received news saying 
that they are gonna demolish all these buildings, and we have to leave 
in a week. We barely found another flat close to the neighbourhood, 
but I do not know what we could have done if we have not found this 
place. (Translated by the author) (interviews with the inhabitants, 01 
March 2013) 
 
When asked if they received any kind of help from the Municipality, the reply was: 
We received 500 TL (£124) from the Municipality, but nothing else. 
(Translated by the author) (interviews with the inhabitants, 01 March 
2013) 
 
Another reply was: 
There was a forced eviction that I heard about. I do not know the lady 
personally, but there was this old lady, and they (people from 
Municipality or the police force) came to her house when she was in 
the hospital and threw away all her stuff like her bed, her duvet on the 
street. So, these things happened. (Translated by the author) 
(interviews with the inhabitants, 01 March 2013) 
 
The prices mentioned in the quotations are considerably below market value. The 
firm’s opening price for a flat in the project area is $289,000 (US dollars) and the 
minimum price for an office is $503.000 (www.emlakkulisi.com, retrieved on April 
2015).  
   8.6.3 Possible Future Effects of the Tarlabası Renewal Project 
Residents interviewed were asked if they thought the project would affect them in 
any way. They answered that they thought that eventually they would be evicted, 
one way or another. Most of the people stated that the area would be more expensive 
and richer when new people moved in to the project. They said it would be a good 
thing because the maintenance of the neighbourhood would be improved as a result 
of the change of the inhabitants’ profile, but they felt that in the end, they would 
have to move out because they would not be wanted in the neighbourhood.  
The possibility of keeping current inhabitants in their homes in the neighbourhood 
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seemed like a utopian dream to these residents. They were aware that they would not 
be wanted in the area once the renovation was complete, and they did not have any 
hope that they would be able to stay.  
Some of the inhabitants were angry about this situation. They said that it was not fair 
to displace them from their own neighbourhood only for the sake of other people’s 
profit. They were also angry at their neighbourhood being called a crime area and 
pointed out that they were not all criminals.  
Other interviewees accepted the fact that they were not wanted, and they did not 
even imagine the project could have been carried out differently. In other words, 
they never thought the project could have proposed they stay in the neighbourhood 
after renovation.  When asked how Tarlabasi will look like in the future, one of the 
interviewees stated that: 
As far as we saw from the project, this area will be for the posh, rich 
people with a lot of hotels and everything. It is very hard for people 
like us. All the people we know live in Tarlabasi, and we certainly do 
not have any business connections. To be honest, we do not want to 
leave Tarlabasi, but it seems we might be forced to leave. For that 
reason, we are even more afraid now since the demolition has begun, 
and we really do not know what to do or where to go at this point. 
(Translated by the author) (interviews with the inhabitants, 03 March, 
2013) 
 
   8.6.4 Increasing Crime Rate 
One of the justifications of the project presented by some academics and 
Municipality was the elimination of the crime in the neighbourhood. The 
problematic part of this justification is that it categorizes everyone in the area as 
criminal and leads to the conclusion that the only solution is to remove them all.  
However, during the interviews in the area, people said that the crime rate is 
increasing because of the demolition of buildings and the empty buildings left after 
the eviction of people from the project area.  Criminals such as drug dealers use the 
empty buildings, and the police do not do much about it. In addition, people fight on 
the streets during the night, and these fights increased with the implementation of 
evictions and demolitions for the project. Most of the inhabitants are trying to ignore 
these fights, but are bothered by the increase. When asked if they consulted with the 
police, the answers were either the police did not do anything to stop the 
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disturbances or residents did not call the police because they did not trust them to be 
helpful. 
About the issue, one of the interviewees stated that: 
I was very surprised about some of the academics’ reaction towards 
the project. Now, all these people from the Municipality and 
construction firm based the legitimacy of this project on social 
reasons, and I found that very offensive. I remember very vividly, in a 
meeting, even though there is important architectural heritage in the 
area, the whole defense of the project was about people living there. 
They said: ‘There are organized crime gangs, prostitution, drug 
dealers, and transvestites there’. They entirely based their argument 
on the poverty and the social status of the inhabitants. I felt very 
uneasy about that. I also remember in the same meeting there was an 
advisor who cared a lot about the historical heritage and he/she said: 
“If this place was so full of crime and considering that there is big 
police station in the neighbourhood, why no one did anything about it 
until now?” However, many people, including some sections of the 
public was saying that they cannot go there or visit there because of 
the crime rate. Therefore, they thought it was good that there is a 
project for the area. This strategy of demonizing the inhabitants was 
also used in Sulukule. (Translated by the author) (interviews with the 
inhabitants, 10 March 2013) [See Chapter 8] 
 
8.7 Academics  
Four interviews were conducted with academics who were working or had worked 
in Tarlabasi. Some of the issues that were discussed during the interviews covered: 
1. The behaviour of the Municipality and the construction firm 
2. The possible future effects of Tarlabasi Renewal Project 
3. The actions of the NGOs 
   8.7.1 The Behaviour of the Municipality and the Construction Firm 
The academic respondents felt that the Municipality stood by the construction 
company responsible for constructing the new development. The Municipality did 
not put in place any policies to soften the process of displacement and clearly never 
had any plans to keep current inhabitants in their homes.  
In the acquisition process, not only did the Municipality buy the flats from the 
owners below housing market value, but no survey of residents’ opinions or 
information meeting for the current inhabitants were arranged by the Municipality. 
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There was only one survey about the current inhabitants, and that was performed by 
the construction company independent from the Municipality, with the aim of 
justifying the social consequences of the project rather than creating policies for the 
residents being evicted.  
When asked about the behavior of the Municipality during the project, one of the 
interviewees stated that:  
The Municipality is without any doubt with the construction firm. 
Even during the negotiation process, the Municipality invited owner-
occupiers to informatory meetings, but the negotiation itself took 
place in the office of the construction firm. The Municipality behaved 
like it is the construction firm and not like an entity for the public. I 
think they neglected their duties during this project. (Translated by 
the author) (interviews with the academics, 20 March 2013) 
 
   8.7.2 Possible Future Effects of Tarlabasi Renewal Project 
When the academic respondents were asked about the future effects of the project 
and whether it was going to create a wave of gentrification or not, there were several 
answers. A common answer was that the Tarlabasi project would start a classic 
gentrification process in the nearby districts, and it would also influence how 
subsequent renewal projects in the area and elsewhere were carried out. Classic 
gentrification would occur because middle class people will buy and renovate 
houses in areas surrounding the project, once the area was seen as safe and 
fashionable.   
Other answers talked about new renewal projects in other parts of Tarlabasi 
following the same logic of the current project. This would involve a same kind of 
displacement and unfair treatment that inhabitants of the project area received.  
At the moment, in addition to Tarlabasi Renewal Projects, there are a number of 
renewal projects both in and outside the historical parts of Istanbul. Considering this 
wave of projects, one of the respondents commented that he thought that “these 
projects would fail miserably, and this failure could even lead to an economic crisis” 
[a collapse of the whole Turkish property sector could cause a national crisis]. But 
even though it seems obvious that a developing country like Turkey would be 
unlikely to find enough middle or upper class buyers for further projects, it seems 
that Tarlabasi is not the last of these urban renewal waves.  
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When it comes to support for people evicted from their homes by such projects (not 
only Tarlabasi), the interviewees all said that there would be no future policies to 
deal with displacement, evictions would continue, and current inhabitants would not 
be able to stay in the area. 
 
   8.7.3 The Actions of the NGOs 
According to the academics, there were too few NGOs involved in the project, and 
not enough was being done to raise public awareness. However, unlike other 
renewal projects, Tarlabasi organized its own association in the neighbourhood, and 
this Association tried to organize the whole neighbourhood to defend their rights. 
Even though it was successful to some extent in that people reacted to the project, 
the Association was not able to stop the evictions from the project area. It was hard 
for any NGO to stand against such a project so strongly supported by the state.  
Nevertheless, some lawsuits were filed by the Chamber of Architects against the 
project. However, these lawsuits were decided in the favor of the Municipality, after 
which there was not much the Chamber of Architects could do.  
The academic respondents also felt that academia had not done enough to prevent 
this project. Even though there were some attempts by NGOs and academics to 
oppose it, these had not been enough to change the course of the project, and more 
could have been done. 
When asked about the actions of the NGOs during the project process, one of the 
interviewees stated that the NGOs 
 … did point out some very important issues in the area. At least they 
exposed the unjust, sometimes illegal practices during the process. 
They tried to expose the forced evictions as much as possible. 
However, the NGOs are so naïve compared to the state, and that is 
also what happened in Tarlabasi. They did report much unfairness, 
but they were not able to stop it. On the other hand, by nature (at least 
in Turkey) it is very hard for an NGO to stop such a project by itself’ 
(Translated by the author) (interviews with NGOs 16 March 2013) 
 
Another interviewee replied to the same question with: 
The NGOs had limited interaction with Tarlabasi. The Tarlabasi 
Association of Owner-Occupiers and Tenants firstly started off only 
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for the owner-occupiers, and when they realized that they had to 
include the tenants as well, it was a little bit too late. There was 
another attempt to establish another association called “Tarlabasi 
Initiative”, but activists could not get along and everyone was talking 
about something else, so nothing came out of that. One opposition 
party [the Peace and Democracy Party, known to represent the 
Kurdish population in the Parliament] tried to some things, but they 
only included the Kurdish population, so that did not work as well. 
However, what the Municipality did was to force the construction 
firm to do a report about the social-economic status of the 
neighbourhood, and there are some people that we call “the 
negotiators”. They hired these people to prepare a report and [make 
the project] seem better in the public eye, but I never heard of 
anything done after the report. I guess I would have heard of if 
anything would have come out of that. (Translated by the author) 
(interviews with NGOs, 08 March 2013) 
 
This section discussed accounts of academics who studied the area to show the 
contradiction between them and the authorities and how the national and local 
government disregarded the professional opinions of intellectuals. Now I turn to the 
interviews with NGOs. 
 
8.8 NGOs  
Five interviews were conducted in three different NGOs interested in the Tarlabasi 
Renewal Project: the Tarlabasi Platform; the Chamber of Architects; and the 
Tarlabasi Association of Owner-Occupiers and Tenants. The interviews discussed: 
1. Communication and interaction with the state 
2. Communication and interaction with the inhabitants 
 
   8.8.1 Communication and Interaction with the State 
The NGOs had some interaction with the Municipality and the construction firm. 
These interactions were mostly information meetings, which the Municipality and 
the construction firm always attended together. According to the NGO respondents, 
these meetings did not actually have any specific results. The demands from the 
NGOs (such as better policies for the tenants, prices closer to the current housing 
market) were not met. There were around six to seven meetings between the NGOs, 
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the Municipality and the company, but since there had been no positive outcomes 
from so many meetings, some of the NGOs filed lawsuits against the project.  
However, most of these lawsuits have ended in favor of the project. 
According to interviewees, the Municipality never intended to make conditions 
better for the current inhabitants. Instead, they acted like a private firm aiming only 
to maximize their profits by attracting a wealthy population to the neighbourhood. It 
became clear that the meetings or other interactions they had with the Municipality 
or the construction firm were not going to change anything in the project.  
The (so-called) ‘expert report’ (see Section 10.3) for Tarlabasi claimed that all the 
buildings in the area should be demolished, even though there were 210 listed 
buildings. The Chamber of Architects filed a lawsuit against this expert report for 
Tarlabasi Renewal Project, arguing that the report was far from being professional, 
and it was unable to respond to the problems about the neighbourhood. The 
Chamber demanded a new report to be prepared, but the court found in favour of the 
report, and it was accepted as valid. According to the Chamber, this decision was not 
based on convincing scientific, professional or legal grounds. In addition, the report 
states that the academic expert authors did not go into the neighbourhood because 
they thought they would get a hostile reaction from the inhabitants. The decision to 
demolish the whole area was based solely on external visual assessment from 
outside the neighbourhood.  Nevertheless, the court accepted this as scientific 
evidence while discarding all the Chamber’s evidence and arguments against the 
project. This is an example of general patterns where the courts favored the 
government against the evidence. 
About their interaction with the state, one of the NGO respondents stated that: 
They have nothing to say to the public or to our NGO because of all 
the illegal things they have done. The Mayor [of Beyoglu] himself 
told me [possibly in February 2008]: “What do you want from me? I 
have the Prime Minister [Recep Tayyip Erdogan] and the President 
[Abdullah Gul] supporting me. This project will happen the way I 
want it to happen!”. Therefore, we left the meeting. (Translated by the 
author) (interviews with NGOs, 25 March 2013) 
 
   8.8.2 Communication and Interaction with the Inhabitants 
The NGOs had meetings and interactions with the people in the neighbourhood. The 
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meetings were mostly about the residents’ options and information about the current 
Renewal Law (5366). Even though in these meetings residents expressed strong 
opposition to the project, they did not have the power to fight against a project 
supported by the state. 
The NGOs failed to offer options for the inhabitants to give them some power to 
give their opposition to the state some effect. In addition, the interviewees 
acknowledged that they also failed to give sufficient legal assistance to the residents 
and failed to organize people to form orchestrated resistance in the neighbourhood. 
As a result, most of the owners and owner-occupiers agreed to the project, and the 
tenants had no choice but to leave their houses without compensation. 
When asked what could have been done to avoid displacement, one of the 
interviewees stated that: 
Many things could have happened; however, our problem as an NGO, 
legally, there is not much we can do. For example, if there was free 
legal counselling [advice] for the inhabitants of Tarlabasi, this project 
could have changed and the displacement would not have been so 
brutal. The [proper] acquisition process should have been followed 
[instead of threatening people with Urgent Acquisition], and this was 
not done so well by the NGOs. Tenants’ rights were violated, and 
almost no charges were made for those violations. The police force 
behaved in an illegal way from time to time. For example, there was a 
lawsuit going on filed by a tenant, and while it was still going on, the 
tenant had to leave his/her house because police forced them to. 
Those lawsuits were not followed very well by the NGOs. Besides 
that, we found out about some disastrous decisions [removing the title 
of some listed building in the neighbourhood] by Preservation 
Council, and these decisions could have been avoided if we had 
followed the process. [because they are the ones who filed the 
lawsuit, and he also means making better arguments for the propoer 
processes to be followed by the court] Some international petitions or 
lawsuits could have been prepared, but that did not happen either. 
Therefore, I cannot say that the NGOs did everything possible to stop 
or change this project. (Translated by the author) (interviews with 
NGOs, 08 March 2013) 
 
Before the conclusion of this chapter with a discussion of the main points of the 
interviews, it is necessary to reconstruct the story of the Tarlabasi Renewal Project 
from beginning to the end. 
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8.9 Whose View is Correct? 
In this Chapter, I have examined many stories from various points of view. Since I 
am a critical realist, I believe there is a single truth of what happened, but it is seen 
differently by different groups of people. There are many views concerning 
gentrification as politicized process, but as a critical realist I analysed one single 
process and will construct the closest version of the story that one can get to the truth 
from the evidence that I presented above.  
In Tarlabasi, the construction firm, the MHDA and the Municipality tell one story 
and the inhabitants, academics and the NGOs tell an entirely different story. The 
Tarlabasi Renewal Project is a highly controversial project, but one that attempts to 
speak to a particular social class and even to a particular ethnicity. In order to do 
that, the state and the firm portray a neighbourhood whose residents are almost 
entirely criminals and who are responsible for the physical and social deterioration 
of the area.  It is impossible to rehabilitate this neighbourhood unless these people 
are completely removed. To justify these statements, the state and the firm 
manipulated prejudices against the Kurdish and Roma ethnicities, so that it was 
simple racism that led some sections of the public to ignore the injustice happening 
in Tarlabasi. With the help of mainstream media, this attitude toward Tarlabasi 
became widespread, and not many people felt the need to investigate the details of 
the process of state-led gentrification in the area. In addition, the state had the 
judicial system on its side. With the unsubstantiated ‘expert report’, biased court 
orders and one-sided media coverage, the local government and the construction 
firm were able to make the project appear to operate in a transparent way. As 
mentioned in earlier sections (10.5 and 10.6), even though there were reports 
recommending compensation for the residents’ losses and for the preservation of 
cultural heritage, the reality was different. 
The story told by the inhabitants, the NGOs and academics represents the reality of 
the state-led gentrification process in Tarlabasi. The Tarlabasi Renewal Project used 
the police force as a source of intimidation and a tool for the displacement process; 
forced owner-occupiers to sell their properties much below market value; 
demolished architecturally-significant buildings to reconstruct bad copies, with 
offices, upmarket consumption areas, cafes and bistros; and created a gated 
community inside a working class neighbourhood with the hopes of transforming the 
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whole neighbourhood into an upper class area. These are the aims and the reality of 
Tarlabasi Renewal Project. In Tarlabasi, the gentrification process is state-led. There 
was no intention to keep the current inhabitants in their homes or even give them a 
proper chance to stay in the area after the project. The prices paid to the former 
owners were below market value, and there were no plans for the tenants.  
Insufficient time was given for the tenants to find alternative accommodation (only 
one week in some cases). The historic buildings have been demolished, and the new 
buildings have nothing to do with the old ones. The ‘expert report’ that made it 
possible for listed buildings to be demolished was legally challenged on the grounds 
of inadequate research and lack of knowledge of the area, but this challenge failed. 
The Tarlabasi Renewal Project proposes residential, tourist and office areas for the 
neighbourhood. Even though there is no definite information, according to the 
Chamber of Architects, there were between 4700 and 6350 people in the area before 
the start of the project. The new proposed population is 1900, which means that the 
eviction of the whole population of the project area was assumed in the beginning of 
the project. In addition to that, there are many statements in newspapers by officials 
in the municipality and the construction firm that say there would not be 
displacement (i.e. 11 May, 2012, Sabah; 3 July, 2012, Sabah; 17 August, 2012, Star; 
26 August, 2012, Vatan; 31 December 2012, Yeni Safak). 
In addition to these points, the MHDA gave people who used to live in the Tarlabasi 
project area priority in buying a house in one of the affordable housing sites on the 
periphery of Istanbul. One hundred and fifty six people decided to buy a house on 
the periphery with 4000 Turkish Liras (around £1000) advance payment and an 
arrangement to pay the rest in instalments. But Tarlabasi is a working class area, so 
most of the inhabitants do not make enough money to buy a house, even in the 
affordable housing sites and even with payment by instalments. Even though there 
may be some people who could afford that, since the location of the houses is so far 
from the central city, they would face great difficulties in getting to work in the city 
centre; some housing areas are almost a two and a half hour bus journey from the 
city centre.  
Considering the statements above, it is clear that state did not have the role of 
mediator between the inhabitants of the neighbourhood and the construction firm in 
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this project and did not do much to protect the working class inhabitants. Rather, it 
behaved as a private firm trying to make the most profit out of the project.  
The interviewees from the local government, MHDA and the construction firm were 
asked about state’s role after the project, but there was not a clear answer. However, 
it is said by the interviewees in the Municipality that Municipality is not thinking of 
conducting another project for the same neighbourhood. The authorities believe that 
the project will initiate the gentrification of the whole of Tarlabasi and maybe also in 
the surrounding neighbourhoods. During the project, the state’s role was to make the 
construction firm’s job as easy as possible as can be seen by the fact that some of the 
Municipality’s officers have their own offices in the construction firm’s sales office 
for the project. In addition, the Municipality made its first priority the eviction of the 
residents so the construction of the project could start sooner.  
There are two reasons why I reject the story of the authorities and believe the story 
of the NGOs, inhabitants and academics. There is not any contradicting evidence for 
the story of the inhabitants, and their claims are backed up with the evidence they 
present. On the other hand, authorities tend to change their stories slightly when 
presented with a document, which makes them inconsistent. Second, there is the 
issue of ‘researcher bias’. My political opinions are more aligned with the academics 
and NGOs I interviewed, but nonetheless, there is no evidence that they were 
presenting an unreliable story of Tarlabasi. To analyze this story deeper, I turn to the 
conclusion of this section.  
 
8.10 Conclusion: Analysis and Interpretation 
In this concluding, section I go somewhat deeper to interpret the story I have told. 
To be able to do this, I ask four questions: Where does the state stand in this 
process?, Why didn’t Tarlabasi become gentrified like Galata?, How were the 
inhabitants of Tarlabasi portrayed? And was that the only way for Tarlabasi? 
First, the state profited by renovating and selling historic areas to middle and upper 
class people. One reason for this increase in state intervention is that the state 
increasingly acts like private companies; local governments are in competition with 
other local governments, and they behave like private firms in a neo-liberal economy 
to create investment potentials and make profits to support more private projects. 
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The construction sector is the easiest and most profitable sector in which to create 
investments. Socially, the reason for this increase in state intervention and for 
projects like Tarlabasi to become more common, rather than classical gentrification 
examples like Galata, is that gentrification following urban renovation is a very 
effective way not only to create property for the professionals, but also to change the 
class-cultural nature of inner Istanbul. 
Second, the conditions that led Galata to become gentrified (central location, having 
a multicultural history, historic houses) were also present in Tarlabasi, but the state 
needed to speed up the process in order to accelerate and increase the finance and 
business services in Istanbul. In addition to that, most JDP politics depend on 
economic stability and development (see Chapter 6), and they present many plans 
and programmes to put Turkey in the top ten economies of the world by the 2023 
(the 100th anniversity of the foundation of the Republic) and for that reason they 
need to speed up these processes. In a neo-liberal system, local governments and the 
national state see the advantages of gentrification, and instead of waiting for ten or 
twenty years for a neighbourhood to become gentrified, they step in to make it 
happen with urban renovation and regeneration projects. In this sense, while Galata 
shows the previous form of gentrification and its social effects, Tarlabasi is the new 
form of gentrification (mostly in developing countries) with more extensive and 
harsh effects. 
Third, there is another reason why Tarlabasi did not experience classical 
gentrification. The common opinion is that Tarlabasi is so rundown and the 
inhabitants are so ‘undesirable’, it is not possible for a middle class household to live 
there. It is a fact that the inhabitants of Tarlabasi were marginalized, being mostly 
Romani and Kurdish immigrants. However, it is also a fact that the former (and 
some current) inhabitants of Galata were also Roma and some Kurdish immigrants 
from Anatolia. This might mean the bad publicity about how unsafe, poor, dirty, 
undesirable Tarlabasi is led middle class people to stay away from this 
neighbourhood. This played a significant role for stopping gentrification, but also 
provided the state with ammunition for this renewal project. It is also a fact that 
public amenities in the area are in poor repair, but this was also the situation in 
Galata 20-30 years ago, and this did not stop middle class people from moving into 
the area. This comparison indicates the extent of manipulation of public opinion to 
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demonize the people of Tarlabasi. 
Villifying the inhabitants of Tarlabasi led the neighbourhood to become more run 
down, and it made it easy for local government to step in and prepare a state-led 
urban renovation project ‘for the sake’ of the inhabitants.      
Demonizing the inhabitants can also mean the state can evict residents more easily 
and without public resistance. Once the urban renewal project is implemented and 
all the current inhabitants are displaced, it becomes possible to present a tension-free 
gentrified area to the new comers. Thus, classic gentrification that offers peaceable 
social mixing and glorious buildings representing the history of a place is becoming 
a different concept under state-led gentrification. The kind of segregation brought 
about by these projects  will cause problems in the future because the local state not 
only deepened the differences between social classes by displacing all the poor 
inhabitants, but also created feelings of resentment among working class residents in 
reaction to exaggerated accusations of  criminality and degradation. 
The fourth point is that this speculative urbanization is mostly shaped by private 
housing market dynamics: the ad hoc solutions of various actors with different 
intentions in the city, by shifting political balances between various levels of 
national and local government, rather than being the result of  strategic plans and 
programs (Turel et al., 2006). Given this, the state and its agencies have been crucial 
actors in this transformation, leading the enormous urban growth of the city and 
exacerbating the unequal distribution of urban rents among different social classes. 
This neoliberal urbanization experience is marked by the transfer of resources from 
lower to upper classes and from public to private sector (Kurtulus, 2005: 161-186). 
In Tarlabasi’s case, the state used legal mechanisms (Law 5366, Urgent Acquisition 
verdict, establishing urban renewal councils), the media (demonizing the 
inhabitants), tax exemptions for the construction firm, and the police force for some 
evictions. Legal mechanisms helped the state and local government to prepare and 
implement the project with a minimum of complications and helped bypass strict 
urban conservation laws (Law 2863). The media was used to reduce negative public 
reaction as much as possible, so that those who might have reacted against the 
project chose not to because of the bad publicity against the inhabitants. A part of 
the society chose to look away believing that the inhabitatns are not ‘worthy’ of their 
support, because of this bad publicity and demonization.     
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This situation leads to two problems: (i) the expansion of the geography of gentrified 
neighbourhoods, gated communities, and prestigious business centres puts pressure 
on untransformed neighbourhoods around them; and (ii) this type of development 
increases the consequent risks of social exclusion of the working class, social 
explosion, civil unrest, conflicts, and inequality across urban space. 
Was that the only way for Tarlabasi? National governments have enough resources 
and are able to influence public opinion to create a rehabilitation project that serves 
the inhabitants of the area, enables them to stay in their homes and solves many 
social and physical problems of the neighbourhood in the long-term. For the 
Tarlabasi district, a more sensitive rehabilitation project could have been 
economically and physically feasible, but it is being implemented in the way that it 
is by the demands of business and middle class people rather than working class 
people. In Tarlabasi, free legal advice could have been provided for the residents, 
and maybe this alone could have led to a better project for the current inhabitants. 
Wider publicity and media coverage about the illegal implications and the 
discriminative nature of the project was necessary. An alternative for this project is 
discussed in the conclusion. 
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CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSION: BIG THEMES AND ISSUES 
 
9.1 Introduction  
The thesis has shown that processes and effects of state-led gentrification are 
different from market-led gentrification. For that reason, the approach of the thesis 
and its application is discussed, then the differences and similarities between not 
only two types of gentrification, but also the two types of localities (global North vs. 
global South) are discussed with regard to world city theory to answer the following: 
why state-led gentrification replaced market-led in some locations (particularly in 
Global south) and how and why the outcomes for middle and working class 
inhabitants differ. This is followed by a summary of how social spatial segregation is 
exacerbated as a consequence of gentrification and how the abstract discussions 
were presented with regard to historical environment of a developing country’s 
world city. Next, the complex and contested notions of neo-liberalism and the neo-
liberal city are discussed, showing how these complex processes operate in Istanbul. 
One of the primary aims of this thesis has been to develop alternative strategies to 
the urban renewal projects in Istanbul, and possible urban policies for this case 
specifically are discussed in the sixth section. Finally, possible future directions of 
research and dissemination are discussed in the last two sections. 
 
9.2 The Critical Realist Approach: Linking Different Spatial Scales and Levels 
of Abstraction 
This section reflects on the research and analyses carried out for this thesis.  As a 
critical realist, I started my analysis with the abstractions and went on to concrete 
case studies, and in this sense, the analysis of this research starts with and is not 
separate from theory and continues throughout to the Conclusion.  From this 
perspective, it is necessary to have a deeper understanding of the changes that 
Turkey and Istanbul have been and are going through to understand the 
gentrification processes in specific neighbourhoods. I present the two case studies as 
‘emergent properties’: they are complicated entities that are created by collective 
abstractions. I do not reference this chapter because I already referenced the 
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information I used in detail in previous chapters. This section is all about using the 
method and bringing out critical realist approach.  
A critical realist approach makes it possible to understand the abstractions and the 
historical backgrounds of concrete cases and allows the researcher to develop 
analyses that are suitable not only for one particular instance, but also for other cities 
and neighbourhoods experiencing the effects of similar abstractions and processes.  
The effects of the changing world economy and gentrification processes differ from 
one case to another, and it is not surprising that the state-led and market-led 
gentrification in historical Istanbul is different from other developing countries’ 
world cities. The kinds of urban policies proposed in this research may or may not 
be compatible with another world city facing similar processes, and therefore, it will 
not be scientific to claim that these policies can be generalized. This shows the 
shortcomings of relying only on empirical approach when taken as a generalization. 
A large number of geographers and urbanists have looked for these empirical 
generalizations instead of investigating the deep and historical processes going on 
behind the concrete case studies, 
What we learnt from abstractions such as world city theory and processes of 
gentrification is how they are connected and how the economic conditions related to 
the emergence of world cities can result in gentrification. However, these 
abstractions take different forms from one locality to another in different socio-
political relations, and these forms are visible in concrete case analysis of a specific 
place in a specific time that is unique to that case. This is why these forms cannot be 
generalized; however, the analysis of the emergence and effects of these forms can 
be generalized as a framework.  
I used these abstractions and the connection between them to analyse two concrete 
cases in historical Istanbul. I examined middle-range processes such as the historical 
and economic development of Turkey and Istanbul in order to link a deep 
understanding of abstract processes with the changing social, economic and political 
situation in Turkey and Istanbul over time. This helped me to provide a thorough 
analysis of the historic neighbourhoods of Istanbul that have been experiencing 
gentrification. All of these abstract processes and changing situations collectively 
create concrete cases, and in this thesis, the cases of Tarlabasi and Galata were 
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examined in depth, and the alternative urban and social policies suggested for Galata 
and Tarlabasi were derived from this analysis. The results of empirical studies and 
policies derived from them cannot be simplistically generalized, but a critical realist 
framework provides tools for the analysis of particular cases (in other localities) in 
relation to general overarching processes.  
Now I turn to explain the ways in which I applied this approach all throughout the 
thesis.  
 
9.3 Application of Critical Realist Approach 
I start the analysis with two global abstract processes, namely world city theory and 
gentrification. In the last few decades, some cities in mostly developed countries 
emerged as control centres of the global economy, driven by the growing FBS 
sectors in the city centres of large cities. World cities have been considered to form a 
hierarchy with three cities at the top: London, New York and Tokyo. This hierarchy 
has been defined as alpha, beta and gamma cities. Alpha cities and most beta cities 
are in developed countries, but there are some developing country world cities as 
well. Developing countries’ world cities are not as influential as those in developed 
countries when it comes to the world economy, and precisely for that reasonc 
developing countries feel the need to actively promote their world cities as finance 
and business centres to attract foreign and local investment and to catch up with 
developed countries economically.  
Encouraging gentrification processes in the inner city leads to a transformation of 
residential areas into middle and upper class places and provides young 
professionals with housing areas close to their work places in the finance and 
business sectors located in the central city. Young professionals’ consumer 
preferences are different from other middle class people living in the suburbs. Many 
of them prefer to stay childless, and at times, sustain single lives, and for these 
reasons, their interests are different from the rest of the middle class. These lifestyle 
preferences include being closer to cultural and entertainment facilities in the city 
centre; these professionals also usually have a taste for historical heritage. With their 
diverse urban population and wide selection of cultural amenities, the centres and 
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inner areas of world cities present themselves as appropriate choices for intellectuals 
and artists, and they were followed to sustain this kind of lifestyle.  
There have been two types of gentrification processes in historic urban environments 
– classic gentrification and state-led gentrification – and both are relevant to world 
city theory. Classical gentrification is related to the expansion of the FBS sectors, 
especially in world cities, and the increase in employment in these sectors led to 
increases in upmarket consumption areas in the inner city and city centre and the 
demand for inner city middle class housing in the urban area of large cities spatially 
and socially. Initially, gentrification in large cities took place through the private 
housing market with no direct state involvement, which resulted in social 
replacement and displacement in some previously working class inner city 
neighbourhoods. Social replacement refers to the process in which working class 
owner-occupiers in a neighbourhood sell their properties and move elsewhere 
because they can make financial gains, but sometimes also because they feel the loss 
of previous neighbour relations. They are not forcefully evicted; rather, they are 
replaced by middle class owners as the result of market transactions. Displacement, 
on the other hand, refers to forced eviction of mostly tenant working class 
inhabitants from a gentrifing area. This displacement can be the result of landlord 
harassment or not being able to meet rising rents and cost of living because of 
gentrification.  
Even though classic gentrification still takes place in many places around the world, 
in the 1980s, another type of gentrification appeared that was state-led. This process 
is closely related to world city theory as it is used as a tool – mostly in developing 
countries – to restructure the city and increase FBS sectors in the city centre. States 
that realize the ‘advantages’ of gentrification but do not want to wait a decade for a 
neighbourhood to be transformed initiate this process themselves. State-led 
gentrification is a much more brutal process than market-led, which mostly results in 
total displacement of the working class. With urban renovation and regeneration 
projects in the central city, local and national states not only push the poor to the 
periphery, but also create middle or upper class neighbourhoods with upmarket 
consumption areas that can attract many local or foreign investors and tourists to the 
city.  
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The emergence of world cities and gentrification are global processes; however, the 
way they operate is specific. Turkey is specific in the following aspects: economic 
development, historical and political background, and housing markets. Turkey is a 
NIC, and this means it is substantially industrialized, but it does not have as much 
FBS sector as one can see in a MDC. Therefore, the Turkish state and Turkish 
businesses wanted to accelerate the economic development through urban 
development and regeneration projects. This is a feature of Turkey that makes it 
specific. I continue the analysis with the social, economic and political development 
of Turkey since the 1950s. I do not regard the development of these aspects as 
separate, but they are distinct; economic change and development in Turkey led to 
social and cultural changes. The Republic of Turkey started as an agricultural 
country, but after the 1950s, the manufacturing sector increased dramatically, and 
this led to an increase in rural to urban migration. The Turkish government 
consistently favoured the development of business to increase manufacturing. The 
production sites of these manufacturing firms were located in and around big cities, 
and rural to urban migration was initially encouraged because they needed the cheap 
labour force. However, in Turkey, the bourgeoisie were never concerned with the 
needs of working class people, and this was visible in housing policies. Because of 
the lack of social or affordable housing, people who migrated from various parts of 
Turkey to Istanbul had to create their own solutions for this problem, which were 
‘gecekondus’. Gecekondus are illegal housing built on state-owned land that the 
local and national state ignored until the 1980s as a way of to avoide creating 
adequate social and affordable housing policies.  
From the 1980s, a new, largely neo-liberal, economic policy developed, particularly 
in relation to housing.  The most important institution that has carried out these 
housing policies was the MHDA, in spite of the fact that its foundation purpose was 
to create affordable housing. The MHDA started as a governmental institution to 
create affordable housing stock; however, the kind of ‘affordable housing’ they 
created was almost exclusively for housing ownership with ‘affordable’ instalments, 
and they did not create any rental property for social housing purposes. In addition, 
their ‘affordable housing’ scheme was too expensive for the poor, and only a small 
proportion of relatively better off working class and middle class people were able to 
afford it.  
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After the 2001 economic crisis in Turkey, the economic recovery programme mainly 
consisted of neo-liberal strategies, such as increasing privatization and reducing 
regulations relating to foreign investors entering the Turkish market. The current 
ruling party in Turkey (JDP) is a good example of this. Their politics aimed to 
increase the FBS sectors, especially in Istanbul, and to build massive harbours and 
ports in the important cities of Turkey, at the expense of losing cultural heritage, 
with the sole purpose of encouraging foreign investment, while further repressing 
the unions, leftist organizations and any kind of protest that might develop against 
their policies – including protests against state-led gentrification (e.g., Gezi Park 
Protests). 
Istanbul is specific compared to other world cities. Istanbul as a city was completely 
dominated by industry until 1980s, and this is not the case for other world cities 
located in MDCs. In addition to that, Istanbul is specific because of MHDA. MHDA 
and the way it operates are specific to Turkey and Istanbul. At the same time, 
Istanbul shows the effects of global concepts, and these are visible in the 
development of Istanbul, economically and politically. In this sense, Istanbul is a 
collection of the discussed abstractions and historical, economic and political 
background of Turkey while being specific, which makes it an ‘emergent property’. 
Istanbul shows many similar features with the changing global economy since the 
1970s. The increase of the FBS, media, design and tourism sectors in the CBD and 
decentralization of the manufacturing sectors from the city centre to the periphery 
are common features of other world cities around the globe as well as Istanbul.  
Since the 1980s, Istanbul has emerged as a world city, and this has been driven by 
the Turkish bourgeoisie and the state. The FBS sectors increased dramatically while 
the manufacturing sector was decentralized to the periphery of Istanbul. As the 
major city of Turkey, Istanbul was more affected by these changes than any other 
city in the country. Intellectuals, artists and young professionals started to move to 
central city looking for a neighbourhood that was not only closer to all cultural 
amenities, but also had architectural and historical significance to show their 
difference from the rest of the middle class. In the 1990s, some historical 
neighbourhoods caught the attention of middle-class intellectuals, and they started to 
buy and renovate houses in these neighbourhoods because they were attracted to the 
diverse cultural industry in the city. Because of the increase in employment in the 
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FBS, the changing preferences of young professionals and local governments’ 
encouragement of gentrification by providing better municipal services, the 
processes of gentrification in Istanbul are centred in historical neighbourhoods. The 
number of hotels, cafes, designer shops, art galleries in them has increased 
dramatically. Even though many years passed until the old inhabitants moved away, 
eventually, many of the original residents sold their properties and moved to another 
area. This shows how processes of market-led gentrification operated in Istanbul. 
Istanbul has the most valuable land in Turkey, and currently the MHDA is the 
biggest land speculator in the city. It is leading the process of making Istanbul a 
‘world city’. Most of the urban renewal and urban regeneration projects in the city 
have some direct or indirect links to the MHDA, and the MHDA is able to sell 
public land to any urban renewal project. The intention to turn Istanbul into a world 
city and integrate the city into the global economy with foreign urban investment 
gives some insight into motives behind most of the urban renovation and 
regeneration projects. From the point of view of the state, displacing the working 
class residents currently living in the central city is the fastest way to reach the 
economic goal that is set in several government reports, which is to put Istanbul in 
the top world cities and Turkey in the top ten economies in the world. Market-led 
gentrification is a rather slow process, and it may never happen if the area is not 
attractive to individual members of the middle class.  
The effects of these global processes are specific to Turkey and they create specific 
results in specific cities. Istanbul is a specific example and the spatial consequences 
of market-led and state-led gentrification in Istanbul are specific to this city. That is 
why, as I stated throughout the thesis, Istanbul is an ‘emergent property’ of all the 
abstractions that were discussed.  
This section has demonstrated how critical realism underlies what I have done. It has 
shown that abstract categories can be deployed for analysis of specific cases. It also 
shows how the specificity of these cases can be melted into those abstractions and 
how they are present in all these specific cases. I now turn to theoretical and political 
questions and possible alternatives to the current processes of gentrification in 
Istanbul. 
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9.4 Global South vs. Global North or Can We Learn from Each other? 
We have seen there are two quite different types of gentrification: the first one is 
classic gentrification (gentrification through the private housing market or market-
led gentrification), and the second is state-led gentrification. These processes rely on 
different state policies and have outcomes that have profoundly different effects on 
working class people. 
Market-led processes started in the 1960s, mostly in large cities of developed 
countries, and it was a process in which middle class gentrifiers bought and 
renovated inner city residential properties in working class neighbourhoods. Market-
led gentrification is a phenomenon that is mostly examined and researched in 
developed country cities. However, in this thesis, I have used a case study – Galata – 
from the developing world and showed how the Anglo-American concept can be 
used as a main framework for examining other parts of the world. As Islam and 
Sakizoglu (2015) argue, scholars interested in gentrification in Turkey have long 
used the Anglo-American concept as a main tool. This is because the market-led (in 
other words classical) gentrification examples in Turkey show the ‘main sypmtoms’ 
of the processes of gentrification in Northern America and Western Europe. For that 
reason, I have chose to use the same concept as a theoretical framework as well, and 
I do think this is appropriate, even if other players and processes (e.g., further 
indirect state intervention with planning permissions) come into play that one may 
not usually see in developed world.  
Changes in the world economy have underpinned the states’ desires to promote their 
large cities with the intention of increasing FBS sectors in city centres and to 
accelerate their economic growth by supporting the construction sector. These 
conditions have led to the emergence of another type of gentrification – state-led 
gentrification. Unlike market-led gentrification, the urban changes that prepare the 
environment for state-led gentrification are not solely driven by the private sector or 
changes in consumer preferences: they embody government policy (Weber, 2002; 
Moulaert, 2000). On the other hand, state-led gentrification has been on the rise 
since the 2000s not only in Istanbul, but also in many other developing country 
cities, and even though this thesis does not deal with informal urban settlements 
(e.g., gecekondus) and the gentrification processes happening in them, there is an 
urgent need to integrate this new, complicated and highly political urban process 
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into the conceptualization of gentrification to create a better intellectual 
understanding of world-wide gentrification. In this thesis, I focused on processes of 
state-led gentrification in the historical environment of Istanbul. This kind of 
gentrification is a good example of the brutal consequences of the rise of secondary 
circuit of the capital – especially the real estate sector. As mentioned before, 
developing world needs to catch up with the developed world economically, and that 
is one of the reasons why the real estate sector’s rise has been particularly visible in 
the global South. Urban regeneration and renewal projects started to have different 
meanings and consequences than in the developed countries, and this transformation 
that is usually followed by the total dsplacement of working class people and state-
led gentrification process has shown the need to integrate concepts of authoritarian 
state and power to the Anglo-American gentrification concept. With this thesis, I 
aim to contribute to the expansion of the understanding of gentrification concept 
with a set of case studies that are outside the scope of what Lees et al. (2015: 2) call 
‘usual suspects’.  I think it is necessary to merge the ‘southern and northern’ 
gentrification, instead of ‘unlearning’ the northern one in order to create another 
conceptualization of gentrification. A specific concept that integrates the power 
relations between state and capital with significant importance given on resistance 
against gentrification is needed. It is also necessary to learn and understand the 
resistance against gentrification from the global South, as it seems that it is where 
the most barbaric implementations of state-led gentrification and the most promising 
resistance against gentrification movements tend to happen. As Roy (2009:825) puts 
it: 
These theoretical positions have been produced in the context of the 
Euro-American urban experience. This is not to say that this analysis 
is not applicable to the cities of the global South. Indeed, it is highly 
relevant. The argument is less about transnational relevance and more 
about the scope and rangeof the analysis. 
 
There is a clear theoretical link between the changing global economy and the 
investment in gentrifying areas. This link exists for both processes of gentrification; 
however, for state-led gentrification, this urban and economic change is facilitated 
by the state. In other words, like market-led gentrification, spatial changes in the 
housing market can be partially explained by changes in the global economy, but in 
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addition, the state is an important actor in leading this urban and economic change in 
order to secure its place in the hierarchy of global economy through refashioning the 
urban environment for higher income groups (Webb, 2010).  
When it comes to resisting gentrification, it is harder to organize a resistance against 
market-led gentrification than state-led gentrification. Because in state-led 
gentrification, since almost all of the inhabitants who are to be displaced are treated 
more or less the same and the process takes less than market-led gentrification  
(which makes the effects of it quickly visible), it is easier for inhabitants to organize 
collectively and create a resistance against the process. Also, in state-led 
gentrification, the state has the most important role, and it is easier to recognize the 
unjust treatment and organize against it since it is one important actor, but in market-
led gentrification, there are many private developers, individual gentrifiers or 
landlords that may treat the inhabitants in an unjust way, and there is not any one 
important actor that all the inhabitants can resist.  
 
9.5 Social Spatial Segregation  
In a gentrification process that results in some or total displacement of the working 
class inhabitants, these residents are mostly pushed to the periphery; however, they 
still have most of their work and social connection in the inner city and the city 
centre (Kesteloot, 2005).  This creates many problems for these groups in the long 
term, such as further deepening of social and income polarization. When the urban 
‘regeneration’ and ‘renovation’ projects are completed in the form that they were 
proposed, there will be ‘bubbles’ of social classes in the city where no class interacts 
with another. ‘Bubbles’ refers to working class people not only losing the chance to 
socialize and have time in the central city, but also losing their jobs in the area and 
all connection with it. It is not merely that the middle class benefits from this process 
and it also leads to increased segregation of well-being, where working class people 
are not able to access the amenities and jobs that will provide them with satisfactory 
standards of living and health.  
This can lead to further demonization of the poor by increasing the economic gap 
between middle and working class people and increasing in what Butler (2005) calls 
the ‘urban other’. I find this relative well-being, the contrast or the relationship 
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between these two parts of the city, immoral. In addition, with the increasing 
contrast between the well-being of working and middle class people, the 
demonization of the working class and the social conflict between different social 
classes increases as well. This segregation can lead to a middle class with a false 
sense of superiority over the working class and an excluded working class with no 
trust in the state or authorities.  
Tarlabasi, in particular, is a good example for this situation not only because of the 
total forced eviction of the current inhabitants, but also, the Project is planned in a 
way that new inhabitants will not need to interact with the rest of the neighbourhood. 
In other words, the Project is proposing a kind of gated community in the middle of 
Tarlabasi with tunnels connecting to the courtyards and the entrance of the Project 
area. This is a specific type of exclusion for working class that means that they 
cannot even walk in the streets of the Project. This is a statement of disrespect and it 
is a form of insult towards the inhabitants of Tarlabasi. 
 
9.6 In What Sense is this Neo-liberalism? 
Neo-liberalism is the dominant ideology of Western and many other states  in the 
last 40 years, which argues for a diminishing role for the state.  The period of 
relative economic stagnation since the 1970s, and relatively low profits compared to 
the 1950s and 1960s led governments to adopt neo-liberal policies in attempts to 
revive their economies. Neo-liberalism is based on the ideas of classical economic 
liberalism, which argues that under the right circumstances – all else held equal – a 
free market will regulate itself. Since then, neo-liberalism has been a widely used 
term in many disciplines in sometimes ambigious ways or in an all-encompassing 
meaning. This may cause confusion in the scholarship. As Ferguson (2009:171) puts 
it:  
When the term “neoliberalism” is used as imprecisely as it is in many 
texts, one is tempted to pencil one’s objections in the margins as one 
might in reading a student essay: “What do you mean by 
‘neoliberalism’ here? Do you mean the liberalization of trade policies? 
Then say so! Do you mean techniques of government that work 
through the creation of responsibilized citizen-subjects? Then say that! 
The two don’t necessarily go together. Say what you mean, and don’t 
presume that they are all united in some giant package called 
‘neoliberalism’.” 
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Since the 1980s in Turkey and in the gentrification of Istanbul in particular, the state 
has played an enormous role. This brings into question whether we can simply say 
that Turkey is neo-liberal and Istanbul a neo-liberal city. Hackworth (2000) argues 
that ‘neo-liberal policies’ have enormous effects on urban environments and a ‘neo-
liberal city’ shows the spatial effects of neo-liberalism as a result of the 
encouragement of ‘free market’ policies in the urban environment. Gentrification is 
one aspect of this neo-liberal city, and with the exception of the level of state 
intervention, state-led gentrification processes embody many features of neo-
liberalism, one of which is the attack on working class people to increase profits. 
Hackworth (2000) continues to adds that neo-liberal ideas extend to the social and 
political spheres in general, and the neo-liberal city is a combination of the effects of 
neoliberal public and private policies in social life. However, only talking about the 
neo-liberal city is too simple, and it misses some important points in relation to 
capital and state. It implies capital does not need state, but in fact, it does. Capital 
benefits from many state induced urban regeneration projects, state spending, 
regulations, and intervention, and these are not normally consistent with neo-
liberalism. An important reason why capital needs the state in urban areas is that the 
free market has enormous difficulty dealing with the built environment. Dealing 
with capitalist land is very complicated because of the property laws, and it is 
difficult for private market to invest in it without any state regulation or intervention. 
For example, not many developers want to be the first to invest in an unknown or 
devalued property market, and without state investment, many urban areas would be 
unregenerated.  In addition, the built environment has many limitations – such as 
urban conservation laws, planning permissions – and these lead the private sector to 
actively deal with state. It is also about the contradictory position of the state vis a 
vis the demand of different sectors of capital, different interests of society, and in 
relation to having to appear democratic. 
For these reasons, unlike the free market vision, the state, particularly in developing 
countries, has an important and active role in regulating the market and the social 
life. Istanbul has been greatly affected by the financialization of the economy and 
exhibits many features of a neo-liberal economy with an increase in the FBS sectors 
in the city centre, decentralization of manufacturing, and deregulation for facilitation 
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of the flow of capital. However, increasing state intervention in Turkey and the 
increase in the numbers of state-promoted urban renovation and regeneration 
projects shows that the market is far from having the freedom to regulate itself. In 
Turkey, the state regulates the market in a way that benefits capital rather than the 
poor. The changes in the historic urban environment of Istanbul are good examples 
of that. 
Since Turkey is economically behind compared to developed countries, dealing with 
the built environment, property and urban conservation laws is a big obstacle to 
economic development because fast economic development, most of the time, means 
damaging the poor, the environment and the historical and cultural heritage.  Even 
though current urban regeneration and renewal projects are very brutal towards the 
working class, the economic development they bring is still not enough for sections 
of capital in certain times and places. That is one of the reasons capital has needed 
state intervention in the urban areas of Istanbul.  
Since 2000, Istanbul has been experiencing many changes in urban layout due to the 
increasing number of urban renewal and urban regeneration projects. The most 
important legal tool used in this re-arrangement is the Law on the Protection of 
Deteriorated Historic and Cultural Heritage through Renewal and Re-use (Law No. 
5366). This Law provided the authorities with new legal tools that helped them 
accelerate regeneration and renewal processes in the historic environment, with the 
effect of resulting gentrification. All the urban renewal and regeneration projects 
prepared for the historic neighbourhoods are based on this Law, which allows the 
state and private companies to legally bypass urban conservation laws and create 
urban renewal projects in which they can demolish even entire historic 
environments. With this, the national and local state proceeded to work in 
collaboration with private companies to transform the historic centre of Istanbul into 
middle or upper class areas in the hope that this state-led gentrification process 
would inspire market-led gentrification processes in the surrounding 
neighbourhoods. However, the negative consequences of this kind of urban re-
arrangement, such as the complete displacement of the poor from the central city and 
the increasing social spatial segregation of society, are ignored by the state.  The 
working class and poor inhabitants are pushed to the periphery of the city with fewer 
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financial and social resources than they used to have and with limited access to the 
jobs in the central city.  
In summary, Turkey is a mainly neo-liberal country with Istanbul as its major 
finance centre; however, the state has become too involved, and because of the high-
levels of state intervention and the nature of this intervention as described above, it 
is not a free market economy.  
 
9.7 An Alternative Policy for the Inner Working City Class Neighbourhoods of 
Istanbul  
The acquisition process during the Tarlabasi Renewal Project has been cancelled by 
the law court, and this may lead to the cancellation of the whole Renewal Project. 
Even though it has been cancelled, the future of Tarlabasi is still unclear. However, 
this cancellation opens up an opportunity for the consideration of alternatives, so it is 
well worth discussing.   
During the interviews I conducted, academics and people in NGOs stated their 
suggestion about alternative solutions for Tarlabasi. The academics and NGOs 
presented different aspects from what is being done. I also present something that 
fits their perspective: 
• Policies about displacement process should be drawn up, rather than solely 
eviction; 
• Social housing should be built for people living in the project area; 
• There should not be a specific project, but rather there should be physical 
rehabilitation of the neighbourhood and social policies to tackle the poverty 
in the area; 
• A project should be created with the inhabitants for the renovation of the 
area, rather it being run by a private construction firm. During any possible 
renovation process the Municipality should provide rent support for tenants. 
• Houses should be properly renovated with respect to their original form 
rather than demolishing the whole area and building it again: 
• Social policies (such as policies for poverty, rent assistance, educational 
support, tackling the crime rate, providing better infrastructure) should be 
drawn up to improve residents’ situation in the neighbourhood. 
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In this section, I present two main aims for at least one possible alternative; 
historical preservation, giving housing rights to the working class inhabitants of the 
neighbourhood. First, developing a historical preservation programme in accordance 
with the planning decisions and urban conservation laws with regard to population 
densities is a main target. The second is to keep the poor inhabitants in their homes 
and meet their housing needs. The main housing suggestion for the neighbourhood is 
to create social rented housing because owner-occupied housing schemes with low 
rate mortgages and monthly instalments are not feasible for the poor population of 
Tarlabasi.  
To achieve this alternative policy, I suggest the immediate cancellation of the 
Project, reconstructing the demolished buildings with respect to their original form 
and providing social housing to all the displaced people that would allow them to 
live somewhere in or close to the central city, rather than pushing them to the 
periphery. But this strategy needs to consider tenure in Tarlabasi. The Project solely 
encourages owner-occupation rather than creating possibilities for rental property. 
Due to the high tenancy rate in the area, it is important to begin by building social 
rented housing, but this could be complemented by a model focusing on owning a 
house depending on the owner-occupier rate in the neighbourhood. Depending on 
the demand from the inhabitants for the owner-occupation model, the sale of the 
properties should respect the income levels of the inhabitants, that is, creating the 
possibility of buying the property through flexible and affordable instalments. If 
owner-occupiers choose to sell their property, they should be required to give the 
state first option of buying the dwelling in order to retain it in the social housing 
stock. In the case of a sale, the state should be able to buy the property from an 
owner-occupier for its market price before rehabilitation because in this alternative, 
the state is the main investor in the rehabilitation project. In the social housing 
model, the rent should be regulated according to the income level of the residents, 
with rent subsidies granted where needed. 
 I suggest the development of cultural and tourist amenities should be encouraged. 
For tourist-oriented developments, residents of Tarlabasi should be given priority in 
employment since these places would be state-owned the profit would go directly to 
state.  
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An alternative project has not been proposed for Tarlabasi. While an alternative 
project was prepared by 60 academics in the case of Sulukule (see Chapter 8), it was 
never even discussed by the authorities. In this alternative project for Sulukule, the 
types and sizes of dwellings were rearranged. In the actual Project, there were 620 
flats, and 20 of the locals were able to afford a flat in the project area. The MHDA 
signed contracts with 577 people in total to purchase a flat. The alternative project, 
in contrast, proposed six flat types (60, 70, 80, 85, 90 and 135 m2) for the people that 
MHDA came to an agreement with, and these flats were located on a land area of 
44,615 m2 (a total of 577 houses). In addition to that, three other types of flats (only 
for social housing) (25, 40 and 60 m2) were proposed, located on a land area of 
13,275 m2 (a total of 577 plus 335 houses). The alternative project proposed enough 
residential area for 3,728 people. This meant increasing the number of people who 
would be benefitting from social housing. Another benefit of the alternative project 
was that the current Sulukule project costs 154 million TL (around £40 million) and 
covers 90,000 m2 , but the alternative proposal, prepared with the purpose of keeping 
current inhabitants in their places, had an estimated cost of 83 million TL (around 
£22 million) (Sulukule Platform, 2009).  
This is further evidence that it was not the costs that prevented the state from 
implementing these alternative projects, but because the state aimed to restructure 
the areas not only physically, but also socially – without the poor. The Tarlabasi 
renewal land area is 20,000 m2, and the current project cost is 500 million TL 
(around £125 million) with luxurious office areas and shopping malls and residential 
areas amounting to the whole of the proposed built environment (Gap Insaat, 2012). 
Increasing the number of flats designated for residential use – as in the alternative 
Sulukule Project – with well-restored buildings, instead of demolishing and re-
building, would cost less than this amount. In the case of Sulukule, it was cheaper 
and even though an alternative project for Tarlabasi has not been calculated or 
analysed, there is no reason to think that Tarlabasi will be different. The cost is also 
high because of all the upmarket consumption areas and the target clients’ list the 
current Tarlabasi Project is proposing. An alternative rehabilitation project that did 
not target upper class people would cost less than the current regeneration project 
and at the same time, preserve the heritage and thus and increase the tourist 
importance of the area. Finally, the MHDA has housing ownership schemes on the 
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periphery of Istanbul, where an eligible person (eligibility requirements are set by 
the MHDA) can buy a house for monthly instalments of 500 - 600 TL (£120- £150). 
In Tarlabasi, few people could commit to such long term instalments, as currently, 
rent prices in the neighbourhood are around 300 - 600 TL (£70 - £150). If social 
housing was constructed in Tarlabasi to rent to the inhabitants, it would be feasible 
for the MHDA to charge them around the same rents instead of the housing re-
payment instalments.  
This kind of project takes many years and requires a strong political will, but many 
municipalities that are re-elected every five years choose to do short-term projects 
that are not for the benefit of whole urban population, but to attract investments to 
their locality and thus increase their electoral standings. For that reason, 
neighbourhoods like Tarlabasi with the most disadvantaged segments of the 
population are frequently ignored since improving the social environment in these 
places is not a good advertisement for the municipalities at election time. Because 
the results are not immediately visible and it takes more than five years to see the 
positive effects of such social programmes. Because of this, these rehabilitation 
projects should have the support and help of the national state. Local municipalities 
do not have big enough budgets or strong enough authority to make them happen. 
Creating social housing in the area is crucial for this alternative to succeed. In 
Turkey, the MHDA, therefore, the organization responsible for creating social and 
affordable housing, should be responsible for the construction of these forms of 
alternative project.  
It is true that rehabilitation alone cannot solve all the problems of the 
neighbourhood; the ability of inhabitants to pay affordable rents depends on their 
incomes, so also that needs attention.  For that reason, it is also necessary to develop 
solutions involving the local and national authorities and NGOs, to decrease the 
poverty rate in the neighbourhood. It can be concluded that the rehabilitation of 
Tarlabasi for the working class residents is economically and socially feasible, but 
the political will to initiate such a process is not there. A rehabilitation project with 
the inhabitants that improves not only the physical and historic environment, but 
also the lives of those who are having financial and social difficulties due to 
unemployment, underemployment and to some extent demonization by the rest of 
society, is suggested for Tarlabasi. I suggest that before any physical renovation 
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processes are planned, social policies to decrease the poverty rate and the crime rate,  
and to provide free legal counselling and education are needed in the area.  
The Tarlabasi Project and some other urban renovation projects in historical areas 
(Sulukule and Fener-Balata) have been cancelled by the court, but the future of these 
neighbourhoods is still unclear. However, since the Gezi Park protests, strongly anti-
demolition grass-root movements give hope for more progressive types of 
rehabilitation in Istanbul. Recently, there have been general elections in Turkey (7 
June, 2015) that resulted in JDP losing its majority in the Parliament. At the time of 
writing, it is not clear how the new government going to be formed, but whatever 
happens, the existence of these movements against state-led projects is important 
and can affect the outcomes of big, controversial urban projects in major cities such 
as Istanbul. It is possible that projects such as the Tarlabasi Renewal Project and 
others examined in this thesis may not be completed.  
An additional potential consideration is that Tarlabasi has been under consideration 
to be designated a World Heritage Buffer Zone (World Heritage Papers UNESCO, 
2008). This proposal could be pushed forward to get funding from international 
bodies such as UNESCO or the EU.  
 
9.8 Future Research Directions 
The framework for the analysis I used in this research for gentrified areas in 
historical parts of developing large cities is not commonly used in Turkey or in the 
gentrification literature. I hope that others will use this framework in the future for 
similar international research. On the basis of the above discussion, I suggest that a 
gentrified area should be analysed with the changing economic, social political 
processes in the last 60-70 years, instead of narrowly examining only the housing 
market.  
One of my academic aims is to help organize workshops or conferences about the 
research topic to share knowledge with scholar with similar interests. The 
consequences of gentrification in historic environments of developing countries is a 
matter that has not been examined enough and for that reason, studies focusing on 
this topics and people who are studying this topic should be encouraged to work 
together with workshops focusing on this. Using the analytical framework I am 
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proposing in this thesis, I plan to conduct further research about state-led 
gentrification and its consequences that provide research results with an 
understanding of deeper processes, along with the historical background. 
 
 
9.9 Dissemination 
The dissemination of this research will be through publications, conferences and 
workshops. I have already published one paper (Can, 2013) and submitted another 
one. In the first paper, I compared the state-led and market-led gentrification in 
Istanbul through the cases of Tarlabasi and Galata. In the second, I discussed the 
super gentrification concept and tension between different groups of gentrifiers in 
the case of Galata. I plan to write more papers after the completion of my PhD, 
examining the state-led gentrification and social exclusion in Tarlabasi with 
particular attention provided to social inequality and political power.  
As a condition of my scholarship, I have been allocated to do academic work in 
Istanbul. I have a place in Istanbul Civilization University, and I will have 
considerable autonomy in what I do. Using the knowledge and analysis I developed 
in this thesis, I want to be involved in policy making, in particular, working with 
existing inhabitants for better developments. When there will be an opportunity for 
alternative and progressive policies to be heard, I want to contribute to that with all 
the knowledge gained from my current and future studies. This way, my research 
will also be an example for the other developing countries that are going through 
similar processes. 
	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
260	  
	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
261	  
	  
REFERENCES 
10th Five Year Development Plan, (2014-2018). The Ministry of Development. 
Ankara. 
5th Five Year Development Plan, (1985-1989). The Ministry of Development. 
Ankara. 
6th Five Year Development Plan, (1990-1994). The Ministry of Development. 
Ankara. 
7th Five Year Development Plan, (2000-2005). The Ministry of Development. 
Ankara. 
8th Five Year Development Plan, (2000-2005). The Ministry of Development. 
Ankara. 
9th Five Year Development Plan, (2007-2013). The Ministry of Development. 
Ankara. 
Abasa, M., B. Dupret, and E. Denis. (2012). Eds. Popular Housing and Urban Land 
Tenure in the Middle East: Case Studies from Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon 
and Turkey. Cairo: American University in Cairo Press.  
Akın, N., (1994). Fener. Istanbul Encyclopaedia, 3, 279–281. 
Aksoy, A. (2001). Gecekondudan Varosa Donusum: 1990’larda ‘Biz ve Oteki’ 
Kurgusu, Dısarıda Kalanlar,Bırakılanlar (Transfromation from Gecekondu to 
Slums: The Concept of ‘Us’ and ‘Others’ in the 1990s, Outsiders). Istanbul: 
Baglam Yayıncılık. 
Allen, 1., (1984). The ideology of dense neighbourhood redevelopment: cultural 
diversity and transcendant community experience. Urban Affairs Quarterly, 
15, 409-428.  
262	  
	  
Altay, D. and Turkun, A., (2006). The changing patterns of segregation and 
exclusion: the 
case of Ankara, the capital city of Turkey. In Sandhu, R.S. and Sandhu, J. 
(eds.), Globalizing Cities: Inequality and Segregation in Developing Countries. 
Jaipur: Rawat Publications. 
Amin , A. and Thrift, N.J., (1994). Globalization, Institutions and Regional 
Development in 
Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Andriotis, N., (2008). The refugees question in Greece (1821–1930). Θέµατα 
Νεοελληνικής Ιστορίας (8th Ed.) (Topics from Modern Greek History). 
Athens: ΟΕΔΒ. 
Archer, M., Bhaskar, R., Collier, A., Lawson, T., and Norrie A., (1998). Critical 
Realism: Essential Readings. London: Routledge.  
Arkan, O. K. (1998).  Beyoglu. Istanbul: Iletisim Yayinlari.  
Aslan, S. (2004). 1 Mayıs Mahallesi (May 1 Neighbourhood). Istanbul: Iletisim 
Yayinlari. 
Aslan, S., (2004), 1 Mayıs Mahallesi. Istanbul: Iletisim Yayinlari. 
Atkinson, R. (2005). Neighbourhoods and the impacts of social mix: crime, tenure 
diversification and assisted mobility. Paper presented at ESRC Centre for 
Neighbourhood Research. 
Ayca Inci, (2003). Muzik Endustirisinde Kultur Aracilarinin Rolu ve Asmalımescit 
Semtinin Mekansal Donusumu (The Role of Culture in Music Industry and the 
Spatial Transformation of Asmalimescit) . Unpublished M.A Thesis. Istanbul: 
Mimar Sinan University. 
Aydin, S. and Taskin, Y., (2014). 1960’tan Gunumuze Turkiye Tarihi (The History 
of Turkey from the 1960s to Present). Istanbul: Iletisim Yayinlari. 
263	  
	  
Bank of England Act 1946 (PDF). Retrieved 12 October 2012. 
Barraclough, G., (1978). The Times Atlas of World History. 
Bartu, A. (1999). Who Owns the Old Quarters? Rewriting Histories in a Global Era. 
In C. Keyder (ed) Istanbul Between the Global and the Local. Boston: 
Rowman and Littlefield Publishers. 
Beauregard, R. A., (1984). Structure, agency and urban redevelopment. In Capital, 
Class and 
Urban Structure. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications. 
Beauregard, R.A., (1984). Structure, agency and urban redevelopment. Capital, 
Class and 
Urban Structure. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications. 
Beauregard, R.A., (1986). The chaos and complexity of gentrification. In Smith N. 
and Williams P. (eds.), Gentrification of the City. London: Allen and Unwin. 
Beaverstock J.V., Smith R.G., Taylor P.J., Walker D.F.R. and Lorimer H.N., (2000). 
Relational studies of globalization and world cities: three measurement 
methodologies. Applied Geography, 20 (1), 43-63.  
Beaverstock, J.V., Taylor P.J. and Smith R.G., (1999). A roster of world cities. 
Cities, 16 (6), 444-58. 
Beckhoven, E and Kempen, R., (2003). Social effects of urban restructuring: a case 
study in 
Amsterdam and Utrecht, the Netherlands. Housing Studies, 18, 853-875. 
Beki, M.A., (1997). Whose gang is this?. Hurriyet Daily News. Retrieved 
05.05.2015 from http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/whose-gang-is-
this.aspx?pageID=438&n=whose-gang-is-this-1997-01-17. 
264	  
	  
Bektas, C. (1999). Public Participation in the Rejuvenation of Old Fabric of Cities. 
Paper presented at a conference of Revitalization of Historic Cities, Nicosia. 
Belge, M. (2002). Istanbul Gezi Rehberi (Istanbul Guide). Istanbul: Tarih Vakfi Yurt 
Yayinlari.  
Berkoz, L., (1998). Locational preferences of producer service firms in Istanbul. 
European Planning Studies, 6 (3), 333-349.  
Beyoglu Heritage Site Urban Conservation Master Plan Report, (2009). Ministry of 
Culture and Tourism. Ankara. 
Beyoglu Heritage Site Urban Conservation Master Plan Report. (2009).  
Bhaskar, R., (1987). Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation. London: Verso. 
Bhaskar, R., (1989). Reclaiming Reality. London: Verso. 
Bila, H., (1999). CHP 1919-1999.Istanbul: Doğan Kitap. 
Birand, M.A., (2005). The shame of September 6–7 is always with us. Hurriyet 
Daily News. Retrieved 01.04.2014 from 
www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=the-shame-of-sept.-
6-7-is-always-with-us-2005-09-07. 
Bjørnholt, M. and Farstad, G.R., (2012). ‘Am I rambling?’ On the advantages of 
interviewing couples together. Qualitative Research, 14 (1), 3–19.  
Bluestone, B. and Harrison, B., (1982). The deindustrialization of America. New 
York: Basic Books. 
Bogdan, R. and Taylor, S.J., (1975). An Introduction to Qualitative Research 
Methods: A Phenomenological Approach to the Social Sciences. New York: 
Wiley.  
265	  
	  
Bondi, L., (1999). Gender, class and gentrification: enriching the debate. 
Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 17, 261-82. 
Boratav, K., (2003). Turkiye Iktisat Tarihi 1908–2002 (Turkey’s Economic History 
1908-2002). Ankara, Imge Publications.  
Bradley, J.R., (1991). Bureaucratic and Individual Knowledge and Action in the 
Public Services Departments of an Academic Library. Ph.D. dissertation. 
University of Illinois. 
Brenner, N. and Theodore, N., (2002). Cities and geographies of actually existing 
Neoliberalism. Antipode, 34 (3), 349-379. 
Brunn, S. and Leinbach, T., (1991). Collapsing Space and Time: Geographic 
Aspects of Communications and Information. London: HarperCollins. 
Bryman, A., (1988). Quantity and Quality in Social Research. London: Routledge.  
Bryson, J., Daniels, P. and Warf, B., (2004). Service Worlds: People, Organizations, 
Technologies. London: Routledge Taylor and Francis Group. 
Bryson, J.R. and Daniels, P.W., (1998d). Understanding the rise and role of service 
activities and employment in the global economy: an introduction to the 
academic literature, in Bryson J.R. and Daniels P.W. (1998a). 
Budak, B., (2007). Kentsel Yenilesme Süreci Bağlamında ‘Soylulaştırma’: Fener-
Balat Örneği (Gentrification During the Process of Urban Renewal: The 
Example of Fener-Balat). Unpublished MA Thesis. Istanbul: Mimar Sinan 
University.  
Butler, T. (2005). Gentrification and globalization : the emergence of a middle range 
theory. Cahier européen dupôle Ville/metropolis/cosmopolis, 1-34.  
Butler, T. and Lees, L., (2006). Journal Compilation. London: Royal Geographical 
Society. 
266	  
	  
Butler, T. and Robson, G., (2003). London Calling: The Middle Classes and the 
Remaking of Inner London. Oxford: Berg.  
Butler, T., (1997). Gentrification and the Middle Classes. Aldershot: Ashgate.  
Cameron, S., (2003). Gentrification, housing re-differentiation and urban 
regeneration: going 
for growth in Newcastle upon Tyne. Urban Studies. 40 (12), 2367-2382. 
Campbell, D.T., (1974). Quantitative knowing in action research. Presented as the 
Annual Meeting of the American Psychological Association. New Orleans. 
Campbell, D.T., (1988). Qualitative knowing in action research. In Overman, E.S. 
(ed.), Methodology and Epistemology for Social Science. Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press. 
Can, A.,  (2013). Neo-Liberal Urban Politics in the Historical Environment of 
İstanbul - The Issue of Gentrification.  Planlama, 23 (2), 95-104 
Carter, B. and New, C., (eds.), (2004). Making Realism Work: Realist Social Theory 
and Empirical Research. London: Routledge.  
Castells, M., (1972). La question urbuine. Paris: Maspero. 
Castells, M., (1989). The Informational City. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
Cavdar, T., (1992). Türkiye’de Liberalizm (Liberalism in Turkey). Ankara: İmge 
Kitabevi. 
Çavdar, T., (1996). Türkiye'nin Demokrasi Tarihi 1950-1995 (Turkey’s Democracy 
History). Ankara: Imge Kitabevi.  
Çavdar, T., (2008). Türkiye’nin Demokrasi Tarihi 1950’den Günümüze (Turkey’s 
History of Democracy from 1950 to the Present). Ankara: İmge Kitapevi. 
267	  
	  
Celasun, O., Denizer, C. and Dong He (1999). Capital flows, macroeconomic 
management and the financial System: Turkey 1989-1997. World Bank 
working paper. 
Cheshire, P. (2007). Segregated Neighbourhoods and Mixed Communities: A 
Critical Analysis. York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation. 
Ciraci, H. and Kundak, S., (2000). Changing urban pattern of Istanbul: From 
monocentric to polycentric structure. Presented at 40th Congress of the 
European Regional Science Association, Barcelona, Spain. 
CITF (Creative Industries Task Force), (2001). Creative Industries Mapping 
Document. London: Department of Culture, Media and Sport. 
Clay, P.L., (1979). Neighbourhood Renewal. Lexington: Lexington Books. 
Cook, T.D. and Campbell, D.T., (1979). Quasi-Experimentation: Design and 
Analysis for Field Settings. Chicago, Illinois: Rand McNally. 
Coskun, N. and Yalcin, S. (2007). Gentrification in a Globalising World, Case 
Study: Istanbul. Rotterdam: International Conference Sustainable Urban 
Areas. 
Creswell, J.W. and Plano Clark, V.L. (2011). Designing and conducting mixed 
methods research. Los Angeles, CA: Sage. 
Cumhuriyet  Gazetesi (2002), Yine Bina Trajedisi (Collapsing Building Tragedy). 
Dadrian, V.N., (2003). The History of the Armenian Genocide: Ethnic Conflict from 
the Balkans to Anatolia to the Caucasus. New York and Oxford: Berghahn 
Books. 
Daniels, P.W. and Bryson, J.R., (2002). Manufacturing services and servicing 
manufacturing: changing forms of production in advanced capitalist 
economies. Urban Studies, 39 (5-6), 977-991. 
268	  
	  
Davidson, M. and Lees L., (2005). New-build `gentrification' and London's riverside 
renaissance. Environment and Planning A, 37, 1165 - 1190.  
Davidson, M. and Lees, L., (2005). New build gentrification and London‘s riverside 
renaissance. Environment and Planning A. 37:7, 1165-1190.  
Davidson, M., (2008). Spoiled mixture – where does state-led “positive” 
gentrification end?. Urban Studies, 45, 2385-405. 
Demircan, M., (2005). Radikal Newspaper. Retrieved 15.07.2015 from 
www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=158255. 
Demirci, M. and Sunar, B., (1998). Nüfus Sayımları İle Derlenen İç Göç Bilgisinin 
Değerlendirilmesi (Evaluation of Local Migration and Census Data). 
Türkiye’de İç Göç (Local Migration in Turkey). Istanbul: Türkiye Ekonomik 
ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı. 
Denizer, C., (1997). The Effects of Financial Liberalization and New Bank Entry on 
Market Structure and Competition in Turkey. World Bank working paper no: 
1839. 
Denizer, C., (2000). Foreign Entry in Turkey’s Banking Sector, 1980-97. The World 
Bank, Europe and Central Asia Region, Poverty Reduction and Economic 
Management Sector Unit. 
Dilipak, A., (1991). Ihtilaller Donemi (Coup d’etat Era). Istanbul: Dogan Ofset. 
Dincer I. and Dincer Y., (2005). Historical Heritage – Conservation – Restoration in 
Small Towns and Question of Rural Gentrification in Turkey. Presented In 
15th ICOMOS General Assembly and International Symposium: ‘Monuments 
and sites in their setting - conserving cultural heritage in changing townscapes 
and landscapes’, Xi'an, China. 
Dincer, I. (2008). Tarihi Kentlerin Korunması ve Yeniden Duzenlenmesinde 
Sorumluluk ve Yeterlilik Sorunları (Responsibility and Competence in the 
269	  
	  
Issue of Preserving Historical Cities). Symposium of Istanbul Historical 
Peninsula. Istanbul: TMMOB Chamber of Architects, 239–258. 
Dincer, I. (2009). Kentsel Koruma ve Yenileme Sorunlarını Ornekler Uzerinden 
Tartısmak: Suleymaniye ve Tarlabası (Discussing the Problems of Urban 
Conservation and Renewal over the Examples: Suleymaniye and Tarlabasi). 
Retrieved 23.03.2015 from http://www.planlama.org/index.php/planlamaorg-
yazlar6/planlamaorg-yazlar/66-planlamaorg-yazlar/doc-dr-clal-dincer/325-
kentsel-koruma-ve-yenileme-sorunlarn-oernekler-uezerinden-tartmak-
sueleymaniye-ve-tarlaba-4. 
Dinçer, I. and Enlil, Z., (2002). Eski Kent Merkezinde Yeni Yoksullar: Tarlabaşı-
İstanbul (New Poor People in the Old City Centre: Tarlabasi-Istanbul). 
Presented at  Dünya Şehircilik Günü 26.Kolokyumu, Ankara. 
Dincer, I., (2010). The dilemma of cultural heritage - urban renewal: Istanbul, 
Suleymaniye and Fener-balat. Presented at 14th International Planning History 
Society Conference. Istanbul. 
Dincer, I., (2011). The impact of neoliberal policies on historic urban space: areas of 
urban 
renewal in Istanbul. International planning studies, 16 (1), 43-60.  
Dinler, Z., (2010). Cumhuriyetimizin Kuruluşundan Günümüze İzlenen Bölgesel 
Kalkınma Politikaları ve Kalkınma Ajansları (Regional Development Politics 
from the Foundation of the Republic and Development Agencies). In Akgul, 
B. and Uzay N. (eds.), Türkiye’de Bölgesel Kalkınmanın Yeni Örgütleri: 
Kalkınma Ajansları (New Organizations for Regional Development in Turkey: 
Development Agencies). Bursa: Ekin Kitabevi. 
Dokmeci, V., and Berkoz, L. (2000). Residential-location preferences according to 
demographic characteristics in Istanbul. Landscape and Urban Planning, 48(1-
2), 45-55. 
270	  
	  
Doward, J., (2013). Westminster's world heritage status at risk as UNESCO 
condemns plan for skyscrapers. The Guardian. 
Eisenschitz, A. and Gough, J., (2011). Socialism and the ‘social economy’. Human 
Geography, 4 (2), 1-15. 
Ekinci, O., (1994). Istanbul’u Sarsan 10 Yıl: 1983–1993 (10 Years that Shook 
Istanbul: 1983-1993). Istanbul: Anahtar.  
Ely, M., (1991). Doing Qualitative Research:Circles within Circles. London: Falmer. 
Employment in agriculture between 2000-2014, regional indicators 2013, (Turkish 
Statistical Institute) 
Engardio, P., (2005). China is a private-sector economy. Bloomberg Businessweek. 
Enlil, Z. M., (2000). Yeniden islevlendirme ve soylulastırma: bir sınıfsal proje 
olarak eski kent merkezlerinin ve tarihi konut dokusunun yeniden ele 
geçirilmesi (Re-functioning and gentrification: transformation of old city 
centres and historical fabric as a project of social class). Domus m, 8, 46-49. 
Ercan, F., (2003). Neo-liberal orman yasalarından kapitalizmin kuresel 
kurumsallasma 
surecine gecis, yapısal reformlari (Transformation towards capitalism and 
globalism from neo-liberal forestry laws). Iktisat Magazine, 435, 3–27. 
Erdogan, O., (2009). Neoliberal Kent Politikaları ve Tarlabası’nda Kentsel Yenileme 
(Neoliberal Urban Politics and Urban Renewal in Tarlabasi). Unpublished MA 
Thesis. Istanbul: Yıldız Technical University. 
Ergun, N. (2003). Soylulastirma kuramlarinin Istanbul’da uygulanabilirligi 
(Implication of Gentrification Concept in Istanbul). Paper  presented at a 
conference of Tarihi ve Merkezi Semtlerin Donusumu. Istanbul: Kadir Has 
University. 
271	  
	  
Erkan, H., (2008). Entegre Sistemler Bağlamında Türkiye’nin Ekonomik Dönüşüm 
Süreçleri ve Geleceğe Yönelik Gelişimi (Turkey’s Economic Transformation 
Process and Future Directions). Presented at 2. Ulusal İktisat Kongresi- 
Türkiye’nin İktisadi Dönüşüm Süreci, İzmir. 
Fainstein, S.S., (2001). The City Builders: Property Development in New York and 
London, 1980-2000. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press. 
Fatih Municipality (1998). Balat ve Fener Semtlerinin Rehabilitasyonu 
(Rehabilitation of Fener and Balat Neighbourhoods). Istanbul: European 
Union, UNESCO World Heritage Centre, French Institute of Anatolian 
Research. 
Fatih Municipality (2013). A Report Of Concern On The Conservation Issues Of  
The Istanbul Land Walls World Heritage Site  With A Special Focus on the 
Historic Yedikule Vegetable Gardens. 
Fielding A. and Halford S., (1993). Geographies of opportunity: a regional analysis 
of gender-specific social and spatial mobilities in England and Wales, 1971 – 
81. Environment and Planning A, 25 (10), 1421 – 1440.   
Foggo, H. (2007). The Sulukule Affair: Roma Against Expropriation. Roma right 
quarterly, 4, 41-47. 
Frazer, E. and Lacey, N., (1993). The Politics of Community: a Feminist Critique of 
the Liberal Communitarian Debate. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 
Freeman, L. (2006). There Goes the ’Hood: Views of Gentrification from the 
Ground Up. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. 
Freeman, L. and Braconi F., (2004). Gentrification and displacement: New York 
City in the 1990s. Journal of the American Planning Association, 70 (1), 39-
52.  
272	  
	  
Friedman, M., (1962). Capitalism and Freedom. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. 
Friedmann, J., (1986). The world city hypothesis. In P. Knox and P. J. Taylor (eds), 
Development and Change. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 Gallagher, S. and Zahavi, D., (2008). The Phenomenological Mind. Routledge: 
London. 
Gallouj, F., (2002). Innovation in the Service Economy: The New Wealth of 
Nations. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Gap Insaat, (2012). Tarlabasi Renewal Project Leaflet. Istanbul: Gap Insaat. 
Gerber, J., Macionis, J. and Linda M., (2010). Sociology (7th Canadian ed.). 
Toronto: Pearson Canada. 
 Gezici, F. and Kerimoglu, E., (2010). Culture, tourism and regeneration process in 
Istanbul. International Journal of Culture, Tourism and Hospitality Research, 4 
(3), 252-65. 
Ghertner, D. A. (2014). India’s Urban Revolution: Geographies of Displacement 
Beyond Gentrification. Environment and Planning A 46 (7): 1554– 1571.  
Glass, R., (1964). Introduction: Aspects of change. Urban studies. London: 
MacKibbon and Kee. 
Glynn, S., (2008). Soft selling gentrification?. Urban Research and Practise, 1 (2), 
164-180.  
Goldthwaite, R.A., (1995). Banks, Places and Entrepreneurs in Renaissance 
Florence. Aldershot, Hampshire, and Great Britain: Variorum. 
Goodchild, B., and I. Cole. (2001). Social balance and mixed neighbourhoods in 
Britain since 1979. Environment and Planning D 19: 103–121. 
273	  
	  
Gough, J., (2013). Generalized rents in world cities. Unpublished Paper. 
Graham, S., (2010). Cities Under Siege: The New Military Urbanism. London:  
Verso. 
Greenwood, E., (1957). Attributes of a profession. Social Work, 2 (3), 44-55. 
Grier, G. and Grier, E., (1978). Urban Displacement: A Reconnaissance. 
Washington: US Department of Housing and Urban Development.  
Gulalp, H., (1987) Gelisme Stratejileri ve Gelisme Ideolojileri (Development 
Strategies and Ideologies). Ankara: Yurt Yayinlari. 
Gürler, E., (2005). 1980 Sonrası Kentsel Dönüşüm Sürecinde Küresel Perspektiften İstanbul Örneği: Kent içi Tarihi 
Alanların Yeniden Üretim Modelleri (Istanbul From the Global Perspective during the 
urban regeneration process after the 1980s: Reproduction Models of Historical 
Urban Areas). Presented at 8 Kasım Dünya Şehircilik Günü 28. Kolokyumu, Ankara. 
Güven, D., (2005). 6-7 Eylül Olaylari (1) (Istanbul Pogrom). Radikal Newspaper. 
Retrieved 15.11.2012 from www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=163380. 
Haberturk, (16 June 2012). ‘Tarlabasi will be a rose garden in three and a half 
years’. Retrieved 15.0.2015 from  http://img-
zadaca.mediatriple.net/tarlabasi360/img/basin/00018.jpg 
Hackworth, J. and Smith, N., (2001) The changing state of gentrification. Tijdschrift 
voor 
Economische en Sociale Geografie, 92, 464-477. 
Hackworth, J., (2000). The Neoliberal City:  Governance, Ideology and 
Development in American Urbanism. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University 
Press.   
Hackworth, J., (2002). Postrecession gentrification in New York City. Urban Affairs 
Review, 37 (6), 815-843.  
274	  
	  
Hackworth, J., (2007). The Neoliberal City: Governance, Ideology, and 
Development in American Urbanism. New York: Cornell University Press. 
Hall, P., (2001). Global city-regions in the twenty-first century. In Scott, A. (ed),  
Global City-regions: Trends, Theory, Policy. Oxford University Press: Oxford.  
Hamnett, C., (1984). Gentrification and residential location theory: a review and 
assessment. Geography and The Urban Environment: Progress in Research 
and Applications, 6, 283-319.  
Hanlon, G., (1999). Lawyers, the State and the Market: Professionalism Revisited. 
London: Macmillan. 
Harris, A., (2008) From London to Mumbai and back again: gentrification and 
public 
policy in comparative perspective. Urban Studies, 45 (12), 2407-2428.  
Harvey, D., (1973). Social Justice and the City. London: Edward Arnold. 
Harvey, D., (1985). The Urbanization of Capital. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Harvey, D., (1989). The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of 
Cultural Change. Oxford:  Blackwell. 
Harvey, D., (1990). Between space and time: reflections on the geographical 
imagination. Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 80, 418-
434. 
Harvey, D., (1996). Spaces of Global Capitalism, Verso: London. 
Harvey, D., (2005). A Brief History of Neoliberalism. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Hasan, A. (2015). Value Extraction from Land and Real Estate in Karachi. In Global 
Gentrificaitons: Uneven Development and Displacement. Bristol: Policy Press. 
275	  
	  
Heper. M., (2006). Türkiye Sözlüğü : Siyaset , Toplum ve Kültür (Turkey 
Dictionary: Politics, Society and Culture). Ankara: Doğu Batı Yayınları. 
Hirsch, F., (1978). Social Limits to Growth. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
Howells, J., (2002). Innovation, consumption and services: encapsulation and the 
combinational role of services, paper presented at the 12th International 
RESER Conference, 26-27 September 2002, Manchester. 
Howland, C.P., (1926). Greece and her refugees. Foreign Affairs. The Council on 
Foreign Relations. 
Huse, T., (2014). Everyday Life in The Gentrifying City: On Displacement, Ethnic 
Privileging and The Right to Stay Put. Surrey: Ashgate. 
Hyde, F.E., (1973). Far Eastern Trade: 1860-1914. London: Adam and Charles 
Black. 
Icduygu, A., Sirkeci, I. and Aydingu, I., (1998). Turkiye’de Icgoc ve Icgocun Isci 
Hareketine Etkisi (Local migration in Turkey and its effect on Labour 
Movement). In Turkiye  Türkiye’de İç Göç (Local Migration in Turkey). 
Istanbul: Turkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfi. 
ILO (International Labour Office), (1996). World Employment Reports 1996/1997. 
Geneva. 
IMP (Istanbul Metropolitan Planning and Urban Design Center), (2006). Istanbul 
Strategic Planning Studies – Study Report of Tourism Sector. Istanbul: 
Istanbul Greater Municipality, Metropolitan Planning and Urban Design 
Center. 
Islam, T. (2003) (Unpublished MA Thesis). Istanbul’da Soylulastirma: Galata 
Ornegi (Gentrification in Istanbul: The case of Galata). Istanbul: Yildiz 
Technical University. 
276	  
	  
İslam, T. (2005). Outside the Core: Gentrification in Istanbul. In R. Atkinson and G. 
Bridge (eds)  Gentrification in a Global Context. London: Routledge. 
İslam, T. (2010). Current Urban Discourse. Urban Transformation and 
Gentrification in Istanbul. Architectural Design, 80, 58–63.  
İslam, T., (2005). Outside the core: gentrification in Istanbul. In Atkinson R. and 
Bridge G. (eds.), Gentrification in a Global Context. London: Routledge. 
Islam, T., (2006).  Merkezin Dıșında: İstanbul’da Soylaștırma ( Outside the Core: 
Gentrification in Istanbul). In Behar, D. and Islam, T. (eds.), Istanbul’da 
Soylulastirma: Eski Kentin Yeni Sahipleri (Gentrification in Istanbul: New 
Owners of the Old City). Istanbul: Bilgi Universitesi Yayinlari. 
İslam, T., (2009). ‘Soylulaşma’, İstanbullaşmak (‘Gentrification’, becoming Istanbul 
citizen). In Dervis, P., Tanju, B. and Tanyeli, U. (eds.), Olgular, Sorunsallar, 
Metaforlar ( Concepts, Problems, Metaphors). Istanbul: Garanti Galeri.  
Islam, T., (2009). Retrieved 15.06.2015 from 
https://lsecities.net/media/objects/articles/tarlabasi/en-gb/. 
Islam, T., (2010). Current urban discourse: urban transformation and gentrification 
in Istanbul. Zaha Hadid Architects fromIMP Istanbul Metropolitan Planning and Urban 
Design Center.  
Islam, Tolga and Sakizlioglu, Bahar. (2015). The Making of and Resistance to State-
led Gentrification in Istanbul, Turkey. in Global Gentrificaitons: Uneven 
Development and Displacement. Bristol: Policy Press. 
Istanbul Territorial Plan Report, (2009). Istanbul: Istanbul Metropolitan 
Municipality.  
Jacobs, J., (1961). The Death and Life of Great American Cities. New York: 
Random House. 
277	  
	  
Jager, M., (1986). Class definition and the aesthetics of gentrification : Victoriana in 
Melbourne. Gentrification of the city. Boston: Unwin Hyman.  
Jean-Paul, R., (2013). The Geography of Transport Systems. New York: Routledge.  
Jelinek, C., (2011) State-led gentrification and relocation in Budapest: vacating a 
house in 
Ferencvaros. Paper presented at the International RC21 conference. 
JICA Report (2002). The Study on A Disaster Prevention / Mitigation Basic Plan 
in Istanbul Including Seismic Microzonation in the Republic of Turkey. 
İstanbul Büyükşehir Belediyesi –JICA ortak çalışması. 
Johnson, R.B. and Christensen, L.B., (2014). Educational Research: Quantitative, 
Qualitative, and Mixed Approaches (5th ed.). Los Angeles, CA: Sage. 
Julier, G., (2000). The Culture of Design. London: Sage. 
Kabadayı, M.E., (2011). Inventory for the Ottoman Empire/Turkish Republic. 
Istanbul: Istanbul Bilgi University.  
Karaman, O. and Islam, T., (2012).  On the dual nature of intra-urban borders: 
The case of a Romani neighbourhood in Istanbul. Cities, 29, 234-243. 
Karaman, O. and Islam, T., (2012). On the dual nature of intra-urban borders: The 
case of a Romani neighborhood in Istanbul. Cities, 29 (4), 234–243. 
Karaman, O., (2012). Urban renewal in Istanbul: reconfigured spaces, robotic lives. 
International Journal of Urban and Regional Planning, 37 (2), 715-733. 
Kasinitz, P., (1988). The gentrification of “Boerum Hill”: neighbourhood change 
and conflicts over definitions. Qualitative Sociology, 11 (3), 163-182.  
Kesteloot, C., (2005). Urban Socio-Spatial Configurations and the Future of 
European Cities. In Kazepov, Y. and Kazepov, Y. (ed.), Cities of Europe: 
278	  
	  
Changing Context, Local Arrangements, and the Cities of Europe: Changing 
Context, Local Arrangements, and the Challenge to Urban Cohesion. Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 
Keyder, C. (1999c). The Housing Market from Informal to Global, Istanbul: 
Between the Global and the Local. New York: Rowman&Littlefield 
Publishers. 
Keyder, C., (1987). State and Class in Turkey: A Study in Capitalist Development. 
London: Verso. 
King, A. (eds.), (1996).  Introduction: Cities, Texts and Paradigms in Re-presenting 
the city: ethnicity, capital and culture in the 21st Century. New York: New 
York University Press. 
Knox, P. and Taylor P., (2001). World cities in a world system. In P Knox and P 
Taylor (eds), World Cities In A World System. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Knox, P., (1995). World cities in a world system. In P. Knox and P. Taylor (eds.), 
World cities in a world-system. Routledge: London. 
Korotayev, A., Malkov, A. and Khaltourina, D., (2006). Introduction to Social 
Macrodynamics: Compact Macromodels of the World System Growth, 
Moscow: URSS 
Krijnen, M., and C. Beukelaer. (2015). Capital, State and Conflict: The Various 
Drivers of Diverse Gentrification Process in Beirut, Lebanon. In Global 
Gentrifications: Uneven Development and Displacement. Bristol: Policy Press. 
Kurtulus, H., (2005). Istanbul’da kapali yerlesmeler: Beykoz konaklari ornegi 
(Gated communities in Istanbul: the example of Beykoz Mansions).  In 
Kurtulus, H. (ed.), Istanbul’da Kentlse Ayrisma: Mekansal Donusumde Farkli 
Boyutlar (Segregation in Istanbul: Different Dimensions of Spatial 
Transformation). Istanbul: Baglam Yayincilik. 
279	  
	  
Kuymulu, M.B., (2013). Reclaiming the right to the city: Reflections on the urban 
uprisings in Turkey. City, 17, (3).    
Lawson, T., (2003). Reorienting Economics. London and New York: Routledge.  
Lees L. and Ley, D., (2008). Introduction to a special issue on gentrification and 
public policy. Urban Studies, 45 (12), 2879-84.  
Lees, L., (2003). Visions of “urban renaissance” the Urban Task Force report the 
Urban White Paper. In Imrie, R. and Raco, M. (eds.), Urban Renaissance?: 
New Labour Community and Urban Policy. Bristol: Policy Press.   
Lees, L., (2009) Ideologies of gentrification: from urban pioneer to contemporary 
state-led 
gentrification. Presentation to IAPS CSBE revitalizing urban environments 
conference in 12-16 October. Istanbul. 
Lees, L., (2009) Ideologies of gentrification: from urban pioneer to contemporary 
state-led 
gentrification. Presentation to IAPS CSBE Revitalizing Urban Environments 
Conference. Istanbul. 
Lees, L., H.B. Shin, and E. Lopes-Morales. (2015). eds. Global Gentrifications: 
Uneven Development and Displacement. Bristol: Policy Press. 
Lees, L., Slater, T. and Wyly, E., (2008). Gentrification. New York: Routledge 
Taylor and Francis Group 
LeGates, R. and Hartman, C., (1986). The anatomy of displacement in the United 
States. In Smith, N. and Williams, P. (eds.), Gentrification of the City. 
London: Unwin Hyman.  
Leitner, H., (1994). Capital markets, the development industry, and urban office 
market dynamics: rethinking building cycles. Environment and Planning A, 
26, 779-802. 
280	  
	  
Ley, D., (1996). The New Middle Class and the Remaking of the Central City. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Ley, D., (2003). Artists, aestheticisation and the field of gentrification. Urban 
Studies. 40 (12), 2527-2544. 
Lincoln, Y.S. and Guba, E.G., (1985). Naturalistic Inquiry. Newbury Park, 
California: Sage. 
Lopez-Morales, E. (2015). Gentrification in the Global South. City 19 (4): 564-573.  
Lyons, M., (1996). Gentrification, socioeconomic change and the geography of 
displacement. Journal of Urban Affairs, 18 (1), 39-62. 
Marcuse, P., (1985). Gentrification, abandonment and displacement: connections, 
causes and policy responses in New York city. Journal of Urban and 
Contemporary Law, 28, 195-240.  
Marcuse, P., (1986). Abandonment, gentrification and displacement: The linkages. 
In Smith, N. and Williams, P. (eds.), Gentrification of The City. London: 
Unwin Hyman.   
Marshall, C. and Rossman, G.B., (1989). Designing Qualitative Research. Newbury 
Park, California: Sage. 
Massey, D.B., (1984). Spatial Divisions of Labour: Social Structures and The 
Geography of Production. New York: Methuen. 
Maturana, H., and Varela, F. (1980). Autopoiesis and Cognition: the Realization of 
the Living. In Cohen, S. and Wartofsky, M.W. (eds.), Boston Studies in the 
Philosophy of Science. Dordecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co. 
McDonald, S.C., (1986). Does gentrification affect crime rates?. Chicago Journals. 
The University of Chicago Press. 
281	  
	  
McDowell, L. adn Massey, D., (1984). A woman’s place. In Massey, D. and Allen, 
J. (eds.), Geography Matters!. Cambridge: CUP.  
McKinsey’s Report, (1996). Vision Mumbai: Transforming Mumbai into a World-
Class City. Mumbai: Bombay First. 
Merrett, S., (1976) Gentrification in Housing and Class in Britain. The Conference 
of 
Socialist Economists, 44 49. 
Merrifield, A. (2014). The New Urban Question. London: Pluto.  
Migration and income rate of the regions in Turkey, (1985-2000). Turkish Statistical 
Institute (TurkStat). Istanbul. 
Mishan, E., (1969). The Costs of Economic Growth. Harmondsworth: Penguin. 
Moore, P.W., (1982). Gentrification and The Residential Geography of The New 
Class. Mimeo. Toronto: University of Toronto. 
Moulaert, F., (2000). Globalization and Integrated Area Development in European 
Cities. 
Oxford University Press: Oxford. 
Narli, N., (2006). Tecride ugrayan bir bolgede yasayan ailelerin ‘soylulartirma’ 
projesine yaklasimi: Balat-Fener vaka calismasi (Approach of an exiled family 
towards the project of ‘gentrification’: Balat-Fener case study). In Behar, D. 
and Islam, T. (eds.), Istanbul’da Soylulastirma: Eski Kentin Yeni Sahipleri 
(Gentrification in Istanbul: New Owners of the Old City). Istanbul: Bilgi 
Universitesi Yayinlari. 
Neuwirth, R (2004). Shadow Cities: A Billion Squatters, A New Urban World. 
London: Routledge. 
New Jersey. Urban Affairs Review, 36, 497–531. 
282	  
	  
Newman, K. and Wyly, E., (2006). The right to stay put, revisited: gentrification and 
resistance to displacement in New York City. Urban Studies, 43 (1), 23-57.  
Nowill, S.E.P., (2011). Constantinople and Istanbul: 72 Years of Life in Turkey. 
Leicester: Matador. 
Number of Arrivals to Istanbul by years, (2008).  Ministry of Culture and Tourism 
annual statistics. Retrieved 17.01.2015 from  www.kulturturizm.gov.tr. 
of suburban decline: Residential disinvestment and its discontents in Camden 
County, 
Olsen, W., (2010). Realist methodology: a review. In Olsen, W. (ed.), Benchmarks 
in Social Research Methods: Realist Methods. London: Sage.  
Oncel, D. (2002). Un Nouveau Type d’Habitat Ottoman a Galata (Istanbul) a la Fın 
duXIXe Siecle. Paris: Ecole d’Architecture de Paris-Belle Ville /Institut 
Français d’Urbanisme Universite de Paris VII Vincennes-Saint-Denis. 
Unpublished PhD Thesis. 
Oncu, A. (1997). The myth of the ideal home travels across cultural borders to 
Istanbul. In A.Oncu and P. Weyland (ed) Space, Culture and Power: New 
Identities in Globalizing Cities. London:Zed Books. 
Ortayli, I., (1996). Türkiye İdare Tarihine Giriş (Introduction to the history of 
Turkish administration). Istanbul: Turhan Kitabevi.  
Ozatay, F. and Sak, G., (2002). The 2000-2001 Financial Crisis In Turkey. Central 
Bank of Turkey and Ankara University. 
Palabiyik, H., (2008). Turkish Public Administration: From Tradition to the Modern 
Age. Ankara: USAK Books.  
Pamuk, S., (2007). Economic change in twentieth-century Turkey: is the glass more 
than half full?. In Kasaba, R. (ed.), Turkey in the Modern World, 4, 266-300. 
283	  
	  
 Paton, K., (2014). Gentrification: A Working Class Perspective. Surrey: Ashgate.  
Patton, M.Q., (1990). Qualitative Evaluation and Research Methods (2nd ed.). 
Newbury Park: Sage.  
Pine, J. and Gilmore, J., (1999). The Experience Economy. Boston: Harvard 
Business School Press. 
Pollard, J., (2001). The global financial system: worlds of monies. Human 
geography. Edinburgh: Pearson Education. 
Popkin, S.J., Katz, B., Cunningham, M.K., Brown, K., Gustafson, J. and Turner, 
M.A., (2004). A Decade of Hope VI: Research Findings and Policy 
Challenges, Washington DC: Urban Institute. 
Psillos, S. and Curd, M., (2010). The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of 
Science. London: Routledge.  
Putnam, H., (1999). The Threefold Cord: Mind, Body, and World. New York: 
Columbia University Press.  
Raban, J., (1974). Soft City. London: Fontana.  
 Railton, P., (2000) Morality, ideology, and reflection, or the duck sits yet. In 
Harcourt E. (ed.), Morality, Reflection, and Ideology. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Regional Statistical Indicators, (1923-2013). Turkish Statistical Institute (TurkStat). 
Istanbul. 
Resmi Gazete, (2007). Law no.5706 about Istanbul as a European Culture Capital. 
Retrieved 20.06.2015 from 
www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2007/11/20071114-1.htm. 
284	  
	  
Robinson, J. (2011). Cities in a World Of Cities: The Comparative Gesture. 
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 35 (1): 1–23.  
Roche, M., (2005). Historical Research and Archival Sources. In Hay, I. (ed.), 
Qualitative Research Methods in Human Geography (2nd ed.). Melbourne: 
Oxford University Press. 
Rose, D., (2004). Discourses and experiences of social mix in gentrifying 
neighbourhoods: A Montreal case study. Canadian Journal of Urban Research, 
13 (2), 278-316.  
Roy, A. (2009). The 21st Century Metropolis: New Geographies of Theory. Regional 
Studies 43: 819-830. 
Sabah Newspaper, (11 May 2012). ‘Tarlabasi will be complete in three years’. 
Retrieved 15.0.2015 from  http://img-
zadaca.mediatriple.net/tarlabasi360/img/basin/00012.jpg. 
Sabah Newspaper, (3 July 2012). ‘Half of Beyoglu will be transformed.’ Retrieved 
15.0.2015 from  http://img-
zadaca.mediatriple.net/tarlabasi360/img/basin/00009.jpg 
Sakizlioglu, N.B., (2007). Impacts Of Urban Renewal Policies: The Case Of 
Tarlabasi-Istanbul. Unpublished M.Sc. Thesis. Ankara: Middle Eastern 
Technical University. 
Sasanlar, B.T., (2006). A Historical Panorama of an Istanbul Neighborhood: 
Cihangir from the Late Nineteenth Century to the 2000s. Istanbul: Bogaziçi 
University. 
Saskia, S., (2002). Globalization and the formation of claims. In Richard Grant and 
John R. Short (eds), Globalization at the Margins. New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan.  
285	  
	  
Sassen, S., (1984). Capital Mobility and Labor Migration: Their Expression in Core 
Cities. 
Urbanization in the World System. New York: Academic Press. 
Sassen, S., (1991). The global city: New York, London, Tokyo. Princeton University 
Press, 
Princeton, NJ 
Sassen, S., (1998). The Mobility of Labour and Capital. CUP.  
Sassen, S., (2001). The global city: New York, London, Tokyo. Princeton and 
Oxford: Princeton University Press.  
Sayer, A., (1997). Critical realism and the limits to critical social science. Journal for 
the Theory of Social Behaviour, 27 (4), 473-488. 
Sayer, A., (2000a). Realism and Social Science. London: Sage.  
Sayer, R.A., (2000). Realism and social science. London: Sage. 
Sayer, R.A., (2009). Who's afraid of critical social science?. Current Sociology, 57 
(6), 767-786. 
Schiller, D., (1999). Digital Capitalism: Networking the Global Market System. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Scissors, D., (2009). Deng undone: the costs of halting market reform in china. 
Foreign Affairs, 88 (3). 
Sen, B. (2011). Kentsel mekanda uclu ittifak: sanayisizlestirme, soylulastirma, yeni 
orta sinif (Ternary Alliance in urban space: de-industrialization, gentrification, 
new middle class). I.U. Siyasal Bilgiler Fakultesi Dergisi, 44, 1-21. 
Sen, B., (2005). Soylulastirma: kentsel mekanda yeni bir ayrisma bicimi 
(Gentrification: a new segregation method in the urban space). In Kurtulus, H. 
286	  
	  
(ed.), Istanbul’da Kentlse Ayrisma: Mekansal Donusumde Farkli Boyutlar 
(Segregation in Istanbul: Different Dimensions of Spatial Transformation). 
Istanbul: Baglam Yayincilik.  
Sen, B., (2008). Istanbul’da konut sorununun çözüm önerileri neden radikal 
olmalıdır? (Why the solutions for housing problmes in Istanbul should be 
radical?). TMMOB Istanbul Il Koordinasyon Kurulu. Istanbul. 
Sen, B., (2009). Kentsel donusum: kavramsal kargasa ve neoliberalism (Urban 
regeneration: confusion of the concept and neoliberalism). Iktisat Dergisi: 
Sermaye Birikimi Acisindan Kentsel Donusum, 499. 
Senyapili, T., (1992). A new stage of gecekondu housing in Istanbul: development 
of Istanbul Metropolitan Area and Low Cost Housing. Turkish Social Science 
Association, 98- 
127. 
Sevk ve İskân Kanunu (Relocation and Resettlement Law). Research Centre for 
Turkish–Armenian Relations. Retrieved 25.04.2013 from Ataturk University.  
Shih, M. I. (2010). The Evolving Law of Disputed Reloca- tion: Constructing Inner-
City Renewal Practices in Shanghai, 1990–2005. International Journal of 
Urban and Regional Research 34 (2): 350–364.  
Shin, H.B., and S.H. Kim. (2015). The Developmental State, Speculative 
Urbanisation and the Politics of Displacement in Gentrifying Seoul. Urban 
Studies.  
Slater, T. (2015). Planetary Rent Gaps. Antipode 00: 1-24. 
Slater, T., (2002). Looking at the "North American city" through the lens of 
gentrification discourse. Urban Geography, 23 (2), 131-153.  
287	  
	  
Slater, T., (2004) `North American gentrification? Revanchist and emancipatory 
perspectives 
explored.' Environment and Planning A. 36, 1191-1213. 
Slater, T., (2006). The eviction of critical perspectives from gentrification research. 
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 30 (4), 737-57.  
Sleath, E.C., (1984). Heritage Preservation: The Case of Downtown New 
Westminster. Master Thesis, The University of British Columbia. 
Smith, J., (1999) Cleaning up public housing by sweeping out the poor. Habitat 
International. 
23, 49-62.  
Smith, N., (1979). Toward a theory of gentrification: a back to the city movement by 
capital, 
not people. Journal of the American Planning Association, 45, 538-48.  
Smith, N., (1987). Gentrification and the rent-gap. Annals of the Association of 
American 
Geographers. 77 (3), 462–465.  
Smith, N., (1990). Geography redux? The history and theory of geography. Progress 
in Human Geography, 14(4), 547-559. 
Smith, N., (1996). The New Urban Frontier: Gentrification and The Revanchist City. 
London: Routledge. 
Smith, N., (2002). New globalism, new urbanism: gentrification as global urban 
strategy. 
Antipode, 34, 427-450. 
Smith, N., (2007). Another revolution is possible: Foucault, ethics, and politics. 
Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 25, 191–193. 
288	  
	  
Smith, N., Caris P. and Wyly, E., (2001). The “Camden Syndrome” and the menace 
Smith, T.W. (2001.). Constructing A Human Rights Regime in Turkey: Dilemmas of 
Civic Nationalism and Civil Society. Presented at the American Political 
Science association annual conference in San Francisco. 
Soja, E., (2000). Post-metropolis: Critical Studies of Cities and Regions. Oxford: 
Basil and Blackwell. 
Sonmez, M., (2012). Turkey’s second privatization agency: TOKI. Retrieved 
20.02.2014 from www.reflectionsturkey.com/?p=489. 
SPO (State Planning Office), (1995). 7th 5 Years Development Plan Report. Ankara: 
State Planning Office. 
SPO (State Planning Office), (2000). 8th 5 Years Development Plan, Regional 
Development 
Specialization Commission Report. Ankara: State Planning Office. 
SPO (State Planning Office), (2007). 9th 5 Years Development Plan, Tourism 
Specialization Commission Report. Ankara: State Planning Office. 
Star Newspaper, (17 August 2012). ‘Tarlabasi is a poisoned princess. We are healing 
her.’  Retrieved 15.0.2015 from http://img-
zadaca.mediatriple.net/tarlabasi360/img/basin/00014.jpg. 
Sulukule Platform, (2009). Alternatif Sulukule Projesi (Alternative Sulukule 
Project). Retrieved  15.05.2015 from sulukuleatolyesi.blogspot.co.uk/ 
Swyngedouw, E., Moulaert, F. and Rodriguez, A., (2002). Neoliberal Urbanization 
in Europe: Large-Scale Urban Development Projects and the New Urban 
Policy. Antipode. 34, 542-577. 
Takvim-i Vekayi, April 27, 1919 Number 3540. Ihsan Bey, Director of the Special 
Office of the Interior Ministry confirms that Abdulahad Nuri Bey, who had 
289	  
	  
been sent from Istanbul to the office in Aleppo has stated: The main reason for 
the deportations is annihilation. 
Taylor P. J., (1997). Hierarchical tendencies amongst world cities: a global research 
proposal. Cities, 14 (6), 323-332. 
Teddlie, C. and Tashakkori, A., (2009). Foundations of Mixed Methods Research: 
Integrating Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches in the Social and 
Behavioral Sciences. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Tekeli, I,. (1998). Turkiye’de cumhuriyet doneminde kentsel gelisme ve kent 
planlamasi (Urban planning and development in Turkish Republic). Istanbul: 
75 Yilda Degisen Kent ve Mimarlik. Tarih Vakfi. 
Tekeli, I., (1982). Turkiye'de Kentlesme Yazilari (Essays on Urbanization in 
Turkey). Ankara: Turhan Kitabevi. 
Temizel, H., (2007). Neo-Liberal Politikalar Dogrultusunda Turkiye’de Devletin 
Yeniden 
Yapılanması: Kuresel Sistemle Butunlesme Sorunları (Restructuring the 
Turkish State with Neo-liberal Politics: Integration Problems with the Global 
System). Selcuk University: Konya, PhD Thesis. 
The Chamber of Architects Archive, (2005) 39th Working report. Istanbul: The 
Chamber of Architects. 
The Chamber of Architects Archive, (2008-2010) 40th Working report. Istanbul: The 
Chamber of Architects. 
The Chamber of Architects Archive, (2009) 40th Working report. Istanbul: The 
Chamber of Architects. 
The Loughborough Group (GaWC) inventory of world cities. (1998). Globalization 
and World Cities Research Network.  
290	  
	  
The UK Design Council Report, (2000). 
Tilly, C., (2008). Contentious Performances. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Timur, S., (1972). Turkiye’de Aile Yapisi (Family Structure in Turkey). Ankara: 
Hacettepe Universitesi Yayinlari.  
Topbas, K. (2005). Hurriyet.  Retrieved 16.05.2015, from 
http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=311741 
Tugac, A., Yurt, I., Ergil, G. and Sevil, H.T., (1970). Turk koyunde modernlesme 
egilimleri arastirmasi (Research for modernization tendencies in Turkish 
villages). Ankara: State Planning Organization. 
Türel, A.; Osmay, S.;Güvenç, M.; Ataöv A. and Akkar, M. (2006). İstanbul Eylem 
Planlamasına Yönelik Mekansal Gelisme Stratejileri Arastırma ve Model 
Gelistirme Çalısmaları (Studies of Spatial Development Strategies and Model 
Development for the Planning of Istanbul). Ankara: METU Sehir ve Bölge 
Planlama Bölümü. 
Turkish National Insurance Catastrophe Insurance Pool, (2007). Retrieved 
15.04.2015 from 
www.wfcatprogrammes.com/c/document_library/get_file?folderId=12508&na
me=DLFE-545.pdf. 
Turkmen, H., (2014). Urban Renewal Projects and Dynamics of Contention In 
Istanbul: The Cases Of Fener-Balat-Ayvansaray and Suleymaniye. 
Unpublished PhD Thesis. Cardiff: University of Cardiff. 
Turkun, A. (2011). Urban Regeneration and Hegemonic Power Relations. 
International Planning Studies, 16(1), 61-72. 
291	  
	  
Turkun, A. and Sen, B., (2009). Radical Transformations in Historic Urban Centers 
and Squatter Housing Neighborhoods in Istanbul. Presented at RC21 
Congress, Inequality, Inclusion and the Sense of Belonging. Sao Paulo. 
Turkun, A. and Yapici, M., (2009a), Kentsel donusum ve yasalarin aracsallasan rolu 
(Urban regeneration and the role of laws). Iktisat Dergisi: Sermaye Birikimi 
Acisindan Kentsel Donusum, 499. 
Turkun, A., (2007). Kentsel turizmin telismis ve azgelismis ulkelerde yansımaları 
(Effects of urban tourism in less developed and more developed countries). 
Presented at TMMOB Istanbul Kent Sempozyumu. Istanbul. 
Turkun, A., (2009). The manifestations of voluntary and involuntary migration in 
Turkish cities: from ‘spaces of hope’ to ‘spaces of hopelessness’. Urban 
Poverty in Developing Countries: Issues and Strategies for Sustainable Cities. 
New Delhi: Bookwell.  
Turkun, A., (2009b). The manifestations of voluntary and involuntary migration in 
Turkish 
cities: from ‘spaces of hope’ to ‘spaces of hopelessness’. In Sandhu, R.S., 
Sandhu, S. and Arora B. (eds.), Urban Poverty in Developing Countries: Issues 
and Strategies for Sustainable Cities. New Delhi: Bookwell. 
Turkun, A., (2011). Urban regeneration and hegemonic power relationships. 
International 
Planning Studies, 16 (1), 61-72. 
TURSAB (Association of Turkish Travel Agencies), (2002). Annual Study Report. 
Istanbul: Association of Turkish Travel Agencies. 
Uitermark J., Duyvendak J.W. and Kleinhans R., (2007). Gentrification as a 
governmental strategy: social control and social cohesion in Hoogvliet, 
Rotterdam. Environment and Planning A, 39 (1), 125-41. 
UNDP, Development Centre, (2006). Forced Migration and its Effects: Diyarbakır. 
292	  
	  
Ünlü, A.; Alkışer, Y. and Edgü, E. (2000), Fiziksel ve Sosyo-kültürel Değişim 
Bağlamında Beyoğlu’nda Suç Olgusunun Değerlendirilmesi (An Evaluation of 
the Concept of Crime in Beyoglu According to the Physical and Socio-cultural 
Change). İstanbul TeknikÜniversitesi Araştırma Fonu, 1094. 
Unlu, A.; Ocakci, M.; Tonbul, Z.; Ozden, T.; Alkiser, Y.; Ulken, G.; Cimsit, F.; 
Yuzel, G.; Apak, S. and Akbulut, T. (2005). Avrupa Birligi Uyum Programlari 
Kapsaminda Pilot Bolge Olarak Beyoglu Cokuntu Alanlarinin Aktif Kullanim 
Amacli Rehabilitasyonu Projesi Raporu (Report for the European Union 
Programmes of Deteriorated Urban Areas for the Purpose of Rehabilitation: 
Beyoglu) . Istanbul Technical University. 
Urry, J., (1995). Consuming Places. London: Routledge.  
Uzun, C. N. (2006). Kentsel dönüşümde yeni bir kavram: seçkinleştirme (New 
concept in urban space: gentrification).  In Eraydın A. (ed.), Değişen Mekân: 
Mekânsal  Süreçlere İlişkin Tartışma ve Araştırmalara Toplu Bakış: 1923-
2003 (Changing Space: Discussions about Processes and Evaluation of 
Research: 1923-2003). Ankara: Dost Kitabevi Yayınları, 340-360.  
Uzun, N. (2001). Gentrification in Istanbul: A Diagnostic Study. Unpublished MA 
Thesis. Utrecht: Faculteit Ruimtelijke Watenschappen.  
Varela, F., Thompson, E. and Rosch, E., (1991). The embodied mind. Cambridge: 
MIT Press. 
Varela, F., Thompson, E., and Rosch, E. (1991). The embodied mind. MIT Press: 
Cambridge. 
Vatan Newspaper, (26 August, 2012). ‘Tarlabasi will create a domino effect’. 
Retrieved 15.0.2015 from  http://img-
zadaca.mediatriple.net/tarlabasi360/img/basin/00016.jpg. 
Veldboer L., Kleinhans, R. and Duyvendak J.W., (2002). The diversified 
neighbourhood in 
293	  
	  
Western Europe and the United States: how do countries deal with the spatial 
distribution of 
economic and cultural differences?. Journal of International Migration and 
Integration, 3 (1),41-64.  
Vryonis, S., (1 January 2005). The Mechanism of Catastrophe: The Turkish Pogrom 
of September 6-7, 1955, and the Destruction of the Greek Community of 
Istanbul. New York: Greekworks.com Inc. 
Walby, S., (2001). Against epistemological chasms: the science question in 
feminism revisited. Signs, 26 (2), 485-509.  
Warde, A., (1991). Gentrification as consumption: issues of class and gender. 
Society and Space, 9, 223-232. 
Warf, B. (ed.), (2010). New international division of labor. Encyclopedia of 
Geography. Sage Publication: London.  
Warf, B., (1999). The hypermobility of capital and the collapse of the Keynesian 
state. In  Martin R. (ed.), Money and the Space Economy. London: Wiley. 
Webb, D., (2010). Problem neighbourhoods in a part linear, part network regime: 
problems 
with, and possible responses to, housing market renewal Leviathan. PhD 
Thesis. Newcastle 
University. 
Weber, R., (2002). Extracting value from the city: neoliberalism and urban 
redevelopment. 
Antipode, 34 (3), 519-540. 
Weber, R., (2002). Extracting value from the city: neoliberalism and urban 
redevelopment. 
Antipode. 34 (3), 519-540. 
294	  
	  
Weesep, J., (1994) Gentrification as a research frontier. Progress in Human 
Geography. 18, 
74-83.  
Williams, R., (1986). Keywords (new edition). New York: Oxford University Press.  
Winter, J., (2004). America and the Armenian Genocide of 1915. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
World Heritage Papers,  (2008). World Heritage and Buffer Zones. Davos, 
Switzerland: UNESCO. 
Yalçıntan M.C. and Çavuşoğlu E., (2012) Kentsel Dönüşümü ve Kentsel Muhalefeti 
Kent Hakkı Üzerinden Düşünmek, (Urban Regeneration and Thinking Urban 
Opposition via Right to Stay). In Cinar, B. (ed.), Kentsel Dönüşüm ve İnsan 
Hakları, (Urban Transformation and Human Rights). Istanbul: Bilgi Yayınları. 
Yalçıntan M.C., (2010). İstanbul’un Kentsel Dönüşüm Haritası ve Gecekondu 
Mahallelerinde Geliştirilen Kentsel Dönüşüm Projeleri, (Mapping Urban 
Regeneration in Istanbul and Urban Regeneration Projects Prepared for 
Squatter Areas). MSGSÜ BAP Project. 
Yeldan, E., (2002). Behind the 2000/2001 Turkish crisis: stability, credibility and 
governance for Whom?, Presented at International Development Economics 
Associates (IDEAs) Conference on International Money and Developing 
Countries: Theoretical and Policy Issues in the Current Context, Chennai, 
India. 
 YEM, (2008). History of  Sulukule. Retreived 16.03.2015 from 
www.mimarizm.com/kentintozu/Makale.aspx?id=338&sid=328.  
Yeni Safak Newspaper, (31 December 2012). ‘ A safe environment will be created 
in Tarlabasi.’ Retrieved 15.0.2015 from http://img-
zadaca.mediatriple.net/tarlabasi360/img/basin/00017.jpg.  
295	  
	  
Yilmaz, E. and Pak, E.O., (2013). Istanbul Version 2.0 | the struggle between 
modernisation and historical heritage: The case of Sulukule. Presented at 
International Conference on Cities, People, Places, Sri Lanka. 
Yilmaz, E., (2010). Turkiye’de kentsel donusum politikalari ve TOKI’nin 
onlenemez yukselisi (Urban regeneration politics in Turkey and MHDA’s 
unstoppable increase). Retrieved 15.12.2014 from 
www.academia.edu/2180307/T%C3%BCrkiye_de_Kentsel_D%C3%B6n%C3
%BC%C5%9F%C3%BCm_Politikalar%C4%B1_ve_TOK%C4%B0_nin_%C
3%96nlenemez_Y%C3%BCkseli%C5%9Fi.  
Zukin, S., (1987). Gentrification: culture and capital in the urban core. Annual 
Review of Sociology, 13, 129-147. 
Zukin, S., (1988). Loft Living: Culture and Capital in Urban Change. London: 
Penguin Books Ltd.  
Zukin, S., (1989). Loft Living: Culture and Capital in Urban Change. New 
Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.  
Zurcher, E.J., (2004). Turkey: A Modern history (3rd ed.). London: I.B. Tauris.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
296	  
	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
297	  
	  
APPENDIXES 
Appendix A: The Interview Questions	  
For Officers in the Municipality 
Tarlabasi 
1. Can you summarize the urban renewal project in Tarlabasi? 
2. What kind of responsibilities does the municipality has for the inhabitants of 
the neighbourhood? 
3. What the project has done in the neighbourhood? 
4. What the project is aiming to accomplish in the neighbourhood? 
5. What do you think about the socio-economic situation of Tarlabasi? 
6. How do you think the housing market in Tarlabasi will be affected? 
7. How can you compare the current inhabitants and the potential future 
inhabitants of the neighbourhood? 
8. What kind of informative meetings did the municipality arrange for the 
Project? 
9. What kind of policies did the municipality follow to sort out the problems 
(drug problems, crime rates) in the neighbourhood? 
10. What kind of collaboration was made between the municipality and NGOs? 
11. Do you think the current inhabitants would be able to stay in Tarlabasi after 
the completion of the Project? Why? 
12. What do you think about the gentrification process in Tarlabasi? 
13. In your professional opinion, what can be done to avoid displacement in this 
area? 
14. If I tell you the aim of this research is to explore how the current inhabitants 
might be enabled to stay, how would you achieve this goal?  
Galata 
1. What do you think about the gentrification process in Galata? 
2. How do you think Galata changed throughout the years? 
3. Are there any future projects considering Galata? 
For People in the Construction Firm 
Tarlabasi 
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1. Can you summarize the urban renewal project in Tarlabasi? 
2. What kind of responsibilities does your company has for the inhabitants of the 
neighbourhood? 
3. What the project has done in the neighbourhood? 
4. What the project is aiming to accomplish in the neighbourhood? 
5. In your opinion, what will happen to housing market in the neighbourhood? 
6. What is the compensation for the current inhabitants of the neighbourhood? 
7. How easy have your dealings been with residents of Tarlabasi? 
8. What difficulties have occurred to you during the project? What has been the 
role of inhabitants? 
9. In your idea, what kind of changes will happen in the inhabitants profile of 
Tarlabasi? 
10. Are you thinking about taking responsibility of construction of any other 
urban regeneration projects? Which ones? 
11. What do you think about the potential inhabitant profile after the Project? 
12. What do you think about the gentrification process in Tarlabasi? 
13. Do you think the Project will cause any kind of displacement? Why? 
14. In your professional opinion, what can be done to avoid displacement in this 
area? 
15. If I tell you the aim of this research is to explore how the current inhabitants 
might be enabled to stay, how would you achieve this goal?  
For Officers in the MHDA 
Tarlabasi 
1. Can you summarize the urban renewal project in Tarlabasi? 
2. What kind of responsibilities does the MHDA has for the inhabitants of the 
neighbourhood? 
3. What the project has done in the neighbourhood? 
4. What the project is aiming to accomplish in the neighbourhood? 
5. What do you think about the socio-economic situation of Tarlabasi? 
6. How do you think the housing market in Tarlabasi will be affected? 
7. How can you compare the current inhabitants and the potential future 
inhabitants of the neighbourhood? 
8. What do you think about the socio-economic situation of Tarlabasi? 
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9. What kind of a collobaration was between NGOs, Chambers and MHDA? 
10. What kind of collaboration was between NGOs, Chambers and MHDA? 
11. What kind of informative meetings did MHDA arrange for the Project? 
12. In your idea, what kind of changes will happen in the inhabitants profile of 
Tarlabasi? 
13. What do you think about the potential inhabitant profile after the Project? 
14. What do you think about the gentrification process in Tarlabasi? 
15. Do you think the Project will cause any kind of displacement? Why? 
16. In your professional opinion, what can be done to avoid displacement in this 
area? 
17. If I tell you the aim of this research is to explore how the current inhabitants 
might be enabled to stay, how would you achieve this goal?  
For the Inhabitants of Galata (Owner-Occupiers) 
Information about the interviewee 
Name of the interviewee: 
Age of the interviewee: 
Where the interviewee is from: 
Number of family members the interviewee has: 
Education of the interviewee: 
Marital status of the interviewee: 
Ethnicity of the interviewee: 
First language of the interviewee: 
Current job of the interviewee: 
Whereabouts of the current job of the interviewee: 
Current jobs of the family members: 
Whereabouts of the current jobs of the family members: 
1. How long have you been living in your present house and in Galata? 
2. Do you have family or friends living in Galata? 
3. Are you a tenant or the owner? 
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4. How did you find this house? 
5. How much do you think the house you were living in is worth? 
6. Why did you choose to live in Galata? 
Information about the previous owner-occupier 
1. Do you know who lived before you in the residence? 
2. When you moved into this house did the previous owners were still living in 
the house? 
3. Do you know the jobs of the previous owners? 
4. Do you know where did the previous owners move to? 
Information about the building 
1. What kind of repairments did you do after you moved in? 
2. Are there any problems in the buildings that are impossible to deal with? 
3. When did you buy this house? 
4. What kind of resources did you use while purchasing this house? (inheritance, 
bank credit, cash…) 
5. Do you have any other houses in this district? 
6. Are you thinking about selling this house? If you are, for how much? 
7. If you wanted to rent out this house, for how much would you rent it out? 
8. If you sell this house where would you like to live? Why? 
9. (if the interviewee lived in the area 10 years or more) What do you think about 
the changes that your neighbourhood faced? 
Information about the neighbourhood 
1. Are you thinking about moving away? 
2. Where would you like to move to? 
3. Did you have any troubles with your neighbours? If you did, can you describe 
them? 
4. Are you happy to live here and why? 
5. What kind of problems did you have while you have been living here? 
6. Who deals with the problems of the district? (municipality, NGOs, shop 
owners) 
7. What kind of neighbourhood do you think this neighbourhood will become? 
8. What are the main problems of Galata? 
9. Where do you go for the problems that you face in the neighbourhood? 
10. What do you think makes Galata special? 
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11. Do you have anything else to add to the interview? 
For the Inhabitants of Galata (Tenants) 
Information about the interviewee 
Name of the interviewee: 
Age of the interviewee: 
Where the interviewee is from: 
Number of family members the interviewee has: 
Education of the interviewee: 
Marital status of the interviewee: 
Ethnicity of the interviewee: 
First language of the interviewee: 
Current job of the interviewee: 
Whereabouts of the current job of the interviewee: 
Current jobs of the family members: 
Whereabouts of the current jobs of the family members: 
 
1. How long have you been living in your present house and in Galata? 
2. Do you have family or friends living in Galata? 
3. Are you a tenant or the owner? 
4. How did you find this house? 
5. What is the price you are paying every month? 
6. How much do you think the house you were living in is worth? 
7. Why did you choose Galata? 
Information about landlord 
1. Has your landlord ever spoken of selling the house? 
2. What is your landlord’s current job? 
3. Where does your landlord live? 
Information about the previous tenant 
1. Do you know who lived before you in the residence? 
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2. When you moved into this house did the previous tenants were still living in 
the house? 
3. Do you know the jobs of the previous tenants? 
4. Do you know where did the previous tenants move to? 
5. Problems of the building 
6. What kind of repairments did you do after you moved in? 
7. Are there any problems in the buildings that are impossible to deal with? 
8. Information about the neighbourhood 
9. (if the interviewee lived in the area 10 years or more) What do you think about 
the changes that your neighbourhood faced? 
10. Are you thinking about moving away? 
11. Where would you like to move to? 
12. Did you have any troubles with your neighbours? If you did can you describe 
them? 
13. Are you happy to live here and why? 
14. What kind of problems did you have while you are living here? 
15. Who deals with the problems of the district? (municipality, NGOs, shop 
owners) 
16. What kind of neighbourhood do you think this neighbourhood will become? 
17. What are the main problems of Galata? 
18. Where do you go for the problems that you face in the neighbourhood? 
19. What do you think makes Galata special? 
20. Do you have anything else to add to the interview? 
For Galata Displacees 
Information about the interviewee and household 
Name of the interviewee: 
Age of the interviewee: 
Where the interviewee is from: 
Number of family members the interviewee has: 
Education of the interviewee: 
Marital status of the interviewee: 
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Ethnicity of the interviewee: 
First language of the interviewee: 
Current job of the interviewee: 
Whereabouts of the current job of the interviewee: 
Current jobs of the family members: 
Whereabouts of the current jobs of the family members: 
 
Reasons of moving away from Galata? 
1. What was your job when you were living in Galata? 
2. Do you any family or friends still living in Galata? 
3. Why did you move to your current neighbourhood? 
Information about present accommodation 
4. How long does it take for you to get to your work place? 
5. Are you a tenant or the owner? 
6. How did you find this house? 
7. How long have you been living in this neighbourhood? 
8. How do you feel about the district you are living in right now? 
9. Do you miss your previous neighbourhood? 
Present problems 
10. Are there any problems in the buildings that are impossible to deal with? 
11. Did you have any troubles with your neighbours? If you did can you describe 
them? 
12. What kind of problems did you have while you are living here? 
13. Who deals with the problems of the district? (municipality, NGOs, shop 
owners) 
14. What kind of neighbourhood do you think this neighbourhood will become? 
15. Are you considering yourself as a victim of gentrification? Why? 
16. Do you have anything else to add to the interview? 
For the Inhabitants of Tarlabasi (Owner-Occupiers) 
Information about the interviewee 
Name of the interviewee: 
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Age of the interviewee: 
Where the interviewee is from: 
Number of family members the interviewee has: 
Education of the interviewee: 
Marital status of the interviewee: 
Ethnicity of the interviewee: 
First language of the interviewee: 
Current job of the interviewee: 
Whereabouts of the current job of the interviewee: 
Current jobs of the family members: 
Whereabouts of the current jobs of the family members: 
1. How long have you been living in your present house and in Tarlabasi? 
2. Are you a tenant or the owner? 
3. How did you find this house? 
4. Why did you choose Tarlabasi? 
Information about the previous owner-occupier 
5. Do you know who lived before you in the residence? 
6. When you moved into this house did the previous owners were still living in 
the house? 
7. Do you know where did the previous owners move to? 
8. How much do you think the house you were living in is worth? 
9. Do you know the jobs of the previous owners? 
Information about the building 
10. What kind of repairments did you do after you moved in? 
11. Are there any problems in the buildings that are impossible to deal with? 
12. When did you buy this house? 
13. What kind of resources did you use while purchasing this house? 
(inheritance, bank credit, cash…) 
14. Do you have any other houses in this district? 
15. Are you thinking about selling this house? If you are, for how much? 
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16. If you wanted to rent out this house, for how much would you rent it out? 
17. If you sell this house where would you like to live? Why? 
Information about the neighbourhood 
18. (if the interviewee lived in the area 10 years or more) What do you think 
about the changes that your neighbourhood faced? 
19. Are you thinking about moving away? 
20. Where would you like to move to? 
21. What kind of changes did Tarlabasi have during the years? 
22. Did you have any troubles with your neighbours? If you did can you describe 
them? 
23. Are you happy to live here and why? 
24. What kind of problems did you have while you have been living here? 
25. Who deals with the problems of the district? (municipality, NGOs, shop 
owners) 
26. What kind of neighbourhood do you think this neighbourhood will become? 
27. What are the main problems of Tarlabasi? 
28. What do you think makes Tarlabasi special? 
29. Do you have family or friends living in Tarlabasi? 
30. Where did you hear the Tarlabasi renewal project? 
31. What kind of meetings would you expect from the institutions? 
(municipality, NGOs.. etc) 
32. What do you think about the renewal project? Why? 
33. Do you have anything else to add to the interview? 
For the Inhabitants of Tarlabasi (Tenants) 
Information about the interviewee 
Name of the interviewee: 
Age of the interviewee: 
Where the interviewee is from: 
Number of family members the interviewee has: 
Education of the interviewee: 
Marital status of the interviewee: 
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Ethnicity of the interviewee: 
First language of the interviewee: 
Current job of the interviewee: 
Whereabouts of the current job of the interviewee: 
Current jobs of the family members: 
Whereabouts of the current jobs of the family members: 
 
1. How long have you been living in your present house and in Tarlabasi? 
2. Do you have family or friends living in Tarlabasi? 
3. Are you a tenant or the owner? 
4. How did you find this house? 
5. Why did you choose Tarlabasi? 
6. What is the price you are paying every month? 
Information about landlord 
7. Has your landlord ever spoken of selling the house? 
8. What is your landlord’s current job? 
9. Where does your landlord live? 
Information about the previous tenant 
10. Do you know who lived before you in the residence? 
11. When you moved into this house did the previous tenants were still living in 
the house? 
12. Do you know where did the previous tenants move to? 
13. How much do you think the house you were living in is worth? 
14. Do you know the jobs of the previous tenants? 
Problems of the building 
15. What kind of repairments did you do after you moved in? 
16. Are there any problems in the buildings that are impossible to deal with? 
Information about the neighbourhood 
 
17. (if the interviewee lived in the area 10 years or more) What do you think 
about the changes that your neighbourhood faced? 
18. Are you thinking about moving away? 
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19. Where would you like to move to? 
20. What kind of changes did Tarlabasi have during the years? 
21. Did you have any troubles with your neighbours? If you did can you describe 
them? 
22. Are you happy to live here and why? 
23. What kind of problems did you have while you are living here? 
24. What kind of neighbourhood do you think this neighbourhood will become? 
25. What are the main problems of Tarlabasi? 
26. Where do you apply for the problems that you face in the neighbourhood? 
(municipality, NGOs, shop owners) 
27. What do you think makes Tarlabasi special? 
28. Where did you hear the Tarlabasi urban renewal project? 
29. What kind of meetings would you expect from the institutions? (such as 
NGOs, municipality..etc.) 
30. What do you think about the renewal project? Why? 
31. Do you have anything else to add to the interview? 
For Tarlabasi Displacesss 
Information about the interviewee and household 
Name of the interviewee: 
Age of the interviewee: 
Where the interviewee is from: 
Number of family members the interviewee has: 
Education of the interviewee: 
Marital status of the interviewee: 
Ethnicity of the interviewee: 
First language of the interviewee: 
Current job of the interviewee: 
Whereabouts of the current job of the interviewee: 
Current jobs of the family members: 
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Whereabouts of the current jobs of the family members: 
Reasons of moving away from Tarlabasi? 
1. What was your job when you were living in Tarlabasi? 
2. Do you any family or friends still living in Tarlabasi? 
3. Why did you move to your current neighbourhood? 
Information about present accommodation 
4. How long does it take for you to get to your work place? 
5. Are you a tenant or the owner? 
6. How did you find this house? 
7. How long have you been living here? 
8. How do you feel about the district you are living in right now? 
9. Do you miss your previous neighbourhood? 
Present problems 
10. Are there any problems in the buildings that are impossible to deal with? 
11. Did you have any troubles with your neighbours? If you did can you describe 
them? 
12. What kind of problems did you have while you are living here? 
13. Who deals with the problems of the district? (municipality, NGOs, shop 
owners) 
14. What kind of neighbourhood do you think this neighbourhood will become? 
15. Are you considering yourself as a victim of gentrification? Why? 
16. What do you think about the renewal project? Why? 
17. Did the municipality or the state provide you with good life conditions? 
What do you think about this? 
18. What do you think makes Tarlabasi special? 
19. Do you have anything else to add to the interview? 
For the People in NGOs 
Tarlabasi 
1. Can you summarize the urban renewal project in Tarlabasi? 
2. What are the advantages and the disadvantages of the project? 
3. What do you think about the socio-economic situation of Tarlabasi?  
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4. How can you compare the current inhabitants and the potential future 
inhabitants of the neighbourhood? 
5. How do you think the housing market in Tarlabasi will be affected? 
6. Do you think the current inhabitants would be able to stay in Tarlabasi after 
the completion of the Project? Why? 
7. What do you think about the gentrification process in Tarlabasi? 
8. Was there any collaboration between NGOs and the municipality? What kind 
of collaboration was it? 
9. What kind of meetings were arranged in the neighbourhood during and about 
the Project? 
10. In your professional opinion, what can be done to avoid displacement in this 
area? 
11. If I tell you the aim of this research is to explore how the current inhabitants 
might be enabled to stay, how would you achieve this goal?  
Galata 
How do you think Galata changed throughout the years? 
What do you think about the displacement in Galata? 
How can you describe the gentrification process in Galata? 
For Academics 
Tarlabasi 
1. Can you summarize the urban renewal project in Tarlabasi? 
2. What the project has done in the neighbourhood? 
3. What do you think about the socio-economic situation of Tarlabasi? 
4. How do you think the housing market in Tarlabasi will be affected? 
5. Do you think the current inhabitants would be able to stay in Tarlabasi after 
the completion of the Project? Why? 
6. What do you think about the gentrification process in Tarlabasi? 
7. What do you think about the attitude of the municipality during the Project? 
8. What do you think about the NGOs work in the area? 
9. How much displacement have there been in Tarlabasi? 
10. According to your professional opinion, what kind of a project should have 
been implemented in the neighbourhood? 
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11. In your professional opinion, what can be done to avoid displacement in this 
area? 
12. If I tell you the aim of this research is to explore how the current inhabitants 
might be enabled to stay, how would you achieve this goal?  
Galata 
1. How do you think Galata changed throughout the years? 
2. What do you think about the displacement in Galata? 
3. How can you describe the gentrification process in Galata? 
	  
